DLA and these other agencies, for whatever criticisms there are about efficiencies, I think we need to continue them. Perhaps, they could be cut back a little bit in terms of overhead, the way we have done in the Army staff. I have cut the Army staff 2 years running now, and I think some of that could be done.

The last point that was asked in the letter dealt with the area of Special Operations Forces. And, I would just comment, Mr. Chairman, that the Army has made substantial progress in building the Special Operations Forces. We have grown in the past 3 years from something on the order of 19,000 up to 24,000 personnel in Special Operations Forces. The budget has grown from about $250 million to over one-half a billion dollars, and it is well above that if we add black programs. So there has been great progress in building strength into Special Operating Forces. Were the Congress to say we want to create a special agency run by civilians that handles all of SOF, I think we would be making a mistake in terms of solid support for the joint commanders.

The final point I leave with you, Mr. Chairman, concerns the Senate Armed Services Committee draft reorganization bill. I have looked at that bill; we have had discussions with the leadership of the committee, and we testified before the committee. I would like to insert in the record here my formal statement before that committee, and also a letter that I sent to Chairman Goldwater, which covered four basic concerns that I feel are important with regard to that draft Senate bill.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I leave one last thought with you. You spoke of yourself and your history as a second lieutenant years ago. I have given my life, 36 years, to the U.S. Army. I take my responsibilities in this area of testimony as probably the most important contribution of my whole service. I give to you and to the Senate the best advice I can give you. I am not parochial, and I am not defending something that is going to affect my life in the Army, because these changes that you will legislate will be beyond my time. Someone else will have to live with them. So, I have tried to be as honest as I can. I am giving you my best advice, and to the individual members that I have spoken with, the best advice that I can give by the law and by my length of service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify during your review of our Nation's defense organization.

My personal views are based on broad joint experience. For 14 of the past 18 years I have served in joint assignments including duty as Director of the Joint Staff, Senior Military Executive to the Secretary of Defense, and CINC of the combined as well as unified command in the Republic of Korea. Also, I attended the Armed Forces Staff College and the National War College. Thus, I understand from a variety of perspectives many of the problems which are reviewed in the SASC's staff report, and which also have led to changes proposed in the House bill on Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS] reorganization. I support most of the changes in the House bill. One provision I do not agree with concerns the Deputy Chairman which I shall dis

cuss later.

I have been a strong supporter of reform, but reform that is evolutionary rather than drastic in nature. Late last year, the House passed a JCS reorganization bill that originated in this subcommittee and reflected, in many respects, your understanding that radical reorganization would be harmful to the Nation's security. I am encouraged that as we draw closer to achievement of a Defense Reorganization Act,

Members of both Houses of the Congress appear to be taking care to insure that we preserve proven institutions, solve actual rather than alleged shortcomings while taking into account the significant improvements already undertaken by the JCS themselves, and, in the end, realize an improved defense establishment.

In your letter to Secretary Weinberger, you asked that we come prepared to discuss a number of detailed questions in five areas. In his brief statement, I would like to share some general views with you on each in order to set the stage for later discussion.

As to the unified and specified commands, the JCS initiated a full review of the basic joint publication-JCS Pub 2-dealing with the organization, responsibilities, and authority of our combatant commands. JCS Pub 2 is a comprehensive document-the cornerstone of joint action for the JCS, the services, and the combatant commands. The CINC's are included in our review, and you will receive a report on the results from Secretary Weinberger.

I would not want to prejudice that review with any comments I make today. Nonetheless, I think it is important to tell you that many of the proposals advanced, especially those that give the CINC's more authority in the administrative, logistic, and budget areas, must be carefully weighed against the primary purpose for which the CINC's were established, namely to provide unified, operational command over forces assigned from the services in order to accomplish military missions. As you know, the CINC's focus is, and must remain, operational warfighting and not the full range of support and administrative functions that are the proper burden of the services and military departments. The CINC's have full operational command over forces assigned to them which gives them substantial power and authority over resources, quality of people, organization of forces, and activities of component commands.

