of an emergency and you change acting deputies from the Marine Corps to the Army you're going to have two sets of thinking there at a very crucial time, that's why you should have a continuity. Also, I think that the Chairman ought to be able to have one person who he is in sync with-no pun intended-full time.

Can you expand on that?

Mr. BROWN. I have said what I think, and what you have said is certainly along the same lines.

I do think that it is better to have quarterly rotation than to have random rotation. I can understand that. Too often in the past, before the present administration, the arrangement was that the acting chairman was whoever happened to be in town. I suspect there is still some of that going on, because I just can't believe that, given the duties that the Chiefs of service have now, that the alternate for the quarter isn't often away at the same time as the Chairman.

Mr. SKELTON. Is it not true that a vice chief of a service is really second in command of that service?

Mr. BROWN. That's how they work. When the Chief is away, it's the Vice Chief who is in charge, not just one of the deputy chiefs who happens to be the one designated for that function during the quarter.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Secretary, will you remind us about your time? Mr. BROWN. I am going to have to leave in about 20 minutes, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. I would ask the members to be cognizant of that. Mr. Hopkins.

Mr. HOPKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, welcome back. I remember very well your explanation about why we needed the triad. I thought at that time it's the best one that I had heard. I haven't heard one better since then.

Let me ask you this. The Senate staff report recommended reorganization of the Office of the Secretary of Defense along mission lines. What is your position on that, based on your experience?

Mr. BROWN. My view is that they are dealing with a real problem, but they are dealing with it in an overly restrictive manner. I think it is true that the Secretary of Defense's office ought to pay more attention to mission outputs, not just to resource inputs.

On the other hand, there are already organizations in the Department of Defense that are concerned with that. In particular, the CINC's clearly are concerned with that. And it is not clear to me that you solve the problem by replacing a functional organization with a mission output organization at the top. You don't do that in industry. I mean, if you look at the organization of General Motors, the executive vice presidents are not the staff people, are not organized by Oldsmobile, Buick, and so forth. That's how you organize the field.

Yet they are right. There should be more attention to this problem. I am afraid they have done it the wrong way. What they have done really is replace-as I told the Senate staff people, so I am not saying anything new-the director of program analysis and evaluation with three Under Secretaries of Defense. That kind of mission

output study is done or should be done in the PA&E office. It also needs to be done in the Office of the Under Secretary for Policy and the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs.

So, they have hit on a problem, but I don't think they have hit on the right solution.

I believe that a Secretary of Defense needs a certain leeway in organizing his staff. And to prescribe the Under Secretaries that way is a mistake. But I don't want to make too big an issue out of it, because I don't want to appear to be saying that there shouldn't be more emphasis on mission outputs; there should.

Mr. HOPKINS. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you finally, if I may. We had breakfast this morning with Mr. Packard of the Packard Commission, who is going to announce, I believe tomorrow or the next day, its findings and recommendations. Basically, they find themselves running parallel along most of the mainstream recommendations of Senator Goldwater and Senator Nunn as far as reorganization is concerned.

We have had a parade of witnesses come marching by us, namely the Secretaries, the Secretary of the Army, Navy, Air Force. We have had all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are opposed to that. Where do you stand on that, in a nutshell?

Mr. BROWN. I stand, by and large, with those who favor substantial reorganization, along the general lines of the Senate bill and of these bills. I mean, I said earlier that there are lots of individual things I would disagree with, nitpick on. And also, I have some concern about putting too much into legislation. But I have very little doubt that this is the right direction for change.

Now, when I say that, I do not mean to impugn the judgment or the motives or the integrity or the patriotism or the ability of all the people who are now in office and have come up and told you things are just great now, we get along, we have the right people as opposed to the wrong people, and things are going well.

I think there have been some improvements over the past few years in the way these things are handled. A lot of that is the result of prodding from the outside. But one reason that improvements have happened is there has been a lot more money. When budgets are made by stapling together the requests and sending them up there's less argument about priorities since everybody gets all the high priority things he wants. Those days are over, clearly. I think that that amity and lack of strife and collegiality that have characterized the past few years are largely now very much in danger under new and much more stringent budgetary circumstances. Even if you do make changes, there is going to be a lot more clawing inside the Department of Defense. If you don't make changes, I think it may be worse than anything we have seen so far.

Mr. HOPKINS. Thank you very much.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Kasich.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Secretary, as you know, there is a proposal to try to combine the staffs. I have not been too excited about that idea to this point, probably because Secretary Marsh gave us outstanding testimony about his concerns about civilian control and military control, if you combine the staffs. I wonder what your view is on that, particularly in regard to service secretaries? I be

lieve that staff size means power. If a service Secretary has 200 or 300 staff people, and the service Chief has 2,000 or 3,000 people under him, that in itself makes a statement. I wondered what your view is on that overall argument?

Mr. BROWN. As you may know, Mr. Kasich, I was Secretary of a military department during the 1965-69 period, so I have some experience with this. I think you are right, that if a service chief has 3,000 and the service secretary has 300, that has some influence on their relative weight. But that's how it is now. I think that is probably how it should be, because the real continuity has to be provided by the military staffs plus the civilian staff that stays on. A service secretary brings in a rather narrow layer with him.

Like it or not, how effective he is will depend upon his own personality, how well he is able to impose his views on the military people, or how well he is able to persuade them that he will do better for them with the Secretary of Defense and with the Congress than they can do for themselves. Such a person will be effective in his past examples and also his present examples.

My experience was that a service Secretary does need a small staff to provide him with some independence but that far more of the function could be integrated than now is. I would think that that would make quite a lot of sense.

