F

AN EDITORIAL

It Ain't Broke

But It Needs Some Fixing

OR a variety of reasons-including such emotional scare allegations as a Prussian-style general staff, an armed forces czar, or an irresponsible generalissimo bent on leading us to Armageddon the operational military forces of the United States have been saddled for four decades with a clumsy command structure in the Pentagon.,The fact that it has worked is a tribute to the skill and maturity of the individuals who have occupied our top military positions over the years. The fact that it has not worked well under all circumstances is evidence of our failure to recognize and correct the organizational anomalies that tend to force a separation of military authority from military responsibility.

The House of Representatives has conducted hearings and passed legislation (H.R. 3718, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1983") putting the Chairman of the JCS in the chain of command to the combatant commanders (the CINCs of the unified and specified commands) and making him a member of the National Security Council and advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense in his own right-and on the full range of military matters affecting the posture, readiness, and employment of combatant forces. The Chairman would be given control of the Joint Staff and the opportunity to comment on three and four-star nominees of the services. And, importantly, the House action would place the combatant CINCS under the supervision of the Chairman (who would speak for them in Washington) and would permit them to express their views on any matter the JCS had under consideration. As Congressman Bill Nichols of Alabama said when proposing the legislation, the unified and specified commanders "are in a position to provide insight not elsewhere available concerning the proper structuring of US forces to meet national objectives."

The House has made a commendable start in proposing these corrective measures. The ball is now in the Senate's court, and its Armed Services Committee has the matter under consideration.

Though a relatively obscure issue for the American public, the legislation that results ultimately from this congressional action will be of extreme importance to the future efficiency and effectiveness of our armed forces. The full effect of the sorely needed military modernization and provisioning initiatives now under way will be diluted unless we make comparable improvements in the nation's archaic, Pentagon-level military command structure for our operational forces.

These legislative initiatives could founder on public and congressional apathy, notwithstanding their critical importance. The subject is esoteric and uninteresting to the body politic; some will charge it off as just another Potomac parlor game. Or it could be derailed by simplistic slogans, such as "If it ain't broke, don't fix it!" I submit that our current arrangements ain't broke, but they do need some legislative fixing-and the House deserves kudos for tackling the problem.

Battle lines formed soon after the House initiated its hearings on this matter in 1982. Positions hardened as to what action, if any, was needed. Motives were maligned. Counterattacks were mounted to the public pleas for change from then-retiring Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. David C. Jones (with more JCS experience than any other officer), and from the then Chief of Staff of the US Army, Gen. Edward C. Meyer. We can expect repeat performances during the forthcoming Senate hearings; however, the House action may have defuzed the most explosive issues.

We must recognize that it is difficult for a uniquely democratic society such as ours, fundamentally based on a division of powers, to come to grips with the essential command requirement for a clear-cut, cohesive military command structure-one in which operational decisions, authorities, and responsibilities are not divided, attenuated, or diluted. Also, it is difficult for our complacent body politic to recognize the presence of inimical threats and the essentiality of a relevant, responsive military establishment that can fight. Yet, forces that would deter must be designed and equipped with multiple capabilities to fight effectively, in varied circumstances of combat. Their command structure at Pentagon level must be equally capable and responsive and it must merge military authority and responsibility at this level. In a political or moral sense, it is commendable that we, as a nation, have difficulty with these conflicting requirements; but in a military context, this difficulty has caused us to postpone needed changes in our operational planning, posturing, and command lines. The legislative changes proposed by the House would improve our situation, could save much while costing practically nothing and would immediately enhance our worldwide military capabilities and responsiveness.

But there is at least one more key change that Congress should enact, one that will make clear the legislative intent to streamline command lines and to provide unfiltered military advice to the President and Secretary of Defense: Make the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff a fivestar position!

These changes will go far toward establishing a responsible, responsive Pentagon command structure for advising the Secretary of Defense and the President and for carrying out their orders in a manner worthy of the fine military forces of the United States.

-RUSSELL E. DOUGHERTY, EDITOR IN CHIEF AND PUBLISHER

AIR FORCE Magazine October 1984

62-630 0 - 87 - 15

Mr. NICHOLS. Well, I was particularly interested in what you had to say about the CINC's. That is your ballpark. You have been there. Nobody is better qualified to talk about that issue than you are, and you have said you feel that it needs strengthening. This bill has been described by some as really a power struggle and as a change in power away from the Chiefs that sit on the JCS and toward an all-powerful Chairman. This Member does not care to do that. We are trying to strengthen the Chairman, and somehow the conception is there that when you strengthen the Chairman, you diminish the influence of the Chiefs. Now, I want them to have their say. I have said numerous times that I do not want to have the Chiefs put their light under a bushel. I think they ought to be heard. Have you looked at our bill close enough to make an observation on whether we have really taken a great deal of power away from the Chiefs in

