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an enlarged director, one of those options, I think, would be a significant improvement.

But whatever is done in that regard the officer must have the prestige that the kind of position he would fill deserves. It just cannot be a cosmetic solution to the problem.

I think that both of the chairmen that I worked for have worked very hard to represent, and work for the CINC's—and represent their views. But as I said, the Chairman is really spread too thin. The director is the closest thing he has officially to help. He does have an assistant to the Chairman. But within the structured position of the staff, the director is the closest thing he has to help.

But the director's office is grossly overburdened, and I point this out in my statement. There is no three-star position in the Department of Defense that demands so much of an individual as the director's position.

In a sense, that is kind of good because the fact that the director is so heavily burdened now is evidence of the fact that more and more issues are being worked in the joint arena and that the Joint Staff is, in fact, a significant factor in the defense management structure. So, while we need to fix that problem, we should not regard it in a pejorative context, because it is one more piece of evidence that a whole lot of progress has been made in recent years.

A strong, effective right arm for the Chairman who has the respect and influence that the position-whatever you establish by law—that has the respect and influence that that position deserves can really make a difference to me and to the Chairman-and can provide him with the capability to get the most out of the Joint Staff and make the Joint Staff support more jointness.

For example, as I point out in my statement, he can be the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Management Board, a system that was institutionalized recently under General Vessey's tenure, I think it is one of the most important-and major-and most dramatic steps forward that we have made in some time. But there is not a senior joint officer to chair that group. A deputy chairman or a four-star director could do that.

He could help the Chairman work the problem of operational supervision of the defense agencies, assuring that the defense agencies are playing the proper role in supporting the combat forces, executing combat support functions.

Those are just a couple of examples. There are many others in many areas in which a four-star helper for the Chairman can play a very significant role, and cause more acceleration to that momentum that I talked about in speeding up the movement toward the balance and the jointness.

I think it would be a mistake-and I think some proposals have suggested this-to establish a deputy chairman, and to call him the director of the Joint Staff at the same time, or alternatively, to take away the three-star director's position. I think you need a director for the Joint Staff and you also need somebody to help the Chairman.

An alternative, of course, is to make the director of the Joint Staff a four-star and then have a three-star vice director of the Joint Staff. That kind of vacates the middle ground between the deputy and a dual-hatted four-star deputy who is also serving as the director.

I guess what I am saying is I do not think it is a good idea to have a four-star in that joint arena who is referred to as the director, and the deputy or vice chairman at the same time. I think they should be two separate people. If you are going to have a deputy, make him a deputy and do not dual-hat him as a director. Have a separate director.

If you do have a deputy director or a deputy chairman or a vice chairman and preserve the director, as I suggest you do as a threestar, then you have really introduced a new dimension of balance in the system that hasn't been talked about, that I know of, before. I would recommend that you require each to be from a different military department so that you had a chairman from one department, a deputy chairman or vice chairman, whatever you choose to call him, from another department, and a director from another department. So you really have a nice purple-suited arrangement to strengthen the joint arena; a lot of balance there, a lot of opportunity.

Now, of course, in mentioning that the director is overloaded and overworked and really trying to stay on more icebergs than he can stay on top of, by creating a deputy chairman, even without saying that he is the director, you relieve a lot of the burden of the existing director's role to act as the number two person in the management and direction of the Joint Staff. So I think you go a long way toward solving that problem of relieving the excessive burden of responsibility and activity on the director himself.

The next point I would like to make is that getting the CINC's too involved in resource management, I think, is a mistake. There are some limited things that could be done and initiatives have already been taken. Some have been consummated and others have not. Actually, I am really only talking about two. But to get them fully involved to build budgets and get too involved in the resource management process blurs the distinction between those two chains of command that I talked about. And I think that would be a mistake.

If I am to build a budget for the U.S. Space Command and the activities of its component commands, I am going to need more people. I am going to have to have a lot more people than I have now.

