He goes on to commend the activity of those who have brought this to attention, stating that the Senator from Maine has performed a public service in bringing the Indonesian question to the floor of the Senate; and then he says:

"I am strongly in favor of his position but do not consider this the proper time for his amendment. It now appears, on the assurances of the Secretary of State, that representatives of the two governments are to resume negotiations at an early date."

These are the reasons why it seemed to me we might be warranted, in spite of the tragic record of the past 2 years in the repeated failure to observe the terms of the agreements referred to, in further extending the time to observe the good faith with which the governments concerned shall accept the guidance of the Security Council in trying to work out this affair, not only because of its significance to the peoples immediately involved, but because of the possible profound impact it might have upon the future development of the prestige and authority of the United Nations.

I trust I am not overemphasizing the suggestion that the tragic experience of Ethiopia and Manchuria in the League of Nations laid a foundation for what later developed into the loss of authority for the League. It is the earnest hope of many persons that no similar failures on the part of the United Nations shall contribute to undermine the very foundations of the structure to which the thought of mankind has been so earnestly devoted.

So, Mr. President, I urge the adoption of the substitute amendment, with the high hope that within the next few weeks we shall see a solution of this problem. Mr. VANDENBERG. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. BREWSTER. I yield.

Mr. VANDENBERG. Inasmuch as the able Senator from Maine and I are now in complete agreement upon this subject—and in this connection I am speaking for the Committee on Foreign Relations-I am sure it is needless for me to add anything except very briefly to complete the record. But before I do so, I want to contribute my own personal testimony in complete agreement with those who complain about the activities and procedures of the Dutch Government, not only in Indonesia, but also particularly before the United Nations, and especially in connection with the Renville agreement. I think the protests made upon the floor are already having their effect. I share the hope of the Senator from Maine that the negotiations which are now to proceed at The Hague will produce an effective and highly salutary result in the very near future. I am very sure that the well-nigh unanimous action of the Senate-I hope it will be that-in here registering this very definite opinion on the subject is calculated to be of immense and highly timely importance in connection with the result.

Mr. President, the thing I want simply to indicate for the record is why it seemed so necessary to some of us that the language as originally contained in the amendment submitted by the able Senator from Maine has to be changed in order to be acceptable. As the original amendment was written, the Senator from Maine proposed to invoke what would essentially be American unilateral sanctions, although I am not arguing that phase of the matter at the moment, whenever any foreign government "fails to comply with the orders or requests of the Security Council of the United Nations." In other words, the language in the original amendment was undertaking to gear our direction, in respect to ECA funds, to the sanctions section of the Charter of the United Nations. The difficulty which arose was that the Charter of the United Nations looks upon "orders or requests of the Security Council" in the first instance as being merely the joining of an issue, or the creation of an issue, rather than the adjudication of an issue, and the Charter is very clear about it throughout chapter 6, which provides the methods which shall be followed when such an issue is joined. They are all pacific methods of settlement.

When, however, we come to article 41 of chapter 7, we finally reach the point where the question of adjudicating and enforcing the order or request commences to arise. I quote article 41:

"The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such measures." Then a number of the measures are set out serially.

Since the pending amnedment, while intended primarily for the Indonesian situation, nevertheless, is written in general language so that it would have to apply to any similar question which might arise, it seemed to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that it was necessary to write it very definitely within the terms of the Charter of the United Nations itself.

In connection with the statement made yesterday by the Senator from North Carolina, Mr. Graham, to which the Senator from Maine has referred, I think it is particularly interesting to know that, in addition to the other quotation, the distinguished Senator from North Carolina, who is such a profound authority on this subject, himself said, speaking of the substitute language:

"We thus, as far as possible, keep our procedures within the framework of the United Nations in the exact language of the Charter. This amendment will serve to support and strengthen the United Nations in its heavy responsibility in dealing with the complex Indonesian question."

I lay great stress upon that opinion from the able Senator from North Carolina. The moment he arrived in the Senate, the day he was sworn in, I hastened to discuss this whole question with him, and not only was profoundly impressed by his grasp of it, but also by his willingness to discuss the proposed amendment in realistic terms, and I found him most cooperative.

