enjoys a much higher priority, I don't set those. The unified and specified commanders, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, set that priority system, and I respond by not only making new products but maintaining older products. I have a crisis-reaction system whose responsibility is to make sure that we provide updates in a very rapid manner, such as we did in Grenada when we were told of the need.

So I do feel we have a responsive system when we are called in, and this modernization program that I spoke of, which will get us out of the mode of much manual labor, will, in fact, enhance our ability to provide very timely products.

General POWERS. We have covered this subject at some length, but let me put a capstone on the number of times the DCA charter has been reviewed. I have had a long association with this business-in 1961, 1968, 1974, 1977, 1982, and as late as 1984.

Mr. NICHOLS. Is that to say it should not be examined again? General POWERS. No; it should always be under review, as missions and functions are added to the Agency. One of the concerns that might have been expressed in the past is that the Agency is getting a lot of functions, but none of the functions we have in DCA was done without the explicit direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. NICHOLS. Any further questions?

Thank you, gentlemen. We appreciate very much your testimony here. The testimony of General Powers and also General Rosenberg will be entered into the record, together with the letter we received this morning, hand delivered, from Secretary Lehman, clearing up some questions that were raised in a hearing some days ago about who bought the $110-the next meeting of the committee will be in the morning at 9 o'clock. At that time we will hear witnesses, Dr. Edward Litwak, author of "The Pentagon and the Art of War"; Hon. Robert Komer, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Hon. James Wade, Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, Logistics, Department of Defense; and Lt. Gen. Donald Babers, Director of Defense Logistics Agency. If there is no further business before the committee, the committee will stand in recess until tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Tuesday, February 25, 1986.]

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE,

Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 25, 1986.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9 a.m., in room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Nichols (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NICHOLS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. NICHOLS. The subcommittee will come to order.

This morning we continue our hearings on Department of Defense reorganization.

Our first witness is the Honorable Robert Komer, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Proceed, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT KOMER, FORMER UNDER

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Mr. KOMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no statement to make. Because the House and Senate are already well into drafting bills, I thought it would be more useful if I could comment on any questions that you all might have.

I would say in general, however, that I am a strong advocate of Defense reorganization, have been for years, have participated on a number of the committees that made various recommendations to that effect.

I would like to emphasize in testifying before you that I am testifying as a participant in the Defense decisionmaking process. I spent 4 years under Harold Brown in the Defense Department at the top level. I have dealt with the Chiefs personally and individually and severally. As a result, I feel that I have some understanding of the way the process works or has not worked in the past, and how it might work better in the future.

Mr. NICHOLS. All right. Let me begin with the staffs, the consideration being given to combining certain of the staffs, the most usual proposal being a combination of the Secretaries' staffs with those of the service Chiefs. Would you comment on that? Is that a good idea? Is that a bad idea?

Mr. KOMER. With respect to the service Secretaries and the service staffs, I would agree that it seems to be sensible to combine the civilian and the military components. They do not completely duplicate each other by any means and, by and large, the service military staff is much larger, in my experience, much better informed. It's the institutional memory because political appointees like myself come and go.

I would think that you could get considerably greater efficiency and save a lot of spaces by combining the service military and civilian staffs. I would go further than what was sent to me as a possible House bill.

Mr. NICHOLS. If we elect to do that, how much micromanagement would you suggest from the Congress? Would you simply leave that reorganization to the Secretary of Defense? Or would you leave it to the various departments to make those changes? Or would you try to specify a certain percent reduction in overall staffs? Or a combination?

Mr. KOMER. Some variant of all of those proposals, Mr. Chairman. I must say all my experience has been in the executive branch. When I first saw what your subcommittee sent out in the way of Defense reorganization proposals a few days ago, it rather horrified me that you were overspecifying.

