I believe that he should be the principal adviser to the President, to the National Security Council and to the Secretary of Defense, taking into account the Chief's views if time permits. Often it has been my observation that time does not permit.

The Joint Staff should work for the Chairman. The Chairman should have a true Deputy or Vice Chairman, senior to the JCSthe No. 2 man-and he should be the Acting Chairman when the Chairman is gone. I do not believe that the Deputy should be dualhatted as Director of the Joint Staff. That would be too much.

The reason I am concerned about the Deputy being the Acting Chairman when the Chairman is gone is that for us commanders in chief of the combatant commands the only military voice that we have in Washington to represent cross-service views is the Chairman. When he is gone, we CINC's want to have cross-service views represented by other than an Acting Chairman who is a chief of Service.

From my experience, frankly, I found that trying to carry water on both shoulders, that is, being both the Chief of Staff and the Acting Chairman for any great period of time, caused me to lose something out of each bucket, either as the Chief or as the Acting Chairman.

I don't agree that in order to be less parochial the chiefs of Service need to have rug time with the President from time to time as the Acting Chairman. I think that it is an admission against interest, frankly, for them to say that they have to have that opportunity in order to be less parochial.

So for me, having been a Chief, and now having been a CINC for almost 7 years, I would hope that the law would read that the Vice or the Deputy Chairman would be the Acting Chairman in the absence of the Chairman rather than to leave it to the option of the President or to the Secretary of Defense.

We CINC's need to have cross-service views represented at all times in all interagency groups within Washington and that can only be done, in my opinion, by the Chairman or by a Vice Chairman who knows the Chairman's thinking.

I do not believe that the Chairman needs a permanent management system. I will raise some other personnel items a little later. With respect to the commanders in chief, I think to correct the disconnect that exists between commanders in chief contingency plans and Service force development plans, the law should be changed to read:

Military departments are responsible to man, organize, equip, train, and support forces for joint/combined war-fighting in accordance with the requirements of the CINC's operational plans.

I think as a consequence of that change to the law you would find a greater coordination between the CINC's and services and between the Chairman and services.

I believe that the CINC should make a major input man as the latter integrates the Service programs the Chairman is not to integrate the service PON and therefore not have the major input from the that, then I think we should institutionalize the c Resources Board procedures wherein the CINC's app

Board, provides an integrated priority list of requirements to the members and to his component commanders, and we have direct coordination between the CINC's and the services.

The CINC's should have the option of how they want to exercise command during a contingency, whether through the component commanders or a joint task force or some other means. As a general principle, the CINC, and not the National Command Authority, should command any operation that occurs in the CINC's theater. Now, I say that as a general principle. It should not be commanded from Washington. The CINC himself should command it because one, that is what he is there for, and two, he has the assets within the theater to influence whatever contingency plan is being implemented.

I mentioned tightening the linkage between the services' resource support responsibilities and the CINC's operational responsibility.

I have listed in the memorandum some personnel actions related to joint service. I won't touch on all of those but I do want to touch on one. That is to have recurrent tours for successful joint service officers when we define "successful" as: Did the officer put the good of the Nation above the good of his service? I have not found any definition of successful other than this in my studies of transcripts and appearances by others before this committee and other committees. Then there should be the periodic return to the parent service.

I do not believe that a Chairman or Chief needs to have had a tour as a commander in chief before being appointed. It would be preferable, but they should certainly have had successful joint duties as defined in the manner that I defined it.

There are other personnel actions which I think are also important but I won't go into them at this time.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff should be retained as a body. There should not be a Joint Military Advisory Council; I am pleased to see that on both sides of the Capitol there appears to be no intent of establishing such a Council.

Now, if the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is given the responsibility and authority to integrate the service programs and budgets with major input from the CINC's, then consideration must be given to what you do with the service secretaries. I believe that the service secretaries should be eliminated if my two other proposals are accepted. The alternative would be to have an Under Secretary of Defense for each service, or failing that, to integrate the secretariat staffs with the military department staffs.

I would hope the day would come when programming and budgeting could revert to a single process and that we would have biannual defense budgets.

I have a couple of other things here about micromanagement and necessary PPBS staff capability being given to CINC's and to the Chairman.

I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that the CINC's should be given programming and budgeting responsibility. I say that because the CINC should in fact organize themselves as they would have to be for wartime and then modify any organization as necessary for

peacetime. I believe that is a principle that should be pursued in almost every organization.

The CINC's are responsible for the operational side of what goes on within the theater. I believe that with the major input that they would make to the Chairman as he integrated the POMS and the budgets that that would be satisfactory from the CINC standpoint. Rather than haring each CINC coming in with a program and with a budget, I believe the services themselves need to retain that final authority of being able on a broad, global scale to determine what is necessary, but knowing that what they determine to be necessary as a program and as a budget will be scrutinized by the Chairman for the purpose of integration into a final product to be presented to the Secretary of Defense.

I think with that, Mr. Chairman, I would now like to answer your questions.

Mr. MAVROULES. Thank you very much, General. You have answered a number of questions that I had to put before you. I have a few more though and would like you to comment on those.

General, you are currently serving as the commander in chief of the United States European Command. That means you are 1 of the 10 combat commanders who would be responsible for fighting a war should that happen while you are in command. We have been told that the CINC's do not have sufficient authority to discharge the awesome responsibilities. What is your view on that?

General ROGERS. I have the authority to fight any contingency that may arise within my theater, and I have to separate that into two types of contingencies:

One that occurs within the NATO area; specifically, the Allied Command Europe area from northern Norway to the Mediterranean, and east to eastern Turkey.

