Gen. Robert H. Barrow Mr. Nicholas F. Brady Mr. Frank C Carlucci Mr. William P. Clark Mr. Barber B. Conable, Jr. Gen. Paul F. Gorman Mrs. Carla A. Hills Adm. James L. Holloway Dr. William J. Perry Mr Charles J. Pilliod, Jr. Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft Dr Herbert Stein Mr. R James Woolsey Director Mr. Rhett B. Dawson The President The White House Washington, D. C. 20500 Dear Mr. President: I have the honor to present the Interim Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. At the outset of our work, we recognized the substantial progress made in the last five years to improve the nation's defense. The morale and fighting ability of our Armed Forces are higher than at any time in recent memory. Over the years, many dedicated people have wrestled with the large, complex and critically important task of managing the Department of Defense. Nagging structural problems have long limited their success. Our recommendations, a blueprint for further progress, are intended to provide the Administration and the Congress a better overall framework for defense management. Secretary of Defense Weinberger has already undertaken a number of the management improvements we suggest. His considerable accomplishments give us great confidence that our recommendations are sound and can produce substantially greater efficiency and savings. We hope that you will accept them, that they will receive the full and enthusiastic support of the Congress, and that they will be implemented as soon as possible. Introduction In July 1985, this Commission was charged by the President to conduct a study of important dimension, encompassing current defense management and organization in its entirety, including: "the budget process, the procurement system, legislative oversight, and We have tried to take a broad and searching look at defense issues, and to address the root causes of defense problems. The blueprint for change provided in this, our Interim Report, flows from certain enduring propositions of sound national security policy, effective government, and basic management. The Armed Forces of the United States are now and for the foreseeable future an essential bulwark against the advance of tyranny. The purpose set forth two centuries ago by the drafters of the Constitution—to “provide for the common defense”—is one that we can meet today only with Armed Forces of the utmost strength and readiness. Maintaining peace and freedom requires nothing less. To achieve this military capability, a sense of shared purpose must prevail in relations between the Executive Branch and the Congress, and between government and defense industry. Public and private institutions must cooperate well, to serve the national good rather than mere partisanship or special interest. The spirit of cooperation needed to promote the common defense is today in jeopardy. This vital spirit must be preserved. Like the effectiveness of our forces, it cannot simply be taken for granted. The United States' defense effort is an enormous and complex enterprise. It poses unique challenges—to plan sensibly for an uncertain future, to answer new and unexpected threats to our security, to husband our technological and industrial capacities and resources. Meeting these challenges will require, we believe, a rededication by all concerned to some basic principles of management. Capable people must be given the responsibility and authority to do their job. Lines of communication must be kept as short as possible. People on the job must be held accountable for the results. These are the principles that guide our recommendations on defense organization and acquisition. They apply whether one is fighting a war or managing a weapons program. The present structure of the Department of Defense was established by President Eisenhower in 1958. His proposed reforms, which sprang from the hard lessons of command in World War II and from the rich experience of his Presidency, were not fully accomplished. Intervening years have confirmed the soundness of President Eisenhower's purposes. The Commission has sought to advance on the objectives he set for the Department. Together, our recommendations are designed to achieve the following significant results: Overall defense decision-making by the Executive Branch and the Congress can be improved. Our military leadership can be organized and chartered to provide the necessary assistance for effective long-range planning. Our combatant forces can be organized and commanded better for the attainment of national objectives. Control and supervision of the entire acquisition system—including research, development, and procurement-can be strengthened and streamlined. Waste and delay in the development of new weapons can be minimized, and there can be greater assurance that military equipment performs as expected. The Department of Defense and defense industry can have a more honest, productive partnership working in the national interest. Our interim findings and recommendations, presented in the pages to follow, concern major features of national security planning and budgeting (Section I), military organization and command (Section II), acquisition organization and procedures (Section III), and government-industry accountability (Section IV). I. National Security Planning and Budgeting T he Commission finds that there is a great need for improvement in the way we think through and tie together our security objectives, what we spend to achieve them, and what we decide to buy. The entire undertaking for our nation's defense requires more and better long-range planning. This will involve concerted action by our professional military, the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense, the President, and the Congress. Today, there is no rational system whereby the Executive Branch and the Congress reach coherent and enduring agreement on national military strategy, the forces to carry it out, and the funding that should be provided—in light of the overall economy and competing claims on national resources. The absence of such a system contributes substantially to the instability and uncertainty that plague our defense program. These cause imbalances in our military forces and capabilities, and increase the costs of procuring military equipment. Better long-range planning must be based on military advice of an order not now always available—fiscally constrained, forward looking, and fully integrated. This advice must incorporate the best possible assessment of our overall military posture vis-a-vis potential opponents, and must candidly evaluate the performance and readiness of the individual Services and the Unified and Specified Commands. To conduct such planning requires a sharpened focus on major defense missions in the Department's presentation, and Congress' review, of the defense budget. The present method of budget review, involving duplicative effort by numerous congressional committees and subcommittees, centers on either the minutiae of line items or the gross dollar allocation to defense, and obscures important matters of strategy, operational concepts, and key defense issues. As Senator Goldwater, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, recently observed, "The budget process distorts the nature of congres |