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lieve that staff size means power. If a service Secretary has 200 or 300 staff people, and the service Chief has 2,000 or 3,000 people under him, that in itself makes a statement. I wondered what your view is on that overall argument?
Mr. BROWN. As you may know, Mr. Kasich, I was Secretary of a military department during the 1965-69 period, so I have some experience with this. I think you are right, that if a service chief has 3,000 and the service secretary has 300, that has some influence on their relative weight. But that's how it is now. I think that is probably how it should be, because the real continuity has to be provided by the military staffs plus the civilian staff that stays on. A service secretary brings in a rather narrow layer with him.
Like it or not, how effective he is will depend upon his own personality, how well he is able to impose his views on the military people, or how well he is able to persuade them that he will do better for them with the Secretary of Defense and with the Congress than they can do for themselves. Such a person will be effective in his past examples and also his present examples.
My experience was that a service Secretary does need a small staff to provide him with some independence but that far more of the function could be integrated than now is. I would think that that would make quite a lot of sense.
You know, the number of 30, which is given in the draft legislation, is not a bad number. With that number of people working for you, if you can really pick them yourself, you can exercise significant supervision. Just how you integrate the service staffs with the secretarial staffs would need to be worked out. There is the problem of who works for whom. And the way you've got it in the bill, or the committee staff has it in the bill, civilian supremacy is really quite well preserved, because the Deputy Chiefs of staff are made responsible to the assistant secretaries of service as well as to the Chief of Staff.
I am not sure how well the chiefs of service will like that. But in a cooperative atmosphere that's how it works anyway. That's how it worked, I think, when I was Secretary of the Air Force. The manpower staff served the Assistant Secretary for Manpower as well as serving the Chief on these matters. And the Deputy Chief of Staff for R&D served the Assistant Secretary as well as the chief.
Making that (by law or directive) the intention, will strengthen the service Secretary enough, I think, to compensate for any dilution that might come from reducing the numbers of people that directly report to him.
Mr. HOPKINS. Are there too many procurement decisions that are driven early by military types? Did you have the difficulty, an inability of the service Secretary to be able to make a decision as to whether we should have a weapon system or not, and it's too far down the road, and those kinds of problems?
Mr. BROWN. Such programs do establish a substantial momentum of their own. But that's not just a military-civilian matter. It also is a matter of how long those decisions are in the works and how long a weapons program takes, on the one hand, and the relatively short tenure of civilian personnel, on the other hand.
In the present administration, at least in the services, you've had service secretaries in there 4 years, and some of their assistants in there almost as long. That, I think, has to some degree eased this problem.
But I accept the point that service secretaries are limited in their ability to affect these matters. I don't think that is solved by giving them more staff, because I think it's primarily a problem of short time on the job.
Again, my own experience was that, in a situation where I knew something about it and took a strong stand, I could get the cooperation. I could essentially push the chief, or instruct the chief, and have it come out the right way or the way I wanted. The example I remember most strongly is the A-7 decision. Getting the Air Force to order A-7's was not an easy task, but it worked because there was genuine cooperation between the military and civilian staffs.
Mr. KASICH. A final question. Mr. Brown, do you think we should have requirements for who should be a service Secretary? Should there be some standard established by Congress, or does that preempt Presidential authority and Presidential
Mr. BROWN. You know, I don't think that a peculiar set of qualifications for being a service secretary ought to be established any more than they should be for any other Cabinet office. After all, once you start this, who knows where you'll stop? You may wind up putting it into law for Congressmen, too. [Laughter.] Mr. KASICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Lally, do you have any questions? Mr. LALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Brown, you have endorsed substantial reorganization. You express some hesitancy, though, about incorporating too much of it in legislation. We recognize the inflexibility of legislation. But in the absence of legislation, how would you propose this reform, which you believe should be carried out, could be carried out?
Mr. BROWN. I think it can't be done without some legislation. The existing legislation was written in an atmosphere and has carried on a long tradition of a certain balance between the services and the joint activities. And to change that atmosphere, you are going to need legislation. So, I would not want what I said to imply that no legislation is needed. I think substantial legislation is needed. The only question in my mind is how detailed does it make sense to have it be.
Mr. LALLY. I have one further question. The subcommittee has pending before it a bill which would abolish the Defense Logistics Agency and the Defense Contract Audit Agency and transfer those functions to the services, but at the same time prohibit the services any increase in their civilian personnel. Do you believe that that is a feasible solution to this problem?
Mr. Brown. No; I don't. In the first place, I don't think the DLA ought to be abolished. I think if it has overreached, it should be cut back. The implication of such a bill is that DLA has just made more work for everybody, and if you abolish it, you just don't need any more people. I don't think that's right.
Mr. LALLY. Thank you, Doctor.
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett, the Secretary has 4 minutes. Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You mentioned the area of support and administration for the CINC's. This is a gray area, and it would be a mistake to, I think, move large elements of support and administration to the CINC's.
Mr. Brown. Well, let me see whether I can avoid any misunderstanding
Mr. BARRETT. Let me say one thing.
Mr. BARRETT. The law prohibits any support and administration-4
Mr. BROWN. That and-
Mr. BROWN. OK, that's what I want to correct, a possible misapprehension.
The CINC's now have to depend entirely on their component commands, and that's not good. I mean, the CINC's have to depend on them for communication. They have to depend on them for all those functions. That ought to be changed.
