the role of the United Nations in this matter. The Government of the United States itself took account of this factor, to which many people called attention at the time, through a statement made by Ambassador Austin in the Security Council on March 28, 1947. To the same end the Congress adopted at the suggestion of the late Senator Vandenberg a provision in Public Law 75 approved May 22, 1947, authorizing aid to Greece. The preamble of the law contains several clauses stating that the United States aid is in support of the principles and purposes of the United Nations. Section 5 of the act provides that the United States aid shall be withdrawn inter alia "If the Security Council finds (with respect to which finding the United States waives the exercise of any veto) or the General Assembly finds that action taken or assistance furnished by the United Nations makes the continuance of such assistance unnecessary or undesirable."

In my lecture I referred to Ambassador Austin's statement in the Security Council but stated my view that clarification of our full support of United Nations procedures should hve been given in advance. The course which at the time I advocated is the course which the United States Government has actually followed in regard to Greece and Turkey, namely, that of extending aid in full agreement and in cooperation with the activities of the United Nations, although it was not found appropriate to utilize all of the measures I suggested. This policy of the United States has been successful.

I emphasized the proved validity of this policy in an address which I delivered in Washington on September 26, 1951 (Department of State press release September 26, 1951, No. 868, of which I attach a copy), in which I made the following statement:

"Briefly, what we can and what we must do in the face of the Soviet threat is to proceed resolutely upon our present course. In cooperation with our friends we must continue to develop strength-in-being which will offset that of the Soviet Government and its satellites. The Soviets are realists. They recognize facts and respect strength.

"To develop strength which is dedicated to the preservation of peace has been the unwavering policy of this Government ever since the Soviet Government revived its predatory purposes following World War II. It is the policy which underlay the Truman Doctrine-the President's resolute aid to Greece and Turkey announced in 1947. It is the policy which inspired the Marshall plan, launched by General Marshall in 1948, for aid to the devastated nations of Europe the plan which has matured into ECA, point IV, and the Mutual Security Program. It is the policy which met Soviet force in Berlin with the great airlift in 1948.

"This policy produced the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. It is the policy which underlies Secretary Acheson's program of 'situations of strength'-the program charted in his Berkeley speech of March 16, 1950. It is the same policy which enabled us to act swiftly and decisively, in cooperation with the vast majority of our fellow members of the United Nations, in defense of Korea when it was wantonly attacked on June 25, 1950."

Later in the speech I referred to the success of the Truman doctrine in enabling Greece to throw off the Communist-supported guerrilla attack.

I should like to conclude by repeating that an examination of the entire Claremont lecture will reveal that Mr. Stassen is completely wrong in intimating that I opposed aid to Greece and Turkey and in his further insinuation that in 1947 I was expressing an isolationist view. Quite the contrary, the whole lecture is devoted to expounding my conviction that the international approach through the United Nations is the proper course for the United States to follow. This actually is the policy of the United States Government.

Since Mr. Stassen's telegram was made public, I am also making this letter public.

Sincerely yours,

(Enclosure: Press release.)

PHILIP C. JESSUP, Ambassador at Large.

(The press release, a Statement by Ambassador Jessup on September 26, 1951, at the Round Table on World Affairs of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, appears in an earlier part of these hearings.)

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LECTURE OF PHILIP C. JESSUP, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, CLAREMONT, CALIF., 1947 INTERNATIONAL GUARANTY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

This paper is written during country-wide debates concerning a proposed American guaranty of "democratic" government in two particular states, Greece and Turkey. The Greek and Turkish problems are not newcomers to the international stage. This is not the first case of the kind nor the last. The international problem was not created by President Truman's message of March 12, 1947. The problem will not cease to exist when Greece and Turkey live prosperously under governments as democratic and as free from foreign dangers as is the government of California today. The immediate issue is therefore but a sample of a continuing problem of international law and politics; it will be considered here in the broad frame of the experience of the modern international society and of the United States as a federal union.

The Constitution of the United States provides in article IV, section 4, that "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of Government, and shall protect each of them against invasion."

