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managed to get the program kept active until Senator Stennis put a stop to it. Well, time marches on. Mr. Brown now says that the Joint Chiefs of Staff's advice is worthless. My comment on that is that his advice is very, very expensive because the Navy had to spend $600 million and did not get a single airplane. Nothing you can do to reorganize the Joint Chiefs of Staff can change that because of that kind of civilian control.

General LeMay was very much opposed to the F-111. So was the Chief of Naval Operations. He got fired because he took a strong stand against it. Those are the kinds of things that happen, and that is the reason I say it is the people that are in the position that make it work or not work, and I do not think you can organize around that. I just do not think you can do it. People being like they are, they always are worried about their egos, their chances and whatever, as time goes on.

So, I am just saying that in a democracy, where you have so many people with so many special interests, these things are going to crop up from time to time. But, in my opinion, today the military people, and I have visited many of them, have the highest morale. They are better qualified for operating their equipment and I think that they are in pretty good shape overall. I think the people in this country should be proud of them.

Now, one other thing on which I would just like to comment, and that is, when you get civilian control, which I fully support, the problem is that it is always extended to the point where instead of telling the military people what to do, they are also told how to do it. During the Vietnam war, we were told how many bombs to put on each wing, whether to use a certain kind of weapon, and how far to fly into North Vietnam, how many aircraft to send up there and so on. This is a subject that has not been touched on by the Congress, but I think that it is a very important one. We should never get into another war where we have nonprofessional officials finetuning the military operations. Combat operations are nasty, dangerous, deadly, and to think that you can run them just about like you might a football team that is highly trained is a mistake because things are always popping up that you do not anticipate. They always will pop up in that fashion. I will say that this is not a horse race, and there are no second and third places once you start fighting.

Finally, I want to repeat again that it is men that make the decisions, men that make the plans, men that do the fighting, and men that do the dying, and you cannot circumvent all this by a very detailed and extensive reorganization. Now, I am not opposed to change. I think there is much to change. I think there are too many people in the Defense Department, too many people in the Joint Staff and too many people in the service staffs. I think that, as I used to tell the Secretaries of Defense (and I was with five of them), that I was willing to reduce the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but I could not get rid of the question-answers till they disposed of the question-askers.

The letters that the Congress writes take up so much time, and it gets worse and worse all the time. I remember an experience I had. This was as a relatively junior officer, when Mr. Vinson was chairman of this committee, and Mr. McElroy was the Secretary of De

fense. We were just starting the Polaris program, and Mr. McElroy got the idea, on the advice of some of his analysts, that they did not need any torpedoes in the Polaris submarine because, once you fired nuclear weapons, the war was over anyway. So what were you going to do with the torpedoes? So, Mr. McElroy got a letter from Mr. Vinson saying he wanted torpedoes. He thought they ought to have torpedoes. Mr. McElroy sent it down to Admiral Burke. Admiral Burke gave it to me to answer. It went back up. Mr. McElroy signed it, and sent it back to Mr. Vinson. Mr. Vinson took Mr. McElroy's letter, sent it directly to Admiral Burke, and Admiral Burke gave it to me to answer. So, I spent 6 months writing letters to myself. [Laughter.] This is a true story. That is hard to do because you have got to be sure you do not write a letter you cannot answer. [Extended laughter.]

Well, I think I have talked enough, Mr. Chairman. I am ready for your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS H. MOORER

Mr. Chairman, since I did not have an opportunity to testify during the discussions leading up to H.R. 3622, I would like to ask your permission to present as my formal statement my comments on the key provisions of this Bill.

I will list the provisions of the Bill, which will be immediately followed by my comments.

A. Provision: Replaces the Joint Chiefs of staff with the Chairman as the principal military adviser to the President, etc.

Comment: As a matter of practice, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) has always been the principal military adviser. His office is very near that of the Secretary of Defense, he talks on the phone and/or intercom to the President as well as the Secretary of defense several times a week and he attends the National Security Council meetings. It was my experience that the President always asked the Chairman for his advice on the issue under discussion at an NSC meeting.

B. Provision: Assigns the duties currently performed by the JCS to the Chairman who is to consult, as appropriate, with the other JCS members and the Unified Commanders. In addition, authorizes a JCS member to give the Secretary of Defense any opinion and disagreement with the advice of the Chairman of the JCS as well as authorizes a JCS member to submit to the President, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, of any opinion in disagreement with the advice of the Chairman and the JCS.

Comment: This is exactly what happened during my tenure as Chairman of the JCS and to my knowledge has always been the procedure used. This is simply a manifestation of good management procedures in an executive pyramid.

C. Provision: Replaces the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Chairman as the source of advice for the President in establishing Unified Commands.

