Council when it became apparent that the Dutch were resorting to military action. It was the Soviet Government that prevented the Security Council from acting promptly by insisting that the Council meeting should be deferred for 3 days. Every other member of the Council attended the meeting on December 20 except the two Soviet representatives. The United States also took the initiative in conjunction with the representatives of Colombia and Syria in proposing a resolution to the Security Council to deal with the situation, but the Soviet representative refused to support this resolution. He later tried to cover up this further attempt to prevent the Security Council from acting by introducing a resoluion of his own which he knew could not be adopted by the Council. More fundamental, however, than these obstructionists tactics in the Security Council is the fact that the Soviet Union is fundamentally opposed to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and has itself through the Communist Party, which is, of course, its mouthpiece throughout the world, sought to undermine and overthrow this Government. No one doubts that the Communists in Indonesia like the Communists throughout the world are responsive to and act in accordance with instructions from Moscow. The Communist revolt against the Government of President Soekarno and Premier Hatta was thus an effort on the part of the Soviet Government to overthrow the Indonesian Republic. Furthermore, when the resumption of hostilities by the Netherlands Government against the Indonesian Republic took place, the official Communist line as printed in the Communist press instead of deploring this action, openly gloated that this action was a punishment for the Government of President Soekarno and Premier Hatta who had successfully put down the Communist revolt. The Communist line, which I again repeat means the line of the Soviet Government, accused that distinguished statesman of the Indonesian Republic, Dr. Hatta, of being a traitor to his country. At the very time when editorials were appearing to this effect in the Communist Party organ in Paris, the Soviet representative on the Council sought to cover up the actual policy of his Government by identifying himself with the Council's endeavors to ensure the release of Dr. Hatta and other political prisoners. These are the facts on the record which are known to the world and which reveal that the Soviet Government has no interest in supporting the Government of the Indonesian Republic or of restoring peace to Indonesia. On the contrary, it is following its familiar tactics which it has used in Korea, in Greece and Berlin, and again now in Indonesia, and which have been described in the speeches of many delegates in the last session of the General Assembly, namely, seeking to overthrow a lawful democratie government and to undermine its authority. The Soviet Union does not want an independent Indonesia. It wants an Indonesia under the domination and control of a Communist minority taking its orders from Moscow. Anywhere in the world when a Communist government climbs in through the window, independence is kicked out of the door.

The Government of the United States on the contrary has viewed with admiration the efforts of the Indonesian people both in the Republic and elsewhere to gain their independence and has steadfastly sought to support them. It still takes that position and it is for this reason that it has taken the lead in endeavoring in the Security Council and in the Good Offices Committee to bring about a peaceful adjustment of the difficulties between the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands Government and to establish the United States of Indonesia as one of the fully sovereign and independent peoples of the world.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JESSUP, SECURITY COUNCIL, JANUARY 21, 1949

Mr. President, in my statement at the Council's meeting on January 11, I expressed the views of my Government as to what has happened in Indonesia. It is unnecessary to repeat those views today. In the same statement, I also expressed my Government's view that the time had come for the Council to take appropriate forward-looking action designed to help bring about a just and lasting settlement of the Indonesian dispute. We believe that, although the questions with which the Council is now confronted are incredibly complicated, the Council nevertheless has an obligation to find a balanced and constructive answer to the questions.

With this in mind, we have over the past several days been consulting with various members of the Council in an effort to arrive at a considered, long-term approach to the problem. During the course of these consultations a determined effort has been made to come to grips with each of the essential elements

in the problem before us and, we believe, the consultations have resulted in a fundamentally sound answer to the situation with which the Council is confronted.

We have joined with the representatives of China, Cuba, and Norway in ' working out the text of a draft resolution which represents the considered views of all of us as to the most effective and productive way of dealing with the present situation in Indonesia.

Each sponsoring delegation will of course state its own point of view. For our part, I would like at this point, Mr. President, to elaborate on what we consider the major premises on which this draft resolution is based, for, we believe, it is only on these premises that a real solution can be found.

