Mr. NICHOLS. We will correct that on the record, General.

General GOODPASTER. In particular, having heard the comments of Secretary Brown, I would like to endorse very strongly the greater emphasis that I see now being placed on what I regard as our overall military goal. And that is the ability to carry out, efficiently and effectively, the operations that our security needs and objectives may require. That is the output, end, the product. That is the product of what this military machine provides. A greater emphasis on that, I think, will provide a useful balance to the attention that has been given and should continue to be given to the inputs, that is, the activities of the service departments.

I think that the steps that are being considered and proposed with respect to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are crucial to this whole enterprise. I believe that, if substantial change is made there and if some of the inhibitions that are woven into the legislation at the present time are removed, that a process will be started that will cumulatively put more emphasis on the output, on the effectiveness of the forces and their ability to do the job that our Nation requires.

I have some prepared remarks, which I might say are very little changed from the statement I made before this subcommittee in May 1982 and also before the Senate Armed Services Committee late last year.

Mr. NICHOLS. Those remarks, without objection, will be inserted into the record, General.

General GOODPASTER. Thank you, sir.

My views remain as set out. I would like to very briefly go over the main recommendations that I have made, which I believe show the path toward this greater military effectiveness.

Those include strengthening the role of the Chairman by making him, by statute, the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense; to include among his functions that of principal military staff assistant to the President and the Secretary of Defense in supervising and directing the unified and specified commands. Here I would have the command line go from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commands with the Chairman serving as military staff in that function, not in a command role, but as principal military staff assistant, to make these things happen.

I would provide a vice chairman, of a different service, subordinate to the chairman, but with functions coextensive with his own. And I would make him second in rank only to the chairman.

I would give the Chairman full authority over the Joint Staff, removing limits on its size, and simply control its size and composition through the normal program and budget process of the executive and the legislative branches.

I would continue the Joint Chiefs of Staff to advise the Chairman, and the Secretary of Defense when he so elects, on matters pertaining to the capabilities and readiness of the forces of their respective services to perform their operational roles. That should be their concentration, I believe.

I would sharply reduce service staff involvement in the joint process, limiting it to coordination relating to these service capabilities.

I would authorize the Chairman, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense, to prescribe staff level coordination procedures between the joint and service staffs, together with arrangements for the provision of service information to the Joint Staff. I would like to stress this. That is extremely important-that means be provided by which the necessary information can be made available to the Joint Staff. If you control and withhold that information, you are really controlling and withholding, and very heavily influencing, the decisions that can be made. I would vest that authority, with the approval of the Secretary of Defense in the Chairman.

I would broaden the training and experience and rewards for joint duty and would authorize the Chairman to review and advise the Secretary of Defense regarding all recommendations for threeand four-star officer command assignment to operational forces, both service and joint, and also to the Joint Staff.

I would give the commanders of the unified and specified commands a stronger voice in setting defense requirements, supervising the training and the readiness, including the peacetime operation and maintenance of the forces under their command.

I believe that steps along these lines will make a material contribution to a more effective defense organization.

Now I would like to go on and give some comments regarding the defense reorganization proposals that are before this committee. I have had opportunity to make what I can only call a quick analysis of those, having had them a relatively short time, and not having had the benefit of study in depth of many of these important provisions.

I have also had opportunity to scan, and only that, because I received it only last evening, the actual draft legislation that has been prepared by the staff. But I think my comments on the summary of defense reorganization proposals that are before the subcommittee will be consistent with what I would want to say about the draft legislation itself.

My own experience has been most extensive and recent and responsible with regard to the unified and the specified commands. I will comment primarily, and in detail, on those proposals and make more limited and general comments on the other topics where, as I suggest, careful studies by the responsible officers and officials in the Defense Department are certainly going to be needed.

My general comment is this. If steps such as those recommended for the Chairman and for the Joint Staff are taken, then responsibilities will be more clearly fixed. The Secretary of Defense, with this stronger joint military support, will be in position to shape and implement many new measures along the lines that I know the subcommittee is interested in. It may not be necessary to put as many provisions into legislation as have now been set out.

Now in more detail, let me go item by item if I may. First, with regard to the unified and the specified commands. In this proposal 12 principal points are included. I would like to comment by exception, that is, except where I so indicate in my specific comments which will follow, I support each of these 12 main points and the subpoints that are under them.

Now to go to some of the exceptions or qualifications or cautions that I would want to suggest.

Under command, the third of the points under the unified and specified commands, I would want to consider further the proposal for the commander to exercise the Uniform Code of Military Justice jurisdiction. In order to keep his focus on operations, I would hope that it would be possible to avoid this administrative responsibility. Only if it's necessary to make his authority crystal clear would I recommend this. But if it is necessary in order to make it crystal clear, then I certainly would want to see that done. I think the real strength of these proposals is to strengthen his ability to command as a commander.

Also under command, I would provide that communication between the subordinate commands and the DOD elements be through the unified commander or-I would add this-as he may authorize or direct. That does not appear in the list of defense reorganization proposals, but I noticed in my quick scanning of the legislation that that provision has been added in

Mr. NICHOLS. General, will you repeat that?
General GOODPASTER. Yes.

I would provide that communication between the subordinate commands and the DOD elements be through the unified commander, as is stated in this paper, or-and I would add this-as he may authorize or direct.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, sir.

General GOODPASTER. Third, with respect to support and administration, I would make sure that the Secretary of Defense had unquestioned authority to make the kinds of shifts that are proposed here. That is the main point. But I see value in leaving the bulk of support functions with the services if they and the Secretary of Defense can make the new system work in a way that would support the needs of the unified and the specified commands. And this bears on the next item, resources.

