newcomers formed a striking contrast. It was a German who drew the first plans for underground water supply; a German constructed the paving of Bucarest in 1824-1826, another the first hotel in the European style in 1829, another the first technical school for wood and metal workers in 1840; the first telegraph line was built during the Austrian occupation of 1854-56; a German organised the postal service, while yet another built the first Rumanian railway in the later sixties.

Their sense of order and discipline, their genius for organisation, their energy and perseverance could not fail to compel respect and appreciation. But this was all. The two nations differ too widely in spirit for German influence to penetrate deeper. The German writer whom I have already quoted, and who is well acquainted with the situation in Rumania, feels bound to recognise that 'respect for everything German has visibly increased-but not love.' It is striking that in a country where, in certain classes of society, French is more widely and better spoken than Rumanian, and French literature better known than Rumanian, the import of German books by far surpasses that of French books. In 1904 the customs statistics show an import of 84,216 and 42,760 kilograms respectively. In literary matters mere weight, it is needless to say, is no reliable criterion; but in this case the fact is that the French books imported consist mostly of novels and light literature, whereas scientific books form the majority of the German import. And this correctly represents the general situation. In matters literary and those in which taste is supreme the Rumanians pay homage to the French; in matters of business or those in which reason prevails, they appreciate the Germans. There is something dramatic in the fact that, in a country whose whole civilisation has been built up upon French ideas and ideals, a Rumanian historian and nationalist politician, Prof. Jorga, should have been able to write-and, bitter irony, in the leading French paper of Bucarest, 'L'Indépendance Roumaine '-that no one but a Frenchman can doubt that for a people at the beginning of its civilisation German influence is better, saner, and more

E. Fischer, op. cit., p. 330.

serious than French influence.' The only literary association which has exercised a more than ephemeral influence upon Rumanian life was the 'Junimea,' founded in Jassy, in 1865, by a group of brilliant young men educated in Germany. From it sprang the advanced Conservative party whose members are known as 'Junimishti'; and it is significant to find some of its founders and most distinguished members (MM. Carp, Maiorescu, etc.) voicing now that part of Rumanian public opinion which shows pro-German sympathies.

Leaving aside the purely economic and financial intrusion, how is it that, notwithstanding the deep divergence between the German and Rumanian points of view, Deutschtum has so freely developed in the Danubian kingdom? Firstly, because the spiritual life of the country was in its infancy and readily responsive to the maturer influence which Germany alone chose to exert. Secondly-and here I must repeat that the Austrians form the large majority of the Germanic population of Rumania-because the various German associations have set themselves the task of creating a 'spiritual home for the numerous German colonists, and of giving those natives who desire it the opportunity of getting into touch with German civilisation, while refraining generally from making this connexion oppressive or from interfering in Rumanian affairs.

The preceding pages will have illustrated sufficiently the extent to which Rumania is tied to Germany. But it is just because Germany is in the position to exert much influence in Rumania that, from the moment when this influence becomes oppressive, and in proportion as it is felt to be so, the reaction against it will set in. From the point of view of economic relations, Rumania was free fifty years ago to choose her friend; but only one hand was stretched out, and, whether she liked the feel of it or not, Rumania had to accept it. That hand now grips her fast, nor can she, however desirous, loosen its clasp unaided.

The present situation in the Near East proves only too clearly how unfortunate were the policies of France and England in the past. The complete abandonment of the south-eastern European states to the action of German politics has meant not only the loss of an

errors.

economic market for French and English goods, but also of a political nursery for French and English democratic ideals. Consider the following striking contrast. Notwithstanding their existing liberal constitutions, the crown can wield an almost autocratic power in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece, two of which are under German dynasties, while all have been subjected to strong German influence. Serbia, on the other hand, which is ruled by native princes and has always been loth to submit to Teutonic intrusion, has remained, in spite of difficulties of government, a true democratic polity. There is now undoubtedly an opportunity of making good past Rumania will the more gladly welcome such a change, as her place in the lap of the Central Powers, with Bulgaria sitting on her knees, must be at once uncomfortable and not a little alarming. But there is one point which the Allies must not overlook. The great difficulty in dealing with Rumania is her situation with regard to Russia. What the policy of Russia will be in the future no one can predict. But it is clear that Rumania's position is very delicate; politically, because she would never be able to withstand a pressure from the North; economically, because she depends for her trade upon the Black Sea and the Straits. In these circumstances she must either be made secure against Russia, or she will of necessity, and with no other possible alternative, grow to depend more and more upon the Central Powers. This would mean-the considerations applying with equal force to the other south-eastern European states-a definite step towards the realisation of that Teutonic conception of 'Mitteleuropa' which we may now hope will never become a fact.

