until the Royal Netherlands Government ceases hostilities against the Indonesian Republic, withdraws her armed forces to her side of the demilitarized zones established under the Renville Agreement of January 17, 1948, releases all Indonesian Republican Government leaders arrested since December 18, 1948, and opens bona fide negotiations with the Indonesian Republic under the terms of the Renville agreement."

The matters presented by Mr. Brewster were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

"FACTS OF THE CURRENT INDONESIAN SITUATION

"1. The Dutch have received more than one billion dollars since VE-day; $350,000,000 lend-lease and UNRRA, $290,000,000 World Bank, $195,000,000 Export-Import Bank, $400,000,000 ECA.

"2. The Dutch are asking for $600,000,000 in ECA funds for next year. "3. The Dutch have maintained 150,000 troops in Indonesia for the past 2 years at an expense exceeding $1,000,000 per day.

"4. The Dutch own $4,000,000,000 in Indonesia; the Indonesians $15,000,000. United States investments total $250,000,000 in Indonesia. By and large, the Dutch have shut American business out.

"5. The Dutch, for 30 years, have taken at least $200,000,000 a year clear profit out of Indonesia-the fact is that 70,000,000 Indonesians average 15 to 30 cents a day as family income (an average family of five). In brief Indonesia is a gold mine.

"6. For the past 40 years, a national independence movement has existed in Indonesia, led by moderate Republicans who have consistently fought all radical tendencies and within the past year have suppressed by force of arms a small Communist uprising.

"7. Following VJ-day the Dutch promised full indenpendence to Indonesia and made two agreements to this effect, the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements, the later agreement being negotiated under the auspices of the U. N. Good Offices Committee.

"8. On December 19, without warning, the Dutch atacked the Indonesian Republic and took prisoner its leading officials.

"9. The State Department on December 22 condemned this act of aggression in the Security Council meeting at Paris and by resolution asked that (a) a cease-fire order be issued, (b) the Indonesian Republican leaders be released immediately, and (c) the Dutch troops withdraw from Republican territory.

"10. Points (a) and (b) were adopted by the Security Council; the Dutch refused to comply with the order of the Security Council.

"11. Nehru of India promptly called a conference of 19 Asiatic and African nations (including Australia and New Zealand) to take action against the Dutch.

"12. Moscow has seized upon the situation and its radio is proclaiming day and night that the United States is hypocritical, pointing to the fact that we have financed the Dutch and are continuing to do so.

"STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR PHILIP C. JESSUP IN SECURITY COUNCIL ON JANUARY 11, 1949, ON INDONESIA

"The United States Government can find no adequate justification for the military action taken by the Netherlands in Indonesia. In many important respects, the reasons put forth by the Netherlands representative at the meeting of the Security Council on December 22 in Paris and again here last Friday as to the justification for their action are not supported by the reports of the Committee on Good Offices. In our view, the Netherlands military action is in conflict with the Renville agreement and with the Security Council's resolutions of August 1 and November 1, 1947.

"As the United States delegation has frequently made clear, it is our opinion that these two Security Council resolutions were adopted under the provisions of article 49, chanter VII of the Charter, and that, therefore, in accordance with article 25 of the Charter, the Netherlands Government was and is under obligation to comply.

"On the initiative of the United States, the Security Council was called into session in Paris to consider the emergency created by the military action of the Dutch authorities. The United States, joining with Colombia and Syria, intro

duced a resolution which called upon both parties to cease hostilities forthwith and immediately to withdraw their armed forces to their respective sides of the demilitarized zones under the Renville truce agreement of January 17, 1948. Unfortunately, the paragraph calling for the withdrawal of forces was not adopted by the Council. The Council on December 24 passed the resolution calling upon the parties to cease hostilities forthwith and to release the political prisoners which had been arreseted since the 18th of December. Later, on December 28, the Council passed an additional resolution calling upon the Dutch authorities to release the political prisoners within 24 hours. The Netherlands representative has assured the Council that his Government has complied with the cease-fire and release of prisoners order of the Council. Neither my Government nor the Committee on Good Offices consider they have done so. The committee has reported on this as follows:

"The committee is not in a position to report that there has been satisfactory compliance with subparagraph (A) of the resolution of December 24, which called on the parties to cease hostilties.

