In the second place, the consultations which the Korean Commission has held with individual Korean leaders have revealed the fact that individual Koreans are not unanimous in their opinions concerning the best methods to be used to establish their independent government. This is not a surprising fact. It could not be considered an unanticipated development. All of us here are familiar with the same phenomenon in the operation of every democratic government. The Chairman of the Korean Commission has also suggested that there are certain difficulties arising out of the occupation of south Korea by military forces of the United States. The Representative of the United States in the General Assembly made it clear that we do not claim perfection in our administration of the southern zone of Korea. He stated that in our opinion, no military government is good government.

I wish to quote Mr. Dulles' exact words in his statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly on November 4, 1947:

"Mr. Chairman, I said I would not make charges against the conditions in the north and I would not make any claims for conditions in the south, and I do not. I go further, and I say perfectly frankly that conditions in that area are far from perfect or are what we would all like to see. I know perfectly well that military government, even the best of military government, is bad government and should be ended as soon as practicable. But even military government, with all its faults, may, as a temporary matter, be better than no government at all. Military government, if it is temporary in character, can usefully form a bridge between conditions such as existed in Korea under Japanese control and the creation of a new national government of Korea." Thereafter, he stated in the General Assembly on November 13, 1947:1

66

* * What struck all of us in the First Committee, I think, was this: that although conditions are painted as being so perfect, as being a virtual paradise, in north Korea, and as being such a hell on earth in south Korea, it was the United States delegation which took the initiative in urging that the United Nations should send a commission to Korea to see for itself what is going on, and it was the Soviet Union delegation which took the position that it would have nothing to do with such a commission."

The necessities of a war which was none of our choosing have forced upon us certain responsibilities during this transitional period from war to peace. These are onerous responsibilities but we shall discharge them wherever they rest upon us and we shall not shrink from them. At the same time we recognize that an essential part of those responsibilities is their termination at the earliest possible moment in the interest of the Korean people and in the interest of world peace and fulfillment of the principles and purposes of the United Nations. Surely in view of the frank statements made by Mr. Dulles on behalf of the United States in the General Assembly, the conditions resulting from the existence of a military government in Korea cannot be considered an unanticipated development.

[The two following paragraphs were underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:]

Another development which cannot be considered as unforeseen, is the "negative attitude" of the Soviet Government. The Representatives of the Soviet Union in the debates in the General Assembly and in its First Committee early indicated their attitude. After opposing the whole consideration of the Korean question by the General Assembly, on October 30, 1947, Mr. Gromyko stated that his delegation could not take part in voting on the proposals submitted by the United States. When the report of the First Committee came before the General Assembly on November 13, 1947, Mr. Gromyko stated that the delegation of the Soviet Union could not participate in the vote on the resolution submitted by the First Committee. Notwithstanding these early evidences of a "negative attitude" the United States hoped-I am sure we all hoped-that the Soviet Union would accept the decision of the General Assembly which was adopted by so overwhelming a vote. We deeply regret that it has not seen fit to do so, but its "negative attitude" toward the Korean question has been prevalent at least from the time when the General Assembly undertook the consideration of the question at its last session. Indeed, in Mr. Gromyko's letter to the executive assistant to the Secretary-General on January 22, 1948, he indicated quite precisely that the present attitude of the Soviet Government is merely a continuation of the attitude which it expressed in the debates in the General Assembly.

