you satisfied with what we did? Do you want something stronger in there? Do you have any suggestions on that?

Admiral CROWE. I was relatively satisfied with what you did, Mr. Chairman. I thought the bill, H.R. 3622, dealt with the question in a very realistic and mature way.

My own philosophy, or view, on the subject is that I felt that more or less codifying me as the principal adviser was formalizing a process that is probably true in the real world today, because just by the nature of things, the chairman has more contact with the Secretary of Defense. He sits on the NSC [National Security Council] and the NSPG [National Security Policy Group]. He has an opportunity to present the military view. However, I am charged with, and I do represent, the view of the Chiefs as a corporate body, as well, when I am asked, as my own. At the same time, I try to be very scrupulous if I know that there is some dissent or there is a contrary view that has been expressed by the Chiefs, that I likewise represent that view and identify who holds that view. And if it is important or fundamental, I try to take that Chief with me when I am consulting with the Secretary or the President to make sure that he feels his case has a day in court.

In a more general vein, no Chairman can know everything he has to know; he needs the Chiefs' help. He needs their expertise. He needs their knowledge of their various warfare specialties. He needs them to have a sense of identity with and loyalty to the joint system and a desire to want to contribute.

So, I would hate to see a bill that puts so much emphasis on the chairman and transfers so much authority, et cetera, that the chiefs lost their incentive to be players in the process. It is imperative they be in the process.

I think that, as a practical proposition, when we are doing policy formulation, deciding what policy we should have, we need a joint effort where we bring our views together and I take them up the line, either representing the various splits or telling them what the corporate view is. When it is an operational matter that comes back down the line, in other words a decision has been made that we are going to do A as opposed to B and C, I then think that the chairman should have the authority-and I believe that my confederates on the JCS agree with this-to implement that decision without great consideration or debate or consultation. It's an operational thing, and sometimes doing it quickly and effectively is better than anything you can do. It is important that the Chairman has the authority to carry it out, right straight to the unified commanders, and that we do it.

At the same time, when time permits, he informs the Chiefs what he has done. Or if in the process of doing it, he needs some advice on a particular matter, he calls the Chief and asks him. I have discussed it with the Chiefs. I think they agree in general with what I have just said. They do like the corporate nature, and they do like language that suggests that the JCS is a corporate body. On the other hand, they understand that, in the real world, there are times when the Chairman must do things on his own and must act. In those times, they are very liberal with me, and they think I should go ahead; and they would like to hear about it at some time.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Lally.

Mr. LALLY. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Admiral, following up on the question the chairman just asked you, it's really a question of what type of linkage do we want to have between the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I believe the thrust of the House bills, if you go back 3 or 4 years, has always been that we need to carve out a separate and independent role for the Chairman. That is not to say that there is not another role for the Chairman, linked to the corporate body of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Do we understand that you think that we have satisfactorily done that in H.R. 3622? We have built in a dissent provision, a provision that would have you act as spokesman for the corporate body, a provision that would have the Joint Chiefs of Staff able, on their own, to provide advice as a corporate body when they are asked by the President or the Secretary of Defense. On the other hand, the bill specified that you, the Chairman, are the principal military adviser so you have that separate category that you can operate in, if that's where you are asked to operate. Do you think that we have that linkage right? Or are there other words, more words, that would describe this more satisfactorily?

Admiral CROWE. Mr. Barrett, No. 1, I was relatively satisfied with the way H.R. 3622 was worded. But I should perhaps precede my answer with some of my own attitude toward the general proposition. And that is that I am much more in favor of evolutionary change than I am revolutionary. I feel that this particular kind of question is so complicated and the interests are so diverse and so intermelded that it is a mistake to go too far in one single step, in one precipitous, sharp, dramatic change in a system. Just by the very nature of things, we have got to have a modicum of agreement or a modicum of support, or any change isn't going to work. I can assure you of that.

In passing a law, no matter how complete, if the people that have to implement it don't agree with it, we've got real problems.