Comment: The establishment of Unified Commands is a very involved process. In the real world the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not establish Unified Commands. The recommendations to the President go through the Secretary of Defense when a change in the Unified Command setup is deemed desirable. Before such a recommendation takes place, extensive discussions are held by the JCS, the CINCs of the Unified Commands, and the Secretary of Defense. No Chairman would ever attempt to establish a Unified Command in secret, without discussing it fully with all involved. I am opposed to the Provision.

D. Provision: Assign responsibility to the Chairman for supervising the Unified Command.

Comment: Here again the Chairman has always "supervised" the Unified commanders. The minute the Unified Commanders have a question involving the Component Commanders, the JCS, or the Secretary of Defense, it has been my experience that they always call the Chairman first and seek advice, as well as all the background information they can obtain. While I do not think this provision is necessary, it does no harm and simply codifies normal procedure.

E. Provision: Directs the Chairman to integrate the budgetary needs of Unified Commands into an annual budget recommendation to the Secretary of Defense.

Comment: It must be remembered that the Unified Commanders are not involved in all of the antics of the Defense budget experienced by those in Washington. The Unified Commanders are not responsible for research and development, for recruiting and basic training, for policy matters involving pay scales and retirement laws affecting military personnel or discipline and changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, etc. In short, the Unified Commander should be provided with budgetary support for joint exercises which are scheduled well in advance. However, it would be a mistake to involve the Unified Commanders in full-scale budgeting since during war he would not have time to concern himself with the budget-his job is to fight the forces he has been assigned. It is poor practice to establish an organization in peacetime that will not function well in a major war. I am opposed to this provision.

F. Provision: Places the Joint Staff under the authority of the Chairman and deletes the limit of 400 on the number of officers who may serve on the Joint Staff. Comment: The Chairman as a matter of practice does have authority over the Joint Staff. No officer can be assigned to the Joint Staff if the Chairman does not approve. He simply vetoes the assignment and asks for a substitute. With respect to the level of 400, I see no objections deleting this limit.

But I do think that the number of officers in the JCS as well as in several agencies is excessive. However, I do not think that a significant reduction can be made until reductions are made up the line in the staffs on Congressional Committees as well as the Secretary of Defense.

G. Provision: Authorizes the President or the Secretary of Defense to direct that the chain of command runs through the Chairman to the Unified Commanders.

Comment: The National Command Authority is composed of the President and the Secretary of Defense. However, here again the normal chain through which orders flow from the NCA to the field commands, to my knowledge, has always run through the Chairman to the Unified Commanders. This is because a one-sentence decision on the part of the President can generate a multitude of messages involving active as well as supportive commands required to execute the President's directive. This procedure becomes simpler and simpler as scope of combat increases. For instance, during World War II the orders to commanders in the field stated simply "Seize the Philippines." If procedures by non-professional management people forced on the military during the McNamara regime in the conduct of the Vietnam war had been used during World War II, I doubt if General MacArthur could have seized the Philippines or General Eisenhower conducted the Channel crossing. However, I don't see how by statute one can control the imposition of ridiculous rules of engagement on those fighting a war if the civilians in control choose to force the use of such rules.

H. Provision: Directs the Chairman to submit to the President his evaluation of the Joint Service of an officer who has been recommended to the President for a three- to four-star grade.

Comment: This provision is not practical. Very few Chairmen have had an opportunity to personally observe every officer recommended for three- or four-star grade. The Joint Service of such an officer could well have occurred long before the incumbent Chairman was given his present assignment. In such cases the Chairman would have no alternative but to detail his staff to summarize the Joint Service of the three- or four-star nominees. The way to handle this problem is to have the JCS submit nominations to the Secretary of Defense who would forward them to the President. If the Chairman does not agree, it can be handled in the normal way: he can so advise the President through the Secretary of Defense in writing.

I. Provision: Changes the Chairman's initial term in office from two to four years. Comment: While I do not have a particular objection because the Chairman normally serves four years I would advise against the provision, since the situation could arise where an officer was appointed Chairman a few months before the inauguration of the President, who would then be stuck with this officer for the majority of the President's first term in office. I believe the President should retain the flexibility provided in the two-year term.

J. Provision: Directs the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Joint Staff is independently organized and operated to support the Chairman, etc.

Comment: I object to this provision. I firmly believe that in an executive pyramid the Chief in this case the Secretary of Defense-should have the option of setting up his own staff the way he feels he will get the best support. I have had many staffs and would take very strong objection if I were told how I was supposed to be organized and how it was to function.

K. Provision: Establish a Deputy Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman.

Comment: In my opinion, this simply creates a four-star billet with staff, office, and other support and does not contribute to the operation of the Chairman/JCS's office. The present procedure, which ensures continuity for a three-month period, seems to me to be adequate. Furthermore, the procedure now in use ensures that each member of the JCS, other than the Chairman, will have an opportunity to observe the details of the duties of the Chairman. Since one of the officers will more than likely be Chairman later, this provides excellent training. Consequently, in my opinion a deputy JCS Chairman is unnecessary and simply contributes to bloating the bureaucracy.

