The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:25 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p. m., the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The session convened at 2 p. m., Senator John J. Sparkman, presiding.

Present. Senators Sparkman (chairman of the subcommittee), Fulbright, Gillette, Smith of New Jersey, and Brewster.

Also present. Senators Lodge and Knowland.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.
Mr. Jessup, you were at the middle of page 10 of your statement,
I believe, when we recessed.

Ambassador JESSUP. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SPARKMAN. You may continue.

POINT OF VIEW OF NONINTERVENTION

Ambassador JESSUP. Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would like to pick up one or two points in the testimony this morning, first in regard to the last paragraph that I dealt with on my statement on page 10, where I referred to the attitude of Gen. Robert Wood and Colonel McCormick in connection with my attitude on the Spanish embargo, Aid to Britain, and kindred topics.

To avoid any misunderstanding, Mr. Chairman, I should like to point out that I referred to the two individuals as indicative of a general point of view of nonintervention in the war during that period, and without an attempt to indicate whether or not General Wood and Colonel McCormick took a specific position on the question of the Spanish embargo. I am referring there to the general attitude which I described this morning.

The reason I think it is important to bring this up is that it seemed to me in our discussion this morning, or in my testimony and the questions this morning, there may have been some misunderstanding as to what charge of Senator McCarthy's I was trying to meet. find at page 266 of this committee's transcript that Senator McCarthy, in speaking of what he calls my "Party-line tendency," said this:

The exchange of letters in the New York Times will give you that complete picture and that is very, very important, that he was not a consistent isolationist or consistent interventionist. He changed when the party line changed.

We have called the Library of Congress and checked all the publications after the Russians and the Germans collaborated or rather, after Hitler invaded Russia, and we find no indication any place that Jessup then opposed shipping materials to England. He was vigorously and vigorously opposed before the Nazi invasion of Russia.

So you have the three-way switch. First, the urging that we send arms and ammunition to the Communists in Spain. Two, the arguing that it is illegal to ship them to England while the Nazi-Communist pact existed, and nothing heard from Jessup after Hitler moved into Russia.

It was because of that testimony, Mr. Chairman, that I felt it was necessary to put into the record this morning the evidence which I

did including the letter which I wrote to Senator Johnson on the question of the armed ships, including the statement which I joined a number of other citizens in issuing in regard to the President's speech of September 11 on shooting at sight.

CONSISTENCIES OR INCONSISTENCIES OF JESSUP'S VIEWS

Senator BREWSTER. On that point, Mr. Jessup, do I understand you thought that the arming of the ships was very analogous to the arms embargo?

Ambassador JESSUP. I thought that the arming of the ships was a further move which was calculated to bring us into war.

Senator BREWSTER. You cited that as an indication that after the attack on Russia you still opposed arming the ships?

Ambassador JESSUP. I still followed the same line, opposing everything which I thought would take us into the war.

Senator BREWSTER. Senator McCarthy, as I understood, took the issue of shipping arms to Britain, and as I understand it, you have not any record of your having taken any position one way or another on that after the attack on Russia.

Ambassador JESSUP. I have no specific document; there was no change in my general attitude.

Senator BREWSTER. If you will read his precise statement there again, just what he said

Ambassador JESSUP. Nothing heard from Jessup?

Senator BREWSTER. After that time, and that would be true so far as shipping arms to Britain was concerned, so far as you know?

Ambassador JESSUP. He says here:

* * he was not a consistent isolationist or consistent interventionist. He changed when the party line changed.

We have called the Library of Congress and checked all the publications after the Russians and the Germans collaborated, or rather, after Hitler invaded Russia and we find no indication any place that Jessup then opposed shipping materials to England. He was vigorously and vigorously opposed before the Nazi invasion of Russia.

So you have the three-way switch. First, the urging that we send arms and ammunition to the Communists in Spain. Two, the arguing that it is illegal to ship them to England, while the Nazi-Communist pact existed, and nothing heard from Jessup after Hitler moved into Russia.

Senator BREWSTER. Isn't that statement strictly correct, so far as you know?

Ambassador JESSUP. I think it is entirely misleading, Senator.

Senator BREWSTER. That is not what I asked you. Is that statement not absolutely correct, so far as you know?

Ambassador JESSUP. I beg your pardon; I do not think it is correct, because it is an incomplete statement. It says, "nothing heard from Jessup after Hitler moved into Russia."

Senator BREWSTER. What was the matter that he was discussing? Ambassador JESSUP. Whether I was a consistent isolationist or consistent interventionist, or whether I switched with the party line. Senator BREWSTER. As shown by your position on the matter of shipping arms to Britain. That is what he was discussing; that is the whole subject of the discussion, and as I understand you, you know of no instance where you mention shipping arms to Britain after the

attack on Russia.

Ambassador JESSUP. I know of no instance at the moment in which I made a statement on that particular point, Senator. Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

ORIGIN OF EXHIBIT FOR THE RECORD

Ambassador JESSUP. The other point that came up this morning, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to touch on: Senator Gillette inquired, I think, where I got the copies of the programs of the dinners of the American-Russian Institute in 1944 and 1946. We took those, Senator, from a pamphlet distributed by Senator McCarthy at Rochester, on May 25, 1950. He had a collection of these exhibits somewhat similar to the ones he introduced here. Among them were these pages which we have reproduced. That is the source from which we reproduced them. I have no reason to doubt their accuracy in the form in which they were originally included in his pamphlet.

Senator BREWSTER. You rely on Senator McCarthy as an authority, then, in some cases?

Ambassador JESSUP. If you like to consider that reliance on him, Senator, very well.

