tions will eliminate unnecessary duplication of aerospace tracking and cataloging facilities. It will help obtain optimum identification procedures. A single source for planning will also ensure that separate weapon systems, command and control systems, radars, or other sensing and guiding equipments are not procured to support parochial interests or for reasons stemming from lack of coordination. Savings in manpower and operating expenses go hand in hand with having a single commander of aerospace defense.

H

Single Over-all Direction of

the Offense and Defense

ERETOFORE we have discussed the need for single command of the strategic offensive force and for single command of the aerospace defensive force. Why, now, when considering the relationship between these two forces, will we speak of "close interaction" between them rather than advocate their union under a single commander? The answer lies in the fact that these forces are quite different functionally and hence do not lend themselves to union in a single active command. We shall see, however, that their activities are such as to require the very closest interaction under single over-all direction.

Although the detailed missions of offense and defense are not identical, the over-all objective of both is the same: to deter war, and, in the event hostilities eventuate, to defeat the enemy. In aerospace operations this common objective necessitates the very closest interaction between offense and defense in planning and execution.

In a sense, this need for interaction establishes an inseparable partnership between our strategic offensive forces and aerospace defense forces both in the deterrent role and during actual operations.

The main ingredient of our deterrent philosophy-the ability of our strategic offensive force to strike with war-winning strength-is characterized by diversification of weapon types and delivery means, by dispersed deployments, and by the ability to "go" when needed. Tactical warning, a defense responsibility, provides a basis for the "go" decision. Active elements of defense also interact with the offense in deterrence by preventing the enemy from mathematically calculating his chances of success. In other words, active defense prevents the "free ride." The existence of our defense compels the enemy to build greater numbers of more elaborate, complex, and costly strike weapons for overcoming it. All these factors raise the price of admission for the enemy, thus detracting from his own defensive efforts against our offensive forces. This detraction from his defense in turn increases the net deterrent capability of our strike forces.

Our offensive weapon systems must not be subject to losses through misdirected friendly defensive actions. Nor can we dilute the defensive strength of our over-all aerospace force by actions against friendly weapon systems. For example, by engaging and perhaps destroying friendly forces (possible if unidentified and within attacking range), our fighters or missiles would be

Another argument in favor of single command over all strategic offensive forces is the increasing urgency of constant, consistent evaluation and decision on the proper mix in our strategic aerospace forces. Consistent with a steady, maximum national posture, at what point in time and technological progress should the manned bomber relinquish the principal role in the force to the ballistic missile? When, to what extent, and how should the new space systems be integrated into the force? The security and the economy of the Nation may well depend on the answers.

helping the enemy. Or if our interceptors destroyed tanker aircraft returning to their bases to recycle and refuel other waves of our bombers, large gaps in our offense would result. This cannot be allowed to happen. Only very close interaction can prevent it.

The partnership between offense and defense that must exist needs single direction at a level above both forces. How time affects the offensive and defensive functions has been discussed. The same philosophy and rationale also apply to interaction between them. The need for common aerospace doctrine has long existed; the need for interlocking and simultaneous execution by separate functional forces of tasks based on common doctrine is only now coming to the fore. As the element of time shortens, many of the actions that combine to provide aerospace power must be performed all at once. The situation resembles a concert-only by playing their instrumental parts taken from the same score do all the musicians know what and when to play to achieve harmony instead of discord.

Today extensive plans exist among various offensive and defensive elements covering exit and recovery of strike forces. All these efforts are of the cooperation and coordination type. Months and even years are required to

reach agreements or to make changes. As reaction times shorten, so must the time required to make decisions. The answer lies in active and effective single over-all direction of strategic offensive and aerospace defensive forces at a level above the active command of each force.

A Look Further Ahead

M ILITARY organization and weapon requirements have always followed technology. This pattern will continue as new aircraft, missiles, and spacecraft are conceived and developed. Men resist change. It is natural to feel a sense of uneasiness when familiar equipment and familiar ways of doing things become obsolescent or obsolete. A real danger facing those responsible for over-all military organization and strategy is a misguided loyalty to the "good old days"-to past stages of our growth. Weapon systems have changed and will continue to change, and so must the organizational setup needed for winning the strategic offensive and for controlling aerospace.

As we progress further into the aerospace age it may become increasingly difficult to organize for separate military tasks with the degree of functional refinement now recognized and required. Operation of satellite communication systems, for example, will serve the entire community, and there will be extensive sharing between military and civilian agencies to prevent duplication and reduce costs.

There is a growing similarity in equipments being designed for different aerospace purposes. The Midas system is an excellent current example. In the near future one can envision requirements for manned and unmanned vehicles that are quite similar and perform many other space tasks, such as maintenance of equipment, transportation of personnel, and inspection of unidentified objects.

Ground command-and-control elements will be completely interlaced. Launch facilities for space vehicles will serve many civilian and military needs. Large boosters can be used with any number of different payloads. What does all this lead to? Is there a recognizable next step in organization beyond that previously discussed?