If two factions are contending for the mastery in one of our States, each maintaining that it is the government of the State, what happens? We have recently been witnessing such a conflict in the State of Georgia; the supreme court of that State decided in favor of one contestant and the other promptly yielded to the judicial pronouncement. The case affords a happy example of the successful functioning of a "republican form of government" settling a vital dispute in the political unit in which it arose. In earlier times in our history there were more bloody conflicts, less easily solved.

In 1849 the Supreme Court of the United States was called upon to consider the constitutional provision which has been quoted, in a case which arose in Rhode Island. Rhode Island, unlike the other original states of the Union, did not adopt a new constitution at the time of the Revolution but continued to operate under the form of government established by the Charter of Charles the Second, with some few changes. By 1841, many of the citizens of that State had decided that a new constitution was needed. They formed organizations, held meetings and finally convened a constitutional convention, which adopted a new constitution. Elections were held and a new governor and other State officers were elected. All of this took place extralegally without the support or approval of the established government. The governor who was already in office proclaimed martial law and sought to round up the leaders of the opposing party. Armed clashes of troops occurred and the old established government emerged victorious. A leader of the opposition, appropriately named Martin Luther, was arrested by the militia and sued the arresting officers for trespass; the case was eventually taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. By the time the wheels of justice had ground the preliminaries, Rhode Island had adopted another new constitution by the approved legal methods and peace reigned, but the Supreme Court made a pronouncement on the issues before it. The Court announced that the question which of two rival governments was the government of a State, was a political and not a judicial question. It was to be determined as necessary by the Congress, for example in the seating of senators and representatives. In other instances, the decision might be made by the President exercising the power which Congress had conferred upon him as early as 1795 to call out the militia to suppress insurrection.

The Supreme Court reiterated its basic view in 1912 when it was alleged in a tax case that the adoption of an amendment to the constitution of Oregon, providing for the initiative and referendum, deprived the government of that State of its republican form of government.

A much more violent dispute raged in Kansas in the 1850's while Kansas was still a Territory and its admission to the Union as a State was under consideration. The lines then drawn between the proslavery and antislavery forces strongly remind one of the ideological lines which are drawn in the larger international society today. In the volume of the Chronicles of America Series devoted to the Anti-Slavery Crusade, Jesse Macy wrote 26 years ago that "It had long been an axiom with the slavocracy that the institution (of slavery) would perish unless it had the opportunity to expand." We are told today that this is also the axiom of communism. As democracies seek today to "contain" the expansion of communism, so the antislavery or free-state men of nearly a century ago sought to contain the expansion of slavery. Free-staters sought to settle the territory of Kansas; 5,000 armed Missourians crossed the border,

controlled the polls and elected proslavery delegates to the legislature. President Pierce failed to support the Governor of Kansas who expected him to nullify the election. The proslavery legislature made it a penitentiary offense to deny orally or in writing or in print the right to hold slaves in the Territory; no man was eligible to serve on a jury if he was conscientiously opposed to holding slaves. The antislavery men held their own constitutional convention at Topeka and adopted a constitution under which they elected a new governor and the two rival governments began to arm and drill their adherents. President Pierce denounced the Topeka free-soil group as "revolutionaries." With Federal support, the proslavery government proceeded to arrest their opponents. The freestate stronghold town of Lawrence was attacked. The sheriff destroyed the printing press, turned his guns on the new hotel which was the town's pride, and then burned it to the ground while a drunken mob pillaged the town. For 3 months there was war in Kansas; 200 were killed and property damage was estimated at $2 million. Federal troops restored order at last and the proslavery group drew up a new constitution at Lecompton. A referendum on the constitution was as democratic and free as the recent elections in Poland but President Buchanan submitted it to Congress with the recommendation that Kansas be admitted under it as a slave State. Congress required a new popular vote which resulted in the rejection of the proslavery Lecompton constitution by a large majority.

The historic story of "bleeding Kansas" need not be continued here in detail. It was not long after these events that the Civil War broke out. It broke out in these United States operating with a homogeneous population under a Constitution which was the admiration of mankind. The Union before and since faced the problem of rival political factions contending for the mastery. The United Nations under its Charter which seeks to unite peoples which are far from homogeneous, faces like problems today. Has mankind, have the American people, in the intervening decades, learned enough political wisdom to settle such controversies without war?