Our staff is structured to participate in the resource management process and support me in my role, in the role that I play in interfacing with the Defense Resources Board; and I have an adequate staff, adequate manning to do that. But to go beyond that and to assume some of the responsibilities that are now carried out by the military departments in resource management is going to cause me to have to have more people and different kinds of expertise than I have now. And I think that that is one good reason for not doing that. But I think the most important reason is you tend to blur that distinction that exists between those two chains of command.

Now, initiatives like the CINC's initiatives fund-I was on the Air Staff when we started that—that process is for command and control systems, I think that is an excellent approach. We fought for a little bit more money in that area, and I think a little bit more money at the CINC's discretion in that area would be very useful.

There has been a proposal for sort of a CINC's readiness fund, something to help facilitate some joint training activities. I think on a limited basis that is carefully capped and with proper coordination procedures with the service departments, those kinds of resource management initiatives can be helpful and useful. But to really get the CINC's in the resource management business I think is a mistake.

What you can do to help me as a CINC, and I am sure it applies to all the other CINC's-because I have had an opportunity as a commander in chief to watch this for about a year and a half now, and watch their activities. as well—is institute a 2-year budget cycle. What the 2-year budget cycle does for me is it gives me more time to review the service actions, to review the issues that are being developed in OSD and the issue papers and to develop my positions, and to ferret out all the arguments and prepare myself to deal with the Defense Resources Board and to work with the component commands and the service staffs in getting a program that best supports my needs.

If you go beyond the two things that I have just mentioned in giving the CINC's resource management responsibilities, you also run the danger of doing something else that I mentioned in my paper. If you allow each of the CINC's

to exert excessive influence on how the Air Force is structured you are going to end up with several different Air Forces. The Air Force that CINCPAC would like to see and the Air Force that CINCEUR would like to see are bound to be different. Their needs are different, their commitments are different. What the Department of the Air Force does for you is it leavens that with the influence of the Joint Staff and the joint arena and OSD and provides you the best combination of capabilities in that service department to support all of the CINC's. We cannot afford different air forces for every CINC's needs, and different navies and different armies, as well.

Now, to the extent it is affordable, the military departments try-I really think they honestly try-to accommodate to the unique commitments and the uniqueness of the CINC's missions and their environments. But a line has to be drawn and compro mise has to be made between the one extreme of having an Air Force that is tailored specifically and only to meet CINCPAC's needs and an Air Force that is tailored only to meet CINCEUR's needs, because you are going to have several different kinds of F15's and F-16's, and bombers, and so on; so I think that is another consideration.

But I come back to the main point: The one thing that you can do for me as a unified commander that would help the most is institute a 2-year budget cycle to give us more time to develop a good POM and to get more CINC participation in a timely fashion in that POM-Program Objective Memorandum-development.

As it works today, the window of time for my staff and I to review the services' POM submission to OSD is very, very narrow. And to widen it out is virtually an impossibility because you push the submission upstream too much. If you have to submit the POM too early, it is unrealistic, because the lead time from submission to execution just gets wider and wider. It is already too wide.

If you push it downstream, then, of course, OSD and OMB do not have time to prepare the budget for it to come over here. And so you are kind of squeezed on both ends of this. A 2-year cycle will relieve an awful lot of that.

The initiative that involves the CINC's in the resource management process through DRB deliberations, I think is working well, and I am very grateful for that. And I think the extent to which that facilitates jointness and activates resource management involvement of CINC's is not really recognized. Keep in mind that that process is not all so old that it is, you know, that institutionalized. It improves each time it takes place and it expands.

I might also add that at deliberations of the DRB where the CINC's cannot be present or where they are not intended to be present, a strong Chairman with a strong staff to support him can be a stronger spokesman than has been the case in the past. And I think it is another manifestation of how just that one action can solve a lot of the problems we have discussed.

