General KELLEY. That's correct.
Admiral WATKINS. Correct.

Mr. HOPKINS. Thank you very much.

Admiral WATKINS. Let me just add to that, on that point, Mr. Hopkins. We are in a very serious period of what I call "violent peace" around the world. When we went into El Salvador, we thought we were telling some of our El Salvadoran friends the location where things were going on. We told them where to go. But that place could be 20 miles from where we told them, by the existing maps. You cannot imagine what that means worldwide.

Latin America. If you would break out the charts of Latin America and tell somebody to go find a drug-producing laboratory, as they call them in Colombia, on this particular point in that valley right there, they will discover that it is not there. It is not even close; it may be 60 miles away.

We are remapping the world, practically, in these hot spots that we have to deal with. We cannot do that on a moment's notice. Grenada was a quiet little island of tourists. Sure, it had been through a bloody coup and we had watched that, and perhaps we should have been more aggressive in contingency planning and mapped Grenada instead of Libya or some other country. But, we did not. We do not have maps available for every piece of land for every single conceivable operation. We do not have a map "for all seasons" on these various places. Grenada was not anticipated to be a center of this kind of activity. We have certain priorities in the Defense Mapping Agency to go around the world and provide these things. But we do not walk around with every chart we need in our hands.

A red herring was also thrown out about use of some credit card and that is the kind of trivia prevalent among self-appointed strategists. It's the toilet seat mentality of certain individuals-that do not even look into the facts or take the time to find out what they mean. In fact, the Army has a system whereby any time they go into an urban situation like this, their forces are told that the local telephone is a very legitimate thing to use. Why not use it? What's wrong with it? Do we have to have a fancy, all-spec military system for everything in the world? We didn't in World War II. If we analyzed World War II the way we analyzed Grenada, we lost that war very badly. That is the problem with dealing with the trivia and the superficial analyses that come from these people with Ph.D's and foreign accents that have never had experience serving their country. [Laughter.]

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. One of the amendments that we added, invited, in effect, the JCS to take a more active, affirmative role in, let's call it resource allocation, programmatic decisions and R&D and procurement. Could you illuminate me and possibly some of the others who do not know as well, and may know better than I, what your role is today in resolving procurement decisions, research and development, programmatic decisions, and particularly, it seems to me in this era of somewhat more scarce resources, we need more agencies to get involved in resource allocation. Do you think the JCS has a stronger role to play in this area?

General WICKHAM. As you know, Mr. Spratt, the service departments are charged by law with the provisioning, training and building of forces that are then chopped to the unified commanders so that they can fight wars. Having been one, I do not want to worry about the former, I want to worry about the latter.

Within the service departments, I think you are aware of how we go about building our programs on a global basis so that they are balanced across the world and for all services, they are balanced in terms of long-term and near-term needs, sustainability and readiness are near-term; force-structure and research and development are longer term.

We then have to justify that to the Congress in various form over here. Now, how do the Chiefs interface with that joint organization in terms of trying to assure adequate support for the unified commanders? Unified commanders participate, as we said earlier, in the Defense Resources Board process whereby the services, the agencies, defense agencies, and the CINC's have to defend their requirements against what is made available in terms of building the budget for that year.

For the 1987 budget, which is over here now, we had to go through that process last July and earlier with the CINC's. Out of that process comes some major redirection of funding. We may not, for example, have done adequately by one CINC or by another, and those adjustments are made.

The Chiefs and the Chairman, in particular, with this new analytical organization he has now, SPRAA, provide input to the DRB on joint matters where they feel, and the CINC may feel, the services have not done right in resourcing. All of the services here have in the past 2 years involved the CINC's. I send a team out to every CINC, three times a year, telling him what we are doing in resourcing his requirements. I know what their requirements are, they send them all to me, and, if I tried to fulfill every CINC's requirement it would be impossible. There are not enough resources. For example, we give ĈINCEUR about 95 percent of his needs, and if I gave him the other 5 percent, the other CINC's would get zero. The requirements for Europe are enormous in terms of sustainability. We try to balance all that, and, when the CINC is disturbed about allocations, that is reflected to the Chairman in the Defense Resources Board process. We talk about that among ourselves with the CINC's trying to bring some balance into how the resources are apportioned, and we debate it in the Defense Resources Board. It sounds not very precise, but I think it is like our system of government with checks and balances, and it works well. Mr. NICHOLS. Is this board a subunit of the JCS?

