tually being in the chain of command. But I don't know that I hold that strong a view about it. Mr. BARRETT. Well, of course, as you know, before you became Chairman the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended not only that change-placing the Chairman in the chair-but putting it in the law. But we have had some criticisms of actually doing that. Admiral CROWE. I know there's quite a bit of controversy over that. Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Kasich. Mr. KASICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, I am sorry I was late. We have so many committee meetings going on right now, it's tough to keep track of them all. I quoted you a couple of times in our hearings the last couple of weeks where you were expressing concern when you were a CINC about your ability to affect resources. I wonder what your view is about letting the CINC's themselves have somewhat of a limited operating force budget; for example, in areas like joint exercises, joint training, command and control. The witness this morning from the Georgetown Center had a recommendation. He said he didn't necessarily believe that the CINC's ought to have their own budget, but that CINC's should be in the position to be able to define minimum areas of support. I thought that was kind of an interesting alternative. I wonder what your view is on those two thoughts. Admiral CROWE. Mr. Kasich, I said before you came that I had done a lot of talking out there in the Pacific as a CINC and now I had to live with it back here in Washington when I returned. I understand that in the last 2 years General Vessey has, in the budget process, testified in favor of a readiness fund for the CINC's, which I personally would support. I think it's a fine idea-a modest amount of money that the CINC would have to meet unforeseen operational requirements or even training requirements that present unusual opportunities that are not funded. But in all fairness, that has run into quite a bit of static along the line, I think, both with the defense budgeting people and within the Congress. I have never seen a great deal of sympathy for that point of view. But I would subscribe to it, and I believe from the way you have painted it here, what the Georgetown man said I would concur with. Mr. KASICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That's all right now. Mr. NICHOLS. Admiral, have you been on duty as Chairman long enough to be able to converse with us about the agencies? That is one of the areas that we have been looking at, the DLA in particular. We have a bill before the committee which would, in effect, abolish the Defense Logistics Agency. The argument is that it has grown like Topsy. It's got 50,000 people in it now, and the scope of its operations is much beyond what was originally set out-joint buying for all three of the services. Would you discuss your views on that? Admiral CROWE. I have never served in one of the agencies, Mr. Chairman. I have not as yet been through a budget cycle with the agencies. But I have, in the process of discharging this post, had quite a bit to do with them. In preparing for my testimony today, I consulted with my staff very heavily on our relationship with the agencies. I believe that, from my standpoint, the agencies perform a very important function and that, on balance, we are well advised to do it that way and to keep them. That doesn't mean we shouldn't look into how they are operated; or, if there are things we don't like or are not being done well, that we shouldn't move to correct them. I have no qualms about that. But all of those agencies were more or less created on the theory that there are certain functions across service lines that could be centralized. For purposes of management, for budget, for efficiency, it would be better to concentrate them in one agency, which would be able to concentrate the kind of talent that dealt with that kind of matter, such as intelligence experts or authorities in the nuclear business, or scientists. It's easier in one agency to bring together the requisite talent, particularly in a highly technical field, where you need expertise. At the same time, you don't get something for nothing. There are some disadvantages in doing that. One of those is that these various things separated from the services may be associated with a particular war fighting capability or wartime function. Now, will agencies do then well? I have an interface in the JCS, for example, DIA reports to the JCS, to the Chairman of the JCS, for operational control. I have an interface with the Defense Nuclear Agency, with the Defense Mapping Agency. I also have one with NSA. With all of these, I feel that I have a responsibility to follow and to assess and to monitor their interface with the CINC's and with our war plans and with our war-fighting functions. If they don't do that well, I think part of my responsibility is essentially to point that out, flag that. We have to do something about that. I noticed in the bill that I think you have a draft of today, if I understood it correctly, they are proposing to set up some system where the JCS would assess, actually report on the performance of these agencies. I have no problem with that at all. In a certain sense we do that now. If we didn't do it