You know, the number of 30, which is given in the draft legislation, is not a bad number. With that number of people working for you, if you can really pick them yourself, you can exercise significant supervision. Just how you integrate the service staffs with the secretarial staffs would need to be worked out. There is the problem of who works for whom. And the way you've got it in the bill, or the committee staff has it in the bill, civilian supremacy is really quite well preserved, because the Deputy Chiefs of staff are made responsible to the assistant secretaries of service as well as to the Chief of Staff.

I am not sure how well the chiefs of service will like that. But in a cooperative atmosphere that's how it works anyway. That's how it worked, I think, when I was Secretary of the Air Force. The manpower staff served the Assistant Secretary for Manpower as well as serving the Chief on these matters. And the Deputy Chief of Staff for R&D served the Assistant Secretary as well as the chief.

Making that (by law or directive) the intention, will strengthen the service Secretary enough, I think, to compensate for any dilution that might come from reducing the numbers of people that directly report to him.

Mr. HOPKINS. Are there too many procurement decisions that are driven early by military types? Did you have the difficulty, an inability of the service Secretary to be able to make a decision as to whether we should have a weapon system or not, and it's too far down the road, and those kinds of problems?

Mr. BROWN. Such programs do establish a substantial momentum of their own. But that's not just a military-civilian matter. It also is a matter of how long those decisions are in the works and how long a weapons program takes, on the one hand, and the relatively short tenure of civilian personnel, on the other hand.

In the present administration, at least in the services, you've had service secretaries in there 4 years, and some of their assistants in there almost as long. That, I think, has to some degree eased this problem.

But I accept the point that service secretaries are limited in their ability to affect these matters. I don't think that is solved by giving them more staff, because I think it's primarily a problem of short time on the job.

Again, my own experience was that, in a situation where I knew something about it and took a strong stand, I could get the cooperation. I could essentially push the chief, or instruct the chief, and have it come out the right way or the way I wanted. The example I remember most strongly is the A-7 decision. Getting the Air Force to order A-7's was not an easy task, but it worked because there was genuine cooperation between the military and civilian staffs. Mr. KASICH. A final question. Mr. Brown, do you think we should have requirements for who should be a service Secretary? Should there be some standard established by Congress, or does that preempt Presidential authority and Presidential

Mr. BROWN. You know, I don't think that a peculiar set of qualifications for being a service secretary ought to be established any more than they should be for any other Cabinet office. After all, once you start this, who knows where you'll stop? You may wind up putting it into law for Congressmen, too. [Laughter.] Mr. KASICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Lally, do you have any questions?
Mr. LALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Brown, you have endorsed substantial reorganization. You express some hesitancy, though, about incorporating too much of it in legislation. We recognize the inflexibility of legislation. But in the absence of legislation, how would you propose this reform, which you believe should be carried out, could be carried out?

Mr. BROWN. I think it can't be done without some legislation. The existing legislation was written in an atmosphere and has carried on a long tradition of a certain balance between the services and the joint activities. And to change that atmosphere, you are going to need legislation. So, I would not want what I said to imply that no legislation is needed. I think substantial legislation is needed. The only question in my mind is how detailed does it make sense to have it be.

Mr. LALLY. I have one further question.

The subcommittee has pending before it a bill which would abolish the Defense Logistics Agency and the Defense Contract Audit Agency and transfer those functions to the services, but at the same time prohibit the services any increase in their civilian personnel. Do you believe that that is a feasible solution to this problem?

Mr. BROWN. No; I don't. In the first place, I don't think the DLA ought to be abolished. I think if it has overreached, it should be cut back. The implication of such a bill is that DLA has just made more work for everybody, and if you abolish it, you just don't need any more people. I don't think that's right.

Mr. LALLY. Thank you, Doctor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett, the Secretary has 4 minutes.
Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You mentioned the area of support and administration for the CINC's. This is a gray area, and it would be a mistake to, I think, move large elements of support and administration to the CINC's. Mr. BROWN. Well, let me see whether I can avoid any misunderstanding

Mr. BARRETT. Let me say one thing.

Mr. BROWN. Go ahead.

Mr. BARRETT. The law prohibits any support and administration-

Mr. BROWN. That and

Mr. BARRETT. That's what I wanted

Mr. BROWN. OK, that's what I want to correct, a possible misapprehension.

The CINC's now have to depend entirely on their component commands, and that's not good. I mean, the CINC's have to depend on them for communication. They have to depend on them for all those functions. That ought to be changed.

The CINC ought to have authority to reorganize his command so that he has a staff that serves him and doesn't have to rely on the component commands. In fact, he should be able to organize within those component commands, within limits.

What I was concerned about is that the CINC's would take on procurement functions, functions that really are done by service headquarters: training functions, things that are not now in a component command. And I think that there I would be cautious. Mr. BARRETT. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate your being with us this morning, sir.

Mr. BROWN. I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. NICHOLS. I hope you make your bus schedule.

Our next witness this morning is an old friend of the committee, Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army, retired. General Goodpaster served in the Army for almost four decades. His assignments included combat experience in World War II and in Korea, service on the National Security Council staff in the Eisenhower White House, and command of all NATO forces in Western Europe when he was CINC of the European Command. Following his retirement from active duty, he was recalled to service to serve as Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy. General Goodpaster has a doctor's degree from Princeton University and was considered one of the Army's great intellectual leaders on the postwar era.

General, we are delighted to have you back with us this morning and look forward to your testimony as always.

STATEMENT OF GEN. ANDREW J. GOODPASTER (U.S. ARMY, RETIRED), FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

General GOODPASTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I very much welcome the opportunity to be here with you. May I say that I did not have the opportunity to serve in combat in Korea, but I may have made up for that a bit in Vietnam.