You must consider in any proposal that tasks the combatant commanders with support or programming functions how much of their time and energies as well as that of their staffs will be spent on non-warfighting tasks, rather than on their operational responsibilities involving joint and coalition forces. Moreover, the services are accountable to the Congress among other things for total program development, for balance between near term and long term requirements, and for integration of world-wide national security needs. CINC's on the other hand focus on near term regional requirements of force sustainability and readiness. Thus, giving CINC's greater authority over programming and resources could emphasize near term regional interests at the expense of long term total requirements and blur the services' responsibilities as well as accountability for overall program integration and balance.

It is important to take full account of the substantial roles Secretary Weinberger and the JCS have given the CINC's in recent years to insure that their warfighting requirements are fully considered by the services, OSD, and the Congress. The current defense resources board process is the most comprehensive review of budget issues and involves the CINC's more thoroughly than any other process I've seen in all my years in the Pentagon. In short, I do not believe we should encumber the CINC's with authority in the administrative, logisitics, or budget/program areas. Your second area of concern had to do with the quality of officers who perform joint duty.

The Army always has tried to provide officers of recognized competence to joint assignments. Particularly to the Joint Staff. Joint Staff officers frequently exceed the norms found inside our own service. For example, for three years 100 percent of the eligible Army majors on the Joint Staff were selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel. Repeated tours of duty in the joint arena strengthen the careers of Army officers. Guidance to promotion boards makes this point very clearly.

Toward the goal of upgrading Joint Staff quality, I support giving authority to the Chairman to specify the qualifications needed by the officers on the Joint Staff. Last year the Office of the Secretary of Defense prepared a House-directed report of the proposal for a joint duty specialty. I support the report's conclusion that a joint skill identifier would be preferable. Joint billets generally require functional specialists with solid, current service backgrounds, not simply those who have had joint duty or joint education.

Regarding proposals to consolidate staffs within the military departments, let me say that I support the views Secretary Marsh gave you. The Secretary and I share a very close working relationship. Virtually every day he and I consult on departmental matters. I seek his views and decisions on all key matters. I also keep him informed on actions of the JCS which impact on the Army. I do not see confusion in the role of the Secretary or in my responsibilities to him under statute and DOD directives. Nor do I see any significant advantages to be achieved through full-scale

consolidation of our staffs. The Army secretariat now has about 370 members. Consequently, while some further consolidation may be possible, I do not recommend merger of the staffs.

Regarding defense agencies, it is important to note that they have developed largely as a result of efforts to improve management and to improve program as well as budget visibility over functional activities, this also assists in wartime support of the CINC's. While these functional activities, such as communications or logistics could be split among the service departments, or could be given to a single service department as executive agent, it is not clear that management efficiency would be better than exists with the current defense agencies. Several of the real benefits of defense agencies lies in their jointness which derives in part from manning with personnel from the services, and from the fact that the agencies must participate fully in the defense resources board process which assures solid program visibility in terms of balance, support to the service and CINC's, and efficiency.

All of this is not to say, however, that further efficiencies cannot be made in existing defense agencies. Just as we have done with cuts in the Army staff over the past two years, some consolidation of effort and further manpower efficiencies probably could be made. I do not support the House bill that would eliminate the Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Contract Auditing Agency, both of which achieve efficiencies in performing needed common functions for the services. It would be particularly harmful to disestablish these agencies and cause the services to reassure their functions with no increase in manpower.

I also do not support the proposal to create a new special operations agency. Great progress has been made in recent years in strengthening the special operation forces. Army SOF (total Army) have grown from a strength of 19,500 in 1982 to 24,200 in the 1987 budget, and resource allocations have grown from $254 million dollars in 1982 to $552 million dollars in the 1987 budget. We have organized a special operations command under a major general to assure solid oversight to SOF programs and operational activities. Thus a new agency is not needed given the initiatives taken within DOD in recent years to improve special operations capabilities. The creation of such an agency, in my view, could complicate SOF wartime support to the CINC's and detract from service responsibilities as well as accountability for strengthening SOF capabilities.

I have shared my views on the SASC draft reorganization bill in a letter which I would be happy to provide for the record. The draft bill was an improvement on the extensive report published by the SASC staff last October, particularly with regard to the JCS provisions. However, the bill contained a number of provisions that I believe would be less than helpful. For example, while enhancing the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which I support, it did not sufficiently provide for the retention of the corporate nature of the JCS or of their advice. I would hope that the final bill would make clear the Chairman's responsibility to consult with the JCS and to carry out his duties on behalf of the corporate body.

