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doctrinal publications-and, of course, in light of the national dialog on these matters-I have undertaken, with my headquarters, a more comprehensive analysis of the adequacy, or the inadequacy, of unified commanders' authorities as they exist in law, policy, doctrine, and day-to-day procedures, for the purpose of carrying out our respective assigned missions. I have also reviewed the adequacy and the clarity of my assigned mission statements, those which I paraphrased for you previously.

In that review, I found no instance of legal insufficiency. Consequently, most of my conclusions and recommendations fall into the areas of DOD policy, JCS doctrine, and day-to-day operating procedures. For that reason, I would prefer to share the results of my analysis, to include recommendations for change, with the JCS and the SECDEF first, as part of their ongoing review of JCS Pub 2, which I know has been mentioned before this subcommittee. But I am, of course, prepared to respond to any questions that you may have concerning the House bills at this time.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you, General.

I appreciate you being with us. You have had two combat tours. In Vietnam, you commanded a battalion. You have a wide range of experience, and yet you seem to come before this committee this afternoon and, contrary to a lot of the opinions that we have heard, I gather from you everything's hunkydory.

General MAHAFFEY. No, I did not mean to leave that impression, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. You do not have any problems?

General MAHAFFEY. Not at all. There are areas where I think clarification and change are warranted.

Mr. NICHOLS. Well, let me talk about the CINC's a little bit. We have been told that CINC's do not have sufficient authority to discharge their responsibilities. You do not seem to hold that view?

General MAHAFFEY. No, I think under the law I have adequate authority, including operational command of the Army and the Air Force forces that are assigned to me, to carry out the missions that I am currently assigned.

Mr. NICHOLS. Do you feel that you have sufficient authority to perform your assigned mission in the Readiness Command?

General MAHAFFEY. Yes.

Mr. NICHOLS. No problem with that. Do you believe that the CINC command authority to hire and fire subordinates is a good recommendation?

General MAHAFFEY. Absolutely.
Mr. NICHOLS. You support that?
General MAHAFFEY. I do.
Mr. NICHOLS. What about court martial jurisdiction?

General MAHAFFEY. I have it. I am one of the few who do. Under the law, the Secretary of Defense is permitted to grant court martial authority to the unified and specified commanders, and in my case, particularly because I have oversight responsibilities for a multiservice organization called the Joint Communications Support Element, I have general court martial jurisdiction.

Mr. NICHOLS. Is your situation unique? Do you know of others who have been given that?

General MAHAFFEY. While I do not know for sure, I understand that authority has been granted to only a very few of the unified and specified commanders.

Mr. NICHOLS. How long have you had it during your 9 months? What about your predecessor?

General MAHAFFEY. He had it also. This is not new authority.

Mr. NICHOLS. OK. One final question. When General Meyer testified before this committee, he commented on the fact that the development of joint doctrine is a major weakness in the U.S. military. Would you define what is meant by "joint doctrine" for the record, first; and do you believe that General Meyer is correct in his assessment?

General MAHAFFEY. Mr. Chairman, it is, I believe, true that there are different definitions attached to that term, by different Services.

Mr. NICHOLS. I want yours as head of the Readiness Command.

General MAHAFFEY. I define "joint doctrine” as that set of proven tactics, techniques and procedures which are essential to effective joint war fighting; and I think that they have to be not only developed, and documented; they also have to be reviewed, validated and approved by the JCS in order to have that status. That is true joint doctrine.

Mr. NICHOLS. And what about General Meyer's statement? He said that he thought the development of Joint was a major weakness in the U.S. military doctrine. Do you share those views?

General MAHAFFEY. I do. I think that it is an area where we, the uniformed leadership, are most vulnerable to criticism, in the sense that the system by which joint doctrine and/or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures are developed, validated through hands-on experience in joint training and joint exercises, documented, reviewed, and approved; that system is, by and large, not adequately defined.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Kasich.
Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman.
Your predecessor was General Nutting?
General MAHAFFEY. That is correct.

