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I was opposed to that happening to the Armed Forces of the United States. The commanders ought to be the best possible commanders, not guys who get their tickets punched in order to get promoted on staff jobs later on, and the staff officers ought to be good staff officers. Sometimes good commanders are good staff officers and good staff officers are good commanders, and sometimes they're not. We ought to recognize that.

So I wouldn't want to see something written into legislation that made an elite corps out of guys who chose, of themselves, to get into joint duty, and then got choice assignments later on. By and large, people ought to be chosen for their capabilities to do the job that has to be done, and then they ought to march on and do that job whether they like to do it or not.

But some sort of a way of identifying people who have had joint duty, so you can get back to those people and choose the right people for joint duty, is an important thing. The joint subspecialty, if the words are right on how to do it, would work. But be very careful in how you write the words. Don't write something that creates a new monster out there. Really, the most useful thing that can be is to identify people who have had certain duties and then, whether or not they have those duties again ought to be based on how well they did them the first time. You know, you might get some “cluck" in there that can't hit his backside with both hands and you don't want him again. Just because he's been tabbed for that specialty, he rotates back again and you're stuck with the same people.

What I want on the Joint Staff are good, capable soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, who understand what happens in the combat units of the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines. They're the most valuable people on the Joint Staff, whether they had a joint specialty or whatever it was.

Now, there is a certain amount of training they ought to get. And let me put in a plug for training. Some years ago, I think as a result of the Clements Board, we took the old Armed Force Staff College, which was to train officers in joint operations, joint procedures and so forth, and the officers that went to that course were graduates of their own staff school. So they were already competent staff officers. But then they went on into the Armed Forces Staff College and they learned joint operations, joint planning, and that sort of thing. We turned out a very useful product.

Now, we've still got a good school down there. But nowadays, I believe as a result of the Clements Board's recommendations, they don't go to their own staff college before they go to the Armed Forces Staff College. So, in fact, you've got the school that's supposed to produce Joint Staff officers which is sort of second rate. It's a 6-month school. The service staff schools are 9-month schools. So the joint guys get 6 months and the service guys get 9 months.

Now, what you ought to do is go back to the system before, or what we ought to do—and I think the Secretary of Defense could probably do it-is send people to the Armed Forces Staff College who have already been to their service schools. Then they are competent staff officers and you start right out teaching them joint things. Then the Secretary ought to hold the service Chiefs and the Joint Chiefs to using those people in joint duties. You ought to send know, I, along with several other former military and civilian officials of the Defense Department, supported your JCS bill before the House, and I have testified in favor of it before the Senate. That, to me, is one major area that needs to be addressed.

Another area that needs to be addressed is the span of control of the Secretary of Defense. Based upon my experience, there are just too many people reporting to the Secretary of Defense. Consequently, he gets himself bogged down in areas that he should not be dealing with, but, by law, he must. This situation has arisen because every time we have a problem or somebody perceives a special interest, we create a new office reporting to the Secretary of Defense.

I think the Secretary of Defense should deal with no more than eight people. I have a suggested list in my prepared testimony. I think any Secretary ought to be free within his own leadership style to pick and choose with whom and how he wants to deal. What we have to get away from is forcing him to deal with particular offices. As you know, over the last couple of years a large number of new offices have been created, many by law.

You have asked me to comment specifically on four other areas. I will now do so.

I believe that the Defense agencies do a superb job. I was somewhat appalled by Congressman Courter's testimony because I supervised DLA for almost the last 5 years. He has never spoken to me, nor have I ever been made aware of any of the complaints that he mentioned. I know Secretary Wade and General Babers have also pointed out the fact that DLA does a good job and, in fact, they do a better job than the services in supplying parts. And I might also point out, as has been pointed out in their testimony, that DLA has indeed functioned in a war, the Vietnam war. Many people disagree with how we conducted that war and or even whether we should have intervened, but everybody agrees that from a logistic point of view it was conducted excellently.

There are indeed two problems with the Defense agencies, particularly with DLA. One is that we had a great deal of difficulty getting qualified officers to fill billets in DLA, and when we got a good one, we had a great deal of difficulty keeping him there. Admiral Grinstead and I, and then General Babers and I, spent a great deal of time trying to get and keep qualified officers in key billets.

The other problem and I think this leads to some of the perceptions that there is a parallel growth of staff-is that what has happened is that every time we transfer a function to a Defense agency, the services themselves keep a staff or grow another staff to duplicate the function. I know historically this was true in the case of the Defense Intelligence Agency. When I did my book on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a former member of the JCS told me how he had thwarted McNamara's reorganization of the intelligence area by reestablishing his own staff after their functions had been transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

In terms of joint military specialty, my view is that the best and the brightest are not on the Joint Staff. I think General Vessey has talked about some of the reasons why they are not. I think a strengthened Chairman, in accordance with the bill you have that works pretty well now. I don't think any real change is necessary in that.

Mr. NICHOLS. What would be your suggestion about requiring that before an officer could become a Chief of Staff he first have duty as a CINC commander

General VESSEY. Well, I think you tie the hands of the President and the Secretary by putting that in the law, because there aren't a lot of CINCs out there. For example, it would be tough to get to be Commandant of the Marine Corps-

Mr. NICHOLS. You're saying it would narrow his selection process?

General VESSEY. Sure, it narrows the selection. The President and Secretary ought to be able to choose the best guy when the time comes.

