STATEMENT OF EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, AUTHOR “THE PENTAGON AND THE ART OF WAR”

Mr. LUTTWAK. First of all, I am, of course, honored by this opportunity to present my views here. I have been working professionally as a consultant to the Secretary of Defense, to the Under Secretary of Defense, to the Army-various different elements, the Navy one time, always working on specific problems. I have never been an official in the manner that Ambassador Komer was, in such a distinguished way. I have therefore observed all these problems from the underside. I have never had to carry responsibility for decisions, but I have frequently been involved in decisions at the detailed level and not-so-detailed level. Therefore, the particular expertise I bring to bear is not really of an academic nature but more sort of the below-the-stairs perspective on the making of national policy in the military area.

You were kind enough to refer to this book of mine. Essentially, the argument was that we do, in fact, have a national consensus. There's a lot of talk about the breakdown of national consensus on foreign policy and such. But for the things that account for 90 percent of our defense expenditures, we have wide agreement: defense of Europe, naval superiority, deterrence, the usual elements.

Therefore, in this country, unlike many other countries around the globe, we have the essential basis for the making of a military policy. In many countries there is no political basis for the making of a coherent military policy because of very profound disagreements about it. In this country, very fortunately, we have this con

sensus.

So, the logical process that ought to exist is a process by which we translate this consensus, this 90-percent consensus. We may disagree on an action in Central America, but for 90 percent we agree. Translate that into specific military tasks. Say, well, we all agree we want to participate in the protection of Europe. So, what are the military tasks? And they are easily defined as to maintain a front, as to have a defense, some ability to react, and so on.

And from those tasks we would then say: Well, what are the combat forces we need? And once we have established the array of combat forces, we would then say: How much at any one time do we spend for the readiness of these combat forces, and how much time do we spend for the development? These will be the three steps.

That simply doesn't happen in the present system. Ambassador Komer in, I think, a very colorful, but very specific way, said that these issues are addressed in the JCS system by the Chief of a service in the quickie briefing he gets on his way to the meeting of the JCS; namely, the translation of the generic foreign policy into the listing of the forces that are required and into day-to-day decisions about how much we spend on readiness and how much we spend on the development, the growth, where we have R&D. We simply do not have the mechanism to do that. Such a mechanism would imply a body of people whose concern is the military policy of the United States and who do not have other concerns, who are notfor example, and most notoriously-attached to the preservation of the integrity and magnificence of a single service. Hence all these

proposals, hence the Senate bill, hence the House bill, these initiatives, these studies, and so on. That's the starting point of us all. The question now is: How does one implement this? I read very carefully the Defense reorganization proposals, as I have tried to read the other bills in the Senate, and so on. As I see them, these represent, within limits set by people who are much better qualified than I, what is politically feasible. An attempt is then made to try and bring about the essential mechanism for the making of military policy, for the choosing of forces for the decision of how much readiness versus how much growth.

My own recommendation, which had the bold simplicity characteristic of people who make recommendations who don't have to implement them or make them happen, was of course to bring into existence a body of national defense officers. That is to say, military officers who have risen, had careers up to a certain point-it could be, I don't know, O-5 or 0-6-who have obviously distinguished themselves, who would then separate from the parent service in which they have acquired their initial educational experience; they would then leave it forever, not to return, and become instead national defense officers.

These national defense officers would provide the staff of that organization which we might still, if we so wish, continue to call the JCS, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be manned by national defense officers. The unified commands would be manned by national defense officers, a national defense officer being nothing more than an Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine officer who has made the decision at some point along the way that he himself would prefer to assume the responsibilities for the making of national military policy, as opposed to the satisfactions which are equally important, the satisfactions of service within the unit, what you might call the regimental spirit of the single institution. Now, then, presumably they would go to one of the existing institutions that we have for joint service training-notably the National Defense University, the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and so on. That course might be very much along the lines that have been explicated in the proposals here, a rigorous and serious sort of course. And then they will go into their national defense officer career as the officers who run all the different elements and echelons of the Joint Chiefs and of the unified commands.