The attempt to answer reveals a challenging thought. Time is forcing greater interaction between military operating elements. Technology points to multipurpose equipments. Economy dictates prudent use of available. resources. Perhaps inevitably the answer will be a merger of strategic offense and aerospace defense into a single strategic organization. The logic is clear when, for instance, during hostilities it becomes only a delicate matter of timing whether interception and destruction of a hostile space object is by an offensive strike at its launch base or by a defensive action against it as an attacking target.

Headquarters Strategic Air Command

and

Headquarters Air Defense Command

Effective Aerospace Power

1.

Deterrence: The Hard Questions

BRIGADIER GENERAL NOEL F. PARRISH

HE WORD "deterrence" stems from the same root as the word "terror,"

Tand its basic meaning is to turn aside, restrain or discourage through

fear." The deterrent concept as it developed in this country and in England followed the meaning of the word. It was simply the idea of preventing an action by posing the threat of a counteraction.

Like many overworked abstractions the concept of deterrence has now served as a grindstone for many axes. Its consequent deformation has somehow escaped notice. A review of the rapid shifts in the meaning attached to this word over the past few years is revealing.

From the beginning, deterrence had to mean more than mere resistance. It meant a prepared riposte of sufficient strength to inspire fear. When the Soviets after 1946 began to add territory through the pressure of their huge armies, they had to be deterred by the threat of military reaction. They were certainly not vulnerable to a counterinvasion or to blockade. The only counteraction they had reason to fear was air action. Because the United States possessed atomic bombs in sufficient numbers and the aircraft to deliver them anywhere on the globe, this counterthreat of air action was fearful enough to "discourage" further conquests by land armies.

It was this situation that inspired Winston Churchill's famous statement on 31 March 1949:

I must not conceal from you the truth as I see it. It is certain that Europe would have been communized and London under bombardment some time ago but for the deterrent of the atomic bomb in the hands of the United States.

This was the most important early use of the word "deterrent" in the broad sense in which it was to be used in the succeeding ten years. Churchill's term was soon repeated in this country by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson in June 1949 at the National War College:

[air power] has passed through a period of adolescence to find maturity in a concept of strategic air bombardment. Thus the threat of instant retaliation through an air offensive has become one of the greatest deterrents to war today.

It is interesting that Johnson used the phrase "deterrents to war." Churchill had spoken of a deterrent to Communization as well as to war. Communization without war had occurred in the case of Czechoslovakia in

1947. But when the road to Berlin was blocked a year later, the United States firmly determined to counter the pressure of Red superiority on land and immediately moved two squadrons of B-29's to England. This was the first overseas deployment of an important segment of U.S. power, other than occupation forces, since World War II. Mr. James Forrestal, then Secretary of Defense, explains very clearly in his published diary how completely dependent were the United States and the Free World on this counter to the threatened Communization of Berlin. Czechoslovakia had been lost without war; Berlin had been saved without war. So Churchill's reference to a deterrent against a Communist takeover was more accurate than Johnson's "deterrent to war."

Churchill, rather than Johnson, was again proved right when war was necessary to prevent a Communist takeover of South Korea. This event made it clear that our deterrent must be more than simply a deterrent to war. Certainly the Communists had no intention of getting into a war with the United States in South Korea. All they wanted was South Korea. President Truman surprised them when he decided that military force must be used if necessary to keep them from having it. As Churchill had indicated, deterrence was already a far more complicated problem than just deterrence of war. We were somehow deterred from using our most effective weapons while the Communists were not deterred from employing their unlimited manpower.

AFTER the beginning of the Korean War it was the practice to say that atomic weapons were a "deterrent to World War III." A considerable war was being fought, and these weapons were not being used. "Deterrence" had become a popular word, so it was not abandoned. Instead, its meaning was narrowed. General Hoyt Vandenberg stated at a Senate hearing in May 1951 that "the United States Air Force had, in my opinion, prevented the enlargement of the Korean conflict into World War III."

The dread of atomic war had already risen to such a point that the nonatomic "conflict" seemed relatively unimportant. The dread continued to rise, and it prevented the use of atomic weapons to save the French in northern Indo-China. This second failure to use the atomic weapon to prevent stalemate or defeat in conventional warfare led Denis Healy, a prominent member of the British Parliament, to summarize the matter neatly:

It cannot be denied that the deterrent value of atomic striking power has seriously depreciated through the West's proved reluctance to use it. From the experience of the last five years, it would appear that a general threat of atomic retaliation may well invite the Com. munists to prove Western intentions by local military adventures.

Nevertheless after the defeat in Indo-China was written off at the Geneva Conference, it faded from public consciousness. The old theory that nuclear bombs are a deterrent to "war," per se, was revived. This revival was a necessary outgrowth of Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson's doctrine of "more bang for a buck" and his tendency to boast of the increased power of a reduced Air Force. Wilson's claim of increased effectiveness