getting them enforced. That, of course, is what we had in mind in recommending an Under Secretary, someone to be in charge of this procurement business, to be there fulltime, and to have the responsibility for doing these kinds of things.

I think we always keep getting back to this basic proposition. Here you have one of the largest management jobs in the world, and no one there in charge fulltime, and so I think this recommendation that we are making, to have an Under Secretary at the right level so he has some authority over these people below him to work on this problem full time, will help identify and avoid those kinds of problems.

Mr. WYDEN. I must tell you-and I appreciate the response-I just don't think that is going to do it, Mr. Packard. I think that the problem is really right in the heart of the system.

For example, we on the oversight committee, found that, with respect to one justification for unpriced orders, a Navy directive said that one of the three specific criteria of urgency, which was the concept behind the unpriced orders, was loss of funds. According to the notice, that meant that if appropriated funds are in danger of being lost, due to the imminent expiration of the funding obligation date, that that constituted an urgency. I just don't see how having one person in charge of this area is going to deal with problems as pervasive as the one that I cited where the Navy says it has got to be unpriced just because they otherwise will lose money.

Mr. PACKARD. Well, you are quite right that sometimes these questions of urgency are badly distorted, and quite often when you put things too fast, you just end up having more problems. But I really think that giving an Under Secretary control over these matters, to make sure that these problems are resolved, before you move into full-scale production will work. We can take some of the incentives out of doing the things you are concerned about.

I don't think there is anything wrong with having continuous oversight. Sure, you are going to have these calls if they occur, but we have got to get these people so they do the things right in the first place, and that is the whole objective our recommendations are directed to achieve.

Mr. WYDEN. I think my time is expired. I would just tell you that the existing safeguards with respect to these unpriced orders have clearly failed. The amount of the orders-this isn't a micromanagement issue when we are talking about more than $28 billion. You have a situation where they failed to present the kind of thing that happened in the F-16 radar case. I just don't agree, as sincerely as I know you put it forth, that having some kind of Under Secretary there is going to resolve this. It doesn't do us any good to have these regulations if they are just ignored, and that is what is going on in this area.

Mr. PACKARD. Well, that is a particular issue we haven't looked into, in detail, on the Commission, and as I indicated earlier, we have a number of things that we are going to do in further work between now and June. I am glad to have your thoughts and your concern about that. We will put that on the list to see if we can get a better answer for you before we are through.

Mr. WYDEN. I very much appreciate that initiative, because this is more than $28 billion, and it runs contrary to what you said in

your written statement, which is that we ought to purchase weapons the way we do it in commercial business. I meant it in all sincerity when I said that I was quite sure that, over the years, you didn't sign many contracts——

Mr. MAVROULES. Ron, would you yield to me for a moment?
Mr. WYDEN. I will be happy to yield.

Mr. MAVROULES. On March 18, we are going to have hearings specifically on what you refer to. So I would encourage you to be here in that meeting. We will look that over in detail.

Mr. WYDEN. I very much appreciate the gentleman's comments and Mr. Packard's, as well.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. The Chair recognizes Mr. Kasich.

Mr. KASICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to go back to the first area I was asking about in the first round and just briefly, to check with the admiral about it. That is what we are recommending in regard to the CINCS, in the four bills that we have.

Our JCS bill is already through, and I think we are pretty close to what you recommend here, maybe, if you cross some t's and dot some i's. There is a chance for changes between now and final passage. In regard to the CINC's, which is an area we put a lot of emphasis into, Admiral, do you feel that it does make sense to let the CINC's have an area carved out for them, a narrow area, limited funds in the areas of, for example, joint training, joint exercises, maybe some limited command and control funds when modifications are needed to make the systems functional? Do you think it makes sense (and not overburdening them with administrative detail), to let the Secretary of Defense choose the several limited areas where he thinks the CINC's ought to be able to make requests in terms of separate budgets? What is your view on that and the CINC's bill, in general?

