assure you, 'is first of all an offensive defence, effected through submarines and torpedo-boats, using the coast fortifications as a base.' Furthermore, if I am to believe some of my informants, those people who think that the German fleet lies inactive in the Kiel Canal are entirely wrong. It is continually on the watch, and its ships are day and night in the North Sea, often as far out as a hundred miles. It is guarding Germany's coast, and here follows the description of how it is done. Draw a circle, with Heligoland as its centre, the circumference passing through the Island of Sylt off the Schleswig-Holstein coast and Borkum off that of Friesland. The outer semicircle, having a radius of about 60 miles, is patrolled by torpedo-boats which are on guard, day and night; and they will report at once any enemy war-ships that may venture near. Behind this line of patrols comes a cordon of fast cruisers, to give the 'thin black line' a firm background. Finally a third line of defence is formed by armoured cruisers, which act as a reserve and a support for the cruisers and torpedo-boats. The object of these three lines of defence is to engage and hold back any attacking enemy, until the Grand Battle-fleet-which naturally must remain safely in harbour, protected from submarine attacks-has had time to appear on the scene. In addition to these offensive lines of defence, every channel leading to the various harbours is protected by mines and submarines.

We may next examine the immobile and less elusive lines of German defence, viz. its coast batteries and forts. The Jade Bay, with Wilhelmshaven, is protected by 13 or 14 almost impregnable forts, apart from that on Wangeroog, at the mouth of the Ems-Jade Canal. The surrounding country is flat and marshy, and no attempt has been made in most cases to mask the forts. A strategical railroad encircles the bay, starting at Eckwarden and terminating at the Frederick lock opposite the island of Spiekeroog. Wilhelmshaven is a veritable fortress in itself, surrounded by smaller forts and supporting batteries. Across the bay the four guns of the battery at Eckwarden show their heavy muzzles, while still further east, in the very centre of the mouth of the Weser, lie the twin forts, Langlütjen 1 and 2. Bremerhaven, again, is a large fortress, supported by the

batteries of Forts Geestemünde and Lehe, and several forts along the channel. There are a number of forts from Lehe along the coast as far as Cuxhaven, which is another important defensive centre. At this point the Elbe fortifications begin; and, as is the case at Jade, both sides of the bay are dotted with batteries and forts, from Cuxhaven to Stade, and from Glückstadt to Plattenbronne. Brunsbüttel, about 1 mile west of the Kiel Canal entrance, is a separate and strongly armed fort.

The ordnance of Germany's coast-defence system con sists of the heaviest Krupp armament, as well as lighter guns, the calibres ranging from 17 inch to 47. At Wilhelmshaven, at Forts 1 and 2 Langlütjen, at Cuxhaven, and, I believe but am not certain, at Wangeroog as well, the 17-inch howitzers predominate. The calibres most in use are 10 and 11 inch. Many of these guns are mounted on movable platforms, placed in the centre of heavy steel railroad trucks, strong enough, it seemed to me, to carry a whole house. The guns themselves are protected by a sort of cupola of 'Gruson plate.' When not in use they are stationed in special garages. Now I knew the purpose of all these short lines and connecting railroads. If a concerted attack on any point of the coast should be undertaken, these railway batteries can be moved rapidly to the place where they are most needed.

The 'Gruson plate' protected cupolas and turrets are a formidable and interesting feature of Germany's coastdefence system. Experiments with this armour-plate have shown that it is practically impervious to gun-fire. At the Krupps' offices in Berlin there are certain official reports from the Italian Government concerning the tests to which Gruson plates have been submitted. A plate, weighing nearly 200,000 pounds and intended for an Italian coastal battery, was fired upon at pointblank range by a 100-ton Armstrong gun, using Krupp steel shells. Three shots were fired at it, each projectile weighing 2200 pounds and requiring a powder charge of nearly 800 pounds. It stood the test faultlessly, and the only damage inflicted on it were four or five small cracks, varying from 2 to 4 inches in length. The steel shells that struck the plate splintered in hundreds of bits, which were so hot that they set fire to the surrounding woodwork. I have seen those Italian reports, and I have no

reason to doubt their authenticity. If an Armstrong gun of such calibre, firing steel shells at pointblank range, is unable to destroy that armour plate, there seems small chance that a shell, whatever its size, fired from a necessarily considerable distance by a ship's gun, will make any impression at all. The batteries of every fort of any importance both on the Baltic and the North Sea are protected by this armour-plate.

The cupolas contain mostly 8.2-inch guns, and the turrets the 10, 11 and larger calibres. In naval and other well-informed German circles they are convinced that there is no British Admiral living who would risk his ships against such batteries.

