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cated that this happens all the time and that it will continue to happen. If we don't have some specific provisions that would attempt to take care of these officers, what should be done in order to have a true joint perspective by those who are serving in joint billets?

Mr. KOMER. I think you are correct. I wasn't saying don't specify in any detail at all. I think what I was seeking-and it was a rather hasty look at this paper-was some kind of a golden mean between not making any specifications whatsoever and making specifications at inis length.

Some of these urovisions, of course, will create complications. But to answer your „ubstantive question, I think there's no doubt that, unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his people have a say on the promotability of officers serving on the Joint Staff, general staff, or whatever, they are not going to get their due. Otherwise, the people who are in the services doing service business will have the say over their promotion.

Now, you want them to have a partial say. The Germans, as I recall, created two separate promotion systems. Once a man was selected as a senior captain for the general staff, went to the general staff academy and got promoted, he then worked for a system headed up by the Chief of the general staff. The Army, or the Navy or the Air Force, I guess, had very little to do with the promotability of that officer. There was a quota for general staff officers. Promotions within that quota were the responsibility of the chief of the general staff, not the commander in chief of the forces.

Now, as I read your proposal, it goes halfway there and says that they both shall have a responsibility. I think that's probably better and probably more politically feasible. But I wouldn't mind going the whole way. I just don't think it's going to recommend itself to the Congress.

Mr. NICHOLS. If the gentleman will yield on that particular point, I might ask a followup question.

Would you favor putting into law a provision that an officer should have some joint staff duty before he could become a general officer?

Mr. KOMER. That's one of the most difficult questions, it seems to Mr. NICHOLS. That's why I asked it, Mr. Komer.

Mr. KOMER. I can envision circumstances in which it should not be required. Mr. NICHOLS. Like what?

Mr. KOMER. Well, you have an outstanding officer. He's put up by a service chief for duty as a general officer in a joint job. For various reasons, he has not been able to have joint staff duty before. Therefore, he's not eligible. It puts a great deal of emphasis on the original selection process for the joint staff. I would like to see a little more flexibility in there.

My experience in the Pentagon was that we passed regulations and issued policies that generally dealt with 80 percent of the cases but that we tended to neglect the 10 percent at one end and the 10 percent at the other. I on't know quite how one writes that into law—the necessary fle; lity. I notice you did allow waivers. You said that a fellow who i-d a waiver had to have his first general

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officer assignment in a joint job. Well, I have some reservations about that, too. If the Army is responsible for chemical warfare, I don't think a general who is promoted to head the chemical warfare department ought to be required to have had joint experience. But by and large, I guess one goes with the greater good while trying to leave a little

flexibility at each end. Mr. NICHOLS. Let's talk about CINC's a little bit. We've been told that the CINC's lack sufficient authority to discharge the awesome responsibilities that they have on a day-to-day basis in case of combat. What is your view on this? Is it important that we try to strengthen the CINC's? We are going to be talking to some CINC's later on. I intend to ask that question.

Mr. KOMER. I do, Mr. Chairman. It seems to me that there are few people in uniform who have more responsibility and less authority than the commanders in chief of our unified and specified commands. They have had, until fairly recently, almost no influence on the budget

process. They go to their service chiefs or the various service chiefs, but they don't get much but the time of day. If we regard the missions of the CINC's as important, we should give them more authority to go along with the responsibility. And that particularly applies to—and I see it in your proposed bill, you do something about that—that particularly applies to giving them a handle on budgetary resources.

But having said that, that I agree with the proposition that the CINC's need more authority and more money, I would point out to you that the dichotomy, the difference in outlook between the Chiefs, between the CINC's and the service chiefs, is a more fundamental problem. The Chief, who is concerned with whether we go to war on his watch, has a short-range concern. He is very concerned about readiness, because it's his forces which will fight. He is somewhat concerned about sustainability. He is not all that concerned about modernization of equipment because, if we start putting R&D money into a new tank, it won't be along for another 5, 10, or, in the case of the last tank, 20 years.

