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Finally, should they have capabilities to do their own net assessments?
Admiral CROWE. The CINC's?
Admiral CROWE. Mr. Barrett, I would like to speak to that, sort of in general terms, and then take it for the record, if I could. In answer to your first question, should the JCS have the
capability, I would say yes. And I think General Vessey had been trying during his tour to straighten that out in our own councils. The JCS does a lot of net assessment work on various questions. Whether it likes it or not, it does. To do it properly, we would need some increases in personnel. But my answer to the question is yes.
I believe all the military leadership in the country believes that we need some improvements in our ability to do net assessment. It's not easy. I mean, to say we are going to improve it now and then go out and translate that into improvement is difficult.
A number of initiatives have taken place in the last 2 years in what we call the modern aids to planning system, which is, to put it simply, a more sophisticated computer capability for individual CINC's in order to evaluate contingency responses and in order to do theater, joint theater, games, and analysis. We now have that capability coming in for every unified commander. It's already there for one or two. The bulk will go in this year. By early 1987 the entire system will be in. It permits a CINC, No. 1, to devise war plans against the entire data base of the United States. He can draw on data bases everywhere, all over the country. And also, to test his plans through gaming, et cetera. It allows the JCS to do a similar thing across theaters, across unified commands.
It is our hope that that will considerably enhance our ability to do the kind of thing you are talking about, to net assess in the theater mode. But we don't have it yet. We are just putting it in. The full return on our investment is not clear yet, but we hope it will be.
To give a net assessment capability per se to every CINC, it might be a little like horse meat: the more you chew on it, the bigger it gets. It might be more than we want there, I don't know.
Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, sir.
Admiral CROWE. I will take the question for the record, if I could please.
[The following questions were submitted to be answered for the record:)
Question. How can we improve threat assessment?
Answer. The Defense Intelligence Agency provides data on enemy forces and assists the Joint Analysis Directorate of the OJCS in the conduct of threat assessments. There are intelligence gathering assets to provide information about all areas of the world, however, certain areas are covered in greater detail than others. An increase in intelligence assets across the board would enhance the gathering and analysis efforts and thereby provide a more complete data base to be used in an evaluation determination of the threat.
Question. Do the CINC's currently express their priorities in net assessment terms?
Answer. The CINC's do not have the resources to accomplish net assessments in the fullest sense of the term. However, a JCS initiative to provide added planning capability to the CINC's is underway. The CINC's currently develop their require ments primarily through subjective, qualitative analyses of the warfighting capability of their forces. These analyses aid in formulating degrees of military risk from which priorities are developed. These priorities are then input to the CJCS for consideration in the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System.
Question. Should the CINC's have the capacity to task net assessment capability? Should they have capability to do their own net assessment?
Answer. Yes to both questions. There are currently two programs that support the CINC's requirements for analytic support and assessments capabilities: (1) The CINC's External Study Program, funded and administered by OJCS, provides a vehicle for conducting assessments and studies specifically requested by the CINC's. (2) The Modern Aids to Planning Program, currently under development, is a JCS initative to provide hardware and software directly to the CINC's to support their planning activities.
Question. Should the Chairman of the JCS have a net assessment office as H.R. 3622 recommends?
Answer. Yes, the OJCS currently conducts military net assessments in support of its responsibilities to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To strengthen this capability, we would need some accretion in personnel. This enhancement would permit the JCS to provide even more comprehensive military advice to the Secretary of Defense concerning net assessments.
Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for being with us this afternoon. Your testimony and responses to the questions have been very enlightening. We certainly appreciate your presence here.
The next meeting of the subcommittee will be on Tuesday, March 4, in room 2216 at 9:30 a.m. At that time we will hear from Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, U.S. Navy, retired, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Vice Adm. Eugene Grinstead, U.S. Navy, retired, and former Director of the Defense Logistics Agency. In the afternoon at 2 o'clock in the same room, 2216, the committee is scheduled to hear from Gen. Russell Dougherty, U.S. Air Force, retired, and former Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command; and Mr. John McLucas, former Secretary of the Air Force.