Mr. KASICH. In his response to these problems, it seems, he said that he did feel as though he did not have all the ability to impact resource decisions that he felt he needed. Now, why you do not tend to agree with that?

General MAHAFFEY. Well, since General Nutting left, of course, there has been substantial evolution in the role played by the CINC's in the resource programming and allocation process.

No, I do not agree with him. As a matter of fact, I think we have progressed to the point today where we have about the right balance between the CINC's ability first to identify his prioritized warfighting requirements; second to have those war-fighting requirements programmed by his service components; third, to be able to audit how those requirements fare in the Service program building process that occurs annually, or, at least, is updated annually and finally, to see how they are ultimately acted on by the Defense Resources Board. As a CINC, under current procedures, I have an entry at all of those points, including the DRB.

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Now, I do not want, and I think it would be a mistake to have, additional planning and programming responsibilities as a unified commander because I am dead certain that if I were to inherit those responsibilities, I would not also inherit a proportionate number of additional resources, and people, to discharge them; but, more importantly, I think it would serve to take my eye, and my headquarters' eye off the sharp, operational focus that we try to maintain-that is to say, our war-fighting mission.

Mr. KASICH. Do you think there is a difference between the problems that a unified and a specified commander has in this whole area effecting resources?

General MAHAFFEY. Yes. The specified commander, of course, is dealing with only one service for the purpose of programming against his requirements. CINC's are, in most cases, dealing with two or more. Mr. KASICH. I asked the question the wrong way. The unified command

versus the specified operation-I am talking about the CINC in Europe, as opposed to you, who serves in a unified command. What I mean by that is-General Rogers has a problem that is different than yours because he is in charge of an operation in Europe, whereby you are in charge of a Readiness Command. Is there a difference between his responsibilities and his

a ability to impact resource decisions as opposed to the functions that you have to carry out? In other words, I am asking whether the Readiness Command and the Airlift Command are different than the command in the Pacific and be command in the Atlantic?

General MAHAFFEY. Only in the difference that stems from our differing mission requirements. General Rogers has exclusively theater-related missions.

Mr. KASICH. He has a completely different view of his ability to impact this, as opposed to you.

General MAHAFFEY. I am not sure of that. I cannot speak for him. But my observation has been that he very effectively impacts that process. And, as a matter of fact, I think the other CINC's do as well.

Mr. KASICH. What about the four or five areas that we recommend in the bill? I don't know if you have happened to see the joint training and the joint exercise programs. Do you have a problem with being given, at the Secretary's discretion, two or three of those areas? Would that take your eye off the ball or do you think that would be helpful to you?

General MAHAFFEY. If it were in the form of an opportunity to specify to the Joint Chiefs of Staff what I believe I require in very selective areas, in order to meet my mission requirements, I would have no trouble with that. On the other hand, a more expended role might take the CINC's focus off operational matters.

Mr. KASICH. It is new in the bill.

General MAHAFFEY. I know, and I do not have any great trouble with that. But I would add that the procedures exist today by which I can get the same thing done through my components. I have, again on a short-experience base, yet to experience any shortfalls generated by the Services against my requirements.

Mr. KASICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Lally.

Mr. LALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, what is your view as to what the role of the proposed Deputy Chairman should be? Should he be the Acting Chairman, or should the current procedure continue where there is an alternation between the Chiefs of the various services?