With regard to people and joint specialties—involvement in the joint world-of people in the joint world-in the personnel management business, I urge extreme caution. The personnel management business is very delicate; also, it is very complex. The commandersin-chief and the directors on the Joint Staff do play, I think, a much larger role than has been made known to you all.

When I was on the Joint Staff, after General Dalton as the director was promoted and left the Joint Staff, I was the senior Air Force member of the Joint Staff. I approved, acted on, every single Air Force nomination to the Joint Staff to assure the quality of the people who were assigned to the Joint Staff. And the directors to whom those people were to be assigned, all went over the records of each and every individual who was to be assigned to them.

The Chairman and the Chiefs also review the senior assignments—as I think you all realize-to all the key joint positions, not just in joint commands but also in the DOD. I think there is a lot more influence in the so-called purple-suited world on who gets assigned than is realized.

In my current position, the services who nominate individuals have run those names by me before they have made the nominations to the Joint Staff in each case. If I had wanted to change an assignment of any senior officer from one of the other services that has been assigned to me as the unified commander, I could have weighed in with that service. I was given an opportunity by the service chiefs in each case, the Army and the Navy, to weigh in.

With regard to a joint specialty, I think that again is a serious mistake. What these joint staffs need is people with the experience that is identified by the specialties that they do have. We build our manning documents based on the need for certain kinds of specialties, with recognition and an understanding of what kind of background that particular specialty will bring to a staff.

Now, joint operational planning is a complicated business, very complicated. Unfortunately, it requires the knowledge about a lot of technical things that are involved in the disciplines of activities of all the services. There may be some justification in creating new specialties within the services such as a joint operational planning specialty. I think you could probably go a long way toward solving the problem that concerns people if certain positions were identified as requiring the kind of background or training that such a joint operational specialty might demand. But I think the Air Force, and the Army and the Navy and the Marine Corps, each ought to be allowed to establish that as a separate military occupational specialty, or Air Force specialty code as we call it in the Air Force, or what have you, rather than to create some kind of joint corps, or some other, similar concept. I just think that would be a mistake.

You cannot make all of the joint positions fit that mold, or all fit the same mold. Not all of the people in joint assignments and positions need to be operational planners; that is, one kind of specialty. Many of them need to be communications planners. Many of them need to be logistics planners, and medical support planners and so on. And, so, some broad brush of paint across a problem somebody regards as a joint specialty I think is really a cosmetic solution to a problem that requires much closer examination.

The two specialties that I do not think should be legislated, but I think it would be useful if the Department of Defense looks atand that the Chiefs should be given an opportunity to work-are joint operational planning and joint communications planning. Those are two specialties that could be institutionalized within the services. There are fundamental structures already in existence. Some modifications to them might be appropriate with which to train people for the skills necessary to execute those kinds of responsibilities.

But I disagree strongly with the sort of broad joint operational specialty that I have heard discussed. And I think tinkering with the services' personnel policies and management procedures would be a very serious mistake. The services are different. That's why we have three military departments. They operate in different environments, require different kinds of training. The management of people and the grooming of people for high responsibilities is something that you just cannot legislate with broad, generalized legislation.

I think the service departments do a pretty good job. I would just like to close all those arguments out by making one point. In the 20 months that I served on the Joint Staff, five other general officers who served with me-four others and myself in just 20 months that served on Joint Staff-became four star generals. One naval officer, Admiral Moreau; an army officer, General Merritt; a marine, General Crist; and two air force officers, General Dalton and myself. That's pretty remarkable. If that isn't a good benchmark for how well we are making progress with regard to assigning quality people to joint assignments, I really do not know what is. I think that is pretty remarkable.

Defense agencies. I've worked with five defense agencies fairly extensively, some more than others, throughout my career-particularly as a senior officer: DCA, DIA, NSA, DNA, and DMA. I can tell you that any idea that we ought to do away with joint agencies is a bad idea. It just would be a serious mistake.

Now, one can argue that they could be operated more efficiently, just like one can argue that any bureaucratic organization could be

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