The CINC ought to have authority to reorganize his command so that he has a staff that serves him and doesn't have to rely on the component commands. In fact, he should be able to organize within those component commands, within limits.
What I was concerned about is that the CINC's would take on procurement functions, functions that really are done by service headquarters: training functions, things that are not now in a component command. And I think that there I would be cautious.
Mr. BARRETT. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate your being with us this morning, sir.
Mr. BROWN. I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chairman.
Our next witness this morning is an old friend of the committee, Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, U.S. Army, retired. General Goodpaster served in the Army for almost four decades. His assignments included combat experience in World War II and in Korea, service on the National Security Council staff in the Eisenhower White House, and command of all NATO forces in Western Europe when he was CINC of the European Command. Following his retirement from active duty, he was recalled to service to serve as Superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy. General Goodpaster has a doctor's degree from Princeton University and was considered one of the Army's great intellectual leaders on the postwar era.
General, we are delighted to have you back with us this morning and look forward to your testimony as always.
STATEMENT OF GEN. ANDREW J. GOODPASTER (U.S. ARMY, RE-
I very much welcome the opportunity to be here with you. May I say that I did not have the opportunity to serve in combat in Korea, but I may have made up for that a bit in Vietnam.
Mr. NICHOLS. We will correct that on the record, General. General GOODPASTER. In particular, having heard the comments of Secretary Brown, I would like to endorse very strongly the greater emphasis that I see now being placed on what I regard as our overall military goal. And that is the ability to carry out, efficiently and effectively, the operations that our security needs and objectives may require. That is the output, end, the product. That is the product of what this military machine provides. A greater emphasis on that, I think, will provide a useful balance to the attention that has been given and should continue to be given to the inputs, that is, the activities of the service departments.
I think that the steps that are being considered and proposed with respect to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are crucial to this whole enterprise. I believe that, if substantial change is made there and if some of the inhibitions that are woven into the legislation at the present time are removed, that a process will be started that will cumulatively put more emphasis on the output, on the effectiveness of the forces and their ability to do the job that our Nation requires.
I have some prepared remarks, which I might say are very little changed from the statement I made before this subcommittee in May 1982 and also before the Senate Armed Services Committee late last year.
Mr. NICHOLS. Those remarks, without objection, will be inserted into the record, General.
General GOODPASTER. Thank you, sir.
My views remain as set out. I would like to very briefly go over the main recommendations that I have made, which I believe show the path toward this greater military effectiveness.
Those include strengthening the role of the Chairman by making him, by statute, the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense; to include among his functions that of principal military staff assistant to the President and the Secretary of Defense in supervising and directing the unified and specified commands. Here I would
have the command line go from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commands with the Chairman serving as military staff in that function, not in a command role, but as principal military staff assistant, to make these things happen.
I would provide a vice chairman, of a different service, subordinate to the chairman, but with functions coextensive with his own. And I would make him second in rank only to the chairman.
I would give the Chairman full authority over the Joint Staff, removing limits on its size, and simply control its size and composition through the normal program and budget process of the executive and the legislative branches.
I would continue the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise the Chairman, and the Secretary of Defense when he so elects, on matters pertaining to the capabilities and readiness of the forces of their respective services to perform their operational roles. That should be their concentration, I believe.
I would sharply reduce service staff involvement in the joint process, limiting it to coordination relating to these service capabilities.
I would authorize the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, to prescribe staff level coordination procedures between the joint and service staffs, together with arrangements for the provision of service information to the Joint Staff. I would like to stress this. That is extremely important—that means be provided by which the necessary information can be made available to the Joint Staff. If you control and withhold that information, you are really controlling and withholding, and very heavily influencing, the decisions that can be made. I would vest that authority, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense in the Chairman.
I would broaden the training and experience and rewards for joint duty and would authorize the Chairman to review and advise the Secretary of Defense regarding all recommendations for threeand four-star officer command assignment to operational forces, both service and joint, and also to the Joint Staff.
I would give the commanders of the unified and specified commands a stronger voice in setting defense requirements, supervising the training and the readiness, including the peacetime operation and maintenance of the forces under their command.
I believe that steps along these lines will make a material contribution to a more effective defense organization.
Now I would like to go on and give some comments regarding the defense reorganization proposals that are before this committee. I have had opportunity to make what I can only call a quick analysis of those, having had them a relatively short time, and not having had the benefit of study in depth of many of these important provisions.
I have also had opportunity to scan, and only that, because I received it only last evening, the actual draft legislation that has been prepared by the staff. But I think my comments on the summary of defense reorganization proposals that are before the subcommittee will be consistent with what I would want to say about the draft legislation itself.
My own experience has been most extensive and recent and responsible with regard to the unified and the specified commands. I will comment primarily, and in detail, on those proposals and make more limited and general comments on the other topics where, as I suggest, careful studies by the responsible officers and officials in the Defense Department are certainly going to be needed.
My general comment is this. If steps such as those recommended for the Chairman and for the Joint Staff are taken, then responsibilities will be more clearly fixed. The Secretary of Defense, with this stronger joint military support, will be in position to shape and implement many new measures along the lines that I know the subcommittee is interested in. It may not be necessary to put as many provisions into legislation as have now been set out.
Now in more detail, let me go item by item if I may. First, with regard to the unified and the specified commands. In this proposal 12 principal points are included. I would like to comment by exception, that is, except where I so indicate in my specific comments which will follow, I support each of these 12 main points and the subpoints that are under them.