« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »
However, it has become so big that you can buy a lot of things cheaper then GSA does. Certainly, I would encourage the great competition. I am not trying to say that I would advocate the abolishment of DLA, or that each Service should go back to buying its items. But I would have no problem with the Army being the manager of petroleum.
I guess my orientation is: the more that you can put in the hands of those who have to fight the forces, the better I feel.
Mr. KASICH. You mean to tell me, you think that we ought to let the individual Services buy their own fuel?
General JONES. I did not say that. I am using as an illustration that I would be comfortable with the Army being the executive agent for procurement of petroleum, as opposed to each Service or a central agency.
Mr. KASICH. Oh, I see what you are saying. In other words, the Army would buy for everybody rather than-
General JONES. And I am not sure that is a wise thing to do because I really have not spent that much time looking at it. All I am saying is that bigness is not always good. We form special agencies that get bigger and bigger. So, I would put a lot of pressure on the agencies. I am not an advocate of abolishing them. I would have to look at it in greater detail. But I generally would be skeptical of making agencies bigger.
Mr. KASICH. I would agree with that, except when the bigness leads to economies of scale in the purchasing of consumable items in something that certainly is not that complex. But to follow up on what you say about bigness not necessarily being better, and I agree with that—would you endorse a proposal that could come before this committee that would give the Secretary of Defense the authority to run his department or his own shop any way he wants to? For example, if the Secretary of Defense wants to have three Undersecretaries, one that might handle procurement, one policy, one maybe for R&E, the proposal would allow him and at the same time require him to reduce the total number of people in his shop, rather than the Congress mandating all these different offices and who should report to him. We have 41 people who report to the Secretary of Defense now. He is deciding things like whether we should have smoking on military bases. Shouldn't he be focusing, or be given the latitude to focus, on budget policy questions rather than having Congress mandate all these operations in his shop? Would you endorse something that would allow him to have the flexibility to focus on output rather than on input?
General JONES. Yes, I would endorse that.
Mr. Kasich. I am asking you to answer that affirmatively so the chairman can hear you say that.
General JONES. I would philosophically endorse decentralization. And therefore I would generally support what you had to say, yes.
Mr. KASICH. Secretary Schlesinger, speaking of the position of Secretary of Defense, said (essential): "You sometimes think that when you give an order, hard right or hard left, the ship moves. The problem is with all this bureaucracy within my own office I give the order and the people in the engine room are all seasick."
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Carney.
Mr. CARNEY. General, would you care to comment on the need for joint sub specialities?
General JONES. I think it is very important that somehow we get away from this idea that only 2 percent on the Joint Staff have ever been on the Joint Staff before. We have to have some greater joint experience. And we need some identification of people who are really good in the joint arena. We do not reward strategists enough. I have said a number of times, if Clausewitz were in the U.S. military he would retire as a colonel and go to work for a think tank. The strategist is really more at the national level than the joint level. You can be a service strategist, but we really need some broad-thinking strategists. And I think one of the problems in dealing with the Congress is that strategy really has not been laid out clearly enough.
I would like to see rewards to people who are strategists. Somehow you have to identify them, keep track of them, and be able to bring them back, not as a full time career, but bring them back a number of times. And as they get in senior positions, the people who have had that joint experience should be known. You should be able to put them into the jobs as they grow. If they don't grow, they don't come back.
Mr. CARNEY. How do you see this impacting on promotions, fasttracking, creating a royalty corps?
General JONES. I did not say it would be a royalty corps. The problem is we have had just the opposite. Generally, people who spend a lot of time in the joint system do less well. You will get a few statistics that these people did better. But if you really want to get promoted from a staff position, particularly to the 07 rank, the best thing to do is to be on a small specialized group on a service staff which structures issues.
What we are trying to do is to give people whose perspectives are broader than one service a greater reward. I think there are all kinds of safeguards so you will not end up with a royalty group. We are not advocating a general staff. We are not advocating what a lot of nations have, that joint people are almost in a separate service and wear different colored lapels.
