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returned to their-I believe it said "original condition," or something on that order. The main idea was to have a moratorium for a year and take a look at this to see if we could find out something.

Do you think that has any relevancy to a Communist inclination? Ambassador AUSTIN. NO.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think that that would be a reasonable thing for a man to do under those circumstances? The letter was written 4 months before the so-called Baruch proposal was made.

Ambassador AUSTIN. I do not think the project was reasonable. I do not agree with it and never did, but a man with the intelligence and initiative of Dr. Jessup will have ideas in a great crisis, and he will have the courage to express them, and it was perfectly like him to express these ideas, and just because they are different from mine I do not conclude that they indicate communism in his cosmos.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I may say the record shows that shortly before that time, I believe, Mr. Harold Stassen made a proposal-I won't quote the exact words-to the effect that the United Nations Charter might be amended to declare that the manufacture of atomic bombs be a crime against mankind. That happened, I think, in the fall of 1945. This letter of Dr. Jessup's was February 1946. You would not conclude from that that Mr. Stassen had any peculiar affinity for any such cause, would you?

Ambassador AUSTIN. No.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You would not read anything into it so far as a Communist inclination, would you?

Ambassador AUSTIN. No.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Would you still feel that way even though at a later date the Soviet Government itself should recommend the outlawry of the atomic bomb?

Ambassador AUSTIN. Well, now, you are asking a question that would call for, it seems to me, more of a discussion than I feel I should take the time for.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not wish to go into the merits of the discussion; I only desire the coincidence of the view.

Ambassador AUSTIN. That doesn't mean much.
Senator FULBRIGHT. That is all I was after.

Ambassador AUSTIN. They are likely to say things which are in a setting that shows they are phony. There is no reality in them.

RECOGNITION AS OPPOSED TO APPROVAL OF A REGIME

Senator FULBRIGHT. There is one other point that bothered me a good deal. I haven't been abroad recently. In 1948 I went to the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Rome, and the group stopped in Spain. I had never been in Spain before. But this question of recognition and the maintenance of an Embassy in Spain was a very interesting one to our people there, and the point was made then, and of course it has been made often in the Senate, that during that period we had Ambassadors at Russia, in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and why should we not recognize Spain? This question of recognition of a country seems to me a very difficult one and a subtle one to understand. It has been our traditional policy, has it not, that recognition does not connote approval of a regime in any country?

Ambassador AUSTIN. You are absolutely right. It is, of course, a political question that is exclusively in the judgment of the President.

of the United States, he being the Chief Executive, and many, many reasons for recognition may exist and yet the President might find it unpolitical from the interest of the United States and of other countries with whom we hold friendly relations to make the recognition.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I had understood that our traditional policy prior, we will say, to the great interest in these particular hearings, within the last few years, has been that recognition as such was not influenced, nor did it mean that you approved of the particular government in the country at the time. This idea that such recognition indicates approval is a rather recent growth in this country, is it not?

Ambassador AUSTIN. Oh, I do not know. I do not know whether it has existed before or not. But I have not seen evidence that it is very strong now.

Senator FULBRIGHT. If that was in it, it would seem to me we would withdraw recognition of Russia, for example. None of us is very thoroughly in accord with the Russian Government at the moment, I would gather from your own experience.

Ambassador AUSTIN. That is a different question, don't you know? When you withdraw recognition, you may be doing something else. Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not think that is inconsistent with my point, namely, that the question of approval is not the determining factor. If it was we would withdraw. But there are very many considerations in each case that enter into a consideration of whether you grant it or withdraw.

Ambassador AUSTIN. I am sure you will feel satisfied with the opinion which I hold firmly, and that is that recognition or nonrecognition is not proof of our acceptance of a government.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I agree completely. I merely wanted your

own statement.

I say again I apologize for having to leave, but fortunately you have had enough experience in politics to know that sometimes there are such occasions that arise, in spite of the greatest reluctance, when you have to leave.

I thank you.

Ambassador AUSTIN. I hope you have a nice trip.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right, Mr. Ambassador, you may resume.

JESSUP'S SERVICE WITH RESPECT TO INDONESIA

Ambassador AUSTIN. May I proceed?