The Charter of the United Nations contains no such guaranty of a republican form of government as is found in the Constitution of the United States. It could not have done so. In the United States when the Constitution was adopted, the existing governments of the recently liberated colonies were mutually satisfactory one to the other. In the United Nations when the Charter was drafted at San Francisco in 1945, there was no parallel satisfaction. If the Charter had referred to the "democratic" governments of its members, the word would have had very different meanings in at least two of the member states. Russians speak of "democracy" as meaning political democracy and deny that they have it. Secretary Marshall said recently at Moscow that "To us a society is not free if law-abiding citizens live in fear of being denied the right to work or deprived of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.". The Soviet Encyclopedia of 1936 asserts that "Democracy with capitalism is capitalistic democracy, a democracy of an exploiting minority directed against a majority-Soviet democracy does not exploit anybody-but with its dictatorship suppresses the exploiters smashed by the proletarian revolution-democracy is purely a class conception."

We resent and oppose any attempt by the Soviet Union to impose their concept of democracy upon us or to instill it into our midst by undercover propaganda. We cannot deny their right to resent and oppose any attempt of ours to impose or to instill our concept of democracy upon them. The fact that we have a conviction of the rightness of our view does not change this conclusion. They have a similar and probably more fanatical conviction of their "rightness.” At an earlier day the term “legitimate governments" included, in the parlance of many in the Western World, only those which were monarchial. Republican forms of government were acknowledged by the monarchs to be governments de facto but no de jure. Neither democracy nor Christianity can be imposed by the sword. The Christian missionary has supplanted the Crusader and the Spanish Inquisition. The missionary of our democracy is the demonstration of its success, its effectiveness, through every farm, factory, village, and city of these United States.

The international problem is not one of securing throughout the world an ideological uniformity which has never existed. No doubt Lincoln was correct in saying that the American Union could not continue to exist half slave and half free. But it has existed and can exist half Democratic and half Republican: half New Deal and half anti-New Deal. The world community has in the past existed half monarchical and half republican; half Christian and half non

Christian. In this series of lectures under the auspices of the Associated Colleges at Claremont last year, Prof. Harold H. Fisher demonstrated most effectively that the Soviet and American forms of government can coexist in the world.

The Lincolnian precept cannot be pressed in its international application. The American Union, even in the 1850's and 1860's, was a relatively homogeneous unit. The problem of international politics, vastly more difficult than the American problem, is to find the ways in which so many different peoples with so many different traditions, so many different religious and political and economic convictions, can coexist without war. It is not in the American tradition to insist upon political any more than on economic monopoly. It is the American tradition to foster a system of free political competition under regulations which protect the weak from falling victim to the conflict among the strong. It is our task to see to it that American democracy, as recently defined by Marshall and by David Lilienthal, shall be vital enough to succeed in such competition. It is our task, within the system of the United Nations, to see to it that the weak shall be free to choose their own ways of life, be those ways American, or Russian, or something different from either.

It may be profitable to examine the ways in which the international community during the past two centuries has dealt with the problem of civil wars and of governments which have been disapproved. It is particularly important to scan these pages of history for their lessons in view of the statement by President Truman in his historic speech to Congress on March 12. The President said: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Does this mean that we shall adopt the policy of saying, in a paraphrase of the words of our Constitution, that "the United States shall guarantee to every state in this world a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion" Is such a guaranty to be given by the United States alone or by the United Nations?

In recent times one of the most striking examples of the way in which a civil war may involve the peace of the world, is to be found in the Spanish Civil War of the 1930's. But Spain itself had afforded numerous earlier examples of the same fact. In 1698 the question was not one of Fascist or democratic control but of whether there should be Hapsburg or Bourbon domination of Europe. The great powers of Europe lined up on the two sides of the controversy. This developed into the War of the Spanish Succession in 1702 and by 1720 England had become the mistress of Gibraltar. When in 1808 Napoleon sought to put his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne, England rallied to the support of the other side. The establishment of a liberal government in 1820 in Spain led to 2 years of civil war and at the Congress of Verona in 1822 the powers decided to intervene, demanding the abrogation of the liberal constitution of 1812. This was the period when the Holy Alliance was campaigning against the extension of republicanism. Ten years later in the Carlist revolt the powers were again lined up in support of two opposing factions in Spain. Again in 1869 the question of the succession to the Spanish throne was part of the prelude to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War.

