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Marine Corps, that serve down there; he writes their efficiency reports, coordinates their work and lays down their priorities; he is also the chairman of the subcommittee of the JCS, which includes the operation deputies of the services. In it is a very difficult process dealing with those fellows. So saddling him with those additional duties, it seems to me, would be a mistake. The director really has two full-time jobs, and I think most directors of the Joint Staff, past and present, would agree with me on that one.
General ScoWCROFT. I concur wholeheartedly.
Admiral HOLLOWAY. I agree. I think they are two different functions, and you shouldn't try to combine them, as Paul has said. There just isn't room for them.
Mr. Nichols. Now the $64 question. Then I presume you would retain the three-star who is the director of the staff, and you would make the deputy chairman, which you recommended, a four-star.
General GORMAN. Yes, sir.
General GORMAN. I think that that is a matter for the Secretary and the Chiefs to iron out. It is going to be tough.
Mr. NICHOLS. What I am saying is, don't look to the Congress for it.
General GORMAN. I understand. That is why, again, I think that if the President will go after these recommendations he can effect those changes.
One answer might emerge from the recommendations where we urge reconsidering the unified command plan.
General ScowCROFT. You would still need the billet. Even if you made the deputy chairman the director of the Joint Staff, you still need another four-star billet.
Mr. NICHOLS. Where are you going to get it, General?
General ScowCROFT. I don't know. It is a recommendation in your bill, as well. So, I would presume in your bill you would provide it.
Mr. NICHOLS. We were going to get rid of that third star. We were going to move him on up to a four-star, and we would have the same number of general officers then. That is just a question I threw out here.
Mr. PACKARD. Mr. Chairman, let me make a general comment about this.
I think we are recommending what are some very major changes in this whole procedure. They will work to the extent that people over there want them to work. I think that is probably true whether you pass legislation or not. It seems to me the thing to do would be to proceed with the minimum amount of legislation at this time, do the essential thing, and then use your oversight responsibility to find out whether, in fact, the things that we are recommending here in our Commission report are getting done. If they don't get done, then you can do something about them. But it seems to me that would be the best way to approach this, and not try and put too many detailed restrictions on them. You will have plenty of opportunity to go back and find out whether these things are working, and that would seem to me to be the best procedure.
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Lally.
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett.
Mr. BARRETT. I want to be sure that each member, each military member of the panel, has had a chance to give all of his comments on the CINC's bill that is before the Investigations Subcommittee and the joint officer capabilities bill. There have been some comments within the last hour. If you have any further comments to make, I think they should be made, gentlemen, because we will not be able to call you individually. You represent some of the foremost talent and thinking in this country on military affairs, and particularly defense organization.
Also, if you have further comments on the other two bills before us, the military department bill and the defense agencies bill, we would appreciate those also.
General SCOWCROFT. I think in general, I would like to echo Mr. Packard's comments. Whatever happens, we are not going to, in one piece of legislation or in 1 year, solve all the problems of this vast operation. It seems to me what we need to do is leave open some flexibility. There is broad agreement within the Commission, within the Senate and the House, as to the kinds of things that need to be fixed. There are no great divergencies here. I think the greatest divergence is in the amount of legislation required in order to make the changes.
Now, legislation puts a greater burden on the executive branch to do these kinds of things. It should also allow the flexibility to adapt these to the exigencies of the moment. I would urge that you leave a maximum of flexibility within the broad changes that we all agree need to be made, and then exercise your oversight weight a bit and then see which ones need to be fixed.
After all, as you know, there were three major changes in the Defense Department after 1947, in the first decade. There was a major change in 1949, one in 1953, and another in 1958. Now, it has been about 30 years. So it seems to me we ought to start that process going again, and refine it, rather than to try to perfect it in one piece of legislation.
Admiral HOLLOWAY. Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with what my colleagues have said that too much detail at this point is probably not a good idea because we may not arrive at the best practical solution.
I think we should permit people to move ahead, and this committee would then, as has been pointed out, use its oversight responsibilities. I think that you will achieve the results that you seek without going into the detail, because the broader provisions of your bill, which shift responsibilities away from the service staffs to the Joint Staff, give more strength to the Chairman, more responsibility to the Joint Staff.
As I think General Gorman observed, that is going to be an enormous incentive to the services themselves to assign their best and brightest people. Because that is where the service impacts on their futures and the future of the military establishment is going to be made. So, I think it will work itself out, and in my own view it is better than legislating the details of promotion rates and things of that nature.
General GORMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to state that among the beneficial influences that have been exerted by the Congress on the services and the unified and specified commands, have been the writings of the committee staffs, including those of Mr. Barrett, John Collins, and some of the other experts who have devoted a great deal of time in recent years to the matters that have led to your legislative concern.
I think that if there is one common thread running through all of those writings, it is precisely that we altogether too frequently address ourselves to defense issues without asking ourselves the first questions: what are our national objectives, and what should be the strategy we should pursue in following that. I believe that the Commission has picked up that very valuable thought and put it in front of the President. I believe that if somehow or other in your legislation, in the preamble or otherwise, you could reinforce that notion we would be doing, collectively, the Nation a great service.