before, I am going to do it, because I think it is an important function for us to see whether those agencies, which are primarily worried about other things, do interface well with my unified commanders and with our war-fighting business. We do meet with the heads of those agencies now randomly, the JCS does. They come in and report what they are doing, how they are doing it, and accept taskings from us. But to formalize that and codify it, I think, would be fine. I have no problem with that. I have just one other comment. Most of those agencies work for an ASD or under secretary, except for some such as NSA and SDIO, which work directly for the Secretary of Defense and report to him. I believe for budget, advocacy, and management purposes, that system has worked pretty well. Now, I don't have a lot to do with the DLA, which you mentioned specifically. On the other hand, we feel in the JCS that if a unified commander is not getting the logistics support that he wants, needs, or feels he should have, and he comes to me and says that, then I have a function to get into the business and take it up with the DLA and with the secretary as sort of the advocate or spokesman for the CINC. And I would do that. I must admit, any agency the size of the DLA, I think we should be looking at all the time. Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Lally. Mr. LALLY. Mr. Chairman, one of the criticisms made of the agencies is that there is no accountability or responsibility in the heads of the agencies. The sponsor of the legislation says that he would prefer to see the responsibility in the politically-accountable secretaries of the military departments. Do you think that is a valid criticism of the management of the agencies? Admiral CROWE. Well, in a certain sense, of course, the accountability is in the various secretaries who have the responsibility to oversee those agencies now. It may not be as rigorous as the drafter wanted it to be. But I know in the case of the one that we oversee-and that's DIA-he reports directly to me. He gets as much accountability and overseeing as any commander in the services gets. He is literally in the chain of command, so to speak. His product is reviewed by my organization every day. We watch his performance daily. We watched it in the Philippines situation. We watch it in the Mediterranean. We watch it in the Far East. We rely on him. The trouble is, from his standpoint, with us relying on him, that if he doesn't perform, we know it right away. Mr. LALLY. Each of the other agency heads has a similar chain of command to an assistant secretary? Admiral CROWE. Yes; most of them do. [The following information was received for the record:] Hon. LES ASPIN, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Washington, DC. OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Your Committee will meet soon to consider H.R. 4068, a bill to abolish the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), in addition to your other bills relating to Defense Department reorganization. During the past weeks, several present and former Defense leaders (both military and civilian) have appeared before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations to state their concerns about the disestablishment of DLA and the necessity for its continued existence as a separate DOD operating agency. When I testified before the Subcommittee regarding the aspects of Defense Department reorganization, I did not address the DLA issues in any detail. Therefore, I would like to supplement my testimony by taking the opportunity now to emphasize the importance of DLA to both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff support the continued operation of DLA. DLA plays a key role in maintaining the readiness of our Armed Forces and providing logistic support of our warfighting requirements. Of the 2.6 million consumable items DLA manages, 98 percent are repair or replacement parts; over 700,000 are used on 973 weapons systems identified by the military Services for intensive management. Its supply availability rate of nearly 90 percent, which is higher than any of the individual Services, attests to its efficient and successful management. Additionally, DLA participates in JCS exercises to ensure that its wartime capabilities satisfy the CINC's mission needs. From its establishment in 1962, DLA has grown in responsibility and importance. Its success in running a complex business is documented. It has mustered economies of scale that would be lost by fractionalizing its mission back to the Services. H.R. 4068 would return us to the uneconomical methods of the past and would undo over twenty years of progress. I urge your support to ensure this legislation is not enacted. Sincerely, Mr. LALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. WILLIAM J. CROWE, Jr., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Chairman, one of the issues that causes more flap and more concern and more conversation than virtually any one that has been brought up is the deputy chairman. Admiral CROWE. Never has so much steam been made out of so little water, Mr. Chairman. Mr. NICHOLS. Well, those are your words. What is the problem, as you see it, in what we are doing here? We created a deputy chairman. Most everybody says they support