occurs by virtue of the interpretation of what the word "operational" entails.

Mr. ROURKE. Mrs. Byron, the last thing in the world I'd want to do today is try to justify my own existence. Even the question is mildly uncomfortable. I know you're not referring to us individually. But as the Office of the

Mrs. BYRON. I hope I wasn't referring to you individually.
Mr. ROURKE. Oh, I'm sure you weren't.

The real response is, as Secretary Marsh has pointed out, and as we've reflected a little bit earlier, is the civilian control over the military. We've had separate discussions on this subject, and if you-I know the word is not denegrate-but if you reduce, by perception, the office of the civilian head of the respective services, you must, of course, reduce the manner in which they are viewed by the services, and by the public at large, and, indeed, by the Congress.

But that doesn't mean if you reduced it to something on a wiring diagram that was a bit lower that you couldn't get good people. One of the incorrect suggestions in the city of Washington is that you've got to be able to offer a title to get good people. We have millions of good people in this country. I suggest tens of thousands could fill my job tomorrow with equal ease and capability. So that isn't the question. The question is how do they individually function within their respective services, and within the Department of Defense, and as a cross link with the Congress. And I suggest that the manner in which it's been accomplished, I would also hope, is with less politics.

I think you have on my right and my left two of the most extraordinary service Secretaries you've had in history. This administration has been, myself excluded, extraordinarily devoid of politics in the service Secretary appointment function, and that's a healthy thing. Too much politicization and you do get problems. I think the present operation works magnificently.

Mr. LEHMAN. I think the issue of civilian control has been well addressed by my colleagues. I would say however, that another essential aspect is the fact that the service Secretaries of the military departments are the executive agents of the Secretary of Defense, and through him, the President. For the administration, the running of the military departments, there needs to be a strong executive operating officer, and as has been said, that needs to be a civilian.

If you took that function and made it a staff rather than a line job, several things would happen. One, you would lose some of the most essential tools of management for a chief executive, which are promotions, and assignments, and the comptroller functions. Once you lose those, you become merely an adviser.

Because of that you would not attract high quality people. I disagree with Secretary Rourke. I don't believe you would have your pick of tens of thousands of qualified people. I don't think you'd get many at all because the substance of the job would not warrant attracting that caliber of people.

But more importantly, if you are going to have line accountability and run the operations, the business management, the training, the readiness, and the procurement of the military departments,

you need strong executive authority in order to decentralize and have accountability.

And so, if you did away with the service Secretaries you would have to have some other chief executive officers, call them whatever you will, who have those controlling levers of managementassignments, promotions, and budget authority.

Ms. BYRON. Well, I think the record will show that you all have stated very strongly your feeling on that. It's something I wanted to make sure was in the record because, when the discussion comes around to putting an under secretary of the services in the Department of Defense, I think we have lost that flexibility that is so necessary for our military.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions.
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Kasich.

Mr. KASICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Lehman, in regard to your comments that you made about the CINC's becoming more involved in budgeting, resources, these kinds of, well, I guess, paperwork kind of duties, I asked Secretary Taft this morning what his opinion would be about assigning functions in budget categories to the CINC's things like joint training-responsibilities that are far removed from bureaucratic paper shuffling or budget justification kinds of items.

The CINC's don't have the kind of authority they ought to have. Now, I don't say that because I'm new in the committee really. But when I look at this report from Georgetown. I look at the comments made by General Rogers-he says there's an imbalance between my responsibilities and accountability as a unified operational commander, and my influence on resource decisions. There remains in Washington a preeminence of the services in the program and budget process. General Rogers is saying, "Hey, I can't affect resource decisions being made in Washington, and so, consequently, I've got to fight with what they do tell me I have to fight in Washington.

Now, we talk about this "inside the beltway" psychology, which is why I go home just about every weekend, because I want to avoid it. That's why you go to Philadelphia to see the games you see up there, to get outside of the beltway.

Aren't we doing too much beltway decisionmaking as it affects the CINC's, and shouldn't we, in fact, set-aside some specific areas and some specific budgets so that the CINC's can perform their duties in the right way?

