The United States proposal goes on to recommend that the General Assembly accept the conclusions which the Interim Committee may reach on this subject and "that the General Assembly as a first step recommend to the permanent members of the Security Council that they mutually agree that such voting procedures be followed and that steps be taken to make their agreement effective." We recognize that after the General Assembly has made recommendations for liberalization of the voting procedures, the task of accomplishing such liberalization may be a difficult one. The most effective way of securing improvement in the operations of the Security Council would be through agreement of the permanent members. Mr. Dulles stated this to the First Committee of the General Assembly and Ambassador Austin repeated the statement before this committee on January 9. "We realize that without such agreement, it will be difficult to accomplish great practical results. Charter amendment requires the approval of all five. It may perhaps prove possible to get agreement on certain Charter amendments and certainly there is an important area in which existing procedures could be liberalized without alteration of article 27."

We believe that the permanent members will all give great weight to whatever recommendations may be made by the General Assembly on this subject and we are therefore proposing that the General Assembly recommend to the permanent members that they mutually agree to follow the voting procedure recommended by the General Assembly and to take steps to make their agreement effective.

We have submitted a list of Security Council decisions which in our view should as a matter of principle be made by any seven members of the Security Council; in other words, where there should be no veto. I shall not comment in detail at this time on this list. It suffices to say that a number of these decisions are well established as procedural in the practice of the Security Council and that in other instances a voting procedure not involving the veto is prescribed by the Charter. However, the list of categories of decisions also includes a number of decisions where either no precedent as to voting procedure has as yet been established in the Security Council or where under existing practice of the Council, a negative vote by a permanent member has been considered a vote. It would perhaps be appropriate to note at this time two or three of the more important of these decisions where we firmly believe that the voting procedure should be liberalized.

[The two following paragraphs were underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:]

In the first place, there is the question of applications for membership. This is item 1 on our list. Ten of the twenty-three vetoes in the Security Council have related to membership problems. This is not the time or place for recriminations but I would be less than frank if I failed to point to the most flagrant example of the abuse of the veto, the veto of Italy's membership application by the Soviet Union not once but two times. This was done in the face of overwhelming support for Italy's application in the Security Council and later in the General Assembly. This leads inescapably to the conclusion that the Soviet vetoes of the Italian United Nations membership application can be interpreted only as an expression of lack of friendship of the Soviet Union for the people of Italy. A way must be found to make such an injustice impossible. The Italian people must not be denied the right of United Nations membership which they so richly deserve. It should be noted that one phase of the membership problem has been referred by the General Assembly to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. The Court's opinion, when it is given, should be of assistance in this study.

We have also suggested the elimination of the veto in connection with most of the decisions of the Security Council arising under chapter VI which relates to the pacific settlement of disputes. The Secretary of State in his address to the General Assembly indicated that the United States would be willing to accept the restriction or elimination of the veto in connection with all decisions under chapter VI. We have not, however, at this time suggested its elimination in connection with the Security Council's authority under article 37 (2) to recommend terms of settlement of disputes. While the United States would be willing to accept the elimination of the veto in connection with the Security Council's recommendations under article 37 (2), nevertheless, as was pointed out by Mr. Dulles to the First Committee of the General Assembly in his statement of November 18, this provision raises certain special problems. Therefore. pending further study, by the Interim Committee, the United States did not include this provision in its list.

We are also suggesting that the veto should never be utilized to prevent the Security Council from obtaining assistance from other organs of the United Nations; the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice. We believe that the firm establishment of this principle would result in greater coordination of the work of the various organs of the United Nations and would be of great assistance to the Security Council.

It should be emphasized that the list of categories of Security Council decisions which the United States proposes should be made by affirmative vote of seven members, is strictly a provisional list. The United States hopes that the Interim Committee will study not only these categories of decisions but all categories of decisions which the Security Council must make. The creation of a subcommittee would seem to be useful for this purpose. It may develop in the course of the study that there are a number of other decisions where the effective functioning of the Security Council would be furthered through establishment of voting procedures not requiring the concurrence of the permanent members. The United States is entering into this study in the Interim Committee with an open mind and without any preconceived judgment as to the conclusions that should emerge from the Interim Committee.