Mr. NICHOLS. Any further questions?

General, thank you very, very much for your presence here. Have a good trip back to Minnesota.

General VESSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Our next witness is Dr. Korb, who has been here all afternoon. Mr. Secretary, the last time you came before us, you came in another capacity. We are delighted to have you and you may proceed. STATEMENT OF HON. LAWRENCE J. KORB, VICE PRESIDENT,

CORPORATE OPERATIONS, RAYTHEON CO.; AND FORMER AS. SISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS AND LOGISTICS

Mr. KORB. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here. I know the hour is getting late. I have a prepared statement that I would like to submit for the record.

Mr. NICHOLS. Without objection, it will be inserted in the record.

Mr. KORB. I would just like to make a few comments. I would like to commend the chairmen of this subcommittee and the full committee for looking into this subject. I have spent most of my adult life concerned about defense organization, first on the outside, as what one might call an “armchair expert.” I have also spent the last almost 5 years inside the Pentagon.

5 By and large, I support the conclusions of the report of your colleagues in the Senate; namely, that there is need for change. If you try to understand why there is need for change, you have to remember that the structure we have in the Pentagon is a compromise structure. We have never made up our mind either in the executive or legislative branch whether, in fact, we want a unitary structure or a confederacy.

I believe what's interesting about the present debate is that in previous years many of the proposals that you yourself have advanced and the whole House has advanced and the Senate has advanced were advanced by former Secretaries of Defense and Presidents and then, in effect, turned down by the Congress. Now the situation is reversed.

Based upon my experience both inside and outside the Pentagon, I know that the only way to bring about change is on an evolutionary basis rather than by making very drastic changes. As you

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know, I, along with several other former military and civilian officials of the Defense Department, supported your JCS bill before the House, and I have testified in favor of it before the Senate. That, to me, is one major area that needs to be addressed.

Another area that needs to be addressed is the span of control of the Secretary of Defense. Based upon my experience, there are just too many people reporting to the Secretary of Defense. Consequently, he gets himself bogged down in areas that he should not be dealing with, but, by law, he must. This situation has arisen because every time we have a problem or somebody perceives a special interest, we create a new office reporting to the Secretary of Defense

I think the Secretary of Defense should deal with no more than eight people. I have a suggested list in my prepared testimony. I think any Secretary ought to be free within his own leadership style to pick and choose with whom and how he wants to deal. What we have to get away from is forcing him to deal with particular offices. As you know, over the last couple of years a large number of new offices have been created, many by law.

You have asked me to comment specifically on four other areas. I will now do so.

I believe that the Defense agencies do a superb job. I was somewhat appalled by Congressman Courter's testimony because I supervised DLA for almost the last 5 years. He has never spoken to me, nor have I ever been made aware of any of the complaints that he mentioned. I know Secretary Wade and General Babers have also pointed out the fact that DLA does a good job and, in fact, they do a better job than the services in supplying parts. And Í might also point out, as has been pointed out in their testimony, that DLA has indeed functioned in a war, the Vietnam war. Many people disagree with how we conducted that war and or even whether we should have intervened, but everybody agrees that from a logistic point of view it was conducted excellently.

There are indeed two problems with the Defense agencies, particularly with DLA. One is that we had a great deal of difficulty getting qualified officers to fill billets in DLA, and when we got a good one, we had a great deal of difficulty keeping him there. Admiral Grinstead and I, and then General Babers and I, spent a great deal of time trying to get and keep qualified officers in key billets.

The other problem-and I think this leads to some of the perceptions that there is a parallel growth of staff-is that what has happened is that every time we transfer a function to a Defense agency, the services themselves keep a staff or grow another staff to duplicate the function. I know historically this was true in the case of the Defense Intelligence Agency. When I did my book on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a former member of the JCS told me how he had thwarted McNamara's reorganization of the intelligence area by reestablishing his own staff after their functions had been transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

In terms of joint military specialty, my view is that the best and the brightest are not on the Joint Staff. I think General Vessey has talked about some of the reasons why they are not. I think a strengthened Chairman, in accordance with the bill you have passed, will help get the good people, and I have no objection to establishing a joint specialty, directly or indirectly. I would prefer that it be done by the executive branch rather than by the legislative branch.

As to military department headquarters, I believe a service secretary should be able to choose his own staff, and I think he should have civilians or military officers in the particular jobs as he or she sees fit. In the areas I dealt with-manpower, reserve affairs, installations and logistics—my experience was that when you have parallel civilian and military organizations, either the civilian appointee or the military would emerge as dominant. There was no clear pattern. Sometimes it was military and sometimes it was civilian. The other parallel organization more or less became superfluous.

In regard to the unified and specified commanders, I commend Secretary Weinberger's involvement of the CINC's in the Defense Resources Board. However, I think their influence or impact on that board was somewhat vitiated because at the same time they came on the board there was a tremendous expansion of the other members. I believe that the CINC's should have their own budgets. I supported the efforts of both General Jones and General Vessey to establish contingency budgets for the CINC's. I think that a strong Chairman, as established in your bill, will make lots of the perceived problems of the unified and specified commanders go away.

Our main problem now is to rebuild the defense consensus. Anything that we can do to help the organizational problems of the Department of Defense will enable it to make better use of its resources when the consensus is reestablished. But correcting management problems of the Department will be a necessary condition of reestablishing the consensus.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

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