Now, the power of decision as between forces-what forces do we keep, what forces do we shrink down, what areas do we grow, what areas do we diminish, and the power to decide between readiness and force growth-would be made by this Joint Chiefs organization, manned entirely by these people, at least in the key positions, in response to the policy laid down by the Secretary of Defense, obviously, his interpretation, the Presidential interpretation of that consensus which is interpreted by Congress in a way that actually happens.

All I am saying, therefore, is that the process of forming the foreign policy goals and military goals will not be any different than today's. Certainly there will be no question of giving this reformed JCS or any other military body the power to decide what the United States ought to do.

But these gentlemen in the Joint Chiefs with this Chairman as proposed and the Deputy Chairman as proposed, and then the heads of the services obviously, would receive the broad goals, such as the defense of Europe, and so on. They would have an opportunity to interpret this goal in deciding what forces to keep and what forces not to keep, by means of a systematic and analytical process, with also room for military experience, conducted by a joint staff that would consist of national defense officers, not at all beholden to any one service. No single service would have any power of promotion or nonpromotion over them. That Joint Staff's field experience would then come from their rotation in and out of the unified commands, which would also be staffed entirely by national defense officers.

Now, as soon as you are willing to contemplate this radical proposal, it causes outrage. Emperor Constantine decided to unify the separate career tracks of the infantry and the cavalry officers, because he wanted his battles to be fought by the infantry and cavalry together instead of having two separate programs. That caused a lot of outrage, too. Constantine's enemies attributed it to being part of his infatuation with exotic religions, and such.

The fact is that one reads this bill with its clarity of line and also with its complications, as Ambassador Komer noted. This is typically a transition document. The complications-Ambassador Komer was kind enough to first sort of denounce them and then backtrack a little-are simply inevitable if one doesn't go the full way. The full way entails bringing into existence a body of national defense officers, people whose focus is on the national military need and who will, of course, have a sentimental regard for their parent service-and it would be reprehensible if they didn't-but who would not be beholden, would not be bureaucratically manipulated by that service.

If we had such officers, then obviously you don't need all these "complications" that occur here about how one protects the interests of these people, and so on. But of course, if one doesn't have a body of national officers, then these cannot be described as complications.

I tried to read the bills very carefully. There seems to be a minimum of complications. What we have here on page four, and so on, will be a minimum of what will be needed to protect the system from subversion, the inevitable subversion that would come into existence when one has powerful independent services and a very weak joint structure. If one creates a powerful joint structure by bringing into existence a body of national defense officers, then obviously all these things fall away.

Now, I am absolutely convinced that, when a man ris. to become the head of his own service, and he arrives and sits in that chamber of the Joint Chiefs, I think that he makes every effort to try and think in national terms. I do not see the Chiefs as going there and sort of squatting in their seats and plotting, trying to figure out the ans that will advance the interests of their services ruthlessly, and so un. I don't see that at all. I see them as trying very hard to have the national perspective.

So, I understand how they might come before this committee as they come before others and complain indignantly that your entire

effort is, in a sense, a challenge to their patriotism, their ability to rise above bureaucratic interests, and so on. I understand that.

Unfortunately, their will, their desire to serve the national interest, as opposed to the interests of a single service, is subverted by the fact that there is no unified view they don't have the staff support. The good intention of the service chief is subverted by the fact that the entire detailed machinery of analysis and decision is in the hands of a single service or controlled by it through the colonization of the Joint Staff position. The Joint Staff is supposed to be, of course, as the name indicates, the unified staff of the JCS. But of course, as we all know, it is not. So, the service chief wants to do his best, but all his detailed positions are done by people who are, in a sense, trapped in this one-service perspective, trapped and imprisoned there by the pressures upon them, the social pressures, peer pressures, promotion pressures, and so on.

