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Mr. BARRETT. What I am asking about is-

General DOUGHERTY. I can speak for some industries where you have a corporate staff, and then you have dozens of organizations

Mr. BARRETT. Yes, but this is a case where you have one staff on top of one other staff, and that is all. There are not a number of staffs under the secretariat, there is just one.

General DOUGHERTY. Well, if you are going to charge the Assistant Secretary of Manpower with handling all the actions having to do with manpower, well, then, fine. But, I would submit that that is not what you want the Assistant Secretary of Manpower to do. You do not want him running the schools and making the assignments; you want him making manpower decisions in a policy mode.

Mr. BARRETT. But, the question, I think, is, is there some problem with having an integrated staff in which both those types of functions are performed? What I was pointing out is that in other

I staffs, in the corporate world and elsewhere, you do not split staffs that way. Those two functions, implementing policy as well as de veloping policy, are contained in the same integrated staff. It seemed to me that your objection was that in this particular case, with the military-civil interface, you had to have separate staffs.

General DOUGHERTY. Well, I will take you to the page. I do not have the cite number. Just a minute.

"Each Assistant Secretary," now he is the Assistant to the Secretary, "shall be assisted by a Deputy Chief of Staff who is Deputy to a Chief of Staff."-So, if the Deputy Chief of Staff is assisting the Assistant Secretary, he is the Deputy to the Assistant Secretary. He is not a Deputy Chief of Staff. He is not Deputy to the Chief of Staff—“Who shall have the same functional responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary." So, you have got a Deputy Chief of Staff and an Assistant Secretary with the same functional responsibilities. Seems to me you fatally comingle policy and implementation.

Mr. BARRETT. All right. Yes.
General DOUGHERTY. That is my concern, Arch.
Mr. BARRETT. Yeah.

General DOUGHERTY. And, again, I do not know about the other services. I do know the Navy is different. They are organized differently. I remember some years ago, during the McNamara period, you may recall this, that it suddenly dawned on Mr. McNamara that the Chief of Naval Operations was not like the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

So, he set about to try to make him like that. He found out that he was in one bureau and there were three coequal bureaus, you know, BUSHIPS, BUPERS, BUOPS. I do not know that he ever succeeded, though I do not know that it has ever been undone but the Navy is not the same as the Air Force. I do not think it is the same as the Army.

Mr. BARRETT. Well, presumably, then, your objection would be taken care of if the Assistant Secretary would delegate whatever functions within his authority that he would want the Deputy Chief of Staff to perform.

General DOUGHERTY. Well, I am concerned that you are going to get the Assistant Secretaries in the operational/implementation business. You know, you could appoint an Assistant Secretary and he could run all the personnel actions of the Air Force. But do you really want him to do that? Who is going to handle personnel policies of the Air Force? I would be surprised if the people who have held those jobs really want that kind of comingled responsibility.


In your responsibility as the specified commander, in looking over the bill from that perspective, you may have noted that in drafting it, mostly the unified commanders were-

General DOUGHERTY. Oh, I understood exactly. As a specified commander, I had a different set of problems than CINCEUR did as the unified commander or CINCPAC.

Mr. BARRETT. Do you see anything counterproductive in the way the bill is drafted with regard to specified commanders? Anything that we overlooked or

General DOUGHERTY. Not really. I have had only overnight to look at it. But I did not see anything there that made my antenna twang

I do see a lot of rocky road ahead when you start looking at putting together your strategic forces of the Navy and the Air Force. But, on the other hand, I would not back away from that. I think it is a bullet we ought to bite. I do not know how we are going to come out. I think you ought to bite it because you cannot afford not to. Here is what I see. The Navy operates submarines under the sea and they have got attack submarines, which is one kind, and they have got strategic submarines, which are another. Both are operating in the same element. I doubt if you will be able to separate those two, and if you were to put the attack submarines over in the strategic force, which they could well be because if they have a primary role, it is to get other attack submarines—I mean, other strategic submarines—you are going to have real trouble separating your submarines.

You see what I am talking about?
Mr. BARRETT. Yes, sir.
General DOUGHERTY. That is going to be a problem.
Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, General.
General DOUGHERTY. Thank you.
Mr. NICHOLS. We are most appreciative for your testimony.