Mr. President, I think that is about all I need say. I have made it plain why the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations found it impossible to agree with the original language, and why it has no objection, so far as I know, to the substitute language. I think the substitute language accomplishes everything which can be accomplished, and I am very hopeful that if it may have the heavy and preponderant endorsement of the membership of the Senate it may invoke a moral authority, even before it may ever invoke any physical authority. Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. VANDENBERG. I yield.

Mr. BREWSTER. It seems to me very useful that we in this body give increasing attention to the provisions of the Charter, and with that in mind, so that we may determine exactly how we are proceeding, I have been quite interested to note the language of articles 38 and 40, and I should be interested to know whether or not the Senator from Michigan, who certainly is recognized as an authority-I think this Charter is almost his Bible-believes that the action of the Security Council up to the present time comes under article 38, where the Security Council, it is provided, “may make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement to the dispute," or under article 40, under which it is provided that they may "call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures." Does the Senator know under which article the Security Council considers its present action comes?

Mr. VANDENBERG. I am afraid I cannot be that specific in my identification to the Senator, but I think their action starts under chapter 6, generally. Mr. BREWSTER. Yes.

Mr. VANDENBERG. And I think it proceeds progressively, just as chapter 6 proceds progressively to an ultimate result.

Then, when we reach article 37, we find this provision:

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate."

We are finally approaching the focus. Then chapter 38 provides: "Without prejudice to the provisions of articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations."

We are in a constant progression toward a net result, and when we finally come down to article 40, which, it seems to the Senator from Michigan, is just about the point where the Indonesian dispute now rests, we find ourselves confronting this language, which I shall read again:

"In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in article 39," and those are the actions starting to look in the direction of sanctions, "call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures."

It seems to me that that is just about the point where we are at the present time in connection with the Indonesian dispute.

Mr. BREWSTER. The Senator wil recognize that that is somewhat of a problem Would he say that we may be clear that they have not yet proceeded int article 41?

auspices of the United Nations and with the help of the machinery it affords. The Good Offices Committee in its report of January 7 has appropriately pointed out that it does not wish to be put in a position of seeming to approve by its participation or even its authentication any settlement based on force rather than on true negotiation. The Good Offices Committee was created at the outset as an instrument to further free negotiations between the parties. The Dutch action has temporarily suspended the committee's ability to carry out that function. But the Council's agencies in the field remain in existence ready to carry out any task assigned to them by the Security Council. No temporary suspension of the functioning of an agency of the Security Council can operate to remove an established interest of the United Nations in dealing with a situation to which the Security Council has already addressed itself. In this connection it is necessary to call attention to the report of the Good Offices Committee which indicates that the Netherlands authorities took upon themselves the authority to question whether the military observers were reporting to the Consular Commission or the Good Offices Committee. This is not a question which concerns the Netherlands authorities. The Security Council can utilize any agency which it considers appropriate, and it is the obligation of a member of the United Nations to cooperate with any and all agencies operating under Security Council instructions. "It cannot be denied that despite the efforts of some governments of states which are members of the Security Council, this body has not yet succeeded in overcoming the obstacles which have been placed in the path of achieving a peaceful settlement in Indonesia. The responsibility of the Netherlands Government for this lack of success has already been clear. Another obstacle has been created by the action of a member of the United Nations which has in many parts of the world sought to obstruct the successful operation of the United Nations. I refer to the Soviet Union.

"When this question of Indonesia was being discussed in the Security Council in Paris, the Soviet Union speaking both through its own representative and through the Ukrainian representative followed its familiar procedure of endeavoring to cloak its own improper actions by seeking to place the blame on someone else. The representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of the Ukraine both insinuated that the Government of the United States was in some way responsible for the action of the Netherlands in resorting to hostilities against the Indonesian Republic. It thus becomes necessary to point out again certain salient facts. In the first place, it was the Government of the United States which took the initiative in convening an urgent meeting of the Security Council when it became apparent that the Dutch were resorting to military action. It was the Soviet Government that prevented the Security Council from acting promptly by insisting that the Council meeting should be deferred for 3 days. Every other member of the Council attended the meeting on December 20 except the two Soviet representatives. The United States also took the initiative in conjunction with the representatives of Colombia and Syria in proposing a resolution to the Security Council to deal with the situation, but the Soviet representative refused to support this resolution. He later tried to cover up this further attempt to prevent the Security Council from acting by introducing a resolution of his own which he knew could not be adopted by the Council.