L. Provision: Deletes the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations to be the principal naval adviser to the President.

Comment: I am opposed to this provision since it has been my experience that all Presidents involved in a major naval issue invariably call the CNO for his advice. He also does the same thing with respect to the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. If the JCS Chairman and Deputy Chairman (for instance, if this is approved) are from services other than the one involved in an issue in which the President is interested, no President would make a final decision without speaking to the Chief of the service concerned.

M. Provision: Requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress a report on how a series of matters could be implemented.

Comment: I do not think this provision serves any useful purpose, since it requires the Secretary of Defense to plow through the same ground over and over and adds to the burden or a plethora of studies thriving throughout the system.

In summary, since the reorganization of the Department of Defense and the JCS reform has gained considerable momentum due to various studies and media overkill, I recognize that some bill will be forthcoming from the Congress. As indicated in my comments, H.R. 3622 serves to codify several procedures that have been in effect for some time and consequently this may serve to educate many who seem to misunderstand how, the JCS system operates. However, there are some provisions of H.R. 3622 with which I do not agree and my opinions in this regard are clearly stated above.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Admiral.

I just cannot help but wonder if it took you 6 months to get all that writing done, how long it would take today?

Admiral MOORER. Well, I do not know. The debate would never end today. So, I would have a career, and I would probably make five stars before I quit writing.

Mr. NICHOLS. Let me ask you about the CINC's.

Admiral MOORER. Yes, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. I think we all agree that the CINC's do not have any primary responsibility in recruiting, training, and so forth. Their job is to get ready to fight the war, as you said so forcefully. Are there any changes in the organization of the CINC's that you would recommend, other than the way that we currently are doing it? Is there any more authority, any more input that you feel the CINC's need?

Admiral MOORER. In your bill you state that the chairman will supervise the CINC's, although the law says at the moment that the CINC's report to the Secretary of Defense.

I think that what should be done would be to bring the CINC's back to Washington periodically during the year, have them explain their contingency plans to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to the Secretary of Defense, and then they can point up their requirements.

Now, their requirements should be primarily in the support category. They should give their professional advise about the characteristics of weapon systems that are just starting, but should not be involved in the day-to-day development process.

The point is that the leadtime for developing a weapon is a lot longer than the tour of a CINC, and, so, you have got to have continuity, I think, that can only take place in the Pentagon, in the services.

You run into a situation, you know, where the CINC's cannot dictate the kind of basic organization. Now, you have an argument between General Rogers and the Chief of Staff of the Army about the size of the Army divisions. General Rogers is insisting he needs a heavy division, and, of course, he is going to be relieved very shortly, because his tour will be up. So, you cannot reorganize each unit in the service just to please a CINC because the CINC's are going to have different ideas.

Let me say another thing about CINC's, and this is related to parochialism. The CINC's are always saying that they need more power and more forces; but the point is that the forces can only come from another CINC. So, I do not think that you need any transfer of power or transfer of staffs and so on.

The CINC's have plenty to do, and particularly if they are involved in combat. I could not imagine that CINCPAC would have time to do some of the tasks that are imposed on him in this bill, if he is in a war, because things are just happening too fast. So, I think that there should be more communication. I think the CINC's should be brought into Washington. I think the President should see the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff more than he does.

In your other bill, H.R. 3622, you say, in effect, that the Chairman is the President's principal adviser. The Chairman is always going to be the President's principal adviser, if for no other reason than that he goes to the National Security Council meetings. These meetings break up, the President says to him, "Come over a minute, I want to talk to you awhile." The point here is that it is the duty of the Chairman, however, to inform the President and the Secretary of Defense if the other service Chiefs have different ideas. Now, when I went to the National Security Council meetings, Mr. Nixon invariably started with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Then he asked me what I thought, and the way I answered that question was to say: "Mr. President, in my view, such and such, but it is my duty to advise you that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force or Army does not agree with me, and he wants to do this because of the following."

Now, I was meticulous about doing that, and I will tell you another thing that should be done, that I do not know is always done, but relates to civilian control. When I was told I was going to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I walked into the office of General Wheeler, my predecessor, and he was sitting at his desk with his face in his hands. He looked up to me and said: "You will never survive," and I said, "What is the problem?" Well, he had been over to the White House with the Secretary of Defense. The President had looked both of them in the eye and ordered them to do something, and he, Wheeler, had gone back to the office, and sent out the message because the Secretary of Defense did not come back to the Pentagon. When the Secretary of Defense saw the message, he just chewed Wheeler up one side and down the other. General Wheeler said: "But, the President said to do this," and the

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