(A) The telegram dispatched to territorial commanders in Java by the chief of staff of the Royal Netherlands Indonesian Army at 1700, December 29, 1948, is, according to its terms, for information and cannot be construed as an order to "cease hostilities forthwith" (par. 9 above). The dissemination of the order of the commander in chief to territorial commanders in Java which confirmed the fact that hostilities in Java had ended at 2400 of December 31 was begun at 1854 Batavia time, January 2 (par. 9 above). In Sumatra where a “special emergency situation" existed, the parallel order disseminated late on January 4 had an effective time of 1200, January 5, 1949 (par. 10 above). "(B) It is noted that these orders were issued at a time when the "operational phase" of military activities presumably had been completed. (Appendixes I and II of Netherlands letter of January 3, par. 4 above). The orders noted respectively that hostilities had terminated on December 31, 1948, in Java and on January 5, 1949, in Sumatra, but charged the troops to "carry out action against roving groups, bands of individuals, who attempt to cause unrest or, as was stated by our representative to the Security Council, to act against disturbing elements, who either individually or collectively endanger public security or interfered with or prevent the supply of food and other essential commodities to the needy population."

""The orders permit the continuation of the very type of military action that would be required against the guerrilla resistance likely to be offered by regular or irregular Republican forces (pars. 5 and 9 above).

(C) As a result of the immobilization of its military observers the committee has no first-hand information as to the effect of the order discussed above. "(D) The committee is of the opinion that these orders issued more than a week after the adoption of the resolution of December 24, and expressed as they were, cannot be looked upon as satisfactory compliance with subparagraph (A) of the resolution.

***(E) There is no channel available to the committee for dissemination of the resolution of December 24 to the Government or to the commanders of the Republican Army (par. 8 above). Subparagraph (b) of the Security Council's resolution of December 24, calling for the immediate release of the President of the Republic and other political prisoners, has not been implemented. So far as the committee is aware, President Sukarno, Vice President Hatta, and the other members of the Republican Government, who were captured by Netherlands forces on December 19, are still under detention.'

"Despite the statements to the Security Council by the Netherlands representative on December 27 and 29, the committee has not been in a position to make independent investigations of any kind in the field for the purpose of carrying out its functions under the resolution of December 24. It has been heard unofficially and informally that certain military and naval liaison officers attached to some of the consular officials in Batavia took advantage of a Netherlands offer to conduct them on a tour of some of the military areas on January 5 and 6. These officers are not the military observers of the Committee of Good Offices and their observations are not available to the committee, even if their tour was the type of field investigation and observation required by the functions of the committee.

"The continuance of military action of the Netherlands authorities after the Security Council resolution of December 24 was clearly an act of defiance on the part of the Netherlands authorities. No excuses offered by the Dutch Government can conceal the fact that they have failed to comply with the Security

Council demands, both in refusing to cease fire immediately and in refusing to release the political prisoners immediately. In the opinion of the Governinent of the United States, the representative of the Netherlands has failed to relieve his Government from the serious charges that it has violated the Charter of the United Nations.

"The purpose of the Security Council cease-fire order of December 24 was to stop the fighting in Indonesia immediately so that the dispute could be settled not by force, but by the processes of peaceful settlement enjoined by the Charter on member states.

"Even though members of the Council were well aware that it was the Netherlands authorities which had initiated the resumption of military action, the resolution of the Security Council called on both parties to order a cease fire. In such situations this is an appropriate form of Security Council resolution since the cessation must be mutual no matter who was responsible for starting the fighting.

"It must be assumed therefore that in ordering a cease fire, the Council could only have intended that such an order would apply equally and simultaneously to both sides. The Council could not have expected one side to comply unilaterally while the other considered itself free to comply at such a time and in such a way as it saw fit. The continuance of military action by the Netherlands forces until all military objectives have been taken cannot be regarded as compliance with the cease-fire order. Certainly the reservation of the right by one side to use its own forces in the territory of the other side to eliminate armed adherents of that side, which may so far have escaped destruction, cannot be regarded as compliance with the cease-fire order. Taking these factors into account, I am sure that the Security Council has no intention of approving action consolidating military victories which themselves were gained as a result of open defiance of an order of the Council.