"More fundamental, however, than these obstructionist tactics in the Security Council is the fact that the Soviet Union is fundamentally opposed to the government of the Republic of Indonesia and has itself through the Communist Party, which is, of course, its mouthpiece throughout the world, sought to undermine and overthrow this government. No one doubts that the Communists in Indonesia like the Communists throughout the world are responsive to and act in accordance with instructions from Moscow. The Communist revolt against the Government of President Soekarno and Premier Hatta was thus an effort on the part of the Soviet Government to overthrow the Indonesian Republic. Fur thermore, when the resumption of hostilities by the Netherlands Government against the Indonesian Republic took place, the official Communist line as printed in the Communist press instead of deploring this action, openly gloated that this action was a punishment for the Government of President Soekarno and Premier Hatta who had successfully put down the Communist revolt. The Communist line, which I again repeat means the line of the Soviet Government, accused that distinguished statesman of the Indonesian Republic, Dr. Hatta, of being a traitor to his country. At the very time when editorials were appearing to this effect in the Communist Party organ in Paris, the Soviet representative on the Council sought to cover up the actual policy of his government by identifying himself with the Council's endeavors to ensure the release of Dr. Hatta and

other political prisoners. These are the facts on the record which are known to the world and which reveal that the Soviet Government has no interest in supporting the Government of the Indonesian Republic or of restoring peace to Indonesia. On the contrary, it is following its familiar tactics which it has used in Korea, in Greece, and Berlin, and again now in Indonesia, and which have been described in the speeches of many delegates in the last session of the General Assembly; namely, seeking to overthrow a lawful democratic government and to undermine its authority. The Soviet Union does not want an independent Indonesia. It wants an Indonesia under the domination and control of a Communist minority taking its orders from Moscow. Anywhere in the world when a Communist government climbs in through the window, independence is kicked out of the door.

"The Government of the United States on the contrary has viewed with admiration the efforts of the Indonesian people both in the Republic and elsewhere to gain their independence and has steadfastly sought to support them. It still takes that position and it is for this reason that it has taken the lead in endeavoring in the Security Council and in the Good Offices Committee to bring about a peaceful adjustment of the difficulties between the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands Government and to establish the United States of Indonesia as one of the fully sovereign and independent peoples of the world.

IT'S 1776 IN INDONESIA

"December 19, 1948, Holland invaded the Republic of Indonesia with a crushing, sneak attack like Japan's on Pearl Harbor, like Nazi Germany's on Holland itself.

Solemn interna

"The U. N. negotiated Renville agreement was trampled. tional discussions were used as cover-up for weeks of Dutch preparation. "Holland, home of Kris Kringle and good cheer, timed its murder for Christ

mas.

World leaders were conveniently dispersed. The U. N. General Assembly had adjourned. So had the United States Congress.

"In Indonesia itself, the Dutch first cut off the U. N. delegation's telegraph lines, then notified it. Elaborate deceptions kept republicans off guard.

"Then the Dutch struck without mercy or honor, but with American-manufactured planes, tanks, and guns.

"The Netherlands lately and always has promised Indonesia independence in words, brutally suppressed it in fact.

"The Renville agreement, January 17, 1948

"Promise: Free plebiscites within 6 months to a year in areas claimed by both sides; a constituent convention; an all-Indonesia legislature; voluntary DutchIndonesia union. On February 3, 1948, Queen Wilhelmina broadcast to the world: 'Colonialism is dead.'

"Deed: All-out invasion on December 19, 1948; complete sea blockade of republican trade for 21⁄2 years, even on essential imports like medical supplies. "The Linggadjati agreement, March 1947

"Promise: A sovereign United States of Indionesia by January 1949; guaranty of Indonesian rights in interim period; voluntary Dutch-Indonesian union. "Deed: All-out invasion on July 20, 1947, stopped short of complete destruction of the Republic only by Security Council cease-fire order; refusal to implement agreement because of reinterpretation; sea blockade.

"Postsurrender period, August 1945

"Promise: Constitutional reform; new era..

"Deed: Immediate mobilization of war-starved Dutch reservists for invasion service in Indonesia; dispatch of 120,000 troops over the next year or two.

