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But these gentlemen in the Joint Chiefs with this Chairman as proposed and the Deputy Chairman as proposed, and then the heads of the services obviously, would receive the broad goals, such as the defense of Europe, and so on. They would have an opportunity to interpret this goal in deciding what forces to keep and what forces not to keep, by means of a systematic and analytical process, with also room for military experience, conducted by a joint staff that would consist of national defense officers, not at all beholden to any one service. No single service would have any power of promotion or nonpromotion over them. That Joint Staff's field experience would then come from their rotation in and out of the unified commands, which would also be staffed entirely by national defense officers.

Now, as soon as you are willing to contemplate this radical proposal, it causes outrage. Emperor Constantine decided to unify the separate career tracks of the infantry and the cavalry officers, because he wanted his battles to be fought by the infantry and cavalry together instead of having two separate programs. That caused a lot of outrage, too. Constantine's enemies attributed it to being part of his infatuation with exotic religions, and such.

The fact is that one reads this bill with its clarity of line and also with its complications, as Ambassador Komer noted. This is typically a transition document. The complications—Ambassador Komer was kind enough to first sort of denounce them and then backtrack a little-are simply inevitable if one doesn't go the full way. The full way entails bringing into existence a body of national defense officers, people whose focus is on the national military need and who will, of course, have a sentimental regard for their parent service-and it would be reprehensible if they didn't-but who would not be beholden, would not be bureaucratically manipulated by that service.

If we had such officers, then obviously you don't need all these "complications” that occur here about how one protects the interests of these people, and so on. But of course, if one doesn't have a body of national officers, then these cannot be described as complications.

I tried to read the bills very carefully. There seems to be a minimum of complications. What we have here on page four, and so on, will be a minimum of what will be needed to protect the system from subversion, the inevitable subversion that would come into existence when one has powerful independent services and a very weak joint structure. If one creates a powerful joint structure by bringing into existence a body of national defense officers, then obviously all these things fall away.

Now, I am absolutely convinced that, when a man ris. to become the head of his own service, and he arrives and sits in that chamber of the Joint Chiefs, I think that he makes every effort to try and think in national terms. I do not see the Chiefs as going there and sort of squatting in their seats and plotting, trying to figure out the ans that will advance the interests of their services ruthlessly, and so un. I don't see that at all. I see them as trying very hard to have the national perspective.

So, I understand how they might come before this committee as they come before others and complain indignantly that your entire effort is, in a sense, a challenge to their patriotism, their ability to rise above bureaucratic interests, and so on. I understand that.

Unfortunately, their will, their desire to serve the national interest, as opposed to the interests of a single service, is subverted by the fact that there is no unified view they don't have the staff support. The good intention of the service chief is subverted by the fact that the entire detailed machinery of analysis and decision is in the hands of a single service or controlled by it through the colonization of the Joint Staff position. The Joint Staff is supposed to be, of course, as the name indicates, the unified staff of the JCS. But of course, as we all know, it is not. So, the service chief wants to do his best, but all his detailed positions are done by people who are, in a sense, trapped in this one-service perspective, trapped and imprisoned there by the pressures upon them, the social pressures, peer pressures, promotion pressures, and so on.

Therefore, what I am saying is that I applaud the purposes of the Defense reorganization proposal. I recognize them as being-ideal, I would say that-if one takes it as a given that it is not possible to go the full way and bring into existence a body of national defense officers.

Now, let me emphasize that we are not talking about something exotic, some exotic animal not previously known on these shores. The fact of the matter is that the only reason why the present system has functioned at all is because, over the years, officers have, in fact, made of themselves national defense officers. One doesn't know whether one should praise them or blame them. But the reason why we have not had the complete collapse of the system that would expose its inadequacy in a more brutal way and force a reform is because we have had officers who have sacrificed, in many cases their best career prospects to dedicate themselves, to have recurring tours of joint duty, and who thought jointly when they were not necessarily in joint positions. They have kept the system going. If we had not had the dedicated services of these people, who chose to conduct themselves in this particular way, sometimes to the damage of their careers, the system would have collapsed. Therefore, that's why I do not know whether we should praise them or blame them.