Tomorrow at 2 p.m. the subcommittee will meet in 2118 to hear from the Packard Commission. We will be joined by Mr. Mavroules' procurement panel, and Mrs. Schroeder's panel on the Grace Commission.

If there is no further business, the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, the subcommitte recessed at 3:45 p.m., to reconvene tomorrow, Wednesday, March 5, 1986, at 2 p.m., in room 2118.]

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Washington, DC., Wednesday, March 5, 1986. The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Nichols (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

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This afternoon, it is indeed an honor to welcome former Secretary of Defense David Packard and members of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management to Capitol Hill. I note that Mr. Packard is accompanied by Adm. James Holloway, Mr. Frank C. Carlucci, Gen. Paul F. Gorman, and Gen. Brent Scowcroft.

Back in the 1960's when I first ran for Congress in Alabama, I remember being taught about how to handle contributors to my campaign. There was a saying about political contributions: "If you have got $10, send it. If you have got $20, bring it. Come and visit a while,

Mr. Packard, the figures today would be more like $100 and $200. But whatever the measure, you and your commission have contributed more than enough to come and visit a while. In fact, we consider your contribution so important that we have convened the first triple-panel meeting in my memory. In addition to the Investigations Subcommittee, which I chair, and which the Honorable Larry Hopkins serves as ranking minority member, we have: the Grace Commission Panel, chaired by Representative Pat Schroeder, with Representative Bob Davis as ranking minority member; and the Acquisition and Procurement Policy Panel, chaired by Representative Nick Mavroules, with Representative Jim Courter as ranking minority member.

The reason we are all interested in your report is that it establishes a blueprint for dealing with some of the most vexing defense issues that have plagued this country for decades. I don't want to steal your thunder, but I do want to say that this Member is very encouraged by the substance of your report.

I also want to acknowledge the hard work and dedication of the Commission, and its superb staff. Your commission has published its report-addressing some of the most fundamental national defense organization issues-months ahead of schedule in order to assist the Congress in its deliberations this year.


I think Members and the public should know that you met this accelerated time schedule at the urging of Senators and Congressmen who are concerned about the erosion of public support for the national defense effort. I believe that your distinguished commission can help to reverse that unhealthy trend.

Back in 1982 when the Investigations Subcommittee first began examining JCS reorganization, from time to time a farsighted witness would inform the subcommittee that it was considering matters far more important to the national defense than the yearly budgets and other matters that grab the headlines. Such comments seemed strange at the time, considering the obvious lack of interest displayed by the Pentagon, the media, and the public.

We passed a bill in the House in 1982. We held hearings and passed another bill in the House in 1983. The Senate began its work that year. In 1984, the first significant, though modest, provisions altering the JCS in a quarter of a century were enacted. In 1985, the House passed yet a third JCS bill, and the Senate published a far-reaching report. Also, your commission was established as a result of the efforts of the ranking minority member of the House Armed Services Committee, the Honorable Bill Dickinson, my colleague from the State of Alabama. Suddenly, the strength and significance of the movement to reform the national defense establishment is recognized.

So, this afternoon, Mr. Chairman, we thank you and your commission members for your contribution to this worthwhile effort. This is your first public presentation to the Congress since you published your report. We are deeply honored that

you chose to share the results of your labor with us first.

Before you proceed, Mr. Packard, let me recognize Mr. Hopkins and the other panel chairmen and ranking minority members to make any opening comments they desire.

Mr. Hopkins of Kentucky.
Mr. HOPKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Members of the Packard Commission, allow me first to thank you for the contribution you have made to the basic questions that this committee is trying to address; namely, should there be a fundamental reform in the Pentagon management structure?

As you know, last year we spent countless hours hearing testimony and deliberating on how to increase effectiveness in one crucial area of our military; that is, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, of course, the result was H.R. 3622. I am delighted to note that your interim report echoes the general thrust of our bill. Without going into the specific details of your recommendations, I think it is important, at this point, to underscore the basic message, that I at least, received from your report. I urge my colleagues to use these simple guiding principles as we begin the markup process next week.

First of all, people on the job must be held accountable for the results. Second, in order to hold them accountable, you must give them not only the responsibility but also the necessary authority to get the job done. Finally, lines of communication must be kept as short as possible.

The subcommittee, over the past few years, has been involved in a variety of different areas which explore the reasons behind fail

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