"Queen Wilhelmina's wartime pledge, December 6, 1942

"Promise: A postwar conference leading to 'a commonwealth in which the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam, and Curaçao will participate.'

"Deed: Prewar refusal to train Indonesians militarily for their own defense; postwar use of armed force to restore Dutch power.

"The direct Hitlerlike rupture of the Renville agreement is the most recent case in point.

"Promise: The Renville agreement, January 17, 1948, reached through the U. N. Good Offices Committee, with especial United States encouragement, stipulated in particular: '(10) This agreement shall be considered binding unless one party

notifies the Committee of Good Offices and the other party that it considers the truce regulations are not being observed by the other party and that this agreement should therefore be terminated.'

"In general, it provided a military truce and a set of 18 political principles as a basis for final settlement.

"Deed: The Dutch notified the Committee and the Republic of their December 19 invasion just as it began. Telegraph facilities of both were cut in advance, eliminating U. N. communications.

"The Linggadjati agreement, March 1947, was likewise breached by a bloody, unheralded invasion during negotiations on its implementation.

"Promise: After hysterical, false denunciation of the Republic as Japanesecreated, terror by Dutch forces and establishment of Dutch-controlled independent states outside the Republic had all failed to break it, the Dutch next tried negotiation.

"The Lenggadjati agreement, which resulted, guaranteed Indonesian freedom, with something like dominion status. It also provided an interim period during which a mixed Dutch-Indonesian administration would prepare for the transfer of power. Furthermore, it gave formal Dutch recognition of the Republic as the de facto authority in Java, Sumatra, and Madura, the three main islands. "Deed: The agreement reached was 90 percent Dutch, but the Republic accepted it to facilitate a quick settlement. This was in June 1946. Republicans were assured Dutch ratification was a matter of a few days or weeks. Actually, it was March 1947 before Dutch signatures were affixed. The intervening months were occupied with Dutch obstruction and attempts to force new proposals on the Republic.

"Both before and after signing, Holland repeatedly ignored the agreement, occupying major Republican cities, bringing in 120,000 troops, 30,000 more than previously agreed. Dutch interpretations of their commitments were so extensive that even after the signing, implementation was impossible. Negotiation continued.

"At midnight July 20, 1947, while Republican leaders awaited reply to their latest formal communication, they were abruptly notified of suspension of the agreement. Simultaneously, full-scale war was launched. It ended only when the Security Council issued a cease-fire order some days later.

"By that time, Holland had what it wanted most, the richest producing areas of the Republic.

"Before, during, and just after the war, Holland volubly promised freedom, belied itself in action.

"Promise: The famous Visman report of 1941 supposedly laid the technical base for it; Queen Wilhelmina's speech of December 1942, pledged it; Dutch utterances just after the surrender of Japan seemed to assume it.

"Deed: The Visman report provided excuse for years of delay, while being made; Dutch administration and weakness left Indonesia defenseless before Japan. After the war, Holland left no effort undone to thwart, then destroy the universal vehicle of Indonesian independence-the Republic.

"These infamies against 70,000,000 peaceful, long-suffering Indonesians-and against the United Nations-spring inevitably from the faithless Dutch repression of three centuries.

"Dutch double talk notwithstanding, the cornerstone of all democracy, universal literacy, was effectively prevented. Funds were never assigned, teachers never developed for mass education. Pleading poverty in the world's richest colony, Dutchmen developed only specialized schools for Indonesian aristocrats' sons and daughters, who learned obedience along with their three R's and in higher education.

"Mass organizations were unceasingly harassed. Nationalist leaders, including those who head the Republic today and many others who did not survive, were exiled for years at a time to remote swamps and jungles, often killed.

"A nominal People's Council or Volksraad before the war was subject to the veto of both Governor General and the Dutch Parliament. Even then a high proportion of its members were appointed, not elected. And on top of that, those elected were chosen by a system of suffrage so indirect as to be meaningless. "Brutality like that of the Nazis at Lidice was meted out when the cup of slavery ran over and an uprising occurred. In 1926 whole districts of villages in Java were burned to the ground, the inhabitants murdered by fully equipped Dutch troops. In 1947 some 30,000 Indonesians were massacred in Macassar, Celebes.

"Under its masquerade of paternalistic colonizer, Holland's program was extremely simple-self-enrichment.