Mr. PACKARD. Why don't you go ahead, Jim, and start it.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. I would not disagree that a limited budgeting authority for the CINC's is proper. As a matter of fact, it wasn't too many years ago when the JCS received an appropriation for the same kinds of purposes in order to conduct operations. I believe that, in general, the proposed bill reflects the same concerns and pushes toward the same kinds of solutions that the Commission has come forth with.

However, my personal concerns are that, because your bill for the CINC's goes into really considerable fine-grained detail, it leaves little latitude for adjustment, or discretion, on the part of those who have to manage the entire Department of Defense.

Specifically, the authority for the CINCS in the budgeting and support areas, and having their own administration, really moves too far. I think there is a great danger that the general attitude of the CINC's will shift from war-fighting to in-fighting.

In the past, we have jealously guarded and protected the CINC's from being overburdened with bureaucracies. The people in Washington, at the headquarters, have to defend the budget, have to defend the requirements, and although the CINC's have made their inputs, they have been left relatively free to be prepared to conduct military operations and fight wars. Now, if the CINCS get to the

position where they are submitting budgets, submitting requirements to a major degree, they are going to have to defend those budgets and those requirements where the decisions are made. Since most of the requirements that the CINC's will be presenting will be additional forces-not new kinds of equipment, but more divisions, more battle groups-those additional forces are going to have to come from another CINC. If CINCPAC says, I need three more divisions and two more battle groups, they are going to have to come from CINCEUR. Consequently I see a potential, if it is not very carefully regulated, for divisiveness among the CINC's.

I see that the ČINC's areas are becoming very parochial, and furthermore, if the CINC's get into the fine-grained detail of such things as court-martial authority-today a CINC can say, I want that man court-martialed, and he will be court-martialed-If he has court-martial authority, that means he can court-martial him. But he also has to sign the papers and have a lot of young judgeadvocate generals and lawyer-types on his staff.

If the CINC's get to the position where they are beginning to establish operational procedures within their command, I think there is a great danger that the present operating flexibility that we have had in the past could be lost. Every single aircraft carrier in the Atlantic Fleet deployed at least once to the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam war without a hiccup, because the service chiefs had established the operating procedures. We must guard against CINCEUR saying, you have to operate a division this way, and CINCPAC a different way.

Mr. KASICH. With this limited time, let me just say-in the surveys that were done of current CINC's and former CINC's, they all said there was a striking inability to effect resource decisions compared to their responsibilities, and as you know, we have a severe problem with airlift, both in special forces, and as it relates to NATO. We have problems with close air support. Don't you think it is a problem if we don't get the CINC's more involved? We have the services, you know, trying to design their own POM's-as to what they think is best-with limited input from our commanders in the field.

Admiral HOLLOWAY. I agree that the authority of the CINC's needs to be expanded. I think that is an improvement, but in making that improvement, I think you must be very careful not to degrade one of the very fine concepts we have, and that is allowing the CINC's to be the war-fighters and letting the service chiefs carry out their functions. All I am saying is that you should be very guarded to establish a proper balance, and not lose the good things that we have today.

Mr. PACKARD. Perhaps I could just say a word on that issue if I have just a moment, please.

We looked at this matter quite carefully. We talked to a lot of CINC's from different places, found some of them perfectly satisfied the way things are. Some of them want a big change. I think we came to the conclusion that it would be unwise to adopt any formula that would apply across the boards. They are making some basic improvements in the representation of the CINC's in the form of the Joint Chiefs now. They are giving them a person to represent them, and I think it would be very wise to take these first

steps and not add too much detail until we see how all this is going to work out.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Mavroules.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Since my colleague, Mr. Kasich, brought this up and you responded to it, I want to refresh all our memories. Relative to the chain of command, I go back to the so-called peacekeeping force in Lebanon. I am sure that most of you have read the report put out by Admiral Long and also the report put out by this committee. We took the sworn testimony over there. The chain of command during the initiative on the part of the United States according to the testimony we received from people, sworn testimony, was absolutely abominable. It didn't work. If you take the Long report today, and if you take the report that we put out-to this day we cannot point a finger as to what the hell happened over there, because the chain of command was in disarray, and I think those are the kinds of things we have to address in the future, together.

