compromise China voluntarily issued a proclamation to the effect that she would not alienate any portion of her coastline or islands off the coast to any Power. Among the demands that were rejected by China, on the ground that they were an infringement of her independence, was one that the political, military, and financial advisers of the Chinese Government should be Japanese, and another that Japan should control the munitions industry in China. There were certain aspects of some of the demands that would have aroused general attention, if their presentation had not synchronised with a grave crisis in the military operations then being carried on by the Powers principally concerned. These it is not essential to discuss at the present moment.

Undoubtedly Japan has been enabled, as a result of the opportunities offered by the war, greatly to strengthen her position in the Far East as against other Powers. Though she has not yet been able to secure recognition of her right to take control in China, she has entrenched herself impregnably in South Manchuria, and has succeeded in beginning in Eastern Inner Mongolia, Shantung and Fukien the process which, if no interruption occurs, will eventually bring these regions virtually as much under her control as is South Manchuria to-day. The demands which China rejected in 1915, because their acceptance would have involved an impairment of her independence, have not been withdrawn. In the ultimatum presented to China in May 1915, the Japanese Government stated, in regard to these demands, that it will undertake to detach Group V (which included the demands objected to) from the present negotiations and discuss it separately in the future.' There is more than a possibility that the demands will be presented again.

Since 1902 China has remained an independent State because her independence is guaranteed by international agreements to which she is not a party; and she is no better able to-day to maintain her independence by her own unaided efforts than she was when the original Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed. That was the first undertaking by foreign Powers to assume responsibility for the preservation of China's independence; and it is of interest to note that the last affirmation of this

altruistic resolve was made in the revised Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1911. The expression 'altruistic resolve should, perhaps, be modified. The Powers which have guaranteed China's independence have to some extent been actuated by altruism, but the main consideration has been the knowledge that there would be terrible potentialities for evil involved in permitting any one Power to gain control in China. The same motives that dictated a policy that permitted the Sick Man of Europe to linger on and by contagion disseminate his disease are operative in regard to China. But conditions may change; and the possibility has to be faced by the Chinese that the nations who have hitherto preserved her independence may decide that their interests would be better served if they relieved themselves of their self-imposed responsibility. Those who voluntarily place a burden of responsibility upon their shoulders have an unquestionable right to throw it off. The course of events during the last two years has shown that the trend of opinion in Japan is towards undertaking in China the work that has been efficiently performed in Korea. The Japanese believe that it is futile to expect that China will reform herself, and that, until she is reformed, her weakness is a constant provocation to adventure on the part of other nations. They believe, therefore, that, in the interests of the whole world, and in the interests of the Chinese themselves, it would be well if the nation received the protection and guidance that Japan is willing to extend.

The question whether Japan should be suffered to take in hand the reformation of China is a problem that calls for consideration at the earliest possible moment by the Powers possessing important political and commercial interests in China. Of these Powers Great Britain is most deeply concerned. It is not too much to say that Great Britain opened China to the world's trade. Her own trade with China at the present moment is greater than that of any of the other Powers, including Japan; and her investments in the country greatly exceed those of any other nation. She has every right to expect that those interests will continue to increase in volume and value if China, as an independent nation, adopts a policy of reform and progress and makes a genuine endeavour to carry it out. Would her interests be as

efficiently protected and as likely to increase if the reformation of China were allowed to pass into the hands of a nation which is a political friend but a commercial rival? Very grave consideration would be necessary before an answer could be returned to the question by Great Britain or by the other commercial Powers. The only thing that would reconcile them to such a course would be a conclusive demonstration by the Chinese people of their unfitness to govern themselves. If it be given, then it is to be feared that, with sincere regret, the Treaty Powers will be compelled to place the destinies of the people of China in the hands either of one of their own number, or of an International Commission. By the time the Peace Conference assembles in Europe, it will be known if China has shown herself worthy to retain the honour and responsibility of nationhood. In any case the Great Powers will have to take her condition into consideration, and to discover a fundamental solution of the Far Eastern problem. This problem, however, though it centres in China, cannot be solved solely by the settlement of the question whether China is to remain independent. A question of much graver importance from a non-Chinese point of view-is involved.