General DOUGHERTY. I think the only thing in your bill, Mr. Nichols, that would be perceived, as taking power away from the Chiefs is the Vice Chairman, making him No. 2 rather than leaving the present rotation in place. Now, that interposes another level of authority, but the Chiefs are not the Chairman. In fact, you may remember, Dave Jones said one time, right after he became the Chairman. "You know, when I was a Chief, I had a lot of authority, but not much influence. Now, I have got a lot of influence and no authority." I think that is right. That has been the problem with the Chairman, that he has influence and no authority. The Chiefs have had authority, and they have had some degree of influence during their role as Acting Chairman, and I can understand in a humanistic way how very challenging and appealing that is. You have taken that away from them. You are going to interpose another No. 2. So, I would suspect that they would wince.

On the other hand, I worked at close range with the Chief and the Chief of a service is a very important and very responsible and very respected man, and there is a lot on his plate. You know, you could say he is not a Senator. He is not a Congressman, and he is not a Presidential appointee, either. I mean, not a Secretary. But, he is the chief of his service, and I think most reasonable men would be very honored and pleased to have that role, even if there were two people between him and the top of the military structure. Each of the CINC's is different. That is one of the unique things that a lot of people do not focus on. The CINC's are not amorphous. Every CINC is different. That is why you have got a CINC, because you have a different mission, you have a different area. They have different responsibilities. They are, each one, different. The Chiefs are service Chiefs, and they have a sameness about them. I do not think the CINC's are the challenge, but some make them that; By increasing the stature of the CINC's I do not think you are decreasing the status of the service Chiefs.

So, I come down to the fact that there can only be the Chair

man

Mr. NICHOLS. How do you view the recommendation of the Packard Commission that the procurement czar be appointed and that he be at the deputy secretary level?

General DOUGHERTY. Mr. Packard has not asked me on that, but I think it is wrong. If you are going to make a Vice Chairman, that

means that he is going to act as an alter-ego to the Chairman. If you are going to make a Vice Chairman and then give him a 100percent responsibility-oh, by the way, I should say, I think you make a mistake to make a Vice-Chairman a director of the Joint Staff. I think you had better talk to the director. He has a full-time job. But, as Vice Chairman, giving him the responsibility for a particular thing that the Chairman does not now have, it seems to me that they have titled him wrong.

I think having a person in a joint role with advisory responsibility for procurement and acquisition is very wise. If you want to give the Vice Chairman that job, fine; but do not then say in the next paragraph "as to who will act for the Chairman in his absence, that will be up to the Secretary and the President".

It seems to me that is completely inconsistent. I can only label that as a bugout. You know, they wanted to put the responsibility on the House or the Senate to make that decision so they would not have to. Also, it is an interim report. Maybe that subject was too tough and they are going to get to it next spring.

Mr. NICHOLS. Would you support the proposition of requiring in the law that a man would have to have Joint Staff duty before he could be a general officer?

General DOUGHERTY. No sir. As much as I support Joint Staff duty and, as Mr. Barrett knows, no one has supported joint training anymore than I, I think that would be a mistake.

Mr. NICHOLS. Would you support the proposition that before a man could become Chief, that he should have held the CINC position?

General DOUGHERTY. No, sir. I think those things are too rigid and too artificial; you are going to miss the best man. The Chief of service is a very special guy, and I do not think you ought to put constraints around him or her. I do not want to rule that out-the same way with the Chairman.

That is just like when people say, well, do you not think we ought to have a rotation policy in the Chairmanship, like the British have. I say no, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. OK.

Mr. KASICH. General, if I could follow up on the chairman's question on this creation of a procurement czar.

General DOUGHERTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. KASICH. I am not sure you-let me ask it my way. Do you not think we should have an Under Secretary of Procurement? I do not mean one that will just affect joint kinds of things, but a procurement czar, somebody within the Pentagon who is accountable and who could help to build a professional procurement staff so that we could start to lick these procurement problems that we have had throughout our system ever since the Revolutionary War. General DOUGHERTY. Your question, sir, takes me to a very flat answer. I do not like the word czar, though I guess I have used it, because I think it is sort of un-American. And, we have had that person that had primary responsibility. We have attenuated him into several people and three and maybe even four.

Mr. KASICH. Right.

General DOUGHERTY. And we have spread it between departments and services, military departments and the Office of the Sec

retary of Defense. I guess that the lesson from the interim Packard report is very real, we had not done it very well. While we have not done it so well that we can sit back and say, you know, it is perfect, we have got to do it differently, and I must agree with that. We cannot afford the weapons that we cannot afford. We cannot afford not to be without weapons that we need. We have got to find a better way to do it.