I was in Germany when the first attempt to force the Dardanelles was made. Naturally, the whole plan was dismissed as incapable of execution. Every naval or military officer, with whom I talked, was convinced that the Narrows could never be forced by a naval attack. I was told that, shortly after Turkey entered the war, one of the first things Germany saw to was that the batteries of the Narrows forts were strengthened and protected by Gruson armour-plates. Whether this assertion is true or not I have not been able to ascertain; but, if true, it partly explains the comparatively small damage caused by the bombarding fleets. The average German naval officer is an ardent admirer and student of the late Admiral Mahan's doctrines. His writings are frequently quoted, especially when the possibilities of a British attack on the German North Sea coast are discussed. On the strength of his conclusions they insist that no ship has any chance against a modern fort.

As an illustration of the advantages possessed by coast batteries over ships, I was shown a copy of an official report from the French Admiralty, concerning certain experiments made in 1914. For three days a number of French battleships, using their heaviest guns, fired on several shore batteries placed at different elevations. The result of the trial proved that, even under the most adverse conditions, only about 50 per cent. of the personnel serving the shore batteries would have been injured, while hardly 30 per cent. of the guns could have been placed out of action. And,' my informants added, 'the French have no armour-plate that can compare with Vol. 226.-No. 448.

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our Gruson.' Inquiries as to why they did not use this kind of armour-plate to protect their ships brought forth the information that it is too heavy for that purpose.

At a luncheon given at the Hotel Esplanade in Berlin by an American acquaintance of mine, I met Herr Crass, Krupps' General Representative in Berlin. Herr Crass, who has his palatial offices in the Voss Strasse, occupies one of the most important posts in the Krupp organisation. He is the official intermediary between his firm and the German War Office. I had several long conversations with him, and found him one of the most pleasant and interesting Germans I met. Shortly after our meeting I dropped in at his office and found him much incensed over a report, published in some of the Allied papers, stating that a Krupp gun, sold to the Argentine Government, had burst. It is a falsehood of the first order,' he protested. Never in all the years that we have been building guns, has there been a case of a burst Krupp cannon. If the proper charges of explosives are used it is simply impossible.'

One of his chief arguments against the possibility of a burst Krupp gun seemed to be that the barrel is made of one solid piece of Crucible nickel steel.' 'Compare this with the British Woolwich-built guns,' he continued. 'The barrels of these guns consist of several parts. First there is the rifling, which is fitted in an inner tube. Over this comes a wire covering, consisting of steel sheet ribbon wound round the inner tube at a very high pressure. Finally there comes the outer tube which covers the whole. Our guns of 12, 14 and 15-inch calibres have a life more than three times longer than the equivalent guns of the British Navy. These guns can deliver close on two hundred and thirty rounds, while British-built guns are hardly good for more than sixty rounds for the 12 and 133-inch calibre, and eighty rounds for their 15-inch.'

The proviso of 'proper explosives' brought us to discuss the comparative merits of the powders used by Germany and England. Here too Herr Crass claimed superiority for the German product. The British powder, so he said, contained ingredients which are very hard on the guns, tending to destroy the rifling. The German powder, containing 25 per cent. nitro-glycerin (for their

heavy calibres), is supposed to be far preferable to the British cordite charges. Their powder (meaning the British) is in a large degree responsible for the comparatively short life of their big guns. Apart from the damage it does to the rifling, it causes cracks and abrasions in both the inner and the outer tubes, long before the allowed maximum is reached. Naturally this causes great inaccuracy of fire.' I thought of the 'inaccuracy' of the British guns in the Falkland Islands battle, the Doggerbank affair, and other occasions when there was an opportunity of testing them, but I merely asked why, if the British powder had all those bad qualities, did the British stick to it? Ah! there were several reasons. In the first place it seems (according to my informant) less expensive to renew the guns than it would be to change all the British powder factories; in the second place the British powder is the safest and keeps best of any in the world; and finally, England, being firstly a Naval Power, calculates on quick results in a pitched battle. In other words, a decision would be reached long before the big guns had fired their maximum number of rounds. It is characteristic of every German to-day to place financial considerations always nearest to the British heart.

I was treated to some interesting details regarding the efficiency of the German naval gunner. At a recent gun-practice of the 'Helgoland' (a battleship of 23,000 tons, mounting twelve 12-inch guns) one of these guns, firing a projectile of 981 lbs., struck a moving target, six miles distant, six times in 58 seconds! She also delivered six broadsides (eight guns) in one minute at a moving target some eight miles off and hardly visible with the naked eye. More than two-thirds (over 5,000 lbs.) of each broadside hit the target. Those amongst my readers who are not au courant with the many accomplishments of a 12-inch gun should ask one of their naval friends, and then they will learn what wonders these German gunners are. It is usually understood that two, perhaps at the utmost three shots a minute from a 12-inch gun is the limit. Another record is said to be held by this ship. I was told that at a competition held in March 1915 she coaled 756 tons in one hour. But of course Germany is a surprising country!