D. MITRANY.

Art. 6.-EGYPT AND PALESTINE.

1. Zionism and the Jewish Future. By various writers. Edited by H. Sacher. Murray, 1916.

2. Palästina-Handbuch. By Davis Trietsch. Third edition. Berlin: Jüdischer Verlag, 1912.

3. The Anglo-Palestine Company.

An Account of the Work of the Bank and its Branches during the years 1903-1913. London: 1913.

4. Diplomatic and Consular Reports: Turkey. (1) On the Trade and Commerce of Beirut and the Coast of Syria; (2) On the Trade of the Consular District of Jerusalem. Reports for the Year 1913; Nos. 5302, 5339.

5. Die Jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas. Eine Volkswirtschaftliche Untersuchung ihrer Grundlagen. By Curt Nawratzki. Munich: Reinhardt, 1914.

6. The Wilderness of Zin. By C. L. Woolley and T. E.. Lawrence. Palestine Exploration Fund, 1915.

7. Fifty Years' Work in the Holy Land. A Record and a Summary, 1865-1915. By Sir C. M. Watson. Pal. Expl. Fund, 1915.

8. Recent Jewish Progress in Palestine. By Henrietta Szold. Philadelphia: Jewish Publ. Society, 1915. 9. Palestine and the Powers. By F. G. Jannaway. Birmingham: Walker, 1915.

AT intervals during the past eighteen months the attention of the British public has been bestowed more intently than had for long previously been the case upon Egypt; and, almost for the first occasion since the Suez Canal became a British interest, its safety has been a matter of concern. In England the security of the Canal and of Egypt had been taken generally as a matter of course. This, however, was not the case on the Continent, as is shown by the following quotation from a recent work by Dr Paul Rohrbach, only one of many continental publicists who have devoted their attention to the Near East:

'A direct attack upon England across the North Sea is out of the question; the prospect of a German invasion of England is a fantastic dream. It is necessary to discover another combination in order to hit England in a vulnerable spot-and here we come to the point where the relationship of

Germany to Turkey, and the conditions prevailing in Turkey, become of decisive importance for German foreign policy, based as it now is upon watchfulness in the direction of England.... England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from Europe only in one place-Egypt. The loss of Egypt would mean for England not only the end of her dominion over the Suez Canal and of her connexions with India and the Far East, but would probably entail the loss also of her possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan power, like Turkey, would also imperil England's hold over her sixty million Mohammedan subjects in India, besides prejudicing her relations with Afghanistan and Persia. Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until she is mistress of a developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria, and until, through the progress of the Anatolian Railway to Baghdad, she is in a position to withstand an attack by England upon Mesopotamia. . . . The stronger Turkey grows, the more dangerous does she become for England. . . . Egypt is a prize which for Turkey would be well worth the risk of taking sides with Germany in a war with England. The policy of protecting Turkey, which is now pursued by Germany, has no other object but the desire to effect an insurance against the danger of a war with England.'*

Dr Rohrbach rightly emphasises the importance to the British Empire, not so much of Egypt-although the control of this great country is an asset the value of which it is not easy to overrate-as of the Suez Canal. The principal British interest in the Eastern Mediterranean is, in fact, the safeguarding of the shortest route to India and the Far East. Egypt is of course of great value to the Empire, but the Canal is of still greater. The Empire could continue to live and to flourish without Egypt, provided that the free passage through the Canal were safeguarded. If, however, that were lost, the two halves of the Empire would be severed from one another. In these days, when time is so essential a factor in all military matters, the duration of a voyage from Gibraltar or Malta to the Persian Gulf or Bombay by way of the Cape, which would take twice as long as one from Toulon or Trieste by the Canal, must prove a

* Dr Paul Rohrbach, 'Die Bagdadbahn.' Second edition. Berlin: 1911. Pp. 18, 19. The italics are Dr Rohrbach's.