Let this legislation give a chance to these people. Let it legitimize them. Let's make honest people out of them by recognizing what they have been doing, which is introducing the national perspective that is absolutely essential.

Let me address some of the consequences of the present system very briefly.

In the absence of a military policy, derived logically from our goals, as they would be derived by a JCS manned by national defense officers, unified commanders, what we now have are force goals. Each service has its force goals. The Navy wants 600 ships, and the Air Force 40 wings. The Army has its divisional goals. The Marines' force structure is protected and they maintain their devotion to amphibious landing. So we have each service pursuing its force goals. The administrative instrument for the accomplishment and the preservation of these goals is, of course, the very large service headquarters in the Pentagon, which is addressed in your proposal quite correctly. These are the fortresses of the service interests. They are the Army that fights the bureaucratic battle dayby-day to protect them. But we do have these force goals.

From time to time, as a sort of public relations exercise, efforts are made to justify retroactively these force goals as being in the national interest, which is miraculous. The procedure is miraculous because, over the decades, the entire political and technological environment has changed, and all sorts of other changes have overtaken the entire planet; yet we have different documents dutifully produced by the Army, Navy and Air Force to justify essentially unchanged force goals.

The latest ones are these maritime strategy papers, which have been issued over the signatures of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The maritime strategy papers tried to explain why, in fact, we need the 600-ship Navy. Characteristically, the strategy and justification came out several years after the policy was launched-I mean really after the fact.

If one examines such attempts at retroactive justification, they, of course, vary in quality over time. The Air Force's justification of 40 wings about ten years ago, I thought, was rather better than its current justification, although the wings didn't change. In the case of the maritime strategy, what we have is a very serious example of the collateral problems of the system.

In order to justify the expenditure of large amounts of money on aircraft carriers—this very high quality, very high cost, but quantitatively limited sort of air power—the maritime strategy documents depict scenarios where the Soviet Union would invade, let's say, in Southwest Asia; we then respond by launching attacks against the Soviet naval bases in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski, and so on.

In other words, the reaction of an American President, and of our allies, to the outbreak of a war with the Soviet Union in some area such as Southwest Asia will be to widen the war and to extend it into a direct attack on the Soviet homeland, in the specific operational format of an attack on naval bases which are, of course, also nuclear installations. The implication is, of course, that the allies would welcome this. The Japanese, for example, would welcome the use of their facilities, and so on, in order to support an attack on Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski, which is just up the road from there. The Norwegians would welcome it also, and so on. All of this because of some conflict in the Persian Gulf.

Now, the reason why all this has to be written in such extensive prose is because one has to overcome the fundamental problem that the Soviet Union is rich in ground forces; it is ground strength that we need, not naval strength.

The only reason why the mere publication of these documents has not already caused us tremendous diplomatic problems with our allies is because, of course, people do not take it seriously. The reason why we have not had an uproar in Japan, and elsewhere, caused by these maritime strategy proposals, which are really dangerously inflammatory, is because people don't take them seriously. În other words, the principal expressions of our military policy are not even taken seriously.

Now, let me just conclude by mentioning a couple of points here in detail from my particular below-the-stairs perspective as a consultant, accepting your goals.

First, on the CINC's: The commanders in chief of the unified commands, of course, in a sense represent those elements of the highest military echelon that are in contact with the outside strategic environment. Their colleagues who are service chiefs are much more in day-to-day contact with the internal inward reality of each service and, are therefore, obviously preoccupied by the current needs of the service.

Our commanders in chief are the ones who are in day-to-day contact with the external reality. Ambassador Komer quite correctly said that they have, of course, tremendous responsibilities and do not have the power to accomplish them. In fact, they have virtually no power compared to their responsibilities.