"Probably the most striking and clearest disregard of the orders of the Security Council is to be found in the refusal of the Dutch authorities to release President Sukarno and Prime Minister Hatta and the other leading officials of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia. Quite aside from the disregard of the Security Council's resolution of December 28, which required that these prisoners should be released within 24 hours, there is the present fact that these persons are still not at liberty. The Security Council cannot be expected to accept the view of the Netherlands Government that these prisoners have been released because they are given a certain liberty of movement on the island of Banka. In an archipelago comprising thousands of islands, liberty of movement which is restricted to a single island, one which, I might add, was under Netherlands control even under the Renville truce agreement, cannot be regarded as being in conformity with the Council's resolutions of December 24 and 28. The clear intent of these resolutions was that the high officials of the Republican Government should be restored to a position in which they would be free to exercise their governmental authority. The minimum which would seem to be called for at this moment is that the President and other interned officers of the Republic should be allowed to return to their capitol and to exercise their appropriate functions there free from the constraint of any occupying army. They should be free to establish and maintain contact with other officials of their government. They should also be free to provide their own forces for maintenance of law and order in Jogjakarta.

"Further, my Government in considering the Netherlands-Indonesian dispute cannot but recall a history of noncooperation on the part of the Netherlands in the work of the Good Offices Committee in Indonesia.

"The failure to achieve political setlement and the protracted negotiations which followed the signing of the Renville agreement in January 1943 brought about in Indonesian an increased tension between the Netherlands and the Republic with a consequent increase in provocative incidents which sorely strained the truce. The bill of particulars for these actions has, over a period of months, been reported by the Good Offices Committee to the Council. From these reports it appears that even prior to the resumption of military action against the Republic, the Netherlands pursued a policy which had the effect of weakening the Republic; working unnecessary hardship on the population; isolating the Republican Government economically and politically, and presenting it with a prefabricated interim administration for Indonesia with which it was to associate itself but which it had no part in forming. My Government considers these actions and the Netherlands failure to enter into bona fide negotiations since May of last year to be indicative of a reluctance to utilize the procedure for

pacific settlement made available by the United Nations, and to be in conflict with both the spirit and letter of the Linggadjati and Renville agreements.

"From a purely pragmatic point of view it should be pointed out that the quick military successes of the Netherlands forces will not effect a solution of the Indonesian problem. The United States Government cannot associate itself with any aspect of the Netherlands military action. The use of force in this situation makes the solution of the problem far more complex and difficult. The problem remains a matter of international concern with which the Security Council must continue to deal. It cannot be solved if we begin on the basis of acceptance of the fruits of the illegal use of force.

"The Republic of Indonesia represents the largest single political factor in the projected federation and should therefore have a voice in the formation of the federation. The Republic has a twofold nature. Firstly, it is a political entity and secondly, it is the heart of Indonesian nationalism. This latter attribute cannot be eliminated by any amount of military force. The Netherlands Government may find that far from assuring law and order in the Indies the action they have embarked upon may instead let loose forces of terror, chaos, and sabotage. It may well be that the only victory will be that of the forces of anarchy.

"My Government is of the opinion that real peace in Indonesia can be expected only if there is a settlement of the political issues on the basis of the principles and procedures agreed to by the parties in the Linggadjati and Renville agreements and under the auspices of United Nations machinery.

The responsibility for the future rests in the first instance on the Netherlands authorities. The Security Council has a right to assume that the Netherlands Government will in accordance with its obligations bring to an end its defiance of the Security Council and give its full cooperation toward a fair and reasonable solution of the Indonesian question.

"My Government has over a substantial period of time devoted serious thought to the problem and to its proper solution. Our views are contained in the plan which our representative on the Good Offices Committee submitted to the two parties on September 10 of last year and which was accepted by both of them as a basis for the resumption of negotiations. If Indonesian leaders were restored to their rightful position as the responsible representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, free to conduct the affairs of their Government and to negotiate freely with the Netherlands Government concerning the future of Indonesia, and if these two Governments could proceed to negotiate on the basis of this proposal in accordance with their earlier undertakings this would be a notable contribution to the ultimate solution of the Indonesian problem.

"A first and fundamental step in this direction should be the fixing of a definite date for the holding of elections throughout all Indonesia with a view to establishing the foundations of the United States of Indonesia. Secondly, and also of fundamental importance, is the fixing of a firm date for the transfer of sovereignty from the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia.