The determination of the proper balance between readiness, sustainability, modernization and force structure is a very difficult job. I was involved in it, working for the Secretary. And I do not believe that we can afford, given resource constraints, to give various CINC's all the resources they deem are required for readiness, or sustainability, for that matter. If we were much closer to the point of war than I believe we are, then it seems to me readiness and sustainability ought to get progressively higher priority. But in a situation we've got today, you've got to balance; and I would not put the balance exclusively in the hands of the CINC's any more than I would put the balance exclusively in the hands of the JCS. It's a tough decision. And you have to make it on the merits in, you know, a thousand different cases.

So, what I am saying is, I would give some more authority to the CINC's; but I would not give them too much authority, or we're going to have a big split right down the middle of the Defense Department.

Mr. NICHOLS. A companion question to the one I just asked you about service on the Joint Staff in order to be a general officer: Would you support putting into law that, before a man could be a service chief, he should have served in a CINC capacity at some time?

Mr. KOMER. That's a tough one, Mr. Chairman. By and large, I think I would not. And the reason once again is

Mr. NICHOLS. Do you agree it's desirable?

Mr. KOMER. I think it's desirable, but I would hate to make it mandatory.

Mr. NICHOLS. It narrows your field.

Mr. KOMER. Yes, sir. I think one might get an outstanding officer who had never been a CINC. And that man is au matically barred, if that's in the law. If you provide a provision 1 vaiver or something like that, well, that takes away some of the problem. But for, let's say, 9 out of 10 candidates for service ch: ; I think that would be desirable.

Mr. NICHOLS. I have no further questions.
Mr. LALLY. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BARRETT. I would like to follow up on a couple of things. The chiefs appeared before us last week. On this question of balance, the chiefs indicated that this is their job with regard to the CINC's. That is, an Air Force chief has to balance where he puts his F-15's, in the Pacific or Europe or wherever; and the Army chief similarly. In other words, they spoke for the system, as I understood them, that they have now—that they determine the balance. Also, they are the providers. So they're sort of—they're competitors in this as well as balancers. Are you saying that you think that the joint side should have a focus, and the balancing should be in the Office of the Secretary of Defense? Or should the chiefs, as chiefs, be the balancers, deciding between modernization and readiness? Or how do you think it should work?

Mr. KOMER. I think that the JCS should recommend the balance that they think optimum. And they should do so on the basis, in part, of the views of the CINC's, which would be fortified and provided with a mode of expression through your bill by having them report to the Chairman and the CINC council. But I think that the Secretary of Defense under the law must retain final responsibility for issues like the balance in the Defense program. He is the one who has to defend it to the President and the Congress. So, yes, I would like to make the CINC's major inputers on this. But I would hate to see them given final responsibility at the expense of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you very much, Mr. Komer.
Mr. KOMER. My pleasure.

Mr. NICHOLS. Our next witness is Dr. Edward Luttwak, who is the author of "The Pentagon and the Art of War."

Do you have a statement, Mr. Luttwak?

Mr. LUTTWAK. I have a very brief statement. I don't know how useful it would be. Ambassador Komer and I have, essentially, a large coincidence of views. Perhaps I should focus narrowly on those additional questions.

Mr. NICHOLS. You may proceed.

STATEMENT OF EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, AUTHOR “THE PENTAGON

AND THE ART OF WAR" Mr. LUTTWAK. First of all, I am, of course, honored by this opportunity to present my views here. I have been working professionally as a consultant to the Secretary of Defense, to the Under Secretary of Defense, to the Army-various different elements, the Navy one time, always working on specific problems. I have never been an official in the manner that Ambassador Komer was, in such a distinguished way. I have therefore observed all these problems from the underside. I have never had to carry responsibility for decisions, but I have frequently been involved in decisions at the detailed level and not-so-detailed level. Therefore, the particular expertise I bring to bear is not really of an academic nature but more sort of the below-the-stairs perspective on the making of national policy in the military area.

