believe the statutory authorities are adequate and structural changes basically are not necessary with regard to the Army secretariat.

Mr. Chairman, three years ago, in undertaking our own study of the military command structure, the Joint Chiefs, working with the Secretary of Defense, established five criteria for evaluating proposals for change: Would the change improve our ability to wage war? Would it provide the President and Secretary of Defense better and more timely advise? Would it better insure that the needs of the unified and specified commanders are met? Would it improve the ability to allocate national security resources more wisely and efficiently? Would it maintain our national legacy of civilian control of the military?

In my view, those criteria remain valid today, and they should be used to measure the merits of proposed changes. We should also keep in mind the importance of the human dimension. The effectiveness of reform is less a function of organizational structure and change, than a function of the quality of people in the organization, their relationships, and their commitment to and understanding of the purpose at hand.

In conclusion, let me again express my full willingness to work closely with the Congress in this important review of our defense organization.

Letter to Senator Goldwater, dated 4 February 1986, subject: DOD reorganization.

The following information is submitted for the record by Gen. John A. Wickham, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

Hon. BARRY GOLDWATER,

U.S. ARMY,
The Chief of Staff.

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This letter addresses your Committee's staff proposal for Defense Reorganization, dated 27 January 1986. I am taking the liberty of providing personal comments which I shared with you yesterday. I recognize that your Committee already has heard testimony by the Service Chiefs as well as other witnesses. The staff proposal makes sweeping changes to the Law with the potential for reducing not only the quality of military advice based on the corporate experience of the Service Chiefs, but also incentives for joint cooperation. Moreover, the changes would complicate execution of the Service Chiefs' and Service Secretaries' stewardship responsibilities. Let me explain.

a. Throughout the staff proposal, the Chairman of the JCS, and in his absence the Vice Chairman, functions as the principal military advisor. There is no mention anywhere of the concept that advice is given on behalf of the corporate body of Service Chiefs, although the CJCS is encouraged to consult with them as appropriate. Moreover, the corporate body of Service Chiefs may give advice only if requested. The enlarged and strengthened Joint Staff would work solely for the CJSC/ VCJCS who no longer manage the staff on behalf of the JCS. Thus, for advice on joint matters the Service Chiefs would have to rely completely on their service

staffs.

b. The staff proposal strengthens the role of the Service Secretary at the expense of the Service Chief. The bill removes the statutory responsibilities of the Chief of Staff for operation of the Army and as head of the Army Staff. Furthermore the Service staff would be consolidated with the Secretariat into a single integrated staff with the Chief of Staff subordinate to the Undersecretary and Assistant Secretaries. Additionally, the staff proposal requires the Secretary of Defense and the Service Chiefs to keep the Service Secretaries fully informed on operational, as well as service related matters. While the intent may be to equip the Service Secretary so that he can fulfill the broad responsibilities for functioning of the Service department, the potential also would exist to leave uncertain who within the Army would be responsible to give advice on operational matters such as warfighting doctrine or organization and missions of combatant commands. The Service Chief, in a less influential role, may find it awkward to give military advice in a separate capacity, such as with the JCS, when his Service Secretary may disagree and provide separate advice to the Secretary of Defense.

c. The staff proposal invests combatant commanders with expanded operational command which could include logistic and administrative functions. Combatant commanders already have operational command over all forces assigned to them, just as I did during three years as a Combined and Unified Commander in Korea.

Expanding their authority into such areas as administration, logistics, programmaing and budgeting could dilute rather than strengthen their warfighting focus. Moreover, it would lead to inefficiencies and diffused responsibility for the Services in provisioning of forces, fielding of new systems, and justification of programming as well as budgeting actions to the Secretary of Defense and to the Congress. The staff proposal would split administrative and logistic responsibilities between the Services and the combatant commanders who would have to expand staffs to deal with such issues as resource priorities, long range program development and execution among components, and Service specific administrative and logistics functions. This split in responsibilities would be further complicated by the potential impact of the provision allowing the combatant commander to control communications between the component commanders and their Services, thus adding at least one more bureaucratic layer, and impeding the efficient flow of essential information. Finally, there would be another significant inefficiency. The Services have developed specialized support organizations such as the Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC), the Army Intelligence and Security Command (USAINSCOM) and the Army Information Systems Command (USAISČ). These organizations were created to improve the quality as well as responsiveness of specialized support to component commands overseas. Giving full operational command, as defined in the proposed bill, to the combatant commanders would lead to the break up of these functional commands and loss of coherent Army-wide program development and management. The staff proposal clearly would lead to a shifting of responsibility away from the Services which are charged by law with developing and managing programs that are balanced globally, as well as among short term and long term requirements.