The second part of the United States proposal relates to consultation among permanent members. The United States suggests that the "Interim Committee should recommend to the General Assembly that in order to improve the functioning of the Security Council, the General Assembly recommend to the permanent members of the Security Council that whenever feasible, consultations should take place among them concerning important decisions to be taken by the Security Council." Even in the event of substantial liberalization of voting procedures, as is contemplated in the first part of the United States proposal. it is still desirable that there should be agreement and there will be many decisions of the Security Council which require agreement among the permanent members. Consultations on such decisions, and also on some important decisions not requiring unanimity, should take place whenever feasible; that is, whenever they are likely to produce constructive results. We believe that there is likely to be agreement on the desirability of such consultations. The General Assembly resolution of December 13, 1946, "requests the permanent members in consultation with one another, to insure that the use of the special voting privilege does not impede the Security Council in reaching decisions promptly." The General Assembly resolution of November 21, 1947, requests consultations among the permanent members on the problem of voting. The United States proposal goes somewhat further than either of the previous General Assembly resolutions but goes no further than the statements of the permanent members themselves. All of the permanent members have stated in the General Assembly that such consultations are desirable. We believe that the second part of our proposal complements the first part and that its adoption will assist the Security Council in effectively performing its functions.

In conclusion, we sincerely hope that the studies in this Committee will result in a fuller understanding of this extremely difficult and technical subject; and that as a result of this study, this Committee will reach enlightened and constructive conclusions that have the support of the overwhelming force of world opinion. If those conclusions are converted into realities through their adoption in practice, the United Nations will be a more effective instrument for the accomplishment of its great purposes.

VANDENBERG RESOLUTION

Whereas peace with justice and the defense of human rights and fundamental freedom require international cooperation through more effective use of the United Nations; therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations, so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest and that the President be advised of the sense of the Senate that this Government by constitutional process should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter:

[The following paragraph was underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:]

(1) Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.

(2) Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

(3) Association of the United States by constitutional process with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid and as affects its national security.

(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

(5) Maximum efforts to obtain agreement to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranties against violation.

(6) If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a general conference called under article 109, or by the General Assembly.

GENERAL MARSHALL'S TELEGRAM, MAY 18, 1948

Ambassador AUSTIN. Now came the second relationship, in which I call attention to the following correspondence, because it is a part of the truth. It is a telegram from General Marshall to me dated May 18, 1948.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. I am not quite clear what you mean by the "second relationship."

Ambassador AUSTIN. On the list that I have given you of appointments, in which Dr. Jessup served with me. This proves that I was asked, in advance, about the appointment of Dr. Jessup, and that I assented to it with eagerness. [Reading:]

Eyes alone for Ambassador Austin from Rusk, signed Marshall.

Department is very much concerned about possibility of further delay in Participation Act amendment because of House Foreign Affairs Committee desire to lump together several bills in omnibus legislation. In an effort to find your immediate assistance in Security Council we suggest that Philip Jessup be named as Herschel Johnson's successor. Jessup would not be available beyond February of next year, hence this appointment could only be temporary. Appointment would also be without prejudice to permanent appointments to be made under amended Participation Act. Department continues to approve your suggestion of Ross as the "additional deputy" provided in that act. I believe you will agree that Jessup has done a first-class job in the Interim Committee and in special session, sometimes under most difficult circumstances. Nevertheless Department does not wish to send his name forward without your consideration and any comments which you might wish to make on the suggestion.

If you agree, Jessup's name can go forward within the next few hours. That is signed "Marshall, Secret." That is the first time, I think, that has come to notice. I do not think it requires any release. Senator SPARKMAN. Was General Marshall at that time Secretary of State?

Ambassador AUSTIN. Secretary of State.

I replied May 19:

Eyes only for Rusk from Austria.

Re Deptel 313

the number this bears, which I just read

Philip Jessup eminently qualified. Would be glad to have him succeed Herschel Johnson.

AUSTIN.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. That was in 1948?
Ambassador AUSTIN. In 1948, May 18 and 19. That is No. 2.

JESSUP'S HANDLING OF PALESTINE CASE

We come now to another matter that Dr. Jessup handled, and that is the Palestine case. I introduced a resolution April 1, 1948, which resulted in the special session of the General Assembly to consider the Palestine case, and that General Assembly commenced on April 16, 1948, and the delegates to it were myself as Chairman, Ambassador Sayre, and Dr. Jessup. You see the number was small because it was intended to be handled just as one affair. Alternate representatives were Mr. Dean Rusk, then Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs, Department of State, and Mr. John C. Ross.

Now, remember, until this appointment to the special mission of the General Assembly, Dr. Jessup's position in the mission had been that of Deputy United States Representative on the Interim Committee. This is the No. 2 relationship.