General MAHAFFEY. Mr. Lally, I observed the inner workings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the operations deputy-the Army Operations Deputy to the Joint Chiefs of Staff-for 242 years. I was impressed with the tremendous workload that confronts the Chairman, and the difficulty that that imposed on his ability to get out and visit with the unified commands and see the different problems as they exist in the field. General Vessey did that, but he did it at the cost of spending his weekends and any planned leave time traveling

On the other hand, I also saw the very great benefit that I believe came to the service Chiefs as they went through that rotational experience under the current set of procedures by which they were brought up to speed and then became the Acting Chairman during the Chairman's absence. I think that system ought to continue to be provided for, in whatever legislation may happen, because it has great benefit for the Chiefs themselves. I guess my bottom line is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are, first, and foremost, the military staff for the Secretary of Defense. In that role the Secretary ought to be able to organize and make use of those assets in any way he sees fit. So, I favor the Deputy Chairman proposal, but I believe the Secretary ought to have the final say-so as to how that Deputy is, in fact, used.

Mr. LALLY. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. NICHOLS. Does that include the rank you give him?
General MAHAFFEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. NICHOLS. Under that situation, would it bother you that one Secretary might like him and rank him No. 2 whereas the next Secretary might rank him No. 6?

General MAHAFFEY. No, sir, it does not bother me at all. I think that is perfectly in keeping with the Secretary's role under our form of government.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Barrett.
Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, you heard the questions I asked General Welch, not about the Joint Commanders Council, but about Mr. Kasich's amendment, in which the CINCs would have a voice in the overall shape of the Defense budget through the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman. He would take a document, such as the JPAM (Joint Program Assessment Memorandum], and pare it down so that it is a fiscally constrained document. It would mean cutting into your requirements as well as the other CINC's. Do you support or not support that provision that is in the JCS bill?

General MAHAFFEY. I am not entirely sure that I am clear on exactly what he would do differently.

Mr. BARRETT. All right. What it says is that the chairman will submit program recommendations and budget proposals to the Secretary of Defense based upon inputs from the CINCs, and that those proposals will be fiscally constrained. The CINC's proposals will not be fiscally constrained, but the chairman's proposal will be.

General MAHAFFEY. I think that in a budget-constrained environment that someone has to make those tradeoffs; someone has to make those decisions. As General Welch said, no CINC should, or will, get all of his priority items funded.

Again, and from my perspective as the operations deputy for the Army, I saw great strength in the crosswalk analysis that was done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff—the JPAM assessment was part of it, but beyond that, with the advent of the Strategic Plans and Resources Analysis Agency-SPRAA—they have been able to look in more detail across Service programs in an effort for the Chairman to go into the DRB better prepared; and he has, in my judgment.

Certainly, a part of that process has been and should continue to be-direct input from the CINC's. As General Welch said, before any DRB proceeding, all of the CINC's do, in fact, come together with the JCS, lay out our requirements, and explain to them the implications of not having those requirements satisfied. I feel that the Chairman, the CINC's, and the members of the JCS, therefore, go into the DRB proceedings fully informed.

As I said, somewhere along the line, someone has to make the decisions on priorities. I would have no trouble with the Chairman playing the role that you describe, on behalf of the CINC's.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you.
Mr. NICHOLS. Mrs. Byron.
Mrs. BYRON. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NICHOLS. Thank you very much for being with us, General. We appreciate your testimony.

Our final witness, then, is Mr. Robin Pirie, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics. Do you have a statement, a prepared statement?

Mr. PIRIE. I have some brief remarks, Mr. Chairman, if I may.

Mr. NICHOLS. You are welcome. You have been before this subcommittee before, and I would say to those in attendance, members of the subcommittee, that Mr. Pirie is one of the country's leading defense experts. He is currently serving as vice president of the Institute for Defense Analysis. He is a graduate of the Naval Academy, and he completed his studies as a Rhodes scholar at Oxford University.

In the course of a 20-year Navy career, Mr. Pirie served principally as a nuclear submariner. His assignment during that career included command of the nuclear attack submarine U.S.S. Skipjack. Following his retirement from the Navy, Mr. Pirie became the Deputy_Assistant Director for National Security in the Congressional Budget Office. During the Carter administration, he served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and was appointed in 1979 to be the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics. We would be glad to have your testimony at this time.

Mr. PIRIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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