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position where they are submitting budgets, submitting requirements to a major degree, they are going to have to defend those budgets and those requirements where the decisions are made. Since most of the requirements that the CINC's will be presenting will be additional forces-not new kinds of equipment, but more divisions, more battle groups-those additional forces are going to have to come from another CINC. If CINCPAC says, I need three more divisions and two more battle groups, they are going to have to come from CINCEUR. Consequently I see a potential, if it is not very carefully regulated, for divisiveness among the CINC's.
I see that the CINC's areas are becoming very parochial, and furthermore, if the CINC's get into the fine-grained detail of such things as court-martial authority-today a CINC can say, I want that man court-martialed, and he will be court-martialed-If he has court-martial authority, that means he can court-martial him. But he also has to sign the papers and have a lot of young judgeadvocate generals and lawyer-types on his staff.
If the ČINC's get to the position where they are beginning to establish operational procedures within their command, I think there is a great danger that the present operating flexibility that we have had in the past could be lost. Every single aircraft carrier in the Atlantic Fleet deployed at least once to the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam war without a hiccup, because the service chiefs had established the operating procedures. We must guard against CINCEUR saying, you have to operate a division this way, and CINCPAC a different way.
a Mr. KASICH. With this limited time, let me just say—in the surveys that were done of current CINC's and former CINC's, they all said there was a striking inability to effect resource decisions compared to their responsibilities, and as you know, we have a severe problem with airlift, both in special forces, and as it relates to NATO. We have problems with close air support. Don't you think it is a problem if we don't get the CINC's more involved? We have the services, you know, trying to design their own POM's-as to what they think is best—with limited input from our commanders in the field.
Admiral HOLLOWAY. I agree that the authority of the CINC's needs to be expanded. I think that is an improvement, but in making that improvement, I think you must be very careful not to degrade one of the very fine concepts we have, and that is allowing the CINC's to be the war-fighters and letting the service chiefs carry out their functions. All I am saying is that you should be very guarded to establish a proper balance, and not lose the good things that we have today.
Mr. PACKARD. Perhaps I could just say a word on that issue if I have just a moment, please.
We looked at this matter quite carefully. We talked to a lot of CINC's from different places, found some of them perfectly satisfied the way things are. Some of them want a big change. I think we came to the conclusion that it would be unwise to adopt any formula that would apply across the boards. They are making some basic improvements in the representation of the CINC's in the form of the Joint Chiefs now. They are giving them a person to represent them, and I think it would be very wise to take these first steps and not add too much detail until we see how all this is going to work out.
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Mavroules.
Since my colleague, Mr. Kasich, brought this up and you responded to it, I want to refresh all our memories. Relative to the chain of command, I go back to the so-called peacekeeping force in Lebanon. I am sure that most of you have read the report put out by Admiral Long and also the report put out by this committee. We took the sworn testimony over there. The chain of command during the initiative on the part of the United States according to the testimony we received from people, sworn testimony, was absolutely abominable. It didn't work. If you take the Long report today, and if you take the report that we put out-to this day we cannot point a finger as to what the hell happened over there, because the chain of command was in disarray, and I think those are the kinds of things we have to address in the future, together.
I don't mean to get worked up on this, but I do, because to this day we blame a colonel for all that went on in Beirut, and that was wrong. We had a responsibility to do the right thing and to go up the chain of command and separate what the State Department was doing versus what the military was doing. The State Department was calling the shots, even geographically, of where they were going to be stationed around the perimeter—around the perimeter of the air field. Those are the kinds of things that kind of work us up, and I am hoping we can work together to get rid of that situation.
Mr. PACKARD. We have very specific recommendations on that which have to do with the geographical overlap. These operations will overlap some of the established command. And we make recommendations that the shortest possible chain of command be established-from the commander in chief to the person who is commanding that particular operation. So, I think we have recognized that and made some recommendations. Paul might like to make some more specific comments on that.