The Korean Commission's consultations in Korea have also brought forcefully to the minds of its members the problem of the unity of Korea. This problem was eloquently stated by the Chairman of the Korean Commission in his speech at a mass meeting at the Seoul Stadium on the 14th of January. In that speech which he recalled to our attention on Thursday last, he declared “Without unity there can be no independence." "When one thinks of North and South Korea," he added, "one is inclined to quote the words of the Christian marriage service: Whom God hath joined together, let no man put asunder." The United States fully associates itself with this view and with his further statement that no man and no country wants to put Korea asunder. The question is, how can Korean unity be obtained? It unfortunately does not appear to be obtainable through two-party conversations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States diligently sought to secure unity by this path, but it was met by the opposition of the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State of the United States has made most earnest attempts to secure a solution is, how can Korean unity be obtained? It unfortunately does not appear successful. Invariably in those conversations with the Soviet Government, as we have already noted, there arose difficulty over agreement on which Korean organizations should participate in the consultations concerning the political future of Korea. The United States held to the view that a democratic government was one freely elected by the people. The Soviet Representatives, however, refused to allow joint consultations with any political party which had at any time exercised its free right to voice opposition to trusteeship for Korea. This Soviet attitude, if accepted by the United States, would have had the effect of excluding from political life in Korea all major political parties that were not allied to the Soviet-inspired Democratic People's Front. Because the United States maintained its position, it was able to protect freedom of expression for at least that part of a liberated people who lived in the southern part of Korea. But we have reluctantly been led to the conclusion that unity for Korea in the present circumstances cannot be secured through Soviet-American conversations. Nor does Four Power consultation appear to offer a solution. As I have already stated, the United States proposed such a method but it was met by the opposition of the Soviet Union.

We should be happy if this unity could be obtained with the help of the Korean people themselves. We are informed that some individual Koreans have proposed to exert their efforts to this end, and we are hopeful that such efforts will contribute their part to the solution of this problem with which we are all so deeply concerned. It seems clear to us, however, that the chances of success of such efforts will be greatly enhanced if they are backed by the authority of a government elected under United Nations observation by two-thirds of the people of Korea.

The statement of the Chairman of the Korean Commission has implied that some members of the Commission believe that resolutions I and II of the General Assembly in regard to Korea are separable. It is, of course, known that the two resolutions were presented together and were adopted by a single vote.

I find nothing in the legislative history of the discussions in the General Assembly and its committees to support the theory that the two Korean resolutions are separable, in fact, the legislative history points to the opposite conclusion.

The two resolutions must be viewed as a single plan for the solution of the Korean problem. The plan envisages one election and not two elections. The United States Representative pointed out in the General Assembly that it was not necessary to have first a consultation and then a decision regarding independence; these two questions could be dealt with as a single operation. Nowhere is there any suggestion that there should be two elections.

If the two resolutions on Korea are not inseparable parts of a single whole, how could our present consultation with the Korean Commission be justified with respect to resolution number 1? There is nothing in resolution number 1 which authorizes the Korean Commission to consult with the Interim Committee. That authorization is found in paragraph 5 of resolution number II. What is laid down by the General Assembly as the subject of such consultation? The language is that the Commission "may consult with the Interim Committee ** with respect to the application of this resolution." The previous sentence of the same paragraph says that the Commission "shall facilitate and expedite the fulfillment of the foregoing programme." What is that

U. N. doc. A/523, p. 13.

programme? Surely it is the complete programme set forth in both the first and the second resolutions.

Clearly, therefore, the authorization to consult with the Interim Committee relates to the whole problem of elections of members of a national assembly according to the programme carefully formulated in both resolutions which, as I have already noted, were adopted by a single vote upon a single motion.

It is, therefore, in our opinion "open to" and indeed "incumbent upon" the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea under the resolution of the General Assembly which appointed it, to proceed with its task quickly and comprehensively. We recognize that the Commission itself has the responsibilty for reaching its own decisions. By consulting the Interim Committee, however, they have invited an expression of our views. In the light of the facts and considerations which I have stated, the United States believes that if the Korean Commission should pursue a course of action along the following lines, it would be acting in accordance with the letter and spirit of the resolution of the General Assembly, and would thereby make the greatest possible contribution to the attainment of the objective which we all have in mind and at heart, namely, the speedy establishment of an independent and unified Korea.

The course of action which we envisage the Commission might take could be outlined as follows: The Korean Commission might proceed, in consultation with the occupation authorities who are ready to assist them, to decide upon an election law and procedures thereunder, to designate the voting areas or zones which will be utilized for the purpose of holding elections "on the basis of adult suffrage and by secret ballot," and to fix the date on which the elections will be held. Since we recognize that the Commission is not sufficiently numerous in membership or in staff to observe the elections in all areas or zones simultaneously, it might announce that elections will be observed seriatim in the several areas or zones, perhaps beginning in the southern provinces of Korea and working northward until the task is completed.