The record of the past four years is not one in which any patriotic Chinese can feel satisfaction. Domestic politics have largely consisted of futile strife over non-essentials. Little has been done in the direction of reform. In the sphere of foreign relationships China has lost ground instead of gaining it. Although, on the whole, the negotiations with Japan in reference to the demands presented in January 1915 came to a satisfactory conclusion than seemed likely, the Republic has loosened its grip upon vast areas of the heritage of the Manchus. Chinese who have any real love for their country have now to brace themselves to face the fact that there is imminent danger that China may lose her independence. They must realise that she is in danger of being bereft of that priceless possession because North and South have hitherto shown partisanship when they should have displayed patriotism. Though the sands are rapidly running out, there may be still time for them to unite their forces to save the country.

If the South would abandon the belief that the

traditions and habits of mind sanctioned by centuries can be demolished by a political formula, they would probably be met half-way by the North, who now understand that too abrupt an application of the brake is likely to wreck the state chariot. It has been seen that both North and South have had their day of triumph and their night of defeat. The South, who have tactically triumphed in the last trial of strength, should show that they have profited by their misfortunes by rendering cooperation possible. This can be done by refraining from attempting to impose terms whose acceptance by the North would be an admission of defeat. The fabrication of a constitution that would apportion power to the Executive and the Legislature on the lines adopted by the United States of America should be at once effected. Both political parties should remember that China is standing at the cross-ways of Fate. One path leads to national extinction with, possibly, individual prosperity; the other to national salvation. Into the first she may elect to turn, in which case she will find that the goal is speedily reached in accordance with the immutable law that, with equal momentum and frictional retardation, bodies descend more rapidly than they ascend. The road to national salvation slopes abruptly upward; it is strewn with obstacles; and unfailing patience, perseverance and patriotism are necessary if the goal is to be won. Has China these qualities developed to a degree that will inspire her, if the choice be still open to her, to face fearlessly and hopefully the rough and wearisome journey that must be accomplished before she gains the purer atmosphere breathed by free nations? To the future must be left the answer, but well-wishers of China will fervently hope that the hour of opportunity has not yet passed, and that the world will be spared the mournful spectacle of the loss of nationality by four hundred millions of people.

F. LIONEL PRATT.

1. The Political Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke. By H. W. C. Davis. London: Constable, 1914.

2. Politik. By Heinrich von Treitschke. Translated by Blanche Dugdale and Torben de Bille. Two vols. London: Constable, 1915.

In order that a book may deserve serious attention, many people suppose that it must possess some intrinsic merit. In respect of books, however, which express opinions and principles, this is by no means the case. Such books may be expositions of abject or flagrant fallacies, and yet deserve, for that very reason, not neglect but attention, if it happens that they are taken seriously by any large number of people, and have any marked effect on their corporate mood and actions. It cannot be said that Treitschke is a mere prophet of fallacies; but his chief claim to the serious attention of Englishmen is to be found in those parts of his writings which embody not truths, but errors; for it is these which, after his death, have made him what he has notoriously become-the leader of everything in the national thought of Germany, by which the Germans have now distinguished themselves from all other civilised nations. In the political teachings of Treitschke, curiously blended with elements of a very different character, is to be found the intellectual apology for every savage doctrine which stains the pages of the German Military Handbook, for the repudiation of treaties as so many scraps of paper, for the sinking of the 'Lusitania,' for the mutilation of children, for the infection of a nation with the temper of an angry animal. An indictment of this kind must be made with proper discrimination, for else it would be a mere reproduction of the temper which it imputes to others. Those special parts of his teaching which represent the present content of the national temper of Germany must be carefully isolated from the rest, and examined on their own merits.

We welcome, therefore, the two works now before us, one of them being a complete translation of the series of political lectures which made Treitschke famous in