Second, those contingencies that might arise in the European Command area of cognizance that does not fall within the NATO area, such as some nations in the Middle East, Africa-except for the Horn of Africa-and Egypt. I have authority to conduct whatever is necessary to meet a contingency, and that authority is exercised through my component commanders. I am dependent upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide me with the necessary resources with which to implement the contingency plan.

Mr. MAVROULES. General, as the commander of FORSCOM you were intimately involved in the development of combat doctrine. When General Meyer testified before us he commented on the fact that the development of joint doctrine is a major weakness in the U.S. military. Could you define joint doctrine for the record and is General Meyer correct in his assessment?

General ROGERS. Joint doctrine is that doctrine that has been agreed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for use by a unified commander in the operational control and integration of the three services.

With respect to General Meyer's comments I would say that there was quite good doctrinal coordination and coordination between the Army and Air Force at the time when I was the FORS COM commander, and when I was Chief of Staff. We did have the Army's Training and Doctrine Command that does develop the doctrine for the U.S. Army at Fort Monroe working very closely with

the tactical Air Force commander at Langley for the development of joint doctrine as far as those two services were concerned.

I do not believe that even yet today there has been-well, I probably should not say this, because I have been out on the ramparts of freedom for 7 years, and haven't been in the Washington area. But when I left the Washington area at that time there was not great coordination and cooperation between the Army and Air Force and the Navy. But that is not-I find that is not unique with the United States. It also seems to be endemic in the armed forces of other nations with whom I am now associated as supreme allied commander of Europe.

Mr. MAVROULES. I am now going to defer to my colleague, Mr. Skelton, to see if he has any questions.

Mr. SKELTON. General, it is good to see you. Thanks for coming over and sharing your thoughts with us.

General ROGERS. Thank you.

Mr. SKELTON. There are two areas I would like to touch on briefly. No. 1 is in the area of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the proposed Deputy. My argument has been that even a platoon leader has someone as an assistant in the nature of a platoon sergeant and here we have a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a makedo operation to be the deputy when he was over visiting you or in Scotland or wherever they go.

Would you reiterate your thoughts on this for the record, sir? General ROGERS. Yes sir. I have been convinced, Mr. Skelton, since 1962, that the Chairman should have a Deputy or a Vice Chairman. From 1962 to 1966 I had the privilege of serving as the executive assistant to Gen. Max Taylor and then General Wheeler, 2 years each, when each was Chairman.

Mr. SKELTON. Is that the same as a director?

General ROGERS. No. This is a Deputy, a Vice Chairman. They were Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. SKELTON. What were you?

General ROGERS. I was a colonel, executive assistant to the Chairman. I sat outside his door, saw that what he got and who he talked to and one or two other functions, and I saw what he got was properly prepared. He needs a Vice Chairman to take off his shoulders some of the-if nothing else-some of the representational responsibilities that the Chairman has, which keeps him from doing other things.

Second, he needs a Vice Chairman to handle certain specific areas that he, the Chairman, should and would assign to him to have cognizance over, just as all of us who have deputies make specific assignments of cognizance for those deputies.

But what I believe oftentimes is forgotten here in Washington is the importance we CINC's ascribe to a Vice Chairman or Deputy Chairman to represent our views in the Washington area, in the interagency groups, when the Chairman must be gone. He is going to be gone twice a year for the Nuclear Planning Group meetingsthat is NATO-twice a year for NATO ministerial meetings, so those are four times as a minimum. He must get out and see the unified commanders and their troops, and he also must visit other nations as an official guest.

Now, when we as CINC's observe the times when the Chairman is gone, we would like to see his Deputy, who understands the cross-service views of the Chairman and who is the representative of the cross-service views in Washington for us CINC's, to see that Deputy sitting in the seat as Acting Chairman and to represent us in the interagency groups. That is why I had hoped the language of this committee's bill and that of the Senate Armed Services Committee would not have just left it to the option of the President and the Secretary of Defense whether or not he is the Acting Chairman, but by law would have said that first, the Vice Chairman is the number two ranking man in the Armed Forces. Second, he is the Acting Chairman when the Chairman is absent. Third, he is not a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but he sits in obviously and listens to their discussions. And fourth, he assists the Chairman in representing the cross-service views of the CINC's in Washington.

That may be more than you wanted to know, Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. I couldn't have written it better, General. As a matter of fact, it was said so well the Navy offices in the back of the audience were squirming.

My second question deals with your comments regarding the CINC's and the planning and the budget. I know that you would not go as strong as we in putting the CINC's into the budgetary process. This came about basically as a result of a couple of examples.

I guess the main example that we refer to on the committee was the example where the ĈINCPAC was unable to get the Army to move its ammunition from its evidently exposed position to someplace else.

And then there is an example of the CINCLANT wanting certain types of airplanes up in Iceland and unable to get them up there. Subsequently, however, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs did agree with the new CINC in all that and there was a change.

These are a couple of examples of not being able to control their own assets and their own destiny. With that in mind, would you reiterate your thoughts on the power of the CINC's and how you would change it, if at all?

General ROGERS. Well, as I mentioned in my memo, I start out with the assumption that the purpose is to enhance the authority and influence of the CINC's as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In doing that, I believe that on the programming and budgeting side the Chairman should be responsible for integrating the programs and the budgets that come from the services, and he would do that with major input from the CINC's. That can be done.

Then the Chairman presents that integrated budget program to the Secretary of Defense. What that would mean would be that the Chairman, in his broad view of looking at the responsibilities of the United States on a global basis, would have to judge between CINC's requests for certain forces to be assigned to them. That is the kind of decision that I think the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs should make, and we in turn as the CINC's, would make our presentation to the Chairman as to what it is that we felt we needed.