d. The staff proposal creates a Vice Chairman who ranks all the Service Chiefs and who would function as Acting Chairman when the CJCS is absent. This procedure completely eliminates the opportunity for Services Chiefs to function, on a rotational basis, as Acting CJCS, which helps make them better informed joint advisers and supporters of unified/specified commanders. In short, there would be less incentive for the Service Chiefs to be joint because they would have less joint stature and would participate less in the joint process including the National Security Council decision-making process. Moreover, the fact that the enlarged joint staff would support only the CJCS and VCJCS makes these two individuals powerful figures who may tend, particularly in fast moving situations, to ignore consultation with the Service Chiefs whose knowledge of joint matters would be limited to the knowledge and advice of Service staffs. While the staff proposal allows for Service Chiefs to submit their personal views, my experience as Director of the Joint Staff and Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense suggests that the Service Chiefs, unless consulted by the CJCS, may in fact not have timely or adequate knowledge so that they are in a position to submit their personal views to the National Command Authorities.

Having pointed out what I believe to be the major problems of the draft bill, I offer the following recommendations regarding which changes should or should not be approved by your committee.

As to the role of Service Secretaries I do not believe we should merge the Secretariat with the Army staff nor should the Chief of Staff be removed from his statutory responsibilities to preside over the Army staff and for efficiency of the Army, its preparedness for military operations, and plans therefor. I support the concept of keeping the Service Secretary fully informed on all matters affecting the Service just as I have tried to do during my tenure.

Moreover, I do not believe combatant commanders require that their full operational command of assigned forces include administrative, logistic and programming/budgeting functions, nor should they require all communications with their component commands to go through their headquarters. Their currently strengthened role in the Defense Resources Board process assures visibility of their resource needs. If we are serious about strong stewardship of resources then we must hold the Service Secretary and Service Chief accountable for developing coherent programs and managing them on a Service-wide basis, which includes Service component commands overseas.

Finally, while the CJCS probably needs a four-star assistant, the Vice Chairman should not function as the Acting Chairman. If we are serious about developing more jointness among the Services, then making the Service Chiefs function periodically as Acting Chairman and strengthening the visibility of their corporate military advice, as well as interface with the combatant commanders, is essential.

To summarize, in my opinion, the changes in the staff proposal, taken together, severely denigrate the role of the corporate body of Service Chiefs, erode their organizational and statutory authority to provide military advice, and complicate effec

tive administration of the Services. I want to go on record again in support of a stronger CJCS, but his role as the principal military advisor must be on behalf of the JCS. Only in this way, in my view, can we assure that the national security decision-making process benefits from the corporate experience of Service Chiefs. Warmest personal regards and best wishes.

Most sincerely,

JOHN A. WICKHAM, Jr., General, U.S. Army, Chief of Staff.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you very much, General Wickham. I appreciate a very good statement, and appreciate the sincerity which you presented.

Admiral Watkins, I guess you are next, sir.

STATEMENT OF ADM. JAMES WATKINS, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral WATKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My fellow Chiefs and I testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in December on this same subject. On receipt of a copy of the so-called draft Senate bill, I wrote Senator Goldwater, as General Wickham just pointed out, and I told him of my concerns. With your permission, I would also like to enter into the record that formal statement provided to the Senate Armed Services Committee, as well as my letter to that committee's chairman. I would like them put in the record of today's proceedings, because their content is very germane and may be of use to you and your staff as you continue to address the issue.

I will use my time to discuss what I believe to be critical factors to be considered in any changes anticipated to the existing national security organization. I would also like to provide views on the key provisions of the already-passed H.R. 3622. Finally, I will cover areas mentioned in your letter of February 11 to Secretary Weinberger.

First, I would like to say that I am not against change. I am for change, and I am for change that makes sense. With a previous tour as Vice Chief and with my tenure as Chief of Naval Operations nearly over, I have observed, and have been a part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for some time. I have seen it work well under this President and Secretary of Defense. Prior thereto, I have also seen it work not as well.

Personalities do make a predominant difference, in my opinion, and not organizational diagrams. Nevertheless, a considerable number of organizational changes have been made by General Vessey and Admiral Crowe, and these have clearly helped make a difference.

More importantly, however, there is another factor which has come into play that is critical, for good military advice is as much a function of the receiver as it is of the provider. This President and Secretary of Defense have valued our advice, aggressively sought it, and have acted upon it. They have been willing to listen to divergent views when the Chiefs disagree, as professionals often do on important issues.

They have been willing to consider military advice that may not match their own initial thoughts on what might be in the best interests for the country. This close, healthy, and frequent interchange of views has not always been the case within prior adminis

needs help in the internal management of the Joint Staff, in the interagency process, and in day-to-day dealings with the unified commanders and the OSD staff. These functions are terribly timeconsuming and can detract from the Chairman's other heavy responsibilities, particularly if those responsibilities are even further enhanced, as now envisioned in House bill 3622.