In the first place, we are convinced that there is no question but that the Council must continue to concern itself with the Indonesian question. We agree with the recent statement of the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom that in the light of recent events we now have a situation in which the Security Council feels compelled to make recommendations. As matters stand, I think the majority of the members of the Council will agree that we have an obligation to continue our efforts to assist in arriving at a solution as a whole. The time has passed for a piecemeal approach.

A second basic premise of ours is that there were and are two parties before us. Discussions concerning the legal inequality in their status have not at any point prevented the Council from dealing with them as parties. The fact that they both in good faith signed an agreement under the auspices of our own agency is sufficient, aside from any other consideration, to establish both as parties with interests with which we have and can legitimately concern ourselves as we have done hitherto.

As we understand the factual situation at the moment, however, it is necessary that the Council seek to reestablish the position of one of the parties to a point where it can resume bona fide negotiations with the other. Naturally, the Council could not accept a contention that the Government of the Republic is, in its present situation, able to enter upon negotiations in any real sense of the word. Clearly it must be enabled freely to negotiate with the Netherlands and thus have a voice in the discussions of the future of Indonesia.

In the third place, we do not believe the Council can put its seal of approval on the results of the recent military action. We all know that the Dutch troops will have to be withdrawn if the ultimate goal of creating a sovereign United States of Indonesia is to be achieved. We do not understand that the Netherlands Government has any intention or desire to maintain its troops in occupation indefinitely. The problem before us it not whether the troops should be withdrawn; the real problem is the method and timing of withdrawal worked out in such a way as not to create other and perhaps even greater difficulties.

In solving a problem of this nature we all of us recognize that there are local conditions which must be taken into account. Practical matters such as the maintenance of order, the supply and delivery of food and other everyday necessities are vital to the success of an operation of this character. For example, as the records of the Committee of Good Offices will show, the problems of providing for the well-being of local populations require long and tedious efforts. The destruction of a single railroad bridge, the burning of a single sugar refinery can mean that the population of a particular area is cut off from vital sources of supply. There may be many communities whose daily supply of rice depends on access to areas from which, for all we know, they are now completely cut off. Where a local population might have to depend on delivery of grain by oxcart, a blown out bridge can lead to the severest deprivation unless such factors are otherwise provided for. We believe the only way they can be provided for is to approach the problem of withdrawal realistically and painstakingly.

If we overlook such factors as these, we are simply not living up to our primary responsibilities. Accordingly, we recognize that these factors must be brought into balance after full consideration of each one of them. This balance is reflected in the preamble of our draft resolution. In the operating clauses, we have directed the Commission to take them all into account before recommending to the parties the circumstances under which a withdrawal should take place. The Council itself, if its authority is invoked in the matter, should also take these considerations into account.

We all recognize, Mr. President, that we have placed a heavy burden on the Commission in our draft resolution. We have not, on the other hand, sought to give it any power which the Council cannot delegate. In the final analysis, the responsibility rests with the Council. We are convinced, however, that it is 89965-51-24

necessary to give our agency on the spot sufficient authority in the first instance to enable it to meet the new situation there.

In the fourth place, we consider that the negotiations should be assisted by an agency of this Council. Both parties have heretofore accepted such assistance; we assume they will continue to accept it. We believe, however, that 18 months' experience has shown that a goal must be set for the consummation of negotiations; a protraction of them will not serve the interests of either party. As the reports of the Committee of Good Offices will show, most of the basic issues have already been thoroughly explored. In some matters, there have been large areas of agreement. It now remains to bridge the gap between these areas and we believe that with the assistance of the Commission, as described in the draft resolution, the gap can be bridged.

The parties have been negotiating, intermittently, over a period of 3 years. They have not yet arrived at an agreement on the political issues between them. It is clear to all of us, however, that it is only through negotiation of these political issues that there can be a just and durable settlement of the Indonesian question. Fortunately, the negotiations which have taken place so far have produced some measure of agreement on the really fundamental issues. There are certain basic principles which have been incorporated in the Linggadjatti and the Renville agreements which undoubtedly will form a part of any final settlement. Both of these instruments, for example, contemplate the creation and establishment of a federal, sovereign and independent United States of Indonesia. Both contemplate the inclusion of the Republic as a state within the United States of Indonesia. Both contemplate a union in which the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia will be equal partners.

