Now there is in H.R. 4234 the authority to set up separate and individual task forces and the like. But I am concerned that the overall enhancement of the role of the CINC might create a situation whereby the increased bureaucracy and layered command at the CINC level could interfere with the needed flexibility of creating task force commanders for individual contingency operations. As one moves further up the spectrum of violence from contingencies to general nonnuclear war, the unified and specified command structure is, I think, relatively well organized. That is more or less what I believe the CINC's are for, and their role and authority should be strong in that type of conflict.

As one merges into more difficult circumstances, as the spectrum of violence might increase to nuclear war and the like, the situation could change yet again. And the thing that I want to stress is the importance of flexibility in command arrangements to be established by the President and the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

I do believe that at the present time that a tilt toward enhanced authority for the CINC's is important. But I would recommend against 15 pages of detail with CINC councils and the like as a method for trying to correct the current problems. I believe that a general and rather brief statement enhancing the role of the CINC in peacetime particularly, and clearly giving flexibility for various command arrangements to be established, tailored to individual circumstances would be far superior.

With respect to H.R. 4235, the joint subspecialty for military officers, I would identify myself also with John Kester's testimony on this bill. I believe that the direction is right, but the degree of detail and rigidity are wrong. It may well be that in some circumstances an officer of unusual background will be needed for a senior position. I would hate to have it enshrined in legislationthat can only be changed by coming to the Congress and going through a lengthy process-that only a former CINC can be a Chairman, for example.

I believe that that sort of provision is enormously too restrictive. I agree that we want to enhance the careers and the opportunities for those who have served in joint backgrounds and joint commands. I think that it might be worth seriously considering a small number of military promotions at senior levels to be placed in the hands of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense, but I believe that this level of detail of legislation on this type of issue is unwise.

I would submit that one step which has long been proposed by the former commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command, Russ Dougherty, might be worth considering. That would be to require that all new flag officers be assigned for the first year of their new status as flag officers to some joint school, perhaps National Defense University, for an opportunity to learn joint operations and the activities and military operations of the other military services. This would be for submariners to get a chance to fly with Air Force fighter pilots, tank drivers to have the experience of serving on destroyers, and generally for the new flag officers to be taught the responsibilities and tools of joint command.

This sort of proposal has been made before. It tends to be watered down in the committee-like structure of the Joint Chiefs to where occasionally a few officers for a few weeks are sent to some sort of endeavor. But even with a full year being set aside-a onetime tax essentially, on the military personnel system-I think the time would be well spent. I would suggest to you that if there is any interest in this sort of approach toward increasing joint consciousness, understanding of joint operations, understanding of the other services, that General Dougherty's views be solicited by the committee.

With respect to H.R. 4236, the Military Department Reorganization Act, this consolidated method of running a military department is essentially the way Graham Claytor ran the Navy Department when I was his Under Secretary, and I think that it is a sound approach.

I do not believe that uniformity should be required of each military department. I believe that it is unwise to include in the legislation a prohibition against future reorganizations. But as a general matter, I think that an integrated staff serving together under the service Secretary at the military department level is the proper direction.

And finally, with respect to H.R. 4237 dealing with the agencies in the Department of Defense, I would only echo what I said before about civil service reform being the real centerpiece of this issue. What is important is that able people be provided through the civilian personnel system to manage these agencies, and that the Commander or Director of any of the agencies report to someone in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and, as appropriate to someone in the Chairman's organization, that can actually effectively oversee his operation. But I would recommend against detailed provisions such as Combat Support Agency Policy Councils and the like.

As a general matter, Mr. Chairman, I think that these bills head in the right direction. I think that we are seeing an overdue and desirable move in the Congress to correct some of the problems which have existed as a result of a heavily military-service-oriented peacetime structure, and a set of combatant commands that also are too heavily influenced by the roles of the individual military services. But I would counsel you in the direction of generality, of principles, of oversight hearings, of later amendment if necessary, and against 45 pages of detail.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Woolsey. Let me go back to your comments on the Deputy Chairman which is a controversial subject at best. Why did the Commission make the Deputy a sixth member of the JCS?

Mr. WOOLSEY. I think that the use of the number six, Mr. Chairman, was not meant to suggest that he should be sixth in hierarchy, but rather that he should be one of the six members, a full member of the JCS. And I believe that the Commission felt that the addition of a Deputy Chairman was particularly important for several reasons. One, many of us, although I am not certain that this would be true of all on the Commission, thought that the Chairman should have a Deputy Chairman to serve in his absence in order to maintain continuity in the advice and knowledge of

what was going on in the Joint Chiefs, and continuity of advice to the President and the Secretary.