General WICKHAM. No, sir, the Defense Resources Board is chaired by the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. We are not even statutory members of that board; the Service Secretaries are. We sit at the table and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a statutory member. We have visibility in that board, where we spend roughly the entire month of July, virtually 2 or 3 days a week, full time, debating issues, listening to the CINC's, trying to make our case for why we have structured the budget this way and the program that way. Out of that process then come decisions by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the

Secretary of Defense that are formalized in the budget for that year.

Mr. SPRATT. Well, the statute that will be, the bill that we adopted, contains a clause which invites the JCS, I say "invites," because the way it is worded, as I recall, is somewhat discretionary rather than mandatory, invites you to take a larger role that can be effected through the Resource Board, rather than-

General WICKHAM. Yes, sir; I think there is adequate opportunity and authority there for the Chiefs to-▬

Mr. SPRATT. Is this board structured so that it can resolve conflicts between the services on close air support, for example, 810 attack helicopters, decisions like that?

General WICKHAM. The issues are raised, and sometimes hotly contested, and then the decisions are made. It is not a voting thing. In the Defense Department there is one vote: Mr. Weinberger's. Those decisions are made subsequent to the Board's meetings, but, you have got to have your act together in terms of justifying what you have done in your program or you are going to lose your shirt. Mr. SPRATT. Well, this bill, if passed in this form, will give the JCS authority to make an independent input on its own to the Secretary of Defense with respect to program acquisitions.

General WICKHAM. That is a codification of what we really do

now.

Mr. SPRATT. But, it cuts you directly into the decisionmaking process, rather than indirectly through your service Secretary and the Defense Resource Board. It will at least give you an opportunity to devolve in a different way and to have an additional handle on decisionmaking. I personally think it is a good addition to the bill, particularly since it is discretionary rather than mandatory. General WICKHAM. Good.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you for your comments. Anybody else care to comment about that particular aspect?

Admiral WATKINS. The only thing I would add to that, Mr. Spratt, is that we have a system whereby joint service programs, programs where clear interservice operability is essential, are frequently debated in the Defense Resources Board and given back to the Chairman to find a solution.

Let me give you an example. Command and control. Mark 15IFF in Europe. Go get it solved. Come back up here with a combined command and control/communication package from all services in these areas where clear inter-operability with allies and with our own services are involved; solve it. It was a very difficult problem. It took us several months to do it. We went back and were able to effect the 1987 budget decisions by making adjustments in resources to make sure we were covered in all areas. There were some voids that needed filling.

We have been forcing ourselves in the last 3 years to bounce back into the Joint Chiefs of Staff arena, not only to the Chairman who is a statutory member of the Board, some of these kinds of problems. The remote-piloted-vehicles case that General Gabriel was talking about was a classic example. Given to what we call the Joint Resources Management Board in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we solved it and sent our input back to the Secretary of Defense.

Guidance comes from the Chairman as a statutory member, but the Chairman works on behalf of the corporate body, so that we all have an opportunity to participate. That process has been very active and very aggressive. Jack Vessey was the first one to attend those meetings and give concrete resolution to some very complex interoperability issues, cross-service issues, that we were not heretofore addressing very well. This led to the Navy-Air Force Memorandum of Agreement. It led to the Army-Air Force approach to their joint force development scheme, into which we have also plugged ourselves.

So, all of this is beginning to come together now, and in a much more coordinated way, to ensure that our forces are coming up equally and balanced across the needs to meet our defense guid

ance.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Carney.

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any questions. I would just like to take this opportunity to apologize to the Chiefs for coming late. There are three subcommittee meetings of the Armed Services Committee going on concurrently, and I was at the other two. So I am glad I had the opportunity. I walked in the back door when the voices were loud; I think I went to the boring committee hearings.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Stratton.

