know, I, along with several other former military and civilian officials of the Defense Department, supported your JCS bill before the House, and I have testified in favor of it before the Senate. That, to me, is one major area that needs to be addressed. Another area that needs to be addressed is the span of control of the Secretary of Defense. Based upon my experience, there are just too many people reporting to the Secretary of Defense. Consequently, he gets himself bogged down in areas that he should not be dealing with, but, by law, he must. This situation has arisen because every time we have a problem or somebody perceives a special interest, we create a new office reporting to the Secretary of Defense. I think the Secretary of Defense should deal with no more than eight people. I have a suggested list in my prepared testimony. I think any Secretary ought to be free within his own leadership style to pick and choose with whom and how he wants to deal. What we have to get away from is forcing him to deal with particular offices. As you know, over the last couple of years a large number of new offices have been created, many by law. You have asked me to comment specifically on four other areas. I will now do so. I believe that the Defense agencies do a superb job. I was somewhat appalled by Congressman Courter's testimony because I supervised DLA for almost the last 5 years. He has never spoken to me, nor have I ever been made aware of any of the complaints that he mentioned. I know Secretary Wade and General Babers have also pointed out the fact that DLA does a good job and, in fact, they do a better job than the services in supplying parts. And I might also point out, as has been pointed out in their testimony, that DLA has indeed functioned in a war, the Vietnam war. Many people disagree with how we conducted that war and or even whether we should have intervened, but everybody agrees that from a logistic point of view it was conducted excellently. There are indeed two problems with the Defense agencies, particularly with DLA. One is that we had a great deal of difficulty getting qualified officers to fill billets in DLA, and when we got a good one, we had a great deal of difficulty keeping him there. Admiral Grinstead and I, and then General Babers and I, spent a great deal of time trying to get and keep qualified officers in key billets. The other problem-and I think this leads to some of the perceptions that there is a parallel growth of staff-is that what has happened is that every time we transfer a function to a Defense agency, the services themselves keep a staff or grow another staff to duplicate the function. I know historically this was true in the case of the Defense Intelligence Agency. When I did my book on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a former member of the JCS told me how he had thwarted McNamara's reorganization of the intelligence area by reestablishing his own staff after their functions had been transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency. In terms of joint military specialty, my view is that the best and the brightest are not on the Joint Staff. I think General Vessey has talked about some of the reasons why they are not. I think a strengthened Chairman, in accordance with the bill you have passed, will help get the good people, and I have no objection to establishing a joint specialty, directly or indirectly. I would prefer that it be done by the executive branch rather than by the legislative branch. As to military department headquarters, I believe a service secretary should be able to choose his own staff, and I think he should have civilians or military officers in the particular jobs as he or she sees fit. In the areas I dealt with-manpower, reserve affairs, installations and logistics-my experience was that when you have parallel civilian and military organizations, either the civilian appointee or the military would emerge as dominant. There was no clear pattern. Sometimes it was military and sometimes it was civilian. The other parallel organization more or less became superfluous. In regard to the unified and specified commanders, I commend Secretary Weinberger's involvement of the CINC's in the Defense Resources Board. However, I think their influence or impact on that board was somewhat vitiated because at the same time they came on the board there was a tremendous expansion of the other members. I believe that the CINC's should have their own budgets. I supported the efforts of both General Jones and General Vessey to establish contingency budgets for the CINC's. I think that a strong Chairman, as established in your bill, will make lots of the perceived problems of the unified and specified commanders go away. Our main problem now is to rebuild the defense consensus. Anything that we can do to help the organizational problems of the Department of Defense will enable it to make better use of its resources when the consensus is reestablished. But correcting management problems of the Department will be a necessary condition of reestablishing the consensus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. PREPARED Statement of LAWRENCE J. KORB It is indeed a pleasure and a privilege to appear before this Subcommittee today to discuss the critical area of defense I can think of no subject that is more important organization. to the future health of our national security, and I commend the distinguished chairman of this subcommittee for his leadership in this