But to give some more detailed analysis of that particular point: each of the theaters is, of course, different in every way. One of the things that I think should happen and could happen, under the current proposals you mentioned, would be that the commanders in chief of the unified commands would have the opportunity to request or levy on the central system, theater-specific, task-configured combat forces, combat support forces, and service support forces. We are missing many opportunities in different theater situations to exploit particular enemy weaknesses or to adopt more economical or better solutions because the commanders in chief, in fact the whole theater echelon, do not have the means to mandate the creation of these theater-configured, task-specific forces.

On the question of readiness tradeoffs, Ambassador Komer was concerned that the unified commanders would have a systematic readiness bias. Now, I agree with Ambassador Komer. I have attempted to write an analysis of this on the fact that readiness by itself is not necessarily a good thing. Readiness is like cut flowers; the more you spend on readiness, the less you have for investment. One should not treat it as a substitute for strategic correctness. I am not sure if the commanders in chief, with the additional power you give them in these proposals, would stress readiness at the expense of force development.

Again, the problem would not arise if the unified commanders were presiding over a body of national defense officers that would be interchangeable and interchanging and intercommunicating with the national defense officers of the reformed JCS. In the present system, that is something to be watched.

One of the symptoms of—"the lack of strategy in our present system" is precisely that the grab for readiness is a substitute for strategy-as if readiness was a good in itself. It's not a good in itself. Everything you spend on readiness, day-by-day, is wasted on that day.

Now, the final point, the focus of analyses which have been performed over the years has been the question of resource allocation. I think all the different analysts have always tried to show how great was the waste of our resources because of this lack of a coherent military policy and the arbitrary divisions of these resources between service goals. Of course, there's another aspect to it. And that is what happens in combat. Not only are total national military resources arbitrarily divided, our operations of war have been arbitrarily divided, also.

General Bruce Palmer's book on Vietnam, I think, gives some very moderate, restrained and obviously sorrowful examples of this. The Iran hostage attempt was, of course, the most graphic illustration of it. We had Marine pilots flying Navy helicopters, to carry Army troops, to rendezvous with Air Force aircraft, in a commando operation. Whereas if there's one thing that even movies about commando operations tell you, it is that you don't mingle even the men of two different companies of the same battalion in that very high stress environment.

Now, when very intelligent and very dedicated, patriotic people do something which is such a crass and gross violation of the most elementary military principles—which, incidentally, involved also a violation of the principle of unity of command, because each of these components had its own commander-when very intelligent and dedicated people do something which is so atrocious, such a military atrocity, then I think we see before us the full, tremendous power of the single service pressures on these individuals. I mean, the Marine officer who successfully manipulated the joint system, as it now exists, to get his boys on board those helicopters so that the Corps wouldn't get cut out of the action, that Marine officer was doing something that, if he hadn't been under such pressure, he could never, possibly, have done.

In the case of Grenada-as I come to an end here-in the case of Grenada, we had another graphic illustration: a small island, twice the size of the District of Columbia, divided, bisected by a line which is the Army and Air Force on one side of that line, the Navy and Marines on the other. We have a very small island, where forces coming in by helicopter were moving in different air vehicles that needed dozens of miles just to keep them separated. Here we have the total space being so small that the bisection was obviously an arbitrary bureaucratic imposition on a situation that would not accommodate it any more than the Iran rescue attempt would accommodate that service division. And the result, of course, was the fact that, as usual, the people fought extremely well, the Rangers and others. For them it was not a small war. It was not a low intensity war for them. It was the real thing. They were parachuted in front of the enemy firing at them. They were betrayed by the joint command system as it now exists, which is not joint but, rather, shared out.

I heard, incidentally, the Chiefs emphasizing how Grenada was not-it was unfair, because they only had 48 hours to plan for it. Now, that is something that I regret that they've said, because for months before the Grenada operation we had senior administration officials pointing out what was happening on the Island of Grenada and making it quite clear that the United States would not, in fact, remain passive as a sort of savage parody of a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship implanted itself there.

And of course, we had the constant stream of complaints and requests from the neighboring countries. For the chiefs to say they only had 48 hours for it implies something much worse than they realize. It implies that they are so obsessed and absorbed by the day-to-day battles of the budget, by the bureaucratic gamesmanship

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