The Commission might immediately announce that the purpose of the elec tions is to choose representatives who will constitute a national assembly of Korea with whom the Commission may consult regarding the prompt attainment of the freedom and independence of the Korean people and which representatives, constituting a national assembly, may establish a national Government of Korea.

The Commission might then proceed to observe the elections in accordance with the schedule which they have announced. We would hope that as they moved on their important mission through the areas or zones from south to north, they would not be obstructed in their work, that they would not be denied the exercise of the right given them by the General Assembly, when they reach the 38th parallel. If it should unhappily prove to be the case that they could not continue with the observation of elections north of the 38th parallel due to the opposition of the Soviet authorities, the result would nevertheless be that two-thirds of the Korean people would have elected their proportional share of the members of the Korean national assembly. One third of the Korean people would have been denied the opportunity to seat their representatives in that assembly. The Korean people and all the world would know who had denied them that opportunity. But a Korean national assembly would exist. Not all of its seats might be filled, but it would exist. It would be in a position, if it desired, to consult with the Commission on the establishment of a national government of Korea, as contemplated in the resolution of the General Assembly. We hope it would also be able to negotiate successfully with the Koreans in the northern part of the country regarding their participation in the Korean national government.

The Korean national government so established would then, as contemplated in the General Assembly resolution, be in a position to consult further with the Commission concerning the implementation of the remaining provisions of the General Assembly's resolution.

In brief conclusion, therefore, the position of the United States is that the first question put to the Interim Committee by the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea should be answered in the affirmative. That being the case, no answer to the second question would be called for. We have embodied our views in a draft resolution which we have asked the Secretariat to distribute to the Committee.

So far as the United States is concerned, the United States Representative is authorized to pledge, and does pledge, the cooperation of the United States in the fulfillment of all parts of the General Assembly's resolution.'

7 Korea's Independence, Department of State publication 2933

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT STUDIES OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE

Ambassador AUSTIN. The second part is pacific settlement. The pacific settlement studies of the Interim Committee were undertaken pursuant to its instruction to consider and report on methods to be adopted to give effect to the general principle of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, and the proposition of international cooperation in the political fields, articles XÌ, paragraph 1 and XIII, paragraph 1 (a) of the Charter.

This was the first task undertaken by the Interim Committee. The field of pacific settlement is of genuine interest to Jessup, and this interest was reflected (a) in his statement in the Interim Committee, and (b) in his public addresses during this period.

(a) Jessup opened up the subject of pacific settlement as the first chairman of the subcommittee dealing with it. As a reporter he drafted a plan of work which surveyed the methods of pacific settlement and ways of making them effective. He also suggested the proposal for a panel of inquiry and conciliation which was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly and which has been drawn on in the Kashmir case by selecting Frank Graham, your former colleague, as United Nations representative. Dr. Jessup himself was appointed to this panel by the United States.

This proposal was originated in the Interim Committee jointly by China and the United States. When I speak of China you know who I mean, don't you?

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. We hope we do.

Ambassador AUSTIN. (b) Public statements: In a speech on April 14, 1948, he showed how these studies could give the United Nations means for development similar to that of the inter-American system (United States mission press release No. 428, p. 5). I have it here and will hand it up and you can do what you please with it. I have likewise emphasized certain points in it, but it is all there so that if somebody wants to see in what context these remarks are, well, they are here.

Senator SPARKMAN. Without objection it will be handled the same as the previous one.

In fact, without objection all of these that he offers will be handled that way.