Mr. KASICH. General, all I am saying is I do not know how we can afford all this-how we can think we can have a manpower guy worrying about all the problems of manpower at the same time that he is worrying about procurement.

General DOUGHERTY. Oh, no. I certainly agree with you, and that is why I do not think you can have a naive person, or even an academic, in that job. That is a pretty case-hardened job, and it requires knowledge and it requires toughness and it requires almost a lifetime of conditioning. I have watched Air Force officers that I know very well, who were very successful in procurement. They came to it by diverse ways, but they all, when they were successful, had experience. I do not know a single one that just jumped into it without experience and they were successful. Because it is a tough league. There is big money involved, and there are great frustrations involved.

I think that Mr. Packard probably put his finger on it. We have got a top-heavy regulation and top-heavy procurement milieu. I worked in contracts. I used to be in charge of the contracts, appeals, and litigation division, getting into contracts that won't sour. Sometimes I just marvelled at how they did it at all, not that they did it very well, with all of the inroads. We have got to streamline that.

Mr. KASICH. The last area I want to ask about is whether the CINC's should get their own budget. One of the generals who came before us this morning said that he was afraid the CINC's were going to get sucked into the vortex of the planning, programming, and budgeting system.

General DOUGHERTY. PPBS, yes. I think that is a legitimate fear. Mr. KASICH. So do I. You know what this debate is about? It means that different men can see the same thing in different lights. That sums up our hearings over the last 3 days.

General DOUGHERTY. Well, I think the kind of PPBS involvement that the CINC needs is far less than that that puts him into that vortex of the programming and budgeting.

Mr. KASICH. In other words, if we did joint exercises, force training, selected operations, special forces kinds of things-

General DOUGHERTY. Those are pretty good things.

Mr. KASICH [Continuing]. And command and control: do you not see the CINC having to have 50 budget people-

General DOUGHERTY. I think on the C2 [command control], you have to say just the adaptation of C2 systems because it is such a big money area and such a heavy procurement area. I would not put him into that business except by tweaking and tuning the C2 system to make it fit his situation.

Mr. KASICH. You do not think that, if you gave him maybe one or two or three areas of budgeting, that you would have to give him-

General DOUGHERTY. I think those in your draft bill are legitimate areas for a CINC to have some money.

Mr. KASICH. You do not have to have a big bureaucracy in order to put a budget in on those, do you?

General DOUGHERTY. If you have got that big bureaucracy, you would not be able to do the CINC's job.

Mr. KASICH. Last area, Mr. Chairman. I am very bothered and troubled by our bill that I am cosponsor on, with the chairman, about combining the departments, the military and the civilian sides, putting them together, and integrating the staff. Secretary Marsh testified that if you integrate the staff, he loses power and Secretary Lehman stated that if we integrate the staff, he gains power. Then we had some very, very good testimony this morning from General DePuy who said that if you integrate the staff, you are going to hurt our ability to do the job as we know how to do it in certain areas of the military. That brings me to my concern for this issue: What do we do in that area? I mean, should we limit our integration? In our bill, we fully integrate, and I wonder whether we go too far. Maybe we should integrate some things and leave other things out there. What is your view on that?

General DOUGHERTY. I watched the Air Force secretariat and the air staff work, and I have been a part of the interface. I have been four times a staff officer on the Air staff, and I was responsible for working with the secretary, who was then Dr. Seamans. I would say that you ought to ask Vern Orr, and I would say that Vern Orr is mature, and he has got his feet on the ground: Ask him.

My guess is that Vern Orr would say it is working very well because he tried to keep his secretariat focused on policy issues and to get them out of the day-in day-out implementation. If they start getting into that big faceless, seamless staff, they are going to get mired down in execution and implementation, just in personnel alone, and in budgeting alone, and the nits and nats of programming. Those things would just destroy a policymaker. He will not be able to focus on why and with what and how much. He is going to get involved in how to do it and how to make it come true.

I said earlier, and I really think it, sir, that policy in the defense area is the toughest thing in the world, and we should not commingle that with a lot of busy work.

Mr. KASICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Let me get back to this deputy chairman again. It is a sticky point.

General DOUGHERTY. Yes, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. The Packard Commission sort of waffled on the thing.

General DOUGHERTY. Yes, sir. You are charitable.

Mr. NICHOLS. Both this subcommittee and the Senate committee have created a Deputy Chairman. Both of us have made him the ranking man right behind the Chairman.

There must be some reason that I do not fully understand why the chiefs would just be unanimously opposed. They all say we they have no objection to a deputy chairman. There is enough work for him to do, so we should go on and appoint him, but make him No. 6. You say ask them their objections. Well, have you