So, I felt that, when you are changing these kinds of matters, small steps with frequent review is better than a great big change and then coming back to it 25 years from now.

With that in mind, what I guess I am really saying is that I would like for us to look for changes that are doable, not only just sound, intellectually good but that are doable. I felt that H.R. 3622 was a real-world change, one that is acceptable but goes a certain way toward where we want to go. We want to see how that works, how many people it upsets, whether there are any side effects later on. In every one of these changes there are going to be some unanticipated effects. So, I wouldn't want to go too far in one single step.

Now, I think the Chiefs themselves have testified they they would like to see in all these matters, when you give the Chairman additional authority, that it be said that it is on behalf of the JCS. I understand that clause is disturbing some people. I guess it's encouraging others. I testified before the Senate that I have no objection to that. I think whether you object to it or not is largely in the eye of the beholder. I have discussed that phrase with the Chiefs

many times. Certainly according to the interpretation they give me of that, I think I would have the kind of flexibility and latitude that I need. Other people with a very legalistic frame of mind say: "Oh, that emasculates the whole proposition; we couldn't do that." Good men disagree.

Mr. BARRETT. Sir, you spoke about resource allocation responsibilities for the CINC's. You indicated, I believe, that you think that we have gone just about far enough in that area. One aspect of the question I want to ask you is, should we codify the changes? But I also want to have you respond to the formula that we have in H.R. 3622, and which is repeated and somewhat elaborated in the bills that you now have. That is that the CINC's would come to the Chairman with their requirements. The Chairman would integrate those requirements perhaps in the same sorts of documents that you have now. But he would go one step further. We would establish the priorities among them so that the document that came out of that process would be a fiscally constrained recommendation from the joint side. It sounds to me like that is very similar to what you are saying, that would almost be a codification of what you are doing now. But perhaps not.

Admiral CROWE. Mr. Barrett, in a sense it would be. I should be frank, though. What we are doing now is new enough that we are still feeling our way. Every year, to be frank about it, the Chairman gets into more and more under the current system, because he hasn't had this authority long-I think, just less than a year now. So, we are feeling our way. It looks to me like it is going to work very well.

I should tell you, this is one area—if you really want the Chairman to assess the entire budget and to give war-fighting assessments, and so forth-that cannot be done as a corporate body. It just won't work. I would not even suggest or pretend that it would work.

On the other hand, I think the system we are following now has real promise and with a little maturing will work very well. If you choose, or want, to codify that-I would hate to see the Secretary of Defense's flexibility circumscribed. But if you want to codify a system that works very well, I have no objection to that.

Mr. BARRETT. That is one responsibility that the Chairman could not perform on behalf of the JCS, based upon what you just said. Admiral CROWE. I have a strong tendency to agree with that. But that's outside of policy-making and the normal duties that have historically been associated with the JCS.

The JCS involvement in the budget process is a relatively new phenomenon.

Mr. BARRETT. You spoke of the joint specialty with some concern. There is another set of provisions in that joint officer bill that has to do with promotions. The intention of the joint subspecialty, quite frankly, is to get the right kind of officers and train them correctly and give them the right kind of experience for joint duty. Another aspect is, how do you ensure that those officers will not suffer from service intimidation, if they do a good job on the joint side? Now, you can comment, if you like, about intimidation. But what I really want to ask you about is the procedure that is built into that bill

that would allow the Chairman to have a voice in service promotions of officers who have served in joint billets.

Admiral CROWE. Of course, your motivation in trying to set up incentives that would increase the caliber of the people who serve and would attract people-I would agree with those completely-at least idealistically. I myself would like to improve the ability of the JCS, of the unified commanders, of joint duty to attract people. We are trying to do that right now.

I should say on this whole subject, I consider the heart of the problem-and incidentally, each service has faced this another way in another place, at another time, when it tries to route officers into special force duty, into submarine duty, or nuclear submarines, or into fighter aviation. How do we structure that so a new thing becomes popular and prestigious and attractive to a portion of the officer corps?

