substantial improvements in organization and function are needed—and are possible. My remarks will be centered on top-level military organization and responsibility, both in Washington and in the field. First and foremost, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization as it now exists is in serious need of improvement. Military advise and planning are deficient in quality, timeliness and effectiveness. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff bear only part of the responsibility, they bear an important part. To much too great a degree, we see the results of piecemeal approaches lacking an effective integrating strategy, and concentrating on programs relating to particular weapons and services rather than operational plans and requirements. The contributions to increased military efficiency and effectiveness that could be made through improved top-level military planning and advice are not being realized. In particular, the mechanisms for providing coherent overall strategic plans, and responding to overall national security interests and needs, are far weaker than those for developing and advancing individual Service interests, and promoting individual weapons systems. The difficulties and shortcomings of the present system, some of them cited by recent JCS members themselves, extend from the adequacy and objectivity of the information fed into the planning process to the effectiveness of the process itself and to the timeliness, usefulness and validity of the advice and the plans that are the final product of the JCS effort. These weaknesses are reflected as well in deficiencies in our ability to plan and conduct military operations in the field with full effectiveness. The information provided by service staffs is mixed with service interest and service positions. The information and recommendations from the unified and specified commands need to be greatly strengthened, and reflected more strongly in overall military planning and resource allocation. The "corporate duties" of the JCS, repeatedly emphasized by President Eisenhower, have not in fact been given the kind of priority he recommended and the contribution of the JCS has declined, leaving a gap in overall military advice as an input to Defense decisions, which OSD civilians are not and will not be able to fill. The service Chiefs of Staff are heavily burdened with service responsibilities, and their attention is strongly focussed on Service activities and interests. The staff process for joint matters is combersome, laborious and characterized by watering-down and logrolling through repeated layers of review and revision. The product-military advice and plans-lacks the timeliness and responsiveness it should have, reflects too much of "weapons push" and service proponency rather than an "operational requirements pull" based in overall strategy. Although recent steps toward improvement have been made, joint advice on budget formation and resource allocation, though a heavy burden to the whole joint organization, lacks the necessary realism and financial constraint and does not influence these decisions in a sufficiently major and useful way. In considering what should be done concerning these gaps and shortcomings, first let me say that I am not criticizing the individuals involved. I know from my own observation and experience the talent and devotion which the Joint Chiefs, the Joint Staff and the Service staffs bring to their jobs. It is to their great credit that the system has been made to work as well as it has. The truth is that the weaknesses are systemic and fundamental, and that it is systemic improvement that is needed. Whether the inevitable institutional opposition to systemic reform can be overcome, whether the trauma within the Pentagon over reduction of individual Service prerogatives can be dealt with, whether the necessary public understanding and support for such improvements can be achieved with acceptable expenditures of political effort and leadership, I will not attempt to estimate. That is a task this committee, for the Congress, and for the Executive Branch. I do know that it took the unique experience of an Eisenhower, and the unique confidence of the American people in his military judgment, to accomplish the reform measures of 1958. If improvements are to be made, then there are two key principles, I believe, that define the central issue. The first was well stated by President Eisenhower in his 1958 message to the Congress containing his proposals for Defense reorganization at that time. Though the results of that reorganization have not measured up to his hopes, the principle is still valid: · [S]eparate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces organized into unified commands, each equipped with the r cient weapons systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of service." The second principle is the need for assuring a close linkage between U.S. security objectives and the military capabilities for achieving them, i.e., linkage of what is desirable with what is feasible and realistic for the security of the people of the U.S. and the safeguarding of their free institutions. The military capabilities I refer to include (1) military forces and resources, and (2) the ability to employ these forces and resources effectively. For the first, I would like to emphasize that joint planning must be closely tied to service capabilities; for the second, joint planning must be closely tied to the plans and the operational capabilities of the unified and specified commands. In this regard, I would like to emphasize that joint military advice and planning on operational matters should not be dominated by Service staffs, or subjected to Service veto, or to indirect Service control via the Service components assigned to the combatant commands. This is a major source of difficulty-and an unnecessary one-in present JCS operations. The aim of the "linkage" I refer to should be to carry out top-level joint planning within the framework of a "top-down" overall or integrated strategy that rests solidly on realistic capabilities both of the services and the U & S operational commands. These capabilities, both current and future, should be developed and maintained in accordance with approve SecDef guidance, established after careful consideration of joint military advice and recommendations prepared in the manner just described. To me, it is unmistakably clear that a strengthened role for the Chairman of the JCS is the key essential to