In addition to the measure of agreement reached in these instruments, the parties have also explored, as the reports of the Committee of Good Offices indicate, a considerable number of important issues regarding the interim period between the present and the transfer of sovereignty. We believe that future negotiations should take advantage of the fact that much ground has already been covered and we have sought to reflect this in our joint draft.

[The following paragraph was underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:]

Finally, I think we all realize that it is essential to any workable settlement in Indonesia that it be the result of agreement of those concerned; we do not believe a political settlement should or could be successfully imposed by one of the parties or, for that matter, through outside intervention. We consider that not only must a final settlement be negotiated, but that, since a final settlement will necessarily affect the future of Indonesia as a whole, the negotiations must take into account the interests of all parts of Indonesia. For this reason, we believe the representatives of non-Republican parts of Indoseia should have an opportunity to participate in the negotiations.

The draft resolution as a whole is an effort to assist a settlement first by seeking to establish the conditions under which free and bona fide negotiations can take place; secondly by allowing all concerned to reach whatever freely negotiated settlement they wish; thirdly by preserving certain basic points of agreement already reached and, fourthly, by making certain provisions against the possibility of an impasse. Finally, the resolution provides a time schedule which, we believe, corresponds in all essentials to the achievement of the goals which both parties have again and again declared they desire to achieve.

We believe, Mr. President, that this joint resolution meets the various elements in the problem before us which the majority of the members of the Council consider must be dealt with. We realize that there are some who would like to see some elements dealt with in more detail, others would like to see them dealt with less elaborately. The tabling of this draft resolution moves the discussions in the Council on to the stage of concrete examination of a text. A full exchange of views on the text should lead to a complete understanding of its intent. If other suggestions are made, my delegation will study them carefully and be prepared to exchange views in regard to them. We also reserve our right to discuss particular provisions of the draft resolution which has now been tabled if questions are raised regarding them.

We hope that the approach made in the joint drafting of this resolution will be recognized by all concerned as an earnest and conscientious attempt to help reach a solution in Indonesia. We hope also that when the Council expresses its view through the adoption of a resolution, it will command the full support and cooperation of both parties without which this or any other attempt could not succeed.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR AUSTIN BEFORE SECURITY COUNCIL, MARCH 10, 1949 I should like to state that the United States Government continues to believe that the Security Council's resolution of January 28 represents a sound and practical basis for a just and lasting solution of the Indonesian question, and we continue to support it fully.

Five weeks have passed since the Council adopted this resolution. During those 5 weeks, it must be admitted, little progress has been made in the implementation of the provisions of the Council's resolution. There has been neither actual nor complete cessation of hostilities in Indonesia, and active warfare, both guerrilla and on a more generally organized basis, is continuing to a variable extent in different areas. This has been reported to us by the United Nations Commission's Military Executive Board in the Commission's report of March 1.

It is true that the Netherlands has decided to lift the restrictions on the freedom of movement of the leaders of the Republic of Indonesia and that the Netherlands has stated that the lifting of these restrictions is not dependent on the Republcan leaders' participation in the proposed conference at The Hague. We have yet to see, however, the practical results of this decision, and as far as is known at this time, the leaders of the Republic are still in residence at Bangka and Prapat. It is said in the Netherlands' memorandum III contained in appendix E of the Commission's report of March 1 that the Republican leaders will be subject to the same restrictions in force for everybody, or, in other words, that they will be permitted the same freedom other civilians enjoy in the areas under Dutch control. It does not appear, however, that they are free to visit their own territory under Republican control or to have contact with their adherents in these areas. It is apparent that the Dutch have not offered the unconditional freedom which was contemplated in the Council's resolution.

Furthermore, the Netherlands has indicated it is not prepared to restore the Government of the Republic to its capital at Jogjakarta as provided in the Council's resolution of January 28.