If there is no further business, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
(Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 4, 1986. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m., in room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Nichols (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NICHOLS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE Mr. NICHOLS. The subcommittee will come to order.
Our first witness this morning is Adm. Tom Moorer, who served as Chairman of the JSC from 1970 to 1974. Prior to that assignment, he served as Chief of Naval Operations, commander in chief of the Atlantic Command, commander in chief of the Pacific Command.
His extensive experience in both joint and service assignments uniquely qualifies him to comment on our proposals. He is the author of numerous studies on policy and strategy. He is active now in the private sector and is associated with the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies.
He brings a very broad perspective to defense organization questions, and, although this does not appear in the prepared introduction, I note that he was born in my congressional district, in Alabama. We are delighted to have you with us this morning, Admiral. I turn the program over to you. STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER, U.S. NAVY, RETIRED,
FORMER CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Admiral MOORER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, let me say I did not testify on H.R. 3622 and, consequently, I have prepared my comments on that particular bill, which I have right here, which I would like to submit to you for whatever use you and the staff choose to make.
Mr. Nichols. Without objection, it will be included in the record.
Admiral MOORER. My general comment about that bill is that it generally tends to codify things that have already happened or are being put into effect, although there are certain parts of it I do not agree with.
Coming to H.R. 4234 and H.R. 4235, let me say, at the outset, that my opinions about many of the things that are listed in these two bills are conditioned by the fact that I have had, as you mentioned, every command. I have been commander of the battle group in the Mediterranean; commander of the 7th fleet in the Western Pacific; commander of the Pacific Fleet; commander of the Atlantic Fleet; commander of the Atlantic Command; Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and chief of my service.
My so-called senior years occurred during that terrible period of the Vietnam war, when there was a period where the country was in a state of near anarchy. We had people here pouring pigs' blood on the Pentagon steps. We were having people lying down and stopping all the traffic on Constitution Avenue, throwing rocks through the Justice Department building, and, then, of course, to just wind that up, we had Watergate.
So, I have had an opportunity to observe people, both in the White House and the Congress and in the Pentagon, as well as military people under stress in combat, and I think that my views are conditioned very much by the way people behave.
I think we should recognize that the Constitution establishes, in effect, an adversarial relationship between the executive and legislative branches, and, more recently, we have not had a bipartisan foreign policy. We have difficulty always existing between the President and the congressional groups, and I think that that will probably always continue. I accept that as being a characteristic of a democracy, although I am sorry that it reaches the extent it does these days.
Let me also say that I have read your letter to the Secretary of Defense very carefully, and, consequently, I plan to comment on some of the subjects that you brought up in that letter.
But, going on with the general comments, let me say that one thing that has struck me in the times I have testified before the Senate and before the House on this general subject, is that I have never been asked a question yet about morale, pride, dedication, leadership, any of the things that, as you know so well, perhaps better than anybody else in this Congress, impact on combat operations.
I am afraid that because it has been a long time since we had a war, technology is advancing so fast, and international relations have been so mixed, people are just frustrated. Somehow the concern has been passed along and hyped up by the media, working on such things as toilet seats and hammers and whatever, people are just frustrated.
So, the motivation for all these hearings and for the proposals that are made, I think, are conditioned by this media hype: furthermore, I think that the people that write these bills do not live in the real world in the sense that they have not been out and watched how people react, politically and militarily, under different situations.
Every time we have a problem, it appears that the solution is another layer. The Congress, of course, requires the Secretary of Defense to set up a czar for testing. Now, I understand that the Packard Commission report is going to set up a czar for acquisition, and, in this bill, we have a recommendation for a vice chief of staff. I have sat before this committee many times, and have been chewed out for having too many four-star admirals in Washington. Now, we are going to add another admiral.
So, I think that what is not recognized is that the Joint C Staff organization and the military organization have pro significantly since the National Security Act of 1947, and,