Mr. NICHOLS. Gentlemen, you have been with us better than 3 hours, and we are indebted to you.
Some of us met 10 days ago with Chairman Packard. I said to him then that when the report was released, it would have a great deal of clout to it because of the people that serve on this panel. Each of you in your respective way, carries a lot of respect in this town. I say that in all sincerity. So, as we close this session I want to thank you, and I am sure the President will thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of your committee. I want to thank you on behalf of this committee for the services you have rendered and the testimony you have given us here today.
Mr. PACKARD. Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you here today. We appreciate it, all of us.
Mr. NICHOLS. Let me announce that the next meeting of the subcommittee will be in the morning at 9 a.m. At that time we will hear from Gen. David C. Jones, U.S. Air Force, retired, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. John H. Cushman, U.S. Army, retired, and author of "Command and Control of Theater Forces”. With him will be Prof. Anthony Oettinger of Harvard University. Then we will here from Gen. John Vogt, U.S. Air Force, retired, and former Commander of the Allied Air Forces in Europe.
The latter three are in the afternoon. We will hear from General Jones in the morning.
I would think that after hearing all of these prestigious people, the committee will be able to make some sort of a rational decision.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.]
REORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 6, 1986. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:15 a.m., in room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Bill Nichols (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NICHOLS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE Mr. NICHOLS. The subcommittee will come to order.
This morning we are pleased to have as our witness, Gen. David Jones, who was formerly Chief of Staff of the Air Force and later became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
General Jones' distinguished military career ended with his retirement in 1982, but not before he kicked off the present era of the Defense reform debate with an article entitled, “Why the Joint Chiefs Must Change.” He has been an active proponent of JCS reform ever since. He most recently participated in a CSIS study on DOD organization.
General, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you instituted several measures which substantially improved the operations and procedures of the JCS, which numerous witnesses who have appeared before this committee have singled out for high praise. We hope you will tell us this morning, based on your extensive military experience, just what you think are the major things that ought to be done in the way of reorganization at this time. STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID C. JONES, U.S. AIR FORCE (RE
TIRED), FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE
General JONES. Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I don't have a formal statement. But I would like to make some brief remarks.
First I would like to compliment the subcommittee, the Members and the staff, and particularly you, Mr. Chairman, on taking the lead in reorganization. You have an outstanding bill that passed the House by an overwhelming majority. And you are continuing that momentum in these hearings. You are doing a great service to the country. I agree with the overall thrust of your proposed legislation. We have to increase our jointness. If you really take a serious look at our organization today, to a great extent our jointness is a token. It is an outgrowth of our heritage of the Army and the Navy. We have forgotten that in World War II we essentially fought by Service. Eisenhower and McArthur worked for General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army. Nimitz worked for Admiral King, Chief of Staff of the Navy. There were some important interservice operations, some very successful, like Normandy. Some had great problems, like the Gulf of Leyte.
Our current organization has grown out of this structure. We have fundamental cultural differences divided into two areas. And I call these the sea-based and landbased. In the sea-based we have the Navy and Marines who work very closely together. They have a common secretariat and are very interoperable, very close. The Army and Air Force are not as close as the Navy and Marines. They have separate secretariats. But the Air Force came out of the Army. There is a closeness, not only because of the heritage, but support and so forth. But there is considerable cultural difference between these two groups. And we see this in the arguments on Defense organization. We are basically organized today around these two groups-land based and sea-based.
For example, the forces based in the United States which is the overwhelming percentage of our forces—the sea-based forces are under the Atlantic Command and Pacific Command, while all the Army and Air Force units are either under a specified command, single-service Air Force for the Air Force, or the Readiness Command. And there is no command with any appreciable amount of our stateside forces that integrates these four services. We have a few headquarters that have a little four-service integration.
Even in the European and Pacific Commands-which are four service-once you get below the major command level, the unified command headquarters, you immediately go back to the components, which are single service. I agree with your legislation on the unified and specified commands which gives the unified commanders more authority.
There is one thing that should be added. You have a section which requires the Pentagon to examine certain areas. Should we have a Transportation Command? Should we have a Special Operations Command? I believe you should task the Pentagon to take a fundamental look at the organizational structure of the unified and specified commands to see if there isn't some way, from the bottom up, we can have more joint operations. Not just exercises, but day to day from an organizational standpoint. That would be my strongest recommendation on the unified and specified commands. With regard to authority to the commanders-in-chief of the unified and specified commands, you are moving in the right direction by giving them more authority.
What we have to recognize though is that there are great variances in the roles and missions of those CINC's. For example, giving a CINC authority to move headquarters people from subordinate units would be appropriate in commands like the European Command or the Pacific Command, but not in the Readiness Command, in that the Readiness Command does not have a wartime mission. And the forces and organizations assigned to them go to Europe or the Pacific or someone else. And therefore, it should have a more restrained authority.