I think I should tell you next about the Indonesian service of Dr. Jessup. This was a great achievement of the United Nations, bringing about the development of a new country. I had called to my attention the claim of a certain witness before you that the policy of the United States with respect to Indonesia was pro-Communist, and of course that is like a good many of the things that we hear in the country where people differ in opinion. That witness may have that opinion but if he reads the record he will see that it is apparent that were were on the side of freedom and we were opposed to slavery and we were opposed to the overwhelming of the Indonesian people who were striving for independence by the Communist element, and we support them and help them, and Dr. Jessup's service in this connection was a signal service.

I am not going to read to you. You can read just as well as I can, but I am going to call attention to just an extract or two from what he said which shows where he stood, what his beliefs were.

Dr. Jessup represented the United States in the Security Council during the most critical phase of the Indonesian problem. That was in the winter of 1948-49, when the fate of the Nationalist and antiCommunist Republic of Indonesia hung in the balance. By bringing to light the true facts of the situation, by exposing the subversive purposes and tactics of Soviet Russia, and by practicing the most patient and skillfull negotiation, Dr. Jessup steered the Security Council on a course which led to a peaceful solution and the creation of an independent Indonesia able to stand on its own feet.

JESSUP'S SPEECH, JANUARY 11, 1949

This subcommittee will be particularly interested in Dr. Jessup's statement to the Security Council which I am going to submit, marked as the others are, but I would at this point, with your permission, read a short extract. This speech was made on January 11, 1949:

More fundamental, however, than these obstructionist tactics in the Security Council is the fact that the Soviet Union is fundamentally opposed to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and has itself through the Communist Party, which is, of course, its mouthpiece throughout the world, sought to undermine and overthrow this Government. No one doubts that the Communists in Indonesia, like the Communists throughout the world, are responsive to and act in accordance with instructions from Moscow. The Communist revolt against the Government of President Soekarno and Premier Hatta was thus an effort on the part of the Soviet Government to overthrow the Indonesian Republic. Furthermore, when the resumption of hostilities by the Netherlands Government against the Indonesian Republic took place, the official Communist line as printed in the Communist press, instead of deploring this action, openly gloated that this action was a punishment for the Government of President Soekarno and Premier Hatta, who has successfully put down the Communist revolt.

The Communist line, which I again repeat means the line of the Soviet Government, accused that distinguished statesman of the Indonesian Republic, Dr. Hatta, of being a traitor to his country. At the very time when editorials were appearing to this effect in the Communist Party organ in Paris, the Soviet representative in the Council sought to cover up the actual policy of his Government by identifying himself with the Council's endeavors to insure the release of Dr. Hatta and other political prisoners.

These are the facts on the record

remember, this is Dr. Jessup talking

which are known to the world and which reveal that the Soviet Government has no interest in supporting the Government of the Indonesian Republic or of restoring peace to Indonesia. On the contrary, it is following its familiar tactics which it has used in Korea, in Greece, and in Berlin, and again now in Indonesia, which have been described in the speeches of many delegates in the last session of the General Assembly, namely, seeking to overthrow a lawful, democratic government and to undermine its authority.

The Soviet Union does not want an independent Indonesia. It wants an Indonesia under the domination and control of a Communist minority taking its orders from Moscow. Anywhere in the world

remember this

Anywhere in the world when a Communist Government climbs in through the window, independence is kicked out of the door.

One of the most difficult tasks of negotiation in the history of the United Nations was in the disposition of our former Italian colonies.

Under the treaty of peace with Italy-pardon me—————
Senator BREWSTER. Are you leaving Indonesia now?

Ambassador AUSTIN. I am through with the Indonesia subject. Senator BREWSTER. Before you leave that, I wanted to ask a question.

Ambassador AUSTIN. Yes, sir.

BREWSTER-GRAHAM AMENDMENT

Senator BREWSTER. Without deprecating in any way the contribution of Dr. Jessup, which you pointed out, and of the delegates to the United Nations, is it not a fact that in that particular instance the Senate of the United States made a contribution through amendment of the Marshall Plan Aid Act, stipulating that aid would not be extended to any government under that act unless it complied with resolutions of the United Nations?