JESSUP CONFIRMATION, JUNE 1, 1948

He was confirmed as Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council on June 1, 1948. This is important, because the Security Council was meeting at the same time as that special meeting of the General Assembly. It is also important because this is a critical date. The British mandate over Palestine ended on May 15. I had no deputy on the Security Council up to that time. I had to attend all its meetings. Consequently, as you can realize the load was very heavy on Ambassador Sayre and Dr. Jessup to carry forward the work of the Assembly.

On

After his confirmation on June 1, Dr. Jessup succeeded me in the Security Council's active efforts to stop the fighting in Palestine. April 20, I placed before the Political and Security Committee, that we call committee No. 1, the United States proposal in the form of a working paper entitled "Draft Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine."

That paper embodied the principles which the United States had put forward for discussion earlier in informal meetings of members of the Security Council for which the Soviet and Ukrainian members of the Council abstained. In the days that followed it became evident that the necessary two-thirds majority of the delegation present and voting could not be mustered in support of any temporary truce trusteeship proposal for Palestine. Faced with this and the additional fact that the British mandate was expiring at midnight on May 14, the United States threw its support by a resolution which confirmed the General Assembly's support of the Security Council's efforts to secure a truce in Palestine and persons to cooperate in making effective that truce, establish the Office of United Nations Mediator for Palestine. The position of the United States was expressed by Dr. Jessup in committee No. 1 on Thursday, May 13, in a speech which is attached. I need not take your time with rest of that statement. I will save your time and strength by filing here Dr. Jessup's statement, which is marked similarly for your aid.

(The statement referred is as follows:)

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JESSUP, POLITICAL AND SECURITY COMMITTEE,
MAY 13, 1948

Mr. Chairman, this special session of the General Assembly has grappled with the problems of the future Government of Palestine for the past 4 weeks. During these weeks, we have exhausted every effort to find at this time a peaceful solution of the problem which would commend itself to the necessary majority of the General Assembly and to the Jews and Arabs of Palestine.

In our debates we have had the benefit of the long experience of the mandatory power as expressed in statements made by representatives of the United Kingdom Government.

We have heard again the well-known arguments of representatives of the Arab Higher Committee, supported by the Arab states, in favor of a Palestinian state in Palestine.

We have heard reiterated the arguments of the Jewish Agency in support of its claim for statehood.

On the basis of the working paper presented by the United States in an effort to facilitate our efforts, we have considered in detail the possibility of a temporary trusteeship for Palestine, pending the development of a solution on which the parties can agree.

On the basis of suggestions made by the representatives of the mandatory government and on the basis of a working paper prepared by our distinguished Rapporteur and Delegate of Norway, Mr. Finn Moe, we have considered in subcommittee 9 detailed proposals for a number of minimum, practical steps that might be taken now, but we have heard exception taken to these proposals by the representatives of both the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee.

TEN FACTS APPARENT

A number of simple facts have emerged from our discussions.

(1) It has not been possible for us in the time at our disposal to devise a peaceful solution of this problem acceptable to both the principal parties.

(2) The representatives of the Jewish Agency, supported by a number of members of the United Nations, will not agree to any solution of the Palestine problem which fails to guarantee the establishment of a Jewish state. •

(3) The representatives of the Arab Higher Committee, also supported by a number of members of the United Nations, will not agree to any solution which might result in the establishment of a Jewish state.

(4) No proposal has been made which would provide the means of carrying out the resolution of November 29 by peaceful means.

(5) No proposal has been made which would permit the implementation of the resolution of November 29 by use of United Nations forces.

TRUSTEESHIP SUPPORT LACKING

(6) The fair and equitable character of the United States suggestion, that a temporary trusteeship be established without prejudice to the rights, claims, and interests of the parties or the character of the eventual political settlement has commended itself to many members of the committee.

(7) It is clear, however, that neither Jew nor Arab is willing to make, for a temporary period, the necessary sacrifice of partisan interest to permit a trusteeship to operate effectively.

(8) It is likewise clear that, in the absence of the necessary minimum of agreement between the parties, sufficient armed forces would be essential to any trusteeship plan to preserve internal order and the security and territorial integrity of the country.

(9) The United States offered to participate in contributing its fair share of the forces that might be required for this purpose and approached certain other governments which we felt might have a similar interest-but these governments were not in a position to participate.

(10) Meanwhile, the United Kingdom Government, despite the inability of the United Nations thus far to find a peaceful solution of the problem, will lay down its mandate at midnight Friday, or 6 o'clock tomorrow afternoon, New York time.