My own instinct is that one should pick the top management people that they believe qualified to do the job and then allow that top management a good deal of flexibility in deciding how to organize. By and large, I think the Congress should task the Secretary of Defense functionally but leave it to the Secretary of Defense as to how many assistant secretaries he wants, for example, and what jobs they should have, et cetera, et cetera.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Komer, the Senate staff report has suggested a reorganization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense along mission lines. What would be your position on the Senate proposal?

Mr. KOMER. That came from an experience I had, Mr. Chairman. In fact, my personal experience is about the only time the Defense Department has ever organized anything in policy terms along specified lines. I was the adviser to the Secretary of Defense on NATO. I, in effect, ran NATO policy for the Secretary.

My experience was that this is a good thing. I started out by suggesting that my appointment be a temporary one, that this not be an effort to create a permanent new job in the Defense hierarchy. When I left, I had modified that view considerably. So, in a sense, this proposal by the Senate staff has only one basis, and that is the experience that I had in running NATO affairs.

By and large, I think that I would support having an Assistant Secretary for NATO affairs, an Assistant Secretary for the rest of the world, and an Assistant Secretary for Strategic Forces. But I would have them all under a single Under Secretary for Policy.

There has to be the proper balance between centralization and decentralization. I think that that would give it to you.

Mr. NICHOLS. Would you favor an under secretary of Defense for readiness?

Mr. KOMER. No, sir; I would not, probably-I mean mainly-because readiness can be interpreted to cover so much of the Defense Department's business that this guy would be in everybody else's racket.

We don't even know what readiness means. I have never seen an acceptable definition of it for operational purposes.

Mr. NICHOLS. One of the issues that is causing a lot of conversation on both sides of the Congress is the provision that we included in our bill last year which would create a Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That position would complement the Chair

man of the Joint Chiefs. The Deputy Chairman would out rank the other Chiefs. He would serve in the absence of the Chairman.

Do you support that?

Mr. KOMER. Yes, sir, I do. I would not support it if he were made junior to the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. NICHOLS. Why?

Mr. KOMER. Because I don't see how he can function as Chairman in the absence of the Chairman himself. I don't see how he can effectively manage the Joint Chiefs of Staff unless he has seniority. If he's junior, they're not going to pay much attention to him.

I gather that all of the current Chiefs of Staff are opposed to this because they don't think another four-star officer besides the Chairman should be picked and put over them. I am sorry about that. But it seems to me that for effective management of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the deputy should be second only to the Chairman and not junior to the Chiefs.

Mr. NICHOLS. What about the argument that the Chiefs use, that it's desirable and it broadens their expertise to serve a 3-month hitch as Deputy Chairman and sit in the chair and preside. If it broadens their experience, isn't that a good argument for doing it the way we do now?

Mr. KOMER. No, sir. I think that it would be a good argument if there were no better arguments. I do believe that for the present members of the Joint Chiefs to serve in the Chairman's chair, so to speak, is a broadening influence. But by and large, it's not the most efficient way to run the business.

Mr. NICHOLS. Generally speaking then, I gather you support the bill which was passed by the House last year and sent to the Senate?

Mr. KOMER. Yes.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Lally.

Mr. LALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Komer, in referring to the draft bill prepared by this subcommittee, you mentioned that you thought it was overspecifying. Can you be a little more specific in where it overspecifies, sir?

Mr. KOMER. Yes, I can. In particular, when you get down to page 3, joint officer personnel, there are rather detailed criteria for assignment and promotion. Then you get over to the military departments, and you have lots and lots of detail, and the same with defense agencies on pages 7 and 8.

Now, it may be just that looking at this de novo I found it more detailed than I would be happy with, were I in a position to execute it. But the more specific you are, the more detail you get into, the more chance you've got of doing something wrong. And then the Congress will have to go back and change it. If the difficulties we have had in getting Defense reorganization bills through the Congress in the past is any indicator, if something is wrong, it may take ten years to change it.

Mr. LALLY. On the other point you discussed with the Chairman about the Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I recall that a couple of times during his tenure Chairman Nichols had General Vessey over here to discuss this proposal for a deputy chairman with him. As I recall, General Vessey was opposed to a