"The election should be for the purpose of choosing an assembly to represent the people of Indonesia as a provisional legislature and at the same time as a constituent assembly for the purpose of drawing up a constitution. The elections should be held by secret ballot with all the safeguards necessary to insure a vote free from any coercion. Freedom of assembly, speech, and publication must be guaranteed as provided in the Renville agreement. This program contemplates a termination of the type of military occupation of the country which has been brought about by Dutch military action. The withdrawal of the Dutch armies should commence at the earliest possible date and as rapidly as the need for the preservation of law and order permit. The occupation must be completely terminated before an effective transfer of sovereignty could take place. "My Government believes that the length of time which should elapse between the present and the date when elections should take place, and also the date of transfer of sovereignty, should be calculated in terms of months and not in terms of years. As soon as elections have been held and a provisional regime set up, authority should be turned over progressively to the new regime by the Netherlands Government, and the transfer should have been completed by the time when sovereignty is assumed by the United States of Indonesia.

"As I have stated earlier, the problem of Indonesia remains a matter of international concern with which the Security Council must continue to deal. The carrying out of the steps necessary for the ultimate transfer of the sovereignty of the United States of Indonesia should, we believe, be accomplished under the

auspices of the United Nations and with the help of the machinery it affords. The Good Offices Committee in its report of January 7 has appropriately pointed out that it does not wish to be put in a position of seeming to approve by its participation or even its authentication any settlement based on force rather than on true negotiation. The Good Offices Committee was created at the outset as an instrument to further free negotiations between the parties. The Dutch action has temporarily suspended the committee's ability to carry out that function. But the Council's agencies in the field remain in existence ready to carry out any task assigned to them by the Security Council. No temporary suspension of the functioning of an agency of the Security Council can operate to remove an established interest of the United Nations in dealing with a situation to which the Security Council has already addressed itself. In this connection it is necessary to call attention to the report of the Good Offices Committee which indicates that the Netherlands authorities took upon themselves the authority to question whether the military observers were reporting to the Consular Commission or the Good Offices Committee. This is not a question which concerns the Netherlands authorities. The Security Council can utilize any agency which it considers appropriate, and it is the obligation of a member of the United Nations to cooperate with any and all agencies operating under Security Council instructions. "It cannot be denied that despite the efforts of some governments of states which are members of the Security Council, this body has not yet succeeded in overcoming the obstacles which have been placed in the path of achieving a peaceful settlement in Indonesia. The responsibility of the Netherlands Government for this lack of success has already been clear. Another obstacle has been created by the action of a member of the United Nations which has in many parts of the world sought to obstruct the successful operation of the United Nations. I refer to the Soviet Union.

"When this question of Indonesia was being discussed in the Security Council in Paris, the Soviet Union speaking both through its own representative and through the Ukrainian representative followed its familiar procedure of endeavoring to cloak its own improper actions by seeking to place the blame on someone else. The representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of the Ukraine both insinuated that the Government of the United States was in some way responsible for the action of the Netherlands in resorting to hostilities against the Indonian Republic. It thus becomes necessary to point out again certain salient facts. In the first place, it was the Government of the United States which took the initiative in convening an urgent meeting of the Security Council when it became apparent that the Dutch were resorting to military action. It was the Soviet Government that prevented the Security Council from acting promptly by insisting that the Council meeting should be deferred for 3 days. Every other member of the Council attended the meeting on December 20 except the two Soviet representatives. The United States also took the initiative in conjunction with the representatives of Colombia and Syria in proposing a resolution to the Security Council to deal with the situation, but the Soviet representative refused to support this resolution. He later tried to cover up this further attempt to prevent the Security Council from acting by introducing a resolution of his own which he knew could not be adopted by the Council.

"More fundamental, however, than these obstructionist tactics in the Security Council is the fact that the Soviet Union is fundamentally opposed to the government of the Republic of Indonesia and has itself through the Communist Party, which is, of course, its mouthpiece throughout the world, sought to undermine and overthrow this government. No one doubts that the Communists in Indonesia like the Communists throughout the world are responsive to and act in accordance with instructions from Moscow. The Communist revolt against the Government of President Soekarno and Premier Hatta was thus an effort on the part of the Soviet Government to overthrow the Indonesian Republic. Furthermore, when the resumption of hostilities by the Netherlands Government against the Indonesian Republic took place, the official Communist line as printed in the Communist press instead of deploring this action, openly gloated that this action was a punishment for the Government of President Soekarno and Premier Hatta who had successfully put down the Communist revolt. The Communist line, which I again repeat means the line of the Soviet Government, accused that distinguished statesman of the Indonesian Republic, Dr. Hatta, of being a traitor to his country. At the very time when editorials were appearing to this effect in the Communist Party organ in Paris, the Soviet representative on the Council sought to cover up the actual policy of his government by identifying himself with the Council's endeavors to ensure the release of Dr. Hatta and