As you look at organization, and reorganization, I would say a guiding precept and premise is the concept of civilian control. Civilian control of the Department is something that is a hallmark, not just of the Congress, but, indeed, the structure of the Department as we know it today.

It's important that we keep our lines of communication open to the Congress. I would emphasize to you that title 10 of the U.S. Code that establishes the military departments, and particularly the service Secretaries, is quite clear.

I would also say that I am not certain that we have ever fully implemented the powers and authorities that are invested in the service Secretaries under title 10. I would say to you that that authority is in its broadest application, and I simply quote from one portion of the statute defining the duties of the Secretary of the Army, and the Secretary of the Air Force and it's very similar to the Navy. "Functions necessary for the training, operations, administration, logistical support, maintenance, welfare, and preparedness, and research and development.'

I think that there have been, within the last 5 years, significant gains by the civilian Secretaries of the departments in exercising their authority in each of the various services.

I would say that there has also been developed in the last several years in the Army, greater oversight of the Army intelligence community than we've had in the past.

There's one area that I would specifically address. Each of us was asked to comment on this particular question by the Senate, and I recognize that your subcommittee is getting certain reflections based on the Senate report. We were asked if the service Secretaries were circumvented in the Department, either by the military representatives, or by the Secretary of Defense, and by others at his level. I would say to you that I have had a very good relationship both with General Wickam and with General Meyer. It's been a very constructive and a very positive relationship. I would not use the word "circumvention" in addressing what might occur there. I would say that what does happen, as I said in the statement to the Senate, and as I would reiterate in my statement here, it's more likely to be a situation of noninvolvement. It's often overlooked that the service Secretary is not in the chain of the national command authority. I am not advocating that he should be, and I am not recommending that. What has happened, in operationsand the word "operation" has become a sort of exclusive domain of the Joint Chiefs. Consequently, there has been a diminishing of the role of the service Secretary because operational matters have a tendency to be relegated to the military side even though the statute gives the service Secretary, in the Army's case, a specific responsibility in that regard.

Now, this noninvolvement arising largely out of the interpretation of the word "operations," has had a particular impact in the intelligence area which has its own special requirements for oversight. In the Department of the Army-and I'll not get into details in this forum-there have been a number of very positive significant changes that relate to controls, to finance reporting, and to oversight. This has been thoroughly and completely supported by the Secretary of Defense, and has been enormously helpful in ef

fecting changes by the Chief of Staff of the Army. I would say unequivocally that Mr. Weinberger has taken pains not to bypass the service Secretaries. Indeed, there are written procedures in the Pentagon which stipulate the taskings that go to the military departments should come down through the Office of the Secretariat. Now, there may be, from time to time, largely through inadvertence, some circumvention of the service Secretary by the Chief of Staff, and that occurs because of the unique role that he has by statute.

First, the Chief of Staff is charged by statute to give military advice to the Secretary of Defense and to the President. As a result there may be some matters that would, by virtue of statute, and properly so, go to the attention of the Secretary of Defense.

Second, the Chief of Staff presides over the Army staff. He supervises the Army. He is the military adviser to the Secretary of the Army, and he's the Army representative in the Joint Chiefs.

The key in both the operational sense, and in other areas, is to be certain that the service Secretary is thoroughly and carefully informed and kept apprised of the operational side of what goes on in the Pentagon. Because, in the operational side, although an operation may originate at a high level, or may come from a low level, at some point in time that operation must become involved in logistics, training, personnel, and a whole host of things that are within the area of responsibility of the service Secretary.

The question has been raised as to whether or not there's too much layering in the staffs of the departments, meaning OSD, the military staffs-the Army staff-or, the civilian staff in the Army. I would say to you that it always seems the greatest focus, in my view is in the wrong place on this issue and that focus is on the staff of the Secretary, the smallest by far of all the staffs. The staff of the Secretary of the Army is less than 375 people. Size notwithstanding, it is an essential staff because that staff, from the standpoint of civilian oversight, plays a very effective role in planning, coordinating, supervising, and expediting inside the Pentagon. It also plays a very effective role, I believe, of advocacy within the Pentagon.

The proposal that's been suggested, and which is before your committee, to combine the staffs of the military and the civilians, in my view is not a good solution, and I would not recommend it to you. The suggestion that has been made that would abolish, in the Army a certain number of the Assistant Secretaries would be a step in the wrong direction. One proposal would keep two Secretaries and abolish three positions. The two remaining Secretaries would then be placed under the Director of the Army Staff. That is not, in my view, either good management, or a good way to pursue that proposal.