the need for a deputy chairman, that the chairman ought to have a deputy. Admiral CROWE. I agree with that wholeheartedly. I think the other Chiefs do. Mr. NICHOLS. Yet they want to relegate him to the very bottom of the totem pole. They want to make him sixth around that table in rank. They don't want him to be the second-ranking man on it. They don't want him to serve in your absence. They want to continue doing that on a 3-month basis, quarterly basis. The argument is that they become better Chiefs by virtue of the fact that they have had the experience of sitting in your seat when you are not there, and that makes him quite valuable. Would you discuss not necessarily your views on it but what you see is the apprehension that surfaces among the Chiefs on this particular issue? What's the rationale, what is the reason for their concern on this? Admiral CROWE. For the concern between two and six, Mr. Chairman? First, I would like to say that there is a need for a deputy. Just the sheer workload and the representational load and the insistence that somebody at this rank do so many things and be responsible in so many ways has over the years I think, manufactured the need for a deputy. That is my main personal interest in it. The Chiefs that I have talked this over with agree with that. The question as to whether-really, the only question at issue here is whether, when I am out of town, the deputy would stand in my shoes or whether they would continue to rotate, as they do now, between the chiefs of service. Mr. NICHOLS. Well, that other issue is there on his rank, also. Admiral CROWE. Well, that is correct, if he was to be the number two man in rank, he would be my alter ego. That, of course, is an issue which in itself excites a certain amount of emotion. But in the short time I have been there, I am impressed with the argument that it is important for the Chiefs to have a sense of jointness. It's important for us to develop that and for them to have a sense of participation. Standing in for the Chairman does help in that regard. Really, there is no question about that. The question is how much weight you give to the argument. But it is true, and it's irrefutable, that it helps them as par ticipants in the JCS process. I think it's true, and they make this argument, that it helps them be better Chiefs of service. I believe that. In the time that I have been there, I have changed my own mind and come to the view that they should remain in the rotation, the Chiefs should. Mr. NICHOLS. Are there any further questions? Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I just think he is a great leader for our country. I am glad he is out there heading it up right now. Admiral CROWE. Thank you. Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett. Mr. BARRETT. Earlier on, in talking about the Chiefs and their relationship to the service secretaries, you indicated that we should be careful to leave an independent sphere for the Chiefs with regard to their Joint Chiefs of Staff duty. It has been recommended, however, that the Chiefs be required to keep the secretaries fully informed of all of their responsibilities, including their JCS responsibilities. Do you object to that sort of proposal? Admiral CROWE. No. And I was not aware it was a problem until I read some of your testimony the other day. If it is a problem, it has not been drawn to my attention in any forceful way. But, no, I do not object to that. I assume that there are some matters-operational classification, or security classification-that, frankly, I think the same rule should apply to the service secretaries that applies to me. That is, if you don't have a need to know, you don't know it. If there's a need to know, why, of course, they should know it. Mr. KASICH. If I could make an observation-Admiral, you can respond if you want to. You know, in trying to listen through all the testimony that we have had over the last couple of weeks, I want to tell you that it has been difficult to try to analyze what advice we are getting that is right and what advice that we are getting that is not correct. We have had such tremendous divergence of opinions in many of these areas. It kind of bothers me. The reason it bothers me is, we are trying to make a decision based on the evidence and based on the facts. What I don't quite understand is how we could have such divergent points of view from people who are presently active and those people who are not presently active or those who operate in different capacities. How am I, as a civilian Representative, supposed to know what is real good advice that comes from those who are giving advice to our President when that advice appears to be so different at each different level of people who come before this committee? Admiral CROWE. Well, my advice is good, Mr. Congressman. [Laughter.] My father used to tell a story about the man who was 95 years old. The reporter was interviewing him and said: "Ninety five, you must have seen a lot of changes in your life." And the old man said: "Yup, and I've been against every one of them." [Laughter.] I think there's a lot of that in the testimony here. I do not envy your task, because for some reason this subject seems to excite all kinds of emotions. It also has to do with the distribution of power. |