(The material referred to appears in the record, as follows:)

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JESSUP, ROCHESTER, N. Y., APRIL 17, 1948

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

It is not difficult to find groups in this country who view the United Nations with gloom and despair. The gloomy and despondent are sometimes driven to the extremes of demanding either World Government Now or the immediate use of atomic bombs. Both of these demands are apt to reflect an escapist attitude. Those who would seek to obliterate the Soviet Union by atomic bombs assume the problem of world peace is simple. Some who advocate world government think that the adoption of a world constitution by a popular assembly is simple. The problem is not simple. The problem of world peace is one of constant, continuing accommodation. The United Nations is an instrument for such accommodation. World peace is not an ornament purchased at the cost of the blood and treasure poured out in the war against the Axis-an ornament which can be placed on the mantelpiece to be admired from our easy chairs. World peace is the hardest job in the world. It is a job that will not cease during our lifetime or the lifetime of our children or our children's children. No drastic

act, no stroke of the pen, no magic formula will give us the luxury of sitting hack with the contented assurance that the job is done, that peace has come, forever.

I shall not expand on the question of the wisdom, the legality, or the morality of what I call the atom-bomb approach. In my opinion, to state the questions is to answer them. I should like to say a word more on the world government approach.

In the history of almost every great human endeavor one finds the record of two efforts. They are not opposing efforts but they are different ones. The one effort is that of the voices crying in the wilderness, the voice of the prophets, the poets, the dreamers, the planners. The other effort is that of the worker, the drudge if you like, the man who does the daily job because daily jobs must be done. Most of us are likely to fall into one or the other group. Some illustrate the happy combination of the two, who tackle the daily jobs always with an intelligent eye on the future.

[The following paragraph was underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:]

There is at one extreme the impatience of the revolutionary and at the other the excessive patience which may become obstructive standpatism of the ultraconservative. The constant coexistence of the extremes and of those who stand in between is one of the most hopeful aspects of the human race. Although it has been said that power corrupts, power also sobers. The golden dreams and promises of the irresponsible are constantly throughout history brought up sharp against the realities which come with responsibility and power. We would be in a sorry pass if we were not constantly goaded by those who drive us toward the realization of a better life. We would be no better off if there were never a voice to remind us of the practical necessities. Labels are misleading, and "world government" means many different things to many different people. In the sense of a goal, toward which we may work, I personally accept it. I shall not try to define the nice distinctions between federalism and union and superstate. But so far as doing a daily job is concerned, my own convictions and predilections lead me to follow the evolutionary and not the revolutionary approach. We are confronted by facts. These facts include the nature of the human being, the nature of the state, the nature of the relationships between human beings and between states, and they include also the United Nations. The American Association for the United Nations and particularly such branches as this Rochester association represent groups who are wrestling with facts under the inspiration of a conviction that the United Nations is real and that it is a step along the road toward the goal of the consolidation and perpetuation of international peace. In a very minor capacity I am engaged in the same wrestling match and have the same inspiration.

There has been a curious change in the psychological attitude of many of the supporters of the United Nations. I remember very clearly that in June 1945 the general frame of mind of those at San Francisco, and of many sections of the press and of other organs of public opinion, was a very practical one.

It had the hard-boiled character which came naturally during the war which was then still going on. It found expression in the frequently repeated view: "When the League of Nations started, people thought that the struggle was over and that our international problems were solved. There would be no more war. Disillusionment followed and the last state of the world was worse than the first. Now we are more realistic," they said. "We know that the Charter of the United Nations is not the last word. We know there are hard problems still to be faced. But we recognized the Charter for what it is the newest and most promising plan which mankind has devised for world cooperation. We are ready to support it."

(The following paragraph was underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin :)

That was the way many of us thought and talked in June of 1945. But all too many forgot their caution. Those who had not followed the intensely difficult negotiations at San Francisco, who were not aware that the Charter inevitably incorporated many compromises, suddenly, at the end of the war, seized upon the United Nations with all the exaggerated hopes which had greeted the League of Nations. It was inevitable that there should be a letdown when they began to see what the real difficulties were. It must be frankly recognized that the postwar policy and attitude of the Soviet Union are major factors contributing to the sense of discouragement and even of despair. It is people like you who take the trouble to understand the United Nations and the general international