The interest of the great powers in the domestic governmental affairs of other states in Europe was also displayed over and over again in the treatment of Balkan affairs and of the fate of the Ottoman Empire. In 1878 the great powers said in regard to Serbia that, in claiming "to enter the European family on the same basis as other states" she "must previously recognize the principles which are the basis of social organization in all states of Europe and accept them as a necessary condition of the favor which she asks for." In the Treaty of Paris of 1856 the powers had agreed to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and declared that they would consider any act tending to violate this engagement as a question of general interest.

In the Western Hemisphere, from the time of the Spanish colonies' wars of liberation up through the period of United States hegemony, the United States took an active interest in the form of government which Latin-American states adopted. Monroe's famous pronouncement included the proposition that we would defend the republican form of government in these countries against any attempt to reimpose upon them the monarchical systems of Europe. Especially in the latter part of the nineteenth century and in the first years of this century, there were numerous instances in which the action of this country determined what individual or what group would rule in one of our smaller neighbors to the

south. Our action was by no means confined to instances in which there was a threat of foreign domination; frequently it was a question of a choice between two factions which were inspired by nothing more profound than the desire of individual leaders for wealth and power.

In 1907 the republics of Central America made an attempt to put their regional house in order by agreeing among themselves that they would not recognize any new government which came into power through a revolution or coup d'etat. The United States announced that it would adopt the same principle as the basis of its policy in that area. The trend at this period is strongly in the direction of the maintenance of domestic peace and insistence that changes of government should not take place by other than orderly constitutional procedures. This trend finds its consolidation in the signature at Habana in 1928 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States in Case of Civil Strife. This treaty, to which the United States and 14 other American Republics are parties, contains an agreement to prevent revolutionary movements from being organized or operating from the territory of any one of the signatory states. It includes an agreement to embargo shipment of arms to rebels, while permitting the shipments to the established governments.

Although this Habana Convention antedates the good-neighbor policy, it indicated another and most desirable trend toward collective action in the Western Hemisphere in cases of this kind. Thus, as one comes down to the current case of dissatisfaction with the Government of Argentina, one finds the United States attempting to operate in conjunction with all of the other Latin-American Republics. Our failures to aline all of the other republics with our policy is responsible for the present impasse. That failure, in turn, is at least partly due to Latin-American dislike and fear of North American interferences in their civil

strifes.

Turning to the Far East, one finds throughout the modern history of China examples of the joint concern of the great European powers and of the United States in the maintenance or in the creation of stable government. This policy was inspired less by a devotion to any great principle of democracy, than to the fear that some one power would take advantage of chaotic domestic conditions in China to establish a dominant position to the detriment of the other interested states. There was a formalization of this policy in the Washington NinePower Treaty of 1922, whereby the leading western countries and Japan agreed "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China." They agreed also "to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government."

Although China emerged from World War II as one of the five great powers with permanent seats on the Security Council of the United Nations, the domestic difficulties in that country have not yet ceased. The United States through General Marshall sought to assist in bringing the contending factions together, but Marshall's statement of January 7, 1947, registered the failure of that effort. In that statement, the present Secretary of State frankly commented upon the difficulty of bringing together what he called "a dominant group of reactionaries" in the Kuomintang and the equally extreme members of the Chinese Communist Party. He noted the existence of patriotic liberal elements in both groups, but his report marked the end of a policy of outright support for the established government. In the present Moscow conference the affairs of China are obviously of concern to the Big Three, but the United States declines to discuss them formally in China's absence.

In an earlier period, the interests of the United States and of Europe met in the Far East. With the realization of our world-wide interests and responsibilities which the Second World War brought about, joint American and European concern with the nature of the Spanish Government appears. The United States has joined with the other members of the United Nations in condemning the Franco government and in applying certain pressures to bring about a change in that government. The contrast between our present attitude toward Spain and our attitude during the Spanish Civil War of the 1930's is a striking indication of the development of world policy. Ten years ago the United States was not prepared to take an active part in the combined "nonintervention" measures agreed upon by the principal European states. But the nointervention agreement of the 1930's was inevitably itself an interference in the Spanish Civil War and its history was marked by flagrant intervention on the part of the Fascist states.