Mr. LEHMAN. No; because what you hear is the complaint of a CINC who has lost a few battles. I've watched him since he's been there during my tenure over the last 5 years, and he's won 95 percent of his battles on the budget. He's had the budget changed every year since I've been here. But, he's lost a few. I think that all of us complain. We haven't won all our battles.

Mr. KASICH. What about Admiral Crowe saying that on occasion the results of major service decisions not previously coordinated with me have affected my ability to execute strategy?

Mr. LEHMAN. Sure; but who is that not true of? Decisions made by Admiral Crowe, and by General Rogers have affected my ability to do my job. They've affected my training. They've affected the flexibility we need to keep readiness and morale up. They've inter

fered with the proper number of port calls and overland training routes that I've wanted. And I think I've gotten the short end of the stick on occasion. But I'm not asking you to change the Constitution just because I've lost a few bureaucratic battles.

Mr. KASICH. Well, when a man in the Pacific says, Mr. Secretary, that he is dependent on component commanders, not only to compete successfully for sustained resources within their services, but also to represent him in balancing and distributing stocks, ammo, and petroleum, and so on, in locations and ways to support his theater strategy, we are suggesting that this man, who is out somewhere in the Pacific who has to perform a function in a time of crisis, doesn't have the tools at his disposal to be able to do what he thinks he has to do. He's saying the people inside the beltwaybureaucrats who you criticize who are inside the beltway-are making decisions that he has no impact over, and he's the one that's got responsibility.

Wait a minute. He says it. Rogers says it. Nutting says it. Everybody says it but Lehman.

Mr. LEHMAN. Not at all.

Mr. MARSH. No; not just anybody but Lehman.

Could I speak to that?

Mr. KASICH. Absolutely.

Mr. MARSH. Joe, put that chart up. [Laughter.]

Mr. NICHOLS. You're fixing to get the answer, Mr. Kasich. Mr. KASICH. Let me amend that statement by saying that those within the beltway don't agree.

Mr. NICHOLS. I believe you plowed up a snake. [Laughter.]

Mr. MARSH. Mr. Kasich, the way that we're organized today is shown here. Your operational command is shown here in black. Under the CINC's you have Army, Navy, and Air Force, and subunified commands.

Now, the Army in Europe is under General Rogers as the unified CINC and is shown, down here with General Otis as the component CINC. The 1958 act, in effect, put the CINC's directly under the JCS as your combat commanders, and it moved logistics and support into the Departments of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. That's our responsibility under 1958 law.

That's the way it operates now. We provide the CINC's with the logistical support for ammunition, equipment, and all the things that they need.

The change suggested in the Senate report would take the logistics, and a lot of these support responsibilities from the services and make them the responsibility of the unified CINC's.

Under this structure, instead of making his request to the Department of the Army, General Otis, the Army component commander in Europe, will have to submit his request to General Rogers. General Rogers, in order to manage these requests is going to have to develop budgeting, program analysis, and program evaluation capabilities. All those things are now being done either in Secretary Lehman's shop or Secretary Rourke's.

Now, what's happened, the CINC's have a parochial view, as they should have a parochial view. They see the problem of Europe, or the Pacific, and the assets and the resources that they need. When you're here in Washington, inside the beltway where you have to sit, and we have to sit, you do not see them as unique European and Pacific problems. We see them globally.

As suggested in the language in this bill, the CINC's want to move a logistics and resources function down into what you would call CINC components-service components. These logistics and resource functions are administrative, and, in peacetime, can best be administered centrally without creating a new bureaucracy.

Mr. KASICH. So that you're comfortable with that-all of you are comfortable and believe that we really take into account these resource decisions, and we're thinking about what somebody in the Pacific, somebody in the Atlantic, really wants.

These guys are saying-and I hope they're going to come inthese guys are saying we can't really affect it, that the services have their own interests in the beltway. Hey, I've just been doing special forces. I know about, at least in that area, the inability of the services to pursue what we all know we should pursue because of parochial interests-maybe some sexier programs in this area versus lift capability over there. You know that, Secretary Rourke. Mr. ROURKE. I'll get a nameplate in about another month, Mr. Kasich. You're absolutely right. Let me suggest, however, that everything that's been observed, and I think so brilliantly by Secretary Marsh, just points out the humanness and the freshness of this whole operation. You want General Rogers, you want Admiral