I don't mean to get worked up on this, but I do, because to this day we blame a colonel for all that went on in Beirut, and that was wrong. We had a responsibility to do the right thing and to go up the chain of command and separate what the State Department was doing versus what the military was doing. The State Department was calling the shots, even geographically, of where they were going to be stationed around the perimeter-around the perimeter of the air field. Those are the kinds of things that kind of work us up, and I am hoping we can work together to get rid of that situation.

Mr. PACKARD. We have very specific recommendations on that which have to do with the geographical overlap. These operations will overlap some of the established command. And we make recommendations that the shortest possible chain of command be established from the commander in chief to the person who is commanding that particular operation. So, I think we have recognized that and made some recommendations. Paul might like to make some more specific comments on that.

General GORMAN. Mr. Chairman, the issue here is one of balance. I share with Admiral Holloway concern that the legislation that you are examining at the present time is altogether too detailed, and we will end up with rigidities in a system that should, if nothing else, be flexible enough to deal with particular circumstances.

If the President, through executive orders or otherwise, acts on the recommendations that we have put before him, I think we will obviate the need for much of the legislation that you are presently considering, particularly with respect to the question of the chain of command.

We did meet with Admiral Long. We had a number of discussions on other instances of complicated chains of command, and I think the Commission thoroughly recognizes the validity of your point. That sort of complication should be set aside. But the key to it is to give the CINC's, in the balance of the distribution of power and authority, more authority over how their components will be structured, and to authorize, clearly authorize, the Secretary to es

tablish chains of command which are as short as possible to meet the circumstances.

There is also the issue of the unified command plan, which is reviewed in the White House, and reported to the Congress. It is now drawn up on the basis of a geographical division of responsibility. We believe that there should be more attention paid to exigencies of the modern world, where there are problems which transcend those borders presented by, in some instances, Third World nations like Libya or Cuba, and where more than one CINC is concerned. We ought to be able to be flexible enough to deal with those circumstances, and where necessary, to establish altogether unique chains of command to cope with an unforeseen circumstance, not foreseen in the UCP.

Finally, there is an important word used by my colleagues here that I would like to emphasize, and that is flexibility. Surely we do not know what the future circumstances will be in which our Armed Forces are going to be employed abroad. Therefore, to attempt to codify in national law all of those circumstances seems to me to be a mistaken effort.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you very much for your reply, General. I am delighted with your reply, as a matter of fact.

I have two other very quick questions.

We have worked you over pretty good for the last 3 hours. In your report you state that more honest budgets, and budget data, and better processes for estimating costs, are needed at the outset of a weapons development. How can we, together, get better budget data, especially when there has been an institutional tendency to bid low to buy in-I think we all know that game—and then get healthy by contract modifications and program changes? My question to you is: Where will this information, this data, come from? Will it come from the Defense Department or will it come from the contractors, and who is going to give us that honest data so we can work with it? Do you have any ideas on that, perhaps?

Mr. PACKARD. We think that if you have a full-time person there, an Under Secretary for Acquisition, who is at a high enough level so he can force right actions on this advanced development area, that you will be able to get figures that are much more reliable and can be counted on.

Now, clearly the situation has been, quite often, that you get optimistic estimates from contractors and people buying in on programs. I have talked to people that say, well, we wouldn't have gotten the contract if we hadn't done that. Those are the kinds of things we have got to stop.

The ability to make good estimates, particularly on your major programs, is dependent to a large extent on whether you have got all the uncertainties out of the program, whether you have done the necessary work-up in prototyping and testing. Then we would recommend that this Under Secretary be responsible for those estimates that are made on the program, and he be held accountable for them, and that the contractors might have some inputs. But what you are really talking about is you would like to have the estimates made on the most likely cost and have a little conservatism in it, rather than always on the optimistic side, which has been too often the case in the past.