very small way, Mr. President, the protest which I have raised here this afternoon, the points which I have made in opposition to the adoption of the compromise amendment, and the appeal which I have made for the record will make it clear that our Government should always at the first opportunity, as these incidents arise, make it perfectly clear that it cannot be counted on the side of those who transgress and trample upon freedom. I hope my words of protest will help make clear to the Dutch that we will not aid and abet them, directly or indirectly, in their design to destroy Indonesian freedom. Mr. President, in the hope that the words I have spoken this afternoon may at least be recalled by some in future international negotiations over Indonesia, I have taken the liberty of imposing these comments upon the Senate. I close by saying that I join with the Senator from Florida in his expression that the United Nations is our only hope for peace, and I regret that so early in its life and history one of the signatories to its charter, the Dutch Government, stands so thoroughly convicted before the world as being a violator of the moral principles of the United Nations Charter which seek to preserve and protect the freedom of independent peoples. The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, offered by the Senator from Maine [Mr. Brewster]. The amendment, as modified, was agreed to. OPPOSITION TO JESSUP'S NOMINATION Senator SPARKMAN. Now, let me say that before these hearings started I received a letter from the Honorable L. C. Arends, Member of Congress from Illinois, to which I replied on September 24, 1951. He did not ask me to insert his letter in the record but I told him I would call it to the attention of the subcommittee, and I suppose it would be proper to place it in the record along with the reply. He raised 11 points in opposition to Mr. Jessup's confirmation. (The correspondence appears in the record, as follows:) LETTER FROM CONGRESSMAN L. C. ARENDS, SEPTEMBER 22, 1951 Hon. JOHN J. SPARKMAN, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D. C., September 22, 1951. United States Senate, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. DEAR SENATOR SPARKMAN: I am writing to you in your capacity as chairman of the special subcommittee of the Senate Commitee on Foreign Relations considering the nomination of Philip C. Jessup to be a United States delegate to the General Assembly of the United Nations. When a man is chosen to represent this country in deliberations affecting the future of America and the world, it is vital that his qualifications be beyond question. I regard Mr. Jessup unfit for this post for the following reasons: (1) On August 1, 1944, Mr. Jessup wrote a letter to the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations recommending a number of persons as delegates to an IPR conference. According to Robert Morris, counsel of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, 10 persons on the list have been identified in subcommittee hearings as members of Communist organizations. In the same letter, Mr. Jessup remarked that "Alger Hiss would be fine." (2) In the period of the Hitler-Stalin pact before Germany's attack on Russia during World War II, Mr. Jessup took a position that paralleled the Communist Party line on the question of the capture of the American freighter City of Flint by a German cruiser on October 8, 1939, and its subsequent removal to the Russian port of Murmansk, where the ship was held by Russian naval forces. The official position of the United States Government, as expressed by the then State Department, was that the Russian Government had clearly violated international law and had committed an offense against the United States. Yet on February 15, 1940, Mr. Jessup was quoted in the New York Herald Tribune as declaring "that the Soviet Union had committed no violation of international law." Incidentally, the clipping containing Mr. Jessup's statement was promptly sent to Moscow by Mr. Edward C. Carter, then secretary-general of the Institute of Pacific Relations. * * (3) According to the Washington Times-Herald of August 27, 1951, Mr. Jessup, prior to the Nazi invasion of Russia in 1941, "was a vigorous foe of intervention in the European war. After the German attack on Russia, he abruptly ceased his agitation against American intervention. * Jessup began making speeches and writing letters to the New York Times against American intervention in the war soon after Hitler attacked Poland on September 1, 1939. He opposed repeal of the arms embargo as a violation of neutrality." This position paralleled that of the Communist Party. (4) Mr. Jessup was associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations from 1933 to 1946. He held several high offices, including chairman of the American council, chairman of the Pacific council, member of the executive committee, and chairman of the research advisory committee. Several witnesses have testified before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee to the effect that Communists regarded IPR as an important part of their international political and espionage apparatus and that its particular assignment was to help install a Communist regime in China and other far-eastern countries. (5) On March 31, 1938, Edward C. Carter of IPR invited Mr. Jessup to a small dinner "to listen to a hundred percent Bolshevik view of the Communist trials," to be given by "Constantine Oumansky, the able, two-fisted counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington." Jessup accepted "eagerly and gratefully." (6) On September 26, 1940, Edward C. Carter of IPR wrote to Owen Lattimore recommending that one Andrew Roth be permitted to contribute to Pacific Affairs, a publication of the institute. The letter