The final bill also should permit the JCS to retain the current practice of quarterly rotation among the chiefs of the role of Acting Chairman. I have worked with other practices when I was director of the Joint Staff and Senior Military Executive to the Secretary of Defense. The Acting Chairman's role requires that the service chiefs become more deeply involved in joint affairs and the national security decision making process. Fulfilling this important responsibility has made me a better service chief and a better member of the JCS, leading I believe to providing better military advice for our superiors, to support better the CINC's, and to more "jointness." If we are serious about making the JCS more joint, and I know we are, then the Acting Chairman's role is a crucial element in the maturation process.

Increased duties of the Chairman may make it advisable to assign him a Vice Chairman. I supported this concept six years ago during my tenure as director of the Joint Staff, but I did not then, nor do I now, advocate that the Vice Chairman replace the CJCS during his absence. A Vice Chairman, for the reasons cited above, should not become Acting Chairman in the Chairman's absence, but he could aid very considerably the Chairman in such areas as enhancing the Joint Staff's capabilities to review contingency planning; to perform resource analysis; to formulate planning, programming, and budgeting recommendations; and to work with the CINC's staffs on their resource priorities, additionally. He could head the joint requirements and management board and oversee major mobilization exercises such as "Nifty Nugget" conducted in 1979 and periodically since then.

My previous comments indicate my key concerns regarding the draft SASC bill's provisions for the combatant commands and military departments. I would be glad to address specific questions you may have today. I would also like to offer to you

my full cooperation and that of the Army staff in the important work you are undertaking over the coming weeks. Thank you.

I have carefully studied the committee staff's report, with its far-reaching proposals, as well as the House bill. They both merit serious consideration. As your letter requested, my remarks will focus on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified and specified commands, and the service secretariat.

Overall, the report presents constructive criticism on the entire defense organization. There are a number of positive recommendations that I can support. Also, the report is forthright in recognizing that the methods and nature of congressional oversight have a major bearing on the way we conduct our business.

The report unfortunately contains some nearsightedness. Based on my experience, I can find little basis for the report's sweeping generalizations about service parochialism or "log rolling," which undercuts the authority of the Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, the report fails to give adequate credit to how the current JCS system has been changing to respond to today's conditions and to correct identified problems. These hearings must take cognizance of these ongoing internal reforms if we are to adopt further changes that make sense.

For example, DOD has modified significantly the defense resources board to consider better the CINC requirements and priorities in strategic planning and in service programs. Moreover, each service has established formal procedures for reviewing CINC priorities during the programming process and for keeping the CINC's informed.

The joint requirements and management board brings together service vice chiefs to examine joint requirements and coordinate system development to avoid duplication. We have initiated a joint force development program anchored on 35 joint Army-Air Force points of agreement and now including four-service participation. A key element of this participation is cross-service involvement in programming developments. The joint doctrine pilot program, with four major projects involving the CINC's to improve interoperability, further reflects our sustained effort to improve joint thinking and operations.

Now, in addition to these ongoing initiatives, let me outline those areas where I believe improvements could be considered.

I agree generally with strengthening the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thus, I could support legislation which, while retaining the corporate JCS as military advisers, would make the Chairman the principal military adviser. I also believe the law could assign to the Chairman certain "title 10" JCS responsibilities, such as joint training and military education of the Armed Forces. Additionally, the Chairman could assume two new responsibilities: the development of joint doctrine and formulation of recommendations on strategic priorities, defense programs and military budgets.

However, I believe that the Chairman should continue to consult, time and circumstances permitting, with the JCS in fulfilling these responsibilities. The Chiefs, in turn, would be able to forward dissenting views to the Secretary of Defense or even the President should they think their concerns were inadequately addressed within the JCS Councils. Thus, the system would contain the "checks and balances" needed to maintain a healthy joint perspective in national security decision making. Current law and ongoing JCS initiatives provide for substantial improvements in the Joint Staff. The Chairman should be able to specify the staff procedures and tasks. It makes sense to remove the limits on the size and tenure of the Joint Staff, as it does to do away with the distinction between the Joint Staff and other OJCS officers.

The quality of the Joint Staff has been improving. The Army has always tried to provide officers of recognized competence to the Joint Staff, frequently exceeding the norms found inside our own service. For example, this year 100 percent of the eligible Army majors on the Joint Staff were selected for promotion to lieutenant colonel. Toward the goal of upgrading Joint Staff quality, I support the granting of authority to the Chairman to specify the qualifications needed by the officers on the Joint Staff.