Therefore, what I am saying is that I applaud the purposes of the Defense reorganization proposal. I recognize them as being-ideal, I would say that-if one takes it as a given that it is not possible to go the full way and bring into existence a body of national defense

officers.

Now, let me emphasize that we are not talking about something exotic, some exotic animal not previously known on these shores. The fact of the matter is that the only reason why the present system has functioned at all is because, over the years, officers have, in fact, made of themselves national defense officers. One doesn't know whether one should praise them or blame them. But the reason why we have not had the complete collapse of the system that would expose its inadequacy in a more brutal way and force a reform is because we have had officers who have sacrificed, in many cases their best career prospects to dedicate themselves, to have recurring tours of joint duty, and who thought jointly when they were not necessarily in joint positions. They have kept the system going. If we had not had the dedicated services of these people, who chose to conduct themselves in this particular way, sometimes to the damage of their careers, the system would have collapsed. Therefore, that's why I do not know whether we should praise them or blame them.

Let this legislation give a chance to these people. Let it legitimize them. Let's make honest people out of them by recognizing what they have been doing, which is introducing the national perspective that is absolutely essential.

Let me address some of the consequences of the present system very briefly.

In the absence of a military policy, derived logically from our goals, as they would be derived by a JCS manned by national defense officers, unified commanders, what we now have are force goals. Each service has its force goals. The Navy wants 600 ships, and the Air Force 40 wings. The Army has its divisional goals. The Marines' force structure is protected and they maintain their devotion to amphibious landing. So we have each service pursuing its force goals. The administrative instrument for the accomplishment and the preservation of these goals is, of course, the very large service headquarters in the Pentagon, which is addressed in your proposal quite correctly. These are the fortresses of the service in

terests. They are the Army that fights the bureaucratic battle dayby-day to protect them. But we do have these force goals.

From time to time, as a sort of public relations exercise, efforts are made to justify retroactively these force goals as being in the national interest, which is miraculous. The procedure is miraculous because, over the decades, the entire political and technological environment has changed, and all sorts of other changes have overtaken the entire planet; yet we have different documents dutifully produced by the Army, Navy and Air Force to justify essentially unchanged force goals.

The latest ones are these maritime strategy papers, which have been issued over the signatures of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The maritime strategy papers tried to explain why, in fact, we need the 600-ship Navy. Characteristically, the strategy and justification came out several years after the policy was launched-I mean really after the fact.

If one examines such attempts at retroactive justification, they, of course, vary in quality over time. The Air Force's justification of 40 wings about ten years ago, I thought, was rather better than its current justification, although the wings didn't change. In the case of the maritime strategy, what we have is a very serious example of the collateral problems of the system.

In order to justify the expenditure of large amounts of money on aircraft carriers-this very high quality, very high cost, but quantitatively limited sort of air power-the maritime strategy documents depict scenarios where the Soviet Union would invade, let's say, in Southwest Asia; we then respond by launching attacks against the Soviet naval bases in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski, and

so on.

In other words, the reaction of an American President, and of our allies, to the outbreak of a war with the Soviet Union in some area such as Southwest Asia will be to widen the war and to extend it into a direct attack on the Soviet homeland, in the specific operational format of an attack on naval bases which are, of course, also nuclear installations. The implication is, of course, that the allies would welcome this. The Japanese, for example, would welcome the use of their facilities, and so on, in order to support an attack on Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski, which is just up the road from there. The Norwegians would welcome it also, and so on. All of this because of some conflict in the Persian Gulf.

Now, the reason why all this has to be written in such extensive prose is because one has to overcome the fundamental problem that the Soviet Union is rich in ground forces; it is ground strength that we need, not naval strength.

The only reason why the mere publication of these documents has not already caused us tremendous diplomatic problems with our allies is because, of course, people do not take it seriously. The reason why we have not had an uproar in Japan, and elsewhere, caused by these maritime strategy proposals, which are really dangerously inflammatory, is because people don't take them seriously. In other words, the principal expressions of our military policy are not even taken seriously.