I can assure you that making regulations, making laws, restructuring the system may help a little bit. But the big problem is attitudinal change. And you don't do that quickly or easily. No matter how we structure, it takes a long time before it begins to work the way we want it to work. And that's going to be just as true of joint duty as it is of anything else.

Now, we have, as a result of your legislation, increased the authority of the Chairman, in regard to the Joint Staff, to get people, and so forth. We have now brought some chiefs of service in who have joint duty and who are, on their own, doing things in their own services. On a much more mundane plane, I think my own assignment as Chairman has sent a signal. Î think the interest of this committee and of the Senate in improving the caliber and the quality of our people has sent a strong signal throughout the military. In the process of implementing the legislation you passed last year, we have done a number of things to improve the selection system for choosing people and also in encouraging the services to give us good people.

All those things are helping. They are working. We are now following statistically all the officers, starting this last year, who have served on the Joint Staff, what happens to their promotions, what happens to their assignments, what happens to where they go, so we have some information to work from. All those things are going to help.

We are seeing improvements on the Joint Staff. We are not seeing enough improvement yet. We are not seeing it as fast as we want. We have got a lot of work ahead of us.

I must tell you that, no matter what you pass, translating it into a practical personnel assignment system is tough. I am sitting now on a prescription that says the "most outstanding" officers from the services. Well now, what does that mean? Does that mean that all the outstanding officers in all the services are going to serve on the Joint Staff and nowhere else? Does that mean the Joint Staff is ahead of all the command billets in the four services? Does that mean that I should have 100 percent of the outstanding officers on my staff?

There are a lot of definitional problems here, and I don't even want that. What I want is a fair share of the talent of the services serving in joint billets. We are going to get that. But I am just

pleading for a little patience because it's hard. People don't change their minds easily. They watch promotion lists. Young officers watch promotion lists. They see who gets promoted, and that's where they try and go. Now, the promotion lists are improving for those people who have served on the Joint Staff, and they're going to improve some more.

But I would not favor a joint specialty. I would favor what we call in the Navy a subspecialty and what the other services call identifiers, of people who have expertise in joint billets. And they do both operational matters and do also joint responsibilities. That I would favor. I think it will work. I think it will do for us what we want.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Chairman, this morning the full committee had breakfast with the Packard Commission. Of course, the entire city is looking forward to recommendations that Mr. Packard and his commission, a very able group of people, will be making in a few short days. One of the areas that came under some conversation was the chain of command, the flow of the chain of command. Would you discuss the chain of command as you visualize how it should go from the President to the CINC, who has to fight the war in his particular area?

Admiral CROWE. I interpret the chain now, Mr. Chairman, to go from the President to the Secretary of Defense. The chain itself goes directly to the unified commander. However, by defense directive, the Secretary has put the JCS-it runs from the SECDEF through the JCS to the unified commander.

I have testified previously that this is an area, as I described a moment ago, of implementing operational decisions, where I think it would be more appropriate to go through the Chairman as opposed to the JCS as a body. But it should be up to the Secretary of Defense and the President whether or not they want it that way.

Mr. NICHOLS. Did I understand you to say that your recommendation would be that it flow from the President to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman to the CINC?

Admiral CROWE. That the Secretary of Defense have the flexibility to do that, yes, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett, do you have any further questions on that particular point?

Mr. BARRETT. Admiral Crowe, as you know, we received somewhat conflicting advice on this particular provision.

Admiral CROWE. A lot of these issues are pretty emotional, I have discovered.

Mr. BARRETT. So, your recommendation now, I take it, would be the way we have it in the House bill; that is, that the Secretary of Defense would have the authority. Under this bill, we don't direct it, we give him the authority to shape the chain of command as he sees fit, and specific authority to route it "through" the Chairman and not "to" the Chairman. So, as we understand it, that would mean that the Chairman would transmit orders only on behalf of the Secretary or the President.

Admiral CROWE. That's the way I would understand it.

This again is an area that goes back to what I said previously. I think we are looking for doable things. I, of course, coming from a very parochial standpoint, have no qualms about the Chairman ac