You were kind enough to refer to this book of mine. Essentially, the argument was that we do, in fact, have a national consensus. There's a lot of talk about the breakdown of national consensus on foreign policy and such. But for the things that account for 90 percent of our defense expenditures, we have wide agreement: defense of Europe, naval superiority, deterrence, the usual elements.

Therefore, in this country, unlike many other countries around the globe, we have the essential basis for the making of a military policy. In many countries there is no political basis for the making of a coherent military policy because of very profound disagreements about it. In this country, very fortunately, we have this consensus.

So, the logical process that ought to exist is a process by which we translate this consensus, this 90-percent consensus. We may disagree on an action in Central America, but for 90 percent we agree. Translate that into specific military tasks. Say, well, we all agree we want to participate in the protection of Europe. So, what are the military tasks? And they are easily defined as to maintain a front, as to have a defense, some ability to react, and so on.

a And from those tasks we would then say: Well, what are the combat forces we need? And once we have established the array of combat forces, we would then say: How much at any one time do we spend for the readiness of these combat forces, and how much time do we spend for the development? These will be the three steps.

That simply doesn't happen in the present system. Ambassador Komer in, I think, a very colorful, but very specific way, said that these issues are addressed in the JCS system by the Chief of a service in the quickie briefing he gets on his way to the meeting of the JCS; namely, the translation of the generic foreign policy into the listing of the forces that are required and into day-to-day decisions about how much we spend on readiness and how much we spend on the development, the growth, where we have R&D. We simply do not have the mechanism to do that. Such a mechanism would imply a body of people whose concern is the military policy of the United States and who do not have other concerns, who are notfor example, and most notoriously-attached to the preservation of the integrity and magnificence of a single service. Hence all these

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proposals, hence the Senate bill, hence the House bill, these initiatives, these studies, and so on. That's the starting point of us all.

The question now is: How does one implement this? I read very carefully the Defense reorganization proposals, as I have tried to read the other bills in the Senate, and so on. As I see them, these represent, within limits set by people who are much better qualified than I, what is politically feasible. An attempt is then made to try and bring about the essential mechanism for the making of military policy, for the choosing of forces for the decision of how much readiness versus how much growth.

My own recommendation, which had the bold simplicity characteristic of people who make recommendations who don't have to implement them or make them happen, was of course to bring into existence a body of national defense officers. That is to say, military officers who have risen, had careers up to a certain point-it could be, I don't know, 0-5 or 0-6—who have obviously distinguished themselves, who would then separate from the parent service in which they have acquired their initial educational experience; they would then leave it forever, not to return, and become instead national defense officers.

These national defense officers would provide the staff of that organization which we might still, if we so wish, continue to call the JCS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be manned by national defense officers. The unified commands would be manned by national defense officers, a national defense officer being nothing more than an Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine officer who has made the decision at some point along the way that he himself would prefer to assume the responsibilities for the making of national military policy, as opposed to the satisfactions which are equally important, the satisfactions of service within the unit, what you might call the regimental spirit of the single institution.

Now, then, presumably they would go to one of the existing institutions that we have for joint service training-notably the National Defense University, the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and so on. That course might be very much along the lines that have been explicated in the proposals here, a rigorous and serious sort of course. And then they will go into their national defense officer career as the officers who run all the different elements and echelons of the Joint Chiefs and of the unified commands. Now, the power of decision as between forces—what forces do we

, keep, what forces do we shrink down, what areas do we grow, what areas do we diminish, and the power to decide between readiness and force growth-would be made by this Joint Chiefs organization, manned entirely by these people, at least in the key positions, in response to the policy laid down by the Secretary of Defense, obviously, his interpretation, the Presidential interpretation of that consensus which is interpreted by Congress in a way that actually happens.

All I am saying, therefore, is that the process of forming the foreign policy goals and military goals will not be any different than today's. Certainly there will be no question of giving this reformed JCS or any other military body the power to decide what the United States ought to do.

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