Ambassador AUSTIN. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. And that was not incorporated in the original act and was put in over some resistance from the executive branch of the Government and rather reluctantly accepted?

Ambassador AUSTIN. No, sir. Not that I know of.

Senator BREWSTER. You are not familiar with what transpired on the floor?

Ambassador AUSTIN. I am not challenging your statement. I am saying I do not know.

Senator BREWSTER. Dr. Graham, who was then a Member of the Senate and greatly interested in this problem, and myself, presented the amendment.

There were 4 or 5 hours of argument on the floor. I do not know whom we could have been arguing with if it were not the representatives of this committee you are addressing who were defending, let us say, the form of the proposal that had been submitted by the State Department.

It was accepted and I'm not certain to what extent it assisted in what you brought to pass, that is the very great agitation of the Government of the Netherlands over the adoption of that. At the time it was very widely heralded, as you know.

We had given them some $400 million the year before and it was a matter of vital importance to them. They were using approximately that amount to put down the insurrection in Indonesia. The possible withdrawal of the aid certainly afforded a very effective instrument for you, Dr. Jessup and the others, in arriving at the independence of Indonesia.

What the fruits of that will be we are still to witness, I presume. I point that out only for the historical record, but not in any way to diminish what Dr. Jessup may or may not have done. I do not charge him with responsibility.

Ambassador AUSTIN. I think it is well to have it there. My loyalty to the Senate of the United States is just as good as it ever was. Perhaps it is a little better.

Senator BREWSTER. We did have 4 or 5 hours' argument at the end of which time the Committee on Foreign Relations, of which I was not a member, accepted the amendment. It did require whatever

persuasion the Senators from Maine and North Carolina were able to exercise in order to bring it about.

Senator SPARKMAN. Would you say then that the Senator from Maine was implementing the work that Ambassador Jessup had done in the United States, or was Ambassador Jessup carrying out the work that the Senator from Maine had started?

Ambassador AUSTIN. I am not going to comment on the work of the Senator from Maine, except to say that I am holding up his arms. Senator SPARKMAN. They were certainly following the same road, were they not?

Ambassador AUSTIN. He is a great Senator and he comes from a great State.

Senator BREWSTER. I was doing it simply in the interest of historical accuracy and having the full picture before us. I quite realize the implications of what the chairman points out. I have not, however, been associated in any way with many others of the intents which have led to some question in this case.

Senator SPARKMAN. The speech with reference to Indonesia will be inserted the same as the other.

Ambassador AUSTIN. I wanted to finish after this fine contribution by my neighbor by saying that I think it is fair to state in this record under oath that I believe the United States initiative in December, led by Dr. Jessup, in 1948, and in January 1949, led directly to the cessation of hostilities which occurred, and to the negotiation of an agreed political settlement.

You will remember, we had that, and the creation of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. That is some achievement and that is not pro-Communist. It has not a mere shadow of communism in it and the steps taken to achieve it meant fighting communism every step of the way.

Senator BREWSTER. It did involve a judgment that the people of Indonesia were ready to establish and maintain their independence. If that judgment is justified by events, and certainly there have been many things to encourage it, it would vindicate the wisdom of the course that we pursued.

Ambassador AUSTIN. Yes, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. There are still powerful influences, of course, operating to try and create confusion there, as well as elsewhere in the world.

Ambassador AUSTIN. That is right. They continue around the whole periphery of Asia.

I want to also put in this record here, which has a paragraph in it. This is a verbatim record of a meeting on Indonesia.

Senator SPARKMAN. That will be done.

(Statements referred to regarding Indonesia appear in the record, as follows:)

STATEMENT BY PHILIP C. JESSUP, SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS, THIRD YEAR, NO. 132, GIVEN DECEMBER 22, 1948

Mr. JESSUP (United States of America): My Government, in association with the Government of Australia, took the initiative in requesting this emergency meeting of the Security Council [S/1128] so that the Council might take prompt and forthright action in dealing with the dangerous situation which has developed in Indonesia.

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