area. The organization of the Department of Defense is an area that has concerned me most of my adult life. From the late 1960's through 1981, I approached the subject from an academic perspective. My research focused primarily on the JCS and the distribution of functions between OSD and the services. From early 1981 through September of 1985, I served as an Assistant Secretary of Defense with responsibilities for the areas of Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installation and Logistics. Thus, I was a participant in and a direct observer of the decisionmaking processes within the Department. Based upon my research and personal involvement in the process, I am convinced that the system is broke and is need for change. that there It is significant that the Congress is taking the initiative in this area. Too often in the past, Members of Congress have resisted efforts by the Executive Branch to fix the organizational problems of the DoD. The organization of the Do D has been defective since its establishment almost four decades ago. of DoD's organizational structure was a compromise between those who supported a unified department and those who wanted a bifurcated structure. Several Secretaries of Defense and Presidents have tried to remedy those shortcomings but have been thwarted by a combination bureaucratic inertia and such inaccurate historical analogies, as the "man on horseback" and the "German General staff." What is surprising is not that the Department functions poorly, but that, given its organizational problems, it functions at all. If we were designing the Department from scratch, we would not have created such an organizational monstrosity. Indeed, it is a tribute to the management skills of many of the people who have occupied the post of Secretary of Defense that DoD has performed as well as it has. is not one department. The basic problem with the Department of Defense is that it In reality it is at least four departments each with its formal powers and constituencies that force the top civilian and military executives, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS, to act more like weak mayors The Department of Defense still is rather than chief executives. However, given the much more a confederacy than a unitary form of organization. fact that the separate military proud traditions, as departments have long histories and practical matter, they cannot be eliminated. a What any organizational reform must do is to increase the likelihood that not believe that there can be too much formal power given to the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman. However, my research and experience tells me that increased centralization must be done on an evolutionary basis if it is to have any hope of gaining the necessary political support. Therefore, I believe that two comparatively modest steps be taken during the second formal powers of the session of the 99th Congress. Second, the span of First, the Chairman of the JCS must be strengthened. control of the Secretary must be reduced. the most critical problems only alleviate currently facing the Department but they also have an excellent chance of gaining the necessary support. I applaud this subcommittee for taking the leadership in the area of JCS reform. As you may know, I was one of the several former high ranking defense officials who signed a letter in support of HR 3622, and, on December 11, 1985, I testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in support of your JCS reform bill. It is my belief that HR 3622 will enable the Chairman to manage the OJCS more effectively and to provide the Secretary and the President with meaningful advice on operations, budgets, and strategy that transcends service viewpoints. out, However, by passing HR the problem. As the Senate report on DOD organization points the Office of the Secretary of Defense must be streamlined. Because of its centrifugal tendencies and because of the its activities, the Department of Defense is extremely difficult to manage. If the span of control of the Secretary is 3622 you have dealt with only half scope of too great, it is practically impossible. At the present time, the number of people reporting directly to the Secretary is far too numerous. In fact it is almost ridiculous. It seems like every time Do D has an actual or perceived problem, a new Assistant Secretary level position is created. During my four and one half years in the Pentagon, the positions of Reserve Affairs, Command, Control and Communications, Acquisition and Logistics, and Test and Evaluation were added to the rolls of those reporting directly to the Secretary. Secretary Now nearly every problem in the DoD must be resolved by the or the Deputy. Everything from AIDS to acquisition seems to require the direct involvement of the Secretary. The situation is getting worse instead of better. Two years ago the Undersecretary for Research and Engineering was the acquisition while my office czar handled readiness. Now both of these responsibilities have been shifted to the front office. The Secretary of Defense should control the Department through no more than eight individuals: a powerful chairman, the specifically research and engineering, readiness, policy, and financial affairs. All other officials, except for the secretary's immediate personal staff people like the general counsel, and the assistants for public and legislative affairs, ought to report to the Secretary through these eight individuals. |