To bring the Office of the General Counsel under the Office of the Judge Advocate, in my view, is going the wrong way. The General Counsel and the service Secretary is one of the most effective combinations that we have. It's one that can be used very effectively by the service Secretary in dealing with individuals and organizations outside, and in dealing with many controversial legal issues in which you do not wish to involve your Judge Advocate General [JAG].

Suggestions that you bring the small and disadvantaged business operations underneath the Director of the Army Staff, in my view, is not going in the right direction. Indeed, the Congress in 1979 asked us to make it separate.

To do away with the Office of Civil Works would be going in the wrong direction because the establishment of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Works, which has a unique and nonmilitary function, is an endorsement of a study that was made in 1966 and approved by the Congress. This Office has a very special and unique relationship with Congress.

Likewise, to do away with the administrative assistant in the Army, as has been suggested, would not be an effective move. This office provides continuity when you have changes in administration. It also manages a host of duties that involve administration between the Army staff and the civilian Secretary's staff.

Finally I recognize that you have raised some questions about the Defense Logistics Agency [DLA], and other services or functions that are coordinated at Department level.

I am of the view-and I suspect that the Secretary of the Navy would probably disagree-because the Army uses the Defense Logistics Agency more than any service. I think there are things that can be done that would be helpful to define the role and function of the Defense Logistics Agency, but I would say to you if you were to abolish it you will have to transfer back to the services an enormous workload, and we would need to have substantial additional resources to assume those responsibilities and increases in personnel.

The original concept of the establishment of the Defense Logistics Agency where you have one buying authority that buys things like fuel, food, and items that are common to the services, I think is sound in principle. I think it has great merit to try to do it from the standpoint of efficiency and cost, and cost savings.

To do away with the Defense Contract Audit Agency for us would cause problems because currently we do not have the capability of monitoring or auditing contracts that are being performed by Defense. Consequently, we would have to have more auditors to do that, and they would have to be trained in order to undertake this very important and very necessary function. I think it also avoids certain overlaps.

In summary, I would say in reference to the service Secretaries, that the suggestion to have three Under Secretaries of Defense, one for air, land, and sea, is one I would strongly urge you not to pursue. If you look at the basic concept I mentioned, which is civilian oversight of our military establishment, one that is not constitutional in origin-not expressed, but implied-the question of how you achieve effective civilian oversight becomes an organizational one. You would have to determine where in an organizational structure like Defense you can best place civilian management in order to achieve that civilian control. To raise it to the level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in my view, will not achieve either what you want or give the Department of Defense effective civilian oversight and control. I believe that you will destroy a very essential link that exists now between the services and the Department of Defense. You will lose a resource for the daily departmen

tal management of each of the services. You will lose policy spokesmen that I believe are absolutely essential for Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force policies. Finally, you will lose a proponent that you need to pass on to the various services the defense policies that are promulgated by the Secretary of Defense and by the President.

Consequently, to perform this very essential function of civilian oversight and control, I believe the role of the service Secretary is one that should be retained and, indeed, should be strengthened. PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN O. MARSH, JR.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I thank you for this opportunity today to discuss issues so important to our shared duties of providing for the common defense of the Nation.

Certainly we must continue to improve our organization within the Department. I would add that I think this has occurred more than the Congress or the General Public is aware.

I would also suggest we have had nearly 40 years of experience under the present organization of the Department, while cautioning that it is impossible to tell now what impacts some of the changes being proposed by various bodies might have on the long term operations of the Department and whether they would result in the economies and efficiencies sought.

My views on the operation of our Defense Department are drawn in part from my own personal experience. To summarize that experience:

I enlisted in the Army in World War II and was commissioned through infantry OCS, later serving in the Army of occupation in Germany. Upon leaving the service, I maintained my military interests by serving four years in the reserve and 25 years as a member of the Virginia National Guard, holding a series of positions from company commander to division of staff officer.

As you are aware, I served in the Congress for eight years, six of which were spent on appropriations committee.

Executive positions in our Government I have held in addition to the post I now Occupy, included:

Service as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs in 1973;
The National Security Advisor to Vice President Ford; and

Counselor to the President with cabinet rank after President Ford assumed the Presidency.

In this latter post, I had occasion to work with the National Security council, the Department of State, the National Security Agency, and the Department of Defense. I chaired the President's internal task force for the reorganization of the American Intelligence Community. I participated in deliberations with the President and the NSC on the evacuation of Da Nang, Phnom Penh, Saigon, the Mayaguez situation, and the evacuation of American citizens in two crises in Lebanon.