achieving the systemic improvement that is needed. He should have full authority over the Joint Staff (which he now manages on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). The Joint Staff itself should be strengthened and placed under his full and direct control. The participation of Service staffs in the joint process should be discontinued in its present form, and a greatly reduced and re-aligned mode of participation should be established. The authority of the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands should be strengthened and existing service-imposed restrictions removed or reduced. In more specific terms, the following are the changes that in my opinion are needed to achieve a more effective Defense. (1) Strengthen the role of the Chairman by making him by statute the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense. (2) Include among his functions that of principal military staff assistant to the President and the Secretary of Defense in supervising and directing the Unified and Specified Commands. (3) Provide a Vice Chairman of a different service subordinate to the Chairman, but with functions co-extensive with his own. (4) Give the Chairman full authority over the Joint Staff. Remove the statutory limit on its size, and control its size and composition though the mormal program and budget process of the Executive and Legislative Branches. (5) Continue the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee to advise the Chairman (and the Secretary of Defense if he so elects) on matters pertaining to the capabilities and readiness of forces of their respective services to perform their operational roles. (6) Sharply reduce Service staff involvement in the joint process-limiting it to coordination relating to service capabilities. (7) Authorize the Chairman, with SecDef approval, to prescribe staff level coordination procedures between joint and service staffs, together with arrangements for the provision of service information to the joint staff. (8) Broaden the training, experience and rewards for joint duty. Authorize the Chairman, with SecDef approval, to establish qualifications for service on the joint staff, and establish measures to increse joint service experience and provide suitable rewards for joint staff service. Facilitate inter-service transfers and details by officers desiring such transfers and detail, and permit a reasonable number of graduates of each Service academy to be commissioned in other services (as the present law authorizes). (9) Authorize the Chairman to review, and advise the SecDef regarding, all recommendations for 3- and 4-star officer staff and command assignments to operational forces-service and joint-and also to the joint staff. (10) Give the commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands a stronger voice in setting Defense requirements and supervising the training and readiness, including the peacetime operation and maintenance of the forces under their command. These recommendations respond, I believe, to the principal issues raised in the three reports to which I referred at the outset of my remarks. A final question remains: what is the likelihood that such changes would introduce significant disabilities, or even dangers, on their own? This will obviously be a matter for earnest examination by this committee-and for public debate. Such concerns might relate to proper civilian control of the military, proper support for the separation of powers (and specifically, responsiveness to the Congress), assurance that the Chairman is not overloaded, assurance against rashness or bias on the part of the Chairman, and the like. My own analysis and experience suggest that the probabilities lie decidedly the other way. In none of these or similar areas, does it seem to me likely that controls and constraints would be inadequate. The Chairman will not have command authority over forces, as do the President and the Secretary of Defense. It will be the responsibility of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and other elements of government to see that proper supervision and control are maintained. The true problem is not lack of control, but the need for more effective realization of the broad perspectives and purposes of higher civilian authority than is now being achieved. This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. It is my considered judgment that this committee could make a major move in the direction of strengthening our overall military planning, our development or more coherent defense strategy, and the provision of more effective military advice to our governmental leadership, by taking steps along the lines recommended. Thank you. Mr. HOPKINS. No questions, Mr. Chairman. Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Kasich. Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank him for all his work. His book was great. I read it a hundred times, and I will read it a hundred more. Mr. NICHOLS. I believe I am correct in stating that in 1958 General Goodpaster may have been on the committee that wrote the changes in the law at that time. Is that correct? General GOODPASTER. I worked very closely with President Eisenhower in the development of his proposals and in the back-andforth that went on between him and the Congress in working out that legislation. Bryce Harlow, known to many of you, was the other individual of the staff principally involved. President Eisenhower wanted to strengthen the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their corporate function and wanted to clarify and strengthen and leave no doubt as to the authority of the Secretary of Defense. He also wanted to establish the operational chain of command to the combatant forces in the field. Of course, he brought the experience of a theater commander to bear on that issue. I know that his feeling, in the year or two after that, and even after he left the Presidency, was that there had still not been accomplished that strengthening of the joint role of the chiefs that he was hoping for. Much was accomplished in clarifying and strengthening the authority of the Secretary of Defense. The field commands were established, but through a variety of controls, some direct and some indirect, they did not have the command authority to the extent that he envisaged. Now, this latter is my judgment, but it is based on long talks with him and my own experience both in Vietnam and in Europe. Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett. Mr. BARRETT. General Goodpaster, you have given us a very clear picture of where you stand on almost all of our proposals. With regard to the CINC's, you emphasize, as you did throughout, that we should give authority to the Secretary of Defense to do these things, for example, in shifting support and administration, if that is to be done, and giving the CINC's a budget, if that is to be done. I believe that throughout the drafting of the legislation we have attempted to do just that. For example, the support and administration proposal. As Dr. Brown talked about earlier, the CINC's are prohibited in law from having any control over support and administration. Rather than blanket movement of support and administration functions to CINC's, the draft bills say that the Secretary of Defense will consider recommendations from the CINC's as to specific support and administrative functions that they think they can do better, either from a combat capability standpoint or based on improved efficiency and economy. Are you still not satisfied with that sort of formula? We have tried, I think, to follow that throughout. That is just one example. Or is that the sort of thing you are talking about? General GOODPASTER. I would go far enough to remove inhibitions on the Secretary of Defense from doing that, but I would not want to have an idea that the legislative intent was to see some administrative shift accomplished. Leave that to him to determine. But I think, if the legislative intent said that he was to have sufficient input into the programming and budgeting process so that with regard to the levels of training, the levels of maintenance, the levels of equipment, the levels of supply, for example, the voice of the CINC would be heard and consideration would be given to it when he proposed, for example, specific levels for ammunition, which in many cases now, as I am sure you know, receives a very definite second priority to other service interests. Now, that's the kind of thing that I would propose. That could be the legislative intent. The Secretary would have the authority. And if that system didn't work that is, the system of providing recommendations as to the levels-then the Secretary might well feel that it would be necessary to call on the Commander in Chief of the command actually to prepare a budget, actually to prepare program proposals. I would hope that that would not be necessary, as regards the great bulk of the activities in order to keep his focus on his combat command and planning function. Mr. BARRETT. With respect to the military departments and any reorganization there, the things that you read, I think, are in the form of guidelines to the Secretary of Defense. You cautioned us to not go further than guidelines, to allow him to do it. Do you think that those guidelines that you have read are too specific? General GOODPASTER. Not if they are understood as guidelines, as matters to be evaluated and reported, matters on which he should then proceed to make a determination. But as to the principle of consolidating the service civilian and military staffs, I think, out of my own service on service staffs, and my observation of service staffs, that this principle will work in the direction of increased civilian control and more effective civilian control. I think that it may burden the Secretary more. I do see that as a possibility. But it will draw him into functions more closely and more directly where I think civilian control can have an enhanced effect. Mr. BARRETT. Thank you very much. Mr. NICHOLS. Mrs. Byron. Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for being late. As you know, we have meetings all over the building. Let me ask you one thing that I have some problem with. That is giving the budgetary authority to the CINC's. Is that in your estimation a good proposal? General GOODPASTER. Well, as I indicated, I would rather see that come out of recommendations by the CINC's for these levels of training, levels of supply, standards of maintenance, operational levels, and the like. Those, under my view, I would like to see the Commander in Chief submit to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman either would himself incorporate those in budget and program proposals, or he would see that they were incorporated in the budget and program proposals prepared by the services. The service budgets and program proposals would have to be prepared in a way that he and the commanders in chief could explicitly review in order to see whether those levels of training and supply and so on were in fact going to be met. If that could be made to work, I think that would be preferable rather than proliferating additional centers of budgetary and program development. Mrs. BYRON. Thank you. I have no further questions. Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, General Goodpaster. I appreciate your being with us and appreciate your testimony as always. General GOODPASTER. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. NICHOLS. The final witness this morning will be retired Gen. E.C. Meyer, a member of the U.S. Military Academy class of 1951 who has more than three decades of military experience, having retired in 1983, after serving as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. General Meyer has been a leading advocate of JCS reform and was closely identified with the proposals which reopened the debate back in 1982. He was most recently a member of the CSIS study in 1984 which called for JCS reform and attracted additional attention by calling for a joint military advisory council during the Senate's deliberation on this issue. General Meyer, it is always good to have you. If you have a prepared statement, we will insert it in the record. General MEYER. All right, I will do that. I just have some opening comments. STATEMENT OF GEN. E.C. MEYER (U.S. ARMY, RETIRED), FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY General MEYER. Normally when I started out in appearing before you, Mr. Chairman, and the rest of the members of the Armed Services Committee, I never said that I was honored, pleased, or delighted to be here. Because of my past life, I was not honored, pleased, or delighted to have to appear before you. But today, without pandering, I really am, because Mr. NICHOLS. Well, you're in a different uniform-- Mrs. BYRON. He wrote his own speech today. [Laughter.] General MEYER. I always did. But I am pleased to be here because it gives me a chance to express my appreciation to this group, this particular subcommittee, |