stated that Roth "is rated very highly by Jessup." This is the same Andrew Roth who was arrested in the notorious Amerasia case in 1945. According to information placed in the Congressional Record on May 22, 1950, Capt. J. W. Whitfield of the Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy, stated to a House committee that Roth "was known to be a fellow traveler" and "was suspected of being a Communist." (7) On October 29, 1940, Mr. Jessup wrote a draft of a statement to be issued by Frederick V. Field, who was announcing his resignation from the Institute of Pacific Relations to become executive secretary of the American Peace Mobilization. Field is of course the millionaire backer of various Communist-front organizations. The American Peace Mobilization has been listed by the Attorney General as a Communist-front organization. In a letter accompanying the draft of the Field statement, Jessup wrote as follows regarding Field's position with the APM: "I would be glad to help him with his cause." The statement written by Jessup "expressed the hope that when his (Field's) new task was completed, it would be possible for him (Field) to resume active leadership in the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations." When Mr. Jessup wrote this statement, the American Peace Mobilization had already been denounced many times as a Communit front. (8) Mr. Jessup was a signer of a letter that appeared in the New York Times on February 16, 1946, urging that the United States stop immediately the manufacture of atom bombs and suggesting that the United States stockpile of bombs be disposed of. At that time United States atom bombs were the free world's only defense against Russian imperialism. (9) Mr. Jessup was a character witness at the trial of Alger Hiss. Last year Mr. Jessup stated before a Senate subcommittee: "I see no reason to alter the statements which I made under oath as a witness in that case." (10) Brig. Gen. Louis J. Fortier, a retired Far Eastern Army intelligence officer, testified before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on September 20, 1951, that Mr. Jessup favored United States recognition of Communist China. This pro-Red China stand alone should disqualify Mr. Jessup. It is inconceivable to me that a person who would hold this belief could be entrusted with any vital task in the fight against communism. (11) Mr. Jessup has been associated with several organizations that have been cited as Red fronts. It is plain to me that a man with the record of activities and associations of Mr. Jessup is not a man behind whom Americans can unite, nor in whom they can place their full trust. There is more at stake here than a question of one man's loyalty; there is the broader question of American confidence, and American unity. I urge your committee to recommend against confirmation of Mr. Jessup, and I pray that the President will see fit to submit the name of a new nominee whose record will better lend itself for service to our Nation. Sincerely yours, L. C. ARENDS. Hon. L. C. ARENDS, REPLY TO CONGRESSMAN AREND'S LETTER House Office Building, Washington, D. C. SEPTEMBER 24, 1951. DEAR LES: I have your letter of September 22 regarding the appointment of Philip C. Jessup to be a United States delegate at the General Assembly of the United Nations. Our subcommittee has not yet started hearings on Mr. Jessup, but will probably do so within the next few days. You may be assured that the matters contained in your letter will be brought to the attention of the subcommittee. With best wishes and kindest personal regards, I am Sincerely, JOHN SPARKMAN, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Nominations. FOLLOWING PARALLEL LINES OF THOUGHT Senator BREWSTER. I would not want any erroneous inferences from anything the chairman has said about my inserting Dr. Jessup's speech in the record. I think I was the one that brought this matter up, and brought it up to point out that I did not want Ambassador Austin to place the entire responsibility for what transpired in connection with Indonesia on Dr. Jessup. I would like to have it appear that while I have been characterized as a hostile member of the committee, I have also sought in some instances to produce matters which indicated that we were all following parallel lines. Ambassador JESSUP. I appreciate that. Senator SPARKMAN. You have never heard the chairman insinuate that you were a hostile member. Senator BREWSTER. Whether the fruits of our labors on Indonesia will ultimately work out to our security and peace of the world is still a very great question. SENATOR M'CARRAN'S LETTER, SEPTEMBER 20, 1951 Senator SPARKMAN. I have one other item I have checked here, but probably I will withhold this. Mr. Jessup, I shall call it to your attention. In a letter which was directed to me under date of September 20, 1951, Senator McCarran, chairman of the Judiciary Committee and of the Internal Security Subcommittee, called my attention to the availability of certain testimony that was being taken before that committee, and he has supplied us with the excerpts from time to time. He also suggested three different questions that we should look into. I am perfectly willing to move on to this now, and I am not asking you to answer these now. But before we complete these hearings, as I assured Senator McCarran first that we would like to have the testimony and, second, that we would check into these three matters, if you have not already seen these three questions that he said we should check into, I would like for you to look them over and be prepared tomorrow or when we reach them to answer those questions insofar as you can. Ambassador JESSUP. I have seen them, Senator, and I can answer them very quickly in probably 3 minutes. Senator SPARKMAN. That is entirely up to the committee. REQUESTING THE SECRET FILES Senator BREWSTER. Was that the letter which referred to the files? Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, that is true, but I felt it was perfectly proper Senator BREWSTER. I think we should not take them up if we are going to get the files. Senator SPARKMAN. I have not made any request for the files because I assumed we would meet with exactly the same proposition that we have been met with every time so far, that the files are confidential and will not be released. Senator BREWSTER. We are all progressing all the time. I think we should at any rate request them, and find out whether there would be any portions of the file made available. It seems to me a matter of some importance. If they take that position we will have to face the situation. Senator SPARKMAN. If it is the wish of the committee I shall be very glad to have it done. Senator BREWSTER. I think to have just the statement of Dr. Jessup on that matter, without any request by us for the files or any other information, would not be quite in harmony with proper procedure. Senator SPARKMAN. If it is the wish of the committee, I shall be certainly glad to ask the State Department for the files. I suppose it would have to be in an executive session if they presented them to us. Senator BREWSTER. They have done that in several instances. Ambassador JESSUP. As I recall reading these in the newspapers, there are three specific questions which he put up, which I have seen in the public press, which have been bruited around and carried certain implications with them. I would be very glad to have an opportunity now to answer briefly on each one. Senator BREWSTER. I don't think we should hear it until we have at least sought to get the files, and we would have a little more knowledge about it than would appear merely from your statement. Senator SPARKMAN. Suppose we hold that in abeyance for the time being, and you proceed with your statement. THE AMERASIA CASE Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Would Dr. Jessup object to our adding those inquiries and requesting that he give us some comment at some time on the famous Amerasia case, about which I am completely baffled? Ambassador JESSUP. I have no individual information. Senator SMITH of New Jersey. It has been so much identified with IPR—— Ambassador JESSUP. I make the statement that it was disassociated; it was not associated. Senator SMITH of New Jersey. It had no part? Ambassador JESSUP. No, sir. There was a suggestion at one time. that the IPR should take over Amerasia and they should be merged. That suggestion was rejected. Some of the individuals that were in the IPR were also active in Amerasia. There was no corporate connection and there was a definite rejection of a merger. Senator SPARKMAN. Were you ever connected with Amerasia? Senator SPARKMAN. Then suppose we move to the Stassen matter. Ambassador JESSUP. I would like, as I said, to give you the background setting as this has come up. I must assume that this has something to do with me or it would not be pertinent to this committee, therefore I wish to state my role in this situation. RELATIVE TO STASSEN TESTIMONY Senator SPARKMAN. I would like to say this before we get started on it. I read the Stassen testimony pretty thoroughly-not all of it. It is much broader than just your case. I realize that he does tie you in by that noon conversation he had with you with a great part of it. I know it is rather difficult to draw the line, but I hope we can at least limit our case to the question as to how it affects Dr. Jessup. I repeat, I realize that it is going to be difficult to do, but I hope we will keep that in mind. The thing we are aiming at here is the way it affects Dr. Jessup. Senator SMITH of New Jersey. That was the reason for my earlier question; whether or not he is going to treat both the round-table conference, which I think Dr. Jessup attended, and the other alleged conference in which Dr. Jessup participated with the Secretary_of State and others, with the charge that they cut off supplies to the Far East. I understand Dr. Jessup was not at that meeting. Senator SPARKMAN. You have both of those in your papers? Ambassador JESSUP. I have not written out a statement with regard to the so-called meeting with Vandenberg, which I did not attend. I am planning to deal with it if the committee has questions. STATE DEPARTMENT MEETINGS Senator BREWSTER. I understand the meeting becomes more and more mythical. The State Department the day before yesterday denied it; yesterday the State Department admitted it took place, and today the President denies it. Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Dr. Jessup states that he did not attend that meeting. Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Stassen intimates he thought he did. Senator SPARK MAN. Mr. Stassen did in his testimony. I think he said that he attended the conference. Dr. Jessup says that he did not. It seems to me that almost disposes of that so far as Dr. Jessup is concerned. Now it is a matter for us to ask Mr. Stassen about. Ambassador JESSUP. May I just say a word about that, Senator? Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, sir. Ambassador JESSUP. In the New York Times of October 2, Tuesday, an article by William S. White, Washington date line October 1, referring to Mr. Stassen's statement which was the way this matter first came to my attention, said: Mr. Stassen told the subcommittee that in November 1950 Senator Vandenberg, then the Republican foreign policy leader, had told him of a White House conference at which this Acheson-Jessup proposal was made. The date, the witness said, was not mentioned by Mr. Vandenberg, who recalled that he had vigorously opposed the scheme 89965-51-39 |