General GORMAN. Mr. Chairman, the issue here is one of balance. I share with Admiral Holloway concern that the legislation that you are examining at the present time is altogether too detailed, and we will end up with rigidities in a system that should, if nothing else, be flexible enough to deal with particular circumstances.
If the President, through executive orders or otherwise, acts on the recommendations that we have put before him, I think we will obviate the need for much of the legislation that you are presently considering, particularly with respect to the question of the chain of command.
We did meet with Admiral Long. We had a number of discussions on other instances of complicated chains of command, and I think the Commission thoroughly recognizes the validity of your point. That sort of complication should be set aside. But the key to it is to give the CINC's, in the balance of the distribution of power and authority, more authority over how their components will be structured, and to authorize, clearly authorize, the Secretary to es
tablish chains of command which are as short as possible to meet the
There is also the issue of the unified command plan, which is reviewed in the White House, and reported to the Congress. It is now drawn up on the basis of a geographical division of responsibility. We believe that there should be more attention paid to exigencies of the modern world, where there are problems which transcend those borders presented by, in some instances, Third World nations like Libya or Cuba, and where more than one CINC is concerned.
We ought to be able to be flexible enough to deal with those cir. cumstances, and where necessary, to establish altogether unique chains of command to cope with an unforeseen circumstance, not foreseen in the UCP.
Finally, there is an important word used by my colleagues here that I would like to emphasize, and that is flexibility. Surely we do not know what the future circumstances will be in which our Armed Forces are going to be employed abroad. Therefore, to attempt to codify in national law all of those circumstances seems to me to be a mistaken effort.
Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you very much for your reply, General. I am delighted with your reply, as a matter of fact.
I have two other very quick questions.
We have worked you over pretty good for the last 3 hours. In your report you state that more honest budgets, and budget data, and better processes for estimating costs, are needed at the outset of a weapons development. How can we, together, get better budget data, especially when there has been an institutional tendency to bid low to buy in-I think we all know that game-and then get healthy by contract modifications and program changes? My question to you is: Where will this information, this data, come from? Will it come from the Defense Department or will it come from the contractors, and who is going to give us that honest data so we can work with it? Do you have any ideas on that, perhaps?
Mr. PACKARD. We think that if you have a full-time person there, an Under Secretary for Acquisition, who is at a high enough level so he can force right actions on this advanced development area, that you will be able to get figures that are much more reliable and can be counted on.
Now, clearly the situation has been, quite often, that you get optimistic estimates from contractors and people buying in on programs. I have talked to people that say, well
, we wouldn't have gotten the contract if we hadn't done that. Those are the kinds of things we have got to stop.
The ability to make good estimates, particularly on your major programs, is dependent to a large extent on whether you have got all the uncertainties out of the program, whether you have done the necessary work-up in prototyping and testing. Then we would recommend that this Under Secretary be responsible for those estimates that are made on the program, and he be held accountable for them, and that the contractors might have some inputs. But what you are really talking about is you would like to have the estimates made on the most likely cost and have a little conservatism in it, rather than always on the optimistic side, which has been too often the case in the past.
Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you.
I know my time has run out. But this is very important for the committee, the Investigations Subcommittee.
You emphasize military strategy development. Are we educating and training officers capable of fulfilling your strategy requirements, and are the capabilities of officers serving in joint assignments adequate? What changes are needed?
Mr. PACKARD. Of course there is the question of whether you are going to be able to get together a strong enough staff for the Chairman to be able to do these things properly. I would think that the chances are quite good. I think this assignment will be looked at with a good deal of enthusiasm by people who are interested in approaching these military problems from a joint and a unified basis, and I think we will be able to get good advice on this area.
I know that there have been some recommendations to require certain kinds of duty before they can serve in these assignments. I am inclined to feel that here, again, we are making a recommendation for a fairly major change. We are asking the Chairman to do something he has not been asked to do before. We have seen evidence in recent years that the Chairman has been very eager to try and do some of these things, and I am not too concerned about the ability. It will take time to develop this ability. It will require some teamwork with the Secretary. But I am confident that this will come out.