The net result of the foregoing proposals would be to increase the authority of the Chairman and, I would expect, that of the entire JCS as well. There is a potential danger that, over time and with different personalities, such an increase in authority could lead to less consultation and might result in less service chief involvement in, and sense of responsibility for, joint affairs. I believe carefully crafted legislation which retains language expressing corporate responsibilities, consultation among the Chiefs and the Chairman's action "on behalf of" the JCS will assure solid involvement of the Chiefs in joint affairs.

There is one other measure which I strongly recommend. We should retain the current practice of quarterly rotation among the Chiefs of the Role of Acting Chairman. The Acting Chairman's role requires that the service chiefs become more deeply involved in joint affairs and the national security decision making process. Fulfilling this important responsibility has made me a better service chief and a better member of the JCS, leading, I believe, to providing better military advice for our superiors and better support for the CINC's. If we are serious about making the JCS more joint, and I know we are, then the Acting Chairman's role is clearly a key element in the maturation process.

Increased duties of the Chairman may make it advisable to assign him a Vice Chairman. I don't advocate that the Vice Chairman replace the Chairman during his absence for the reasons cited above. However, the Vice Chairman could enhance the Joint Staff's capabilities to review contingency planning; to perform resource analysis; to formulate planning, programming, and bugeting recommendations; and to work with the CINC's staffs on their resource priorities. Additionally, he could head the joint requirements and management board and oversee major mobilization exercises.

As you can see from these comments, I strongly support retention of the basic Joint Chiefs of Staff concept rather than replacing it with a body of military advisers. While I recognize that the "dual hat" responsibilities of JCS members are comprehensive, my experience leads me to believe they are not a serious impediment to providing sound, joint advice on operational as well as policy matters. To the contrary, I believe the "dual hat" concept is a valuable source of strength for several

reasons:

First is that the quality of advice to the national command authorities in peace, crisis, or war is enhanced by Chiefs who can meld their advice from service and joint perspectives. Who else but the Chiefs are the most knowledgeable of, and accountable for, their statutory obligation of preparing forces for prompt and sustained combat operations?

Second, and the other side of the coin, is that service programs are more solidly focused to support operational forces by Chiefs whose perspectives are shaped by participating in the joint decision process, and by interacting routinely with the CINC's.

Third, and related to the first two, is that no single military officer, no matter how competent, dedicated, or experienced can know enough about all aspects of our Armed Forces to render complete military advice or counsel. The Chairman needs all the help he can get to function as the principal military adviser. This advice will be authoritative and sound when it is derived from knowledge and judgement garnered from personal relationships and consultations with service chiefs.

Let me turn now to the unified and specified commands. As you know, the chain of command to the CINC's runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the CINC's. By DOD directive the chain runs through the JCS. The Chairman in practice exercises this function on behalf of the JCS, and I could support codification of that practice. The Chairman also could be authorized to supervise CINC implementation of NCA directives. These measures should not and would not make the Chairman a commander in his own right.

The staff report makes recommendations regarding unification of the command structure at CINC level and below. These require more detailed study, and the JCS are already examining these issues as part of the review of JCS publication 2, "unified action armed forces."

I already have noted some of the many actions we have taken to improve CINC involvement in the resource allocation process. In this regard, I could support the report's recommendations to establish the CINC readiness fund and to strengthen the capability of the OJCS to analyze resources and to assess new requirements.

Regarding the military departments, let me make several comments. Secretary Marsh tomorrow will provide this committee a detailed statement on this subject, and I fully support his views. The Secretary of the Army and I share a very close working relationship, consulting daily on key departmental matters. I also keep him informed on JCS actions which impact on the Army. I do not see confusion in the role of the Secretary or in my responsibilities to him under statute and DOD directives.

Secretary Weinberger has strengthened the role of the service Secretary, particularly in the resource and policy areas by increasing his participation in the deliberations of the defense resources board. Based on my 14 years of joint duty, the current DRB process involves the most comprehensive review of programmatic and policy issues I have witnessed. The roles of the service secretaries, the Chairman of the JCS, and of the CINC's have been strengthened significantly in recent years. Thus I