What we support is just an identifier of who has better qualifications for the joint business, and some additional reward. Officers will get good rewards for doing well in their service. They do not get that across the board in joint assignments. Over the years it will fluctuate. But generally they do not do as well. It is one way to correct that problem.
Mr. CARNEY. Down in the area of 04's and 05's, would you think that there would be any-not intentional, but human nature being what it is—do you think there would be any prejudices on promotion boards and that type of thing? You know, the Lord Faunteroy type of thing, who was fortunate enough to be in joint service.
General JONES. Not as long as the services control promotion boards. Obviously the people in the service on the promotion boards are going to press those people who perform the best for their service. That's human nature. You take a wing commander in the Air Force, outside of Washington that is the best way to get promoted to become a general. And that will continue. I do not think there will be a-
Mr. CARNEY. I would agree with you. And maybe I am saying this wrong. It is that same service that runs the promotion board, and you have an 03 or an 04 who has been selected for a joint spe cialty. I would have to think that 05 who is sitting in front of him on that board, not purposefully, but through human nature, would say, "What does he know?" He has been down there all the time. He is not out with the troops, he is not this, he is not that. There would be a difficulty.
General JONES. And that is why I think you have to say that generally these people must be little enriched in numbers and promo tions. Not a great deal, but at least some. Or you will run into that type of bias.
Mr. CARNEY. Thank you. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. NICHOLS. The Chair is delighted to have Congressman Blaz with us today. He has had former service as a member of the Joint Staff. Do you have any questions you would like to ask, Mr. Blaz?
Mr. Blaz. No, sir; I just appreciate the opportunity to be here.
Mr. STRATTON. I have one other question that I would like to address to the General. I may be wrong, but in reading over the documents that the Packard Commission submitted in their report, I had got the idea that they were proposing that the Deputy Chairman be involved in some other function. It seemed to me that it was tied in with procurement. And I may have misread that portion. But it seemed to me to be terribly wrong to have a Deputy Chairman mixed up with some other function that is not directly connected with the JCS.
General JONES. I am trying to find the specifics.
Mr. NICHOLS. If the gentleman will yield, I think the gentleman is exactly correct. That was a recommendation of the Commission.
General JONES. But I do not think it was procurement. I have it right here. The Joint Requirements Management Board, he would cochair it. It would also have representatives from the services.
What type of military should you have is a legitimate issue to address but he should not be involved in the procurement process. I would be careful about giving the-
Mr. BARRETT. Excuse me, General Jones. He would have responsibilities at two procurement milestones. The Joint Requirements Board would be revamped. And that board would make decisions at two procurement milestones, as Mr. Stratton indicated. So, it would put him into that position.
General JONES. I would question getting the chairman too much into the procurement business. He certainly ought to have an input. But I would be careful about getting them too involved in the detailed budget process. Too many people in the building are already too deeply into the budget process. Not that they should not play a role. But I would be careful about spending too much time on procurement and too much time on budget, certainly, the budget of the unified commands and exercises and that part. But to get into deciding whether or not a radar is ready or a cruiser or an airplane is ready for procurement, I would keep them out of that, except as a secondary role.
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett, do you have any questions?
Mr. BARRETT. General Jones, returning to the discussion of the joint subspecialty a while ago, I have a couple of things. One, I think the impression could be left that these joint subspecialists are going to be staff officers for the rest of their lives. The intent of the bill is that the officers, who would spend half of their time on staffs anyway after the 8 or 9 year level, would serve on the joint side in their staff specialty. But they would go right back out to their services. Second, if we do not do something like this, how do we develop the overall strategists that we need later on, as junior officers progress in their career life?
General JONES. I agree, and I do not think 5-percent is magic. I would be happy with one third of their time. What I am concerned about is having only 2 percent repeats. You can afford a fairly rapid turnover if the people who come in have had previous Joint Staff experience. But it is the people who come in who have not
joint duty who cause difficulty. So I would endorse that a substantial time be in the joint system. Fifty percent maybe, maybe a third would be a right number. But a substantial time beyond the initial duty once you have identified the officer. But most of the time should be spent in the service in the field, rather than in the joint system.