Paul, you would like to add something?
General GORMAN. It is a question of incentives, Mr. Chairman. If, in fact, budgets are going to be based on strategy and operational concepts, you can rest assured that the Services are going to take another hard look at who they send down to the Joint Staff to work on said operational concepts and strategies.
It isn't always the case that the best and most able officers go to the Joint Staff or to the other joint assignments, as all of you well understand. I have testified over here, for example, of my dissatisfaction when I was the planner for the Joint Staff—the J-5—the first assignment in which I had ever served in where I knew no other Army officer in my organization. The reason for that was simple. Those Army officers in J-5 came from a part of the Army totally divorced from the line outfits in which I was raised and trained and did my command service.
I think that will change under this. I think you will get the same kind of hotrod command types in the Joint Staff that you now find over in Army DCSOPS, and I think the same thing will be true in the Air Force and in the Navy.
I know Admiral Watkins told us that he was making a very definite effort to upgrade the quality of Navy officers in the Joint Staff for exactly the reason that he felt that the Navy's interests were best served by so doing. It is a question of incentives.
Mr. MAVROULES. I thank you, General.
Mr. NICHOLS. Gentlemen, you have been very patient with us. We appreciate your tolerance, and we will try to conclude here, Mr. Chairman, in just a few minutes.
Let me first say I appreciate your critique of what we have tried to do as a committee. Constructive criticism is always welcome. We are dead serious about this thing. We don't want to mess up, and we value your judgment very much on matters like you just discussed.
Let me ask just a few questions here concerning the Chairman. As you know, we tried to strengthen the Chairman in the bill we passed last year. We have heard criticisms that, in strengthening the Chairman, we have, in some way, suppressed the chiefs—that they are not going to be able to make their advice heard. That was certainly not the intent of our committee. Would any of you care to comment on what we have done and any failures that we might have made, out of your experience?
General GORMAN. I am not concerned about that.
I know that some of the Chiefs would express themselves otherwise. I would tell you that the Chiefs are pulling together today better than I have seen them in all of my years of service. I have been in and out of Washington since the 1960's. I think one of the reasons for that teamwork, Mr. Chairman, is the interest that has been expressed by your committee and the existence of that legislation. You may be bringing about change in ways that you didn't anticipate.
Mr. NICHOLS. Let me ask you a follow-on question. We, in our legislation, have strongly suggested that the Chairman, because he is the Chairman-the No. 1 military officer in the U.S. militarybe a part of the National Security Council. We didn't do that entirely by law. That is the President's show. That is his committee, and certainly we would not want to impose on the President of the United States that sort of a directive if the Chairman is not welcome. So we leave that final discretion to others to extend that invitation, I would say.
Should the Chairman be a member of the National Security Council?
Mr. PACKARD. Maybe we ought to let Brent answer that question. General ScoWCROFT. Mr. Chairman, I think any such legislation like that is entirely unnecessary. I have never been to, nor do I know of, a National Security Coun
a cil meeting where the Chairman was not present. If, in fact, you legislate additional members on the National Security Council and the President doesn't want to have them at meetings, he will call an executive session, so he is going to have the people he wants to advise him. I can't imagine a case where that will not include the Chairman, and while a Chairman is technically an advisor, not a member, he is a participant in the discussion.
This is not a voting body. This is an advisory body. I really think it is unnecessary to suggest to the President something which, to my knowledge, has been a permanent fixture of the National Security Council system.
Mr. NICHOLS. Two final, real quick questions here.
Back to the Deputy Chairman-should he be a director of the Joint Staff?
General GORMAN. In my view, Mr. Chairman, that would be a serious mistake.
The director of the Joint Staff has more than a full-time job. He not only is the supervisor of the flag officers of the Joint Staff—the admirals, the commanders, the generals of Air Force, Army, and