Mr. STRATTON. I do not have a copy of the bill, Mr. Chairman. I still reiterate my position that the legislation, I think, is ill advised.

Mr. NICHOLS. Let me ask a question about the CINC's. I appreciate, General Kelley, that you enlightened me the other morning that you meet with them four times a year. That did not come out to my knowledge. I have been ignorant of it, that you met that often with them. What role, if any, do they play in such matters as drafting budget documents, and any say-so for funds or weapon systems and so forth, in the selection of their subordinates? Do they have any say-so in these areas?

I am told that CINC's do not even have the authority to say where ammunition is going to be stored, even if it might be placed in a vulnerable location.

Would you gentlemen comment on that?

General WICKHAM. Let me kick this off, sir. Having been the subordinate Unified Commander in Korea, I had the say about my key subordinates. If I did not even want a major, for example, I could reject him, but, on all flag officers from all services I had the final say about them. I do not think that this is a problem at all, and if in your legislation, you want to codify that, fine. That is OK.

In terms of ammunition storage-the words P.X. read you, full operational command-any commander who does not feel he has the authority to say he does not want the ammunition to sustain his war-fighting forces in a vulnerable position, and does not get it accomplished, has something wrong there. He has that authority. I know that there may have been some witnesses that said they did not think they had that authority in the Pacific to do so. We believe that he did have the authority and if we knew in the Army that the commander wanted it moved into Japan or Okinawa or

someplace else, it would have been done. So I do not think that this is a problem.

The question, does the CINC have an opportunity to get involved in terms of developing long-term requirements? You bet they do. General Rogers has made strong cases back here on the need to be able to attack deep forces, the second echelon forces. He calls it follow-on forces attack doctrine. We have developed in the Army a long-range program, a tactical missile system, to be able to strike deep forces. We have, with the Congress' support, gotten money in the last budget and in this budget to pursue that kind of thing. So, we are doing that in support of him.

The CINC's basically come in with a requirements list, a priority list, that includes: Military construction, force-structure, quality of life programs, sustainability items, modern munitions, and so forth. We have to demonstrate programmed funding CINC by CINC, against those requirements. I cannot fill them all, because every CINC has an omnivorous appetite for his part of the world. We have to try to balance them. Where is this balancing done?

It is done among us, when we find we have shorted a CINC and the CINC feels strongly about it. Then we have to defend it in front of the Defense Resources Board. I think there is adequate opportunity here for checks and balances.

Admiral WATKINS. I agree wholeheartedly, Mr. Chairman. In the Navy, in addition to what General Wickham has said, I established 6 years ago what is called the Strategic Readiness Panel that does nothing but take the unified commander's input, which was then coming in twice a year, read it, and meet on it, at the three-star, four-star level. At midyear review, when we have dollars that we can reallocate as the budget process comes along on Capitol Hill for that particular budget year, we give priority to refocusing dollars to respond to all CINC demands. And, I know of no case, except in the Southern Command in Panama where we failed to do that. I have rectified the Panama situation by now having the Naval component commander of CINCSOUTH, in Panama, report directly to me. And, in the last 3 years, he has gotten everything he has asked for-boats, ammunition, guns, you name it. So, there is not any problem there.

We are very responsive to CINC inputs. In fact, we have eliminated Navy-only inputs to our Strategic Readiness Panel, and will only use the unified commander's input. To the best of my knowledge, all support for the CINC's is coupled with the normal budget process. We, like the Army, have to take every unified commander's request and balance our submission of the budget relative to it, and then demonstrate to the Secretary of Defense that we have, in fact, been responsive to the CINC. That is in the institution today and I think it is working well. Where we have problems in the overall picture of trying to balance forces between, for example, the Atlantic and the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, that becomes very difficult. That is where we must get into the act. We hammer out arrangements with the Secretary of Defense to meet the Defense Guidance, which usually sends us a signal ahead of time of how to balance limited resources in this regard.

While the CINC's have legitimate complaints, so does everyone. The degree of hurt is generally equalized around the force, and