Mr. CARNEY. Let me ask this question of you then, General. If we were to have that type of mix, 40 or 50 or 60 percent, depending upon the individuals, would you suggest that those who serve in the upper echelon of the joint activity be exclusive to those who have had that experience?
General JONES. No; but I would try the best I could to work the system where most of them would have that experience. But I would not exclude anybody. I do not like arbitrariness in the personnel business. So, I would not be absolute. I would give the Secretary of Defense a lot of authority in this regard. But I would set as a basic criteria that you have to have had extensive joint experience to be the Chairman or the CINC, with a waiver authority by the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. CARNEY. Thank you.
Mr. ICHOLS. General Jones, we appreciate your testimony very much sir. You have been very helpful to us on former occasions as well as this morning. We appreciate your being with us.
The Chair will announce that at 1 p.m. this afternoon we resume our hearings on the crash of the Arrow Airlines. At that time we will hear from former Arrow Airlines pilot Michael Sanjenis, and former aircraft mechanic for Arrow Airlines, Mr. Randy Stirm, both of whom have been subpoenaed by the committee. And we will have Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Maurice Shriber, who will be with us to speak for the Defense Department as well.
At 3 p.m. this afternoon we resume our hearings on the DOD reform. Witnesses will be General John Cushman, U.S. Army, retired, with Professor Anthony Oettinger, and Gen. John Vogt, U.S. Air Force, retired, former Commander of Allied Air Forces in Europe.
The committee stands in recess until 1 p.m.
[Whereupon, at 10 a.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 1 p.m., the same day.)
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NICHOLS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE Mr. NICHOLS. The subcommittee will come to order.
After considerable delay and with my apologies, we will get started on our afternoon session in which we are going to continue looking into reorganization problems of the Department of Defense. Our witnesses this afternoon are, first, Gen. John Cushman, U.S. Army (Retired], who is a distinguished author of "Command and Control of Theater Forces: Adequacy.” With him is Professor Anthony G. Oettinger, with Harvard University.
General, you have a prepared statement, I believe, sir. Without objection we will put that in the record and we will recognize you for any statement you care to make, sir.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN H. CUSHMAN, U.S. ARMY (RETIRED),
AUTHOR OF “COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THEATER FORCES: ADEQUACY”
General CUSHMAN. I would like to make a condensation of my statement for about 10 minutes.
Mr. NICHOLS. Yes, sir.
General CUSHMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify.
General CUSHMAN. My expertise is that of a researcher and former practitioner in the field of command and control of military forces. In two books I have described, No. 1, “How the Authorities of Commanders of Unified Commands Fall Short of Their Responsibilities,” and No. 2, “Weaknesses of the Present JCS System.” With me is Professor Oettinger, chairman of the Harvard University's Program on Information and Resources Policy, where these books were written.
I have a statement for the record which I have given to the clerk. I will read about a 10- or 12-minute condensation. Professor Oettinger has a statement. We will then be available for questions.
Mr. Chairman, our 1983 study said this: Theater forces' command and control systems are not well tied together. They are not being tested under the conditions of war. Great sections of them will probably not survive. They represent the largley unplanned splicing together of illfiting components, and they do not exploit technology.
We described the basic cause of this alarming condition; namely, that the Chariman of the JCS and senior officers in the operational chain of command have not been given the means, including the necessary authority, to meet their responsibilities and accountability. We have just completed our 1986 study. I have it here. Preliminary copies have been made available to your subcommittee. This study concludes that the 1983 findings remain true. It says that the basic reason for this mismatch of responsibility and authority is the service-dominated culture of U.S. multiservice operational command.
In his 1958 message to Congress, President Eisenhower said that "each unified commander must have unquestioned authority over all units of his command.” He recommended that “present law . .