My objections can be satisfied by changing from terms of reference in the House concept of "Deputy" to our concept of "Vice Chairman," explicitly stating that the Vice Chairman is not senior to the Joint Chiefs nor does he perform as Acting Chairman in the Chairman's absence. At the same time, the very successful procedure of having individual service chiefs serve for mandatory 3month periods as Acting Chairman should be codified. This procedure ensures continuity, with the same Chief taking over Acting Chairman duties repeatedly during any given quarter. It keeps each service chief fully involved in the joint process, but most importantly it improves the breadth and joint sensitivity in each of our performances as service chief.

With regard to issues outlined in your letter of February 11, I do have a few general comments. I think it is very important to avoid shifting the unified commander's focus from planning for war or regional crisis, or peacetime optimization of military force employment to bureaucratic concerns. Under Secretary Weinberger's leadership we have greatly improved the unified commanders' role in the programming and budgeting process. They make important inputs. They review service programs to see if their needs are met, and they participate in deliberation leading to budget decisions.

Some of the reorganization proposals go much further than that, and would, in effect, make each unified commander the near equivalent of a service chief, with most of the administrative requirements and bureaucratic complexity that go with equipping, training, and maintaining forces. On the face of it, such a major shift in responsibility could seem attractive to some. To the uninitiated it appears that such an approach would, for example, simplify matters, and align responsibility for preparing for conflict with a duty of efficient employment of forces.

But, nothing could be further from the real world situation that would ensue. What would result is creation of a large bureaucracy at each unified commander level. For example, in the Navy, and I suspect in the other services as well, special problems would result as forces move around the globe performing emergent tasks. How would one unified commander budget for, train and maintain the USS Saratoga carrier battle group of a dozen ships and 8,000 sailors now operating under the European Commander? Well, let me expand on the thought. During her present 6-month deployment, this particular battle group has performed duties for Commander in Chief Atlantic, Commander in Chief Europe, Commander in Chief Pacific, in the Indian Ocean, and now back under Commander in Chief Europe, and in a few days she will be sailing back under the command of Commander in Chief Atlantic.

Command arrangements that work for fixed-resource management simply do not apply when working with complex shifting of forces as is so frequently the case within the Navy. Such training, equipping, maintaining and shifting of key units will be no less

er. He essentially performs this function today because of daily access to the Secretary of Defense, his regular attendance at NSC meetings, and his participation in interagency discussions on behalf of the Chiefs.

So, it makes sense to codify this relationship. It is, however, important to retain this bill's most important, and amended provision, which requires the Chairman to inform the Secretary and the President when other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagree with the advice that he is providing. I have already discussed in some detail the reasons for such a provision.

During the past 4 years, we have streamlined many of the procedures used by the Joint Staff. There is more to be done. Giving the Chairman responsibility for Joint Staff operations and tasking will help, and will also give him better support. In that regard, I agree with removing the ceiling on the size of the Joint Staff, although I do not agree that any growth is needed at this time.

The current Chief and CINC's have recognized the need for special chain-of-command arrangements for special types of missions. When apprehending the Achille Lauro hijackers, for example, a streamlined chain-of-command concept was adopted and tailored to the circumstances. Inflexible adherence to the well-laid wartime chain of command would simply not have been responsive in this and other fast-moving crisis instances. So, any bill that attempts to improve command relationships needs to reflect the vast difference between command arrangements optimized for day-to-day military operations in peace and in crisis events, against those for war-plan execution.

Having acknowledged the need for flexible command arrangements, I have no problem with the Chairman being placed in the chain of command, providing that is what the Secretary and President desire, as is reflected in the House bill, and by providing that it is clearly specified that the Chairman shall do so on behalf of the other Chiefs. I also have no difficulty with making the Chairman the supervisor of the CINC's, as well as their spokesman. The CINC's, in turn, must continue to maintain their principal focus on war-fighting their forces efficiently. I support provisions that strengthen such emphasis. Additionally, the CINC's should retain authority to communicate directly to the Secretary of Defense without filter, if they so desire.

My major area of disagreement with the House bill involves the terms of reference for establishment of a Deputy Chairman. I am against terms that would weaken the corporate body concept of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in providing the best independent military advice possible. I believe that the position of Deputy Chairman as now contained in the bill would effectively emasculate the corporate body effectiveness. The collegial nature of the Chiefs as a corporate entity is this body's most important strength. Placing another four-star officer on the Joint Chiefs, making him, in fact, the second of six Chiefs, while eliminating the other Chiefs from performing duties as Acting Chairman, would create, in my opinion, a serious setback to the proven and successful thrust toward jointness achieved over the past 4 years.

On the other hand, I do believe the Chairman needs and deserves the kind of help another four-star can provide. Particularly, he