civilian leadership requires unfiltered military information and advice. The chief function of a General Staff, however, as the House Armed Services Committee noted its report on defense organization in 1958, is "the swift suppression, at each level of consideration, of alternative courses of action, so that the man at the top has only to approve or Yet in our disapprove but not to weigh alternatives." system of government, the "man at the top" is not a military Chief, but the President - whose obligation as an elected leader is to weigh alternatives, none of which are more critical to our future than the decision to use or not use military force. Thus the primary function of any joint military system at the seat of government must be to provide not to suppress the options and alternatives which true decisionmaking demands. That requires a balanced, joint, deliberative process, such as we currently possess in the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff. A General Staff has numerous other flaws. Composed of officers whose careers are spent in staff billets rather than command, and who report to, and depend for promotion upon, a single leader, the Staff quickly becomes isolated from the broad range of operational experience and military knowledge that ensures objective, informed decisionmaking. History has shown that such staffs become rigid, adhering to particular doctrines and eschewing innovation and initiative. We have only to look at the German General Staff experience, ΟΙ even that of World War I Britain before 1918, to see the military failure that ensues. For all these reasons, In pursuing the concept of a national General Staff, proponents have suggested a number of partial measures to achieve it in effect if not in name. These include a joint military personnel system, in which a single career path is established for joint-duty, and selection, assignment and promotion policies are controlled by a single officer, typically the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These proposals run many of the same dangers as those noted for a General Staff. Moreover, they fail to do what they are alleged to do: improve joint service. That objective requires the widening of joint experience among military officers; continued improvements in military education and training; and increased joint exercises. In all these respects, this Administration has made progress. Specific issues such as filling joint billets, or promotion rates for joint-service officers are also being addressed. In the Navy, promotion rates for officers serving in joint billets are now comparable to those for Service billets. And, despite demanding sea-duty rotations for Naval officers and a lower flag-enlisted ratio than other Services, the Navy is making a concerted effort to fill its joint officer billets; currently, for instance, we fill 100 percent of the Navy's officer billets in the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We should be clear, however, about the ultimate objective of joint service: not to create and enlarge central staffs, but to enhance the capability of our military forces as a whole. That requires both skilled Service expertise and joint military coordination. 62-630 0 - 87 - 3 CONCLUSION The principles of American defense organization are sound. The final measure of their success is this: throughout the decades since World War II despite changes in Administration, changes in military leadership, destructive vacillations in our commitment to adequate defense spending, debates over nuclear and conventional strategy, and, in the background, the steady, ominous build-up of Soviet military forces despite all this, we have deterred Soviet imperial ambitions and maintained global peace. The principles which such success reflects should not lightly be changed. But anything that nourishes those principles and permits them to invigorate our defense should receive the most thoughtful consideration. That is what is required today. There is room to improve our defense system. We must decentralize, cut bureaucracy, and continue to restore the principle of line management. The answer to the stronger defense we all seek is not to destroy the current system It Thank you. Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Rourke. STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL A. ROURKE, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE Mr. ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I might ask that my statement be made a part of the record in full. Mr. Chairman, I'll simply, if I may, sir, reflect on certain portions of it hoping not to be too repetitious, and hoping there will be less repetition as the presentations go on. I'm feeling almost like a referee in front of my two honored colleagues, one of whom I worked with so long and hard for some years, and another of whom I've come to respect and admire over the years. Let me simply say, Mr. Chairman, now I see the major proposals. We've had the benefit of working with Arch Barrett and John Lally now for quite some time. They preceded many who are currently driving in this fray and who are enthusiastic about reorganization. I commend you, sir, and these gentlemen, for the extraordinary job they've done, and to the initiative they've taken. It was suggested many times in the past that this is a day that would not come. I think it was something that I might have reflected on inaccurately, as I have been somewhat inaccurate on a number of other reflections. But the day is here, Mr. Chairman, and it is a privilege to work with someone like you, and the members of your staff, along with the members of the committee who are so sincere in this undertaking. Let me suggest, if I may, Mr. Chairman, that the proposals that are embodied in some of the substantive legislation that has been proffered, would strengthen the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the expense of the corporate JCS. The combatant commanders, in my view, would be strengthened at the expense of the components of the individual services. Legislation would force the integration, as my colleagues have described, and further reduction, of the secretariat and service staffs without proportional decrease in management responsibilities. Let me begin, if I may, where Secretary Lehman almost concluded, and that is with respect to the unified and specified commanders, noted so forthrightly in your letter. As Secretary of the Air Force, I do urge moderate changes here because much of the criticism of combatant commanders' authority is based on what we view as dated experience. I know that several remarkable changes, and my colleagues have participated in that effort, have occurred under the current Joint Chiefs of Staff to redress the imbalances in the authority and responsibilities of combatant commanders. For example, the unified commanders play a significant role in the formulation of the services' budget plans. Likewise, the CINC's are an integral part of the Defense Resources Board process. And it isn't only in the 4 to 6, days that Secretary Lehman accurately pointed out, in which they physically participate in that process at the Pentagon itself throughout the year. They're part of that process in terms of physical separate visits, telephone calls, and meetings, and correspondence, in which they forthrightly present their views, and properly so. From some of the criticism I've read, Mr. Chairman, and about which we've spoken, one would think that if the services, or the corporate JCS, were removed from the resource allocation process for the combatant commanders, each of these commanders would somehow be provided those forces and equipment presently identified as shortfalls. That, as we know, just isn't the case. We're in a finite resource arena, and their views, with them participating, I think are clearly and accurately reflected. The services and the JCS, we believe, perform a vital function in this area, balancing the combatant commanders' focus on today's regional needs against the perspective of global needs, and the future requirements of deterrence. The balance between readiness and modernization is indeed delicate but vital, and we have to make certain that decisions on the balance are broadly informed ones. That's the purpose and the function performed by, I believe, Secretary Weinberger, Secretary Taft, and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We should continue to move in that direction of insuring that the views of those combatant commanders are clearly visible in the resource process, but not to the exclusion of the services. The commanders of the unified and specified commands are combat commanders who should and must focus on the security of their assigned regions and missions and on the threat to U.S. interest that they face today, along with the readiness and sustainability of the forces assigned to them. Therefore, I believe, as has been pointed out, Mr. Chairman, that it would be a tragic mistake to saddle them with the budget processes and burdens that we all go through in the city of Washington. To have them layer upon themselves a set of budgeteers. I don't think this would be in the best interest of the performance of their immediate duties, or, indeed, contribute to the process as we know it, as difficult as it is in Washington today. Mr. Chairman, as I go through some of the proposals that have been made with respect to the joint command billets, I can point with great pride to the record of the Air Force in terms of joint billets. It has been viewed by some as a career graveyard. It's not that way in the Air Force, sir. We have a long and proud record of selecting those officers who have been performing consistently higher in the Air Force. Their promotion records indicate that they, on average enjoy better career patterns perhaps than any other service. Their professional military education levels are extraordinarily high, and their civilian education levels are high as well. Our officers are assigned to the joint arena tour for a controlled 3-year period, thereby increasing, we think, the stability and consistency. Mr. Chairman, we all agree on the need for increased jointness in our military operations in the resource acquisition process. The provisions to strengthen the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are proposed in the name of improved, better, more timely advice, and improved jointness. I think all of the Chiefs have gone on record to support a strengthened Chairman, but they've all cautioned against separating him too far from the corporate JCS. Our own review of the issue leads me to support that position. What good is done for national defense if we gain what we view as |