The other point which I would like to touch on, sir, is the point which Senator Brewster raised in connection with the position of the United States delegation in the General Assembly in 1949 on this question of the Chinese resolution to condemn Russian action as against the resolution which we did propose, and which was passed affirming the territorial integrity and independence of China, and so forth.

PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN U. N.

May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to offer for insertion in the record an extract from the report by the President to the Congress for the year 1949 on United States participation in the United Nations, pages 69 through 73. Without taking the time of the committee to read all of that, I should like merely to summarize certain points which the committee can then check by reference to the document which I will insert.

It is pointed out here, sir, that as brought out by Senator Brewster this morning, the original complaint of China which formed the item on the agenda had to do with the violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, and violations of the Charter of the United Nations, and the question was on the adoption of a resolution, the draft resolution submitted by the Chinese delegate, calling upon all members to desist from giving military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists and to refrain from granting diplomatic recognition, et cetera.

The account goes on to point out that the Soviet Union tried to keep this item off the agenda and they failed in that. We helped them to fail. We insisted on it going on.

Then, and I will read this:

In the course of the consideration of this problem in the General Assembly, it became increasingly clear that a large number of delegations, though sympathetic with the case presented by the Chinese delegate, felt that the complexity of the legal and factual issues involved made it impossible for the As

sembly to make a specific finding of facts regarding the charges. Many were reluctant, in view of the rapidity of developments in the Far East, to commit themselves to decisions which would restrict their future freedom of action regarding the relations between their respective countries and China. Furthermore, some delegations felt that the United Nations would have been in a better position to have taken effective action on the specific charges brought by the Chinese if the Chinese Government had not waited so long to bring the matter before it.

The United States Representative, Ambassador Philip C. Jessup, voiced the deep concern of the United States Government at the evidence of continuation by the Soviet Union of prewar Czarist and Soviet Russian imperialistic policies in the Far East

and it continues with that and a reference to the statement which I made on behalf of the United States in the Assembly.

Then it continues:

In order to have the Assembly take some action

the United States joined with the delegations of Australia, Mexico, Pakistan, and the Philippines in submitting a resolution dealing with the international aspects of the problem as an integral whole. The resolution called for respect for China's political independence, noninterference in her internal affairs, fulfilment of existing treaties, and a ban on seeking spheres of influence are establishing puppet regimes in China.

There is further discussion of the resolution, and then continuation of the question with regard to the continuing work by the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, and there was an additional resolution referring the Chinese complaint to the Interim Committee. When this came before the Assembly, the United States expressed its concern lest the Interim Committee should be confined to a consideration of Chinese charges of past misconduct, and not be authorized to concern itself with violations now and in the future of the standards of international conduct embodied in the principal resolution. These broader terms of references were incorporated into the

additional resolution.

In summary, then, I should like to say that the point of view of the United States Delegation was that if the original draft resolution. proposed by the Chinese were pressed, it would not succeed in getting a sufficient number of votes to pass. We felt that our resolution would be helpful. We pressed it and we got a good vote on it.

Then the question came of a continuing watchdog kind of business through the Interim Committee. The original resolution was restricted in the sense that it suggested they look merely at these past allegations of Soviet misconduct. We got that changed so that the mandate of the Interim Committee would also include future development, future aggression by China, any other acts which might come along since the original action of which the Chinese complained. That is the general history, and I should like to offer for the record, the appropriate extract from that report.

Senator BREWSTER. When you speak of the Interim Committee, do you refer to what they talk about as the "Little Assembly"?

Ambassador JESSUP. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Without objection, the insertion may be made. (The portions of the document referred to by Ambassador Jessup appear as follows:)

Ambassador JESSUP. I know of no instance at the moment in which I made a statement on that particular point, Senator. Senator BREWSTER. That is all.

ORIGIN OF EXHIBIT FOR THE RECORD

Ambassador JESSUP. The other point that came up this morning, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to touch on: Senator Gillette inquired, I think, where I got the copies of the programs of the dinners of the American-Russian Institute in 1944 and 1946. We took those, Senator, from a pamphlet distributed by Senator McCarthy at Rochester, on May 25, 1950. He had a collection of these exhibits somewhat similar to the ones he introduced here. Among them were these pages which we have reproduced. That is the source from which we reproduced them. I have no reason to doubt their accuracy in the form in which they were originally included in his pamphlet.

Senator BREWSTER. You rely on Senator McCarthy as an authority, then, in some cases?

Ambassador JESSUP. If you like to consider that reliance on him, Senator, very well.

The other point which I would like to touch on, sir, is the point which Senator Brewster raised in connection with the position of the United States delegation in the General Assembly in 1949 on this question of the Chinese resolution to condemn Russian action as against the resolution which we did propose, and which was passed affirming the territorial integrity and independence of China, and so forth.

PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN U. N.

May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to offer for insertion in the record an extract from the report by the President to the Congress for the year 1949 on United States participation in the United Nations, pages 69 through 73. Without taking the time of the committee to read all of that, I should like merely to summarize certain points which the committee can then check by reference to the document which I will insert.

It is pointed out here, sir, that as brought out by Senator Brewster this morning, the original complaint of China which formed the item on the agenda had to do with the violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, and violations of the Charter of the United Nations, and the question was on the adoption of a resolution, the draft resolution submitted by the Chinese delegate, calling upon all members to desist from giving military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists and to refrain from granting diplomatic recognition, et cetera.

The account goes on to point out that the Soviet Union tried to keep this item off the agenda and they failed in that. We helped them to fail. We insisted on it going on.

Then, and I will read this:

In the course of the consideration of this problem in the General Assembly, became increasingly clear that a large number of delegations, though symathetic with the case presented by the Chinese delegate, felt that the comlexity of the legal and factual issues involved made it impossible for the As