I think that it is particularly important that in the Commission report that we sought to enhance the role of the Joint Requirements Management Board, which today is an organization which is chaired in rotating fashion by the Vice Chiefs of the individual services, which deals only with joint requirements, and then only with some joint requirements. We proposed a significantly enhanced role for that Board, and proposed that it be cochaired by the Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and by the new Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, which we also proposed be created.

What we were trying to do was to get a very senior voice for the user commands-the commands which would actually use the weapons systems that were going to be developed-and a senior role for the technical and procurement side of the Department of Defense. We wanted them to cooperate to approve, I would hope, relatively short statements of military requirements for joint programs and for selected individual service military weapons system requirements and I think that these should be the important requirements. We felt that that role for the Deputy Chairman was an extremely important one, and could go a long way toward seeing that the user's, the military user's interests were represented better than they are now in the military weapons requirement process.

We also thought, I believe, that the Deputy Chairman would have an important role in assisting the Chairman in overseeing the needs of the CINC's-their inputs into the planning, programming, and budgeting system. And, as a general matter, he would have a hand in helping the Chairman with the enhanced role which we proposed that he be given.

Mr. NICHOLS. Well, if I might say so, I can understand the controversy that might surround the Packard Commission on various sides on the Deputy Chairman. And without being critical at all of your report, it looks to me like you may have straddled the fence a little on that issue, and passed it on to the Secretary of Defense. Now let me ask you, does the fact that with each changing Secretary of Defense you might have an entirely different setup for the Chairman, give you any concern?

Mr. WOOLSEY. Not really, Mr. Chairman. I think that any Secretary of Defense is going to rely very heavily upon the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. A new joint structure which would enhance the Chairman's role once it is in place, once it has its rules and regulations, will have a certain degree of solidity and permanence to it. My reluctance to embody the structure of the organization of the Joint Chiefs or the role of the Deputy Chairman and so forth in legislation is purely a matter of wanting to ensure if the need should ever arise, a Secretary of Defense could decide himself that he would use one senior military officer rather than another, that he could structure the command chain to the unified and specified commands as he saw fit, and the like. It is purely a philosophical matter of believing that the Secretary of Defense is the person who, in our system, is right at the cutting edge of civilian control of the military, and of not wanting to do anything to denigrate his

This sort of proposal has been made before. It tends to be watered down in the committee-like structure of the Joint Chiefs to where occasionally a few officers for a few weeks are sent to some sort of endeavor. But even with a full year being set aside a onetime tax essentially, on the military personnel system-I think the time would be well spent. I would suggest to you that if there is any interest in this sort of approach toward increasing joint consciousness, understanding of joint operations, understanding of the other services, that General Dougherty's views be solicited by the committee.

With respect to H.R. 4236, the Military Department Reorganization Act, this consolidated method of running a military department is essentially the way Graham Claytor ran the Navy Department when I was his Under Secretary, and I think that it is a sound approach.

I do not believe that uniformity should be required of each military department. I believe that it is unwise to include in the legislation a prohibition against future reorganizations. But as a general matter, I think that an integrated staff serving together under the service Secretary at the military department level is the proper direction.

And finally, with respect to H.R. 4237 dealing with the agencies in the Department of Defense, I would only echo what I said before about civil service reform being the real centerpiece of this issue. What is important is that able people be provided through the civilian personnel system to manage these agencies, and that the Commander or Director of any of the agencies report to someone in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and, as appropriate to someone in the Chairman's organization, that can actually effectively oversee his operation. But I would recommend against detailed provisions such as Combat Support Agency Policy Councils and the like.

As a general matter, Mr. Chairman, I think that these bills head in the right direction. I think that we are seeing an overdue and desirable move in the Congress to correct some of the problems which have existed as a result of a heavily military-service-oriented peacetime structure, and a set of combatant commands that also are too heavily influenced by the roles of the individual military services. But I would counsel you in the direction of generality, of principles, of oversight hearings, of later amendment if necessary, and against 45 pages of detail.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, Mr. Woolsey. Let me go back to your comments on the Deputy Chairman which is a controversial subject at best. Why did the Commission make the Deputy a sixth member of the JCS?

Mr. WOOLSEY. I think that the use of the number six, Mr. Chairman, was not meant to suggest that he should be sixth in hierarchy, but rather that he should be one of the six members, a full member of the JCS. And I believe that the Commission felt that the addition of a Deputy Chairman was particularly important for several reasons. One, many of us, although I am not certain that this would be true of all on the Commission, thought that the Chairman should have a Deputy Chairman to serve in his absence in order to maintain continuity in the advice and knowledge of