I have served as Secretary of the Army for over five years. Prior to appointment to this post, I have lectured or taught at the infantry school at Fort Benning, the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, the Armed Forces Staff College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Army's Logistics Management Center at Fort Lee.

My presentation will focus on that portion of the subcommittee's letter pertaining to the military departments headquarter's staffs. I will be pleased to respond to questions you might have on the other issues.

AUTHORITIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, ROLES OF SERVICE SECRETARIES (TITLE 10, U.S.C.)

Secretary Weinberger has structured his office to his particular management style and has sought to shift more authority and accountability to the service Secretaries. He holds me accountable for his guidance and I think this should be the case. The Senate Armed Services Committee's staff report released last fall raised questions as to confusion about the role of the service Secretaries. However, there is no confusion as to the need for civilian oversight. I believe that the roles and responsibilities as set forth in title 10, U.S.C., are quite clear. Consequently, I see no reason to clarify or modify the statutes that describe these roles.

Another recommendation of that report was to repeal the authority of the service Secretaries to submit matters on their own initiative, directly to the Congress. In

this regard, I agree with the historical position of the House that this should be retained. Even though it may never have been used, I see no need to repeal it.

STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF SERVICE SECRETARIES IN DOD POLICYMAKING

In discussing the confusion of service Secretaries' roles, it should be pointed out that the Senate committee's staff report does urge that the role of service Secretaries be strengthened in DOD policymaking and other DOD-wide activities.

The service Secretaries role in my view can be significantly strengthened in defense-wide activities and in the uniformed services under the present statute simply by exercise of authority granted therein. Also, there must be a recognition of his duties currently imposed by law:

"Functions necessary for training, operations, administrations, logistical support and maintenence, welfare and preparedness, and research and development."

In fact, the duties are not limited to the above, but include other significant activities.

It is clear by statute that the uniformed Chiefs of service are responsible to the service Secretaries for the efficient operation of the organization and for operational, as well as war planning matters. This, if adhered to, assures military effectiveness and civilian oversight. Largely unnoticed, there has been in the last several years enhancement of the responsibilities of the Army Secretary in the field of intelligence which is an important dimension of his policy formulation and oversight responsibilities.

CIRCUMVENTING THE SERVICE SECRETARIES

Let me point out here that my relationship with General Wickham has been excellent. I can assure the committee that General Wickham keeps me informed and is very attentive to ensure that my views on key matters involving the military and questions of policy are communicated to the general staff of the Army and to the Army at large. He has been a strong supporter of initiatives I have undertaken. He also apprises me of the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I can also say I had a good working relationship with the former chief, General Meyer. The Senate committee's staff report raises questions as to "circumvention" of the service Secretaries by the service Chiefs of Staff.

The question of "circumvention" is addressed later in my comments; however, the situation that is most likely to occur is "non-involvement" of the Secretary. This occurs in large measure because of an inadequate understanding as to his role in operations. This non-involvement is not as much intentional as it is an unawareness of mutual roles. In operations involving the national command authority, the service Secretary is not intended to be a participant in these decisions. Consequently, over time, a perception has developed that assigns operational responsibilities exclusively to the JCS. When operational tasks occur involving the national command authority and the JCS arena, tasks may flow directly to operational elements in the Army without the involvement of the service Secretary. This does not occur because of an effort to bypass or circumvent him, but arises from a view based on custom that he is not involved. Ultimately the service Secretary will become involved inasmuch as logistics, training, and personnel will usually flow from the operational decision, but his participation may not be timely. Also, actions within the service in the area of operations can occur without his being aware of them.

In recent years, in the Army, there has been a gradual but significant remedying of this situation and a better understanding of the service Secretaries' authority. In large measure this has been due to the support of the office of the Secretary of Defense and to the leadership of the Chief of Staff who has made a concerted effort to establish a practice of awareness of matters in the JCS arena that will impact on Army units.

Intelligence matters by their nature are a gray area when defining the scope of operations. As noted previously, there have been significant changes in authority in the office of the service Secretary in matters that relate to intelligence. These pertain to identification of problems, corrective actions, controls-both operational and financial-as well as continuing reporting and oversight. All of these changes have occurred with the knowledge and strong support of the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

It should be clearly stated that the Secretary of Defense has taken pains to ensure he does not bypass or encourage others to bypass the service Secretaries. The point is stressed that the statutory authorities are adequate and structural changes are not necessary in reference to non-involvement or circumvention.