Again, I would recommend simply making it completely clear that the Secretary of Defense has clear authority to assign support and administrative responsibilities, as required in his view, for efficiency and operational effectiveness.

That I think, will require some change in the law in order to remove what are currently regarded as inhibitions with regard to shifting functions of that kind.

But rather than have the unified and specified commands maintain the support program and the budget for the forces under their command, I would prefer to see those commanders submit recommendations calling for specific levels of training, specific levels of maintenance, equipment and support, again, if that method can be made to work. And the same comment would apply to the proposed CINC operating budget.

I would like to see him make recommendations for that but not have to maintain that himself. My concern here is that you might see a building-up of administrative and support activities in those headquarters which I believe could better be done more centrally, if simple and clear recommendations are submitted by him.

Now, if there is obstruction and if somehow that is circumvented, so that his recommendations simply will not have influence over

the level of training, the number of flying hours, sailing days, training to what level, battalion, brigade, division, on the Army side, then I think vesting that program and budget function in the commander in chief may be required. But I would like to see an effort made to accomplish this without that administrative step at the present time.

I would not support the proposal for a formally established joint commanders council. Command councils, I think, are not very wise. If you have picked your chairman properly and he has proper staff and proper supervision, then I don't think that it is desirable to impose, by legislation some requirement as to how he forms his view and prepares his decision. I believe that, if the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman is given the role and authority that I think he should have and that is now being proposed, this would be unnecessary. Establishing it formally would impair the flexibility that he should be accorded. I would say that he will undoubtedly have commanders conferences as an aid in ensuring the accomplishment of the very functions that are listed here. So, my disagreement is really with the mode of accomplishing that which is being proposed.

With respect to streamlining the chain of command for contingencies and rationalizing the unified command plan from time to time, I would recommend that authority simply be vested in a very explicit way in the Secretary of Defense, with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that the conduct of reviews and provision of advice and recommendations by the Chairman be made one of his explicit duties. I think that is very much along the line of the proposal, though probably it does not specify to the same extent in legislation exactly how this would be done. Now, with respect to the uniform readiness system, I am going to comment on that specifically, not to disagree at all but to strongly agree with the proposal that is being made. I believe that such a system of evaluation is of vital importance to sound decision and wise policy.

I might say in that regard, that when I was commander in chief in Europe, my deputy commander in chief on his own developed such an evaluation. It was not received with great joy in Washington, but we felt it was our duty to make and provide such an evaluation. That I would like to see nailed down as part of the function of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

As I have indicated, my comments on the other three principal elements of the proposal will be much briefer and more general.

With regard to joint officer personnel, I support the establishment of a joint subspecialty as a central principle. Beyond this, I simply have not studied the issues in sufficient detail and in context to reach conclusions. These specifics should, in my view, be subjected to extremely careful and thorough study because they do bear on the morale and the fighting spirit of the forces. I would not want to derogate in any way from the people who are serving in the units of our combatant forces, which are the true bedrock of our military strength. But I think the proposal is a move in the right direction. If implemented with consideration of those factors, it can be a plus without detriment to the fighting elements of the forces.

With respect to restructuring the service departmental headquarters, the proposal has substantial appeal but again, of course, will need to be examined in full detail to see just how it will work element by element of the departmental staff and the secretariat in each department. I regard this as truly a task for the Secretary of Defense and feel also that any overspecifying in advance should be avoided. In other words, he should have opportunity to go into that thoroughly with his service secretaries.

A substantial shift of operations, planning and intelligence functions to the joint structure appears to me to be appropriate and should be made on the determination of the Secretary of Defense. This comment is very much in line with the proposal as made.

With respect to the proposals relating to the defense agencies, here again I suggest looking to the Secretary of Defense for overall guidance and decision and to the Chairman for review and recommendation in such matters as planning and exercise and readiness. I think that conforms to the thrust of the recommendations that are before you.

A strengthening of these agencies appears to me to be in order. Changes that affect service responsibilities would require particularly careful evaluation to make sure that there is no division of responsibility that would leave confusion as to just who has the responsibility for efficient, timely procurement and the like. Again, I question the proposal to establish policy councils and instead would simply recommend highlighting the authority and responsibility of the Secretary of Defense to ensure defense agency responsiveness to combat-related operational requirements, recognizing that he might well decide to make use of such policy councils to assist him in the process. But I would leave that to him.

Mr. Chairman, throughout these brief remarks I think one particular line of recommendations appears, and that is to vest clear authority and responsibility in the Secretary of Defense and, as his principal military adviser, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If this is done, and if the unified and specified commanders and the Joint Staff are strengthened, then much of what is being sought will quite certainly be furthered without overspecification or the danger of premature decision.

I think a process will be set in motion, and a new balance will be struck which will in itself inherently have the effect of moving the whole operation in the right direction.

I consider that the actions and the directions proposed would be of significant value to our military posture and, beyond that, to our stable and durable national security.

I hope my comments have been of some assistance in this regard. PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. ANDREW J. GOODPASTER, U.S. ARMY (RET.)

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to appear before this Committee as it considers the issue of strengthened and improved Defense organization. I was directly involved in the recent study which produced the report "Toward a More Effective Defense", conducted by the CSIS Defense Organization Project, of which Phil Odeen was Chairman, and Mel Laird and I were Vice-Chairmen. I have also had the opportunity to read the House of Representatives Report on H.R. 3622, as well as the Staff Report of the Senate Armed Services Committee (of 16 October 1985) entitled "Defense Organization: The Need for Change"-and concur with the central premise of all three of three of these reports that serious problems exist, and that