We are unable to understand the attitude of the Government of the Netherlands on this question, for two reasons: One, the provisions of the Security Council resolution in this respect are intrinsically sound and reasonable. Two, the proposed accelerated transfer of sovereignty would transfer to the Republic the power to restore the capital at Jogjakarta.

What were the reasons which led the Security Council to order the restoration of the Government of the Republic to its former seat of authority? My Government believed at the time of the adoption of the resolution, and continues to believe now, that military action cannot be permitted to eliminate one of the parties before the Council. We continue to believe that until the Republican Government can resume governmental responsibilities at Jogjakarta it cannot be expected to assume the responsibilities which negotiation for just and lasting political settlement entail. For the Republican leaders to take part in any negotiations which are meaningful, they must have the opportunity to assemble as a government in its own territory, to reestablish its contacts with members of the government dispersed by the military action, and to be able to represent accurately the wishes of its political adherents.

This is a question not of form, but of substance. We have always understood, as has the Netherlands, that any agreement for the settlement of the political future of Indonesia would have to be reached with the Government of the Republic. The Linggadjati and Renville agreements amply bear out this point. I am glad to note that the Netherlands has confirmed its point of view in this respect in connection with the proposed conference at The Hague. There would be little of permanent value in any plan which fails to take this central fact into account. In order to negotiate an agreement with the Government of the Republic, there must be responsible heads of an organized Republican Government with whom to deal. An agreement resulting from negotiations undertaken without reference to these requirements seems necessarily doomed to failure.

For these reasons it was apparent to my Government, and I believe to the majority of the members of this Council, when we were considering this matter in January, that a necessary first step in the solution of the Indonesian question was the reestablishment of the Republican Government at Jogjakarta.

Unfortunately, this provision of the January 28 resolution has not been carried out. As the Commission has reported, "The Netherlands Government has not complied with the basic prerequisites of further action under the resolution. The basic factor in the present political deadlock in Indonesia is the refusal of

the Netherlands Government to permit the reestablishment of the Republican Government at Jogjakarta."

In memorandum No. II submitted by the Netherlands to the Commission, the Netherlands maintains that to allow the return of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta would be tantamount to barring in advance the possibility of achieving a speedy transfer of sovereignty as envisaged by the Netherlands because, with the Republic Government restored to Jogjakarta, the maintenance of law and order by the Netherlands will be impossible. This seems to us a very extreme position. I believe that the records of the Good Offices Committee during the past year indicate that unstable conditions in Indonesia were not the result of the Republican Government's existence in Jogjakarta but were directly attributable to the failure of the negotiations for a political settlement to produce any concrete results.

The extensive guerrilla warfare now being carried on in Indonesia is the direct consequence of the Netherlands' abandoning negotiations in favor of military action. Is it entirely consistent, moreover, to propose as the Netherlands proposes, a transfer of sovereignty 3 or 4 months hence to an Indonesian Government which will include the Republic as a member state while at the same time maintaining that immediate restoration of the Republic in the limited area of Jogjakarta would result in chaos? It seems to my Government that if Indonesia is to receive early independence as envisaged by the Netherlands plan, a beginning must be made now with the reestablishment of the Republic.

*

Since the Security Council last considered this matter, the Netherlands Government has made a new proposal that a round-table conference be held at The Hague, the purpose of which "will be to discuss the conditions for and the ways along which the earliest possible transfer of sovereignty could be effectuated, the simultaneous establishment of the Netherlands Indonesian Union and the arrangements for the intermediary period, including the creation of a federal interim government, these provisions being considered in their relation to the accelerated transfer of sovereignty." The Netherlands has issued invitations to the President of the Republic, to other non-Republican Indonesian leaders and to the Security Council Commission for Indonesia to attend this Conference.

We have received some information on the Netherlands proposal from our Commission in its report of March 1, and also in a letter to the President of the Security Council from the Dutch representative dated March 2 (S/1274). This proposal is in general terms and is regarded by our Commission as a counterproposal or substitute for the provisions of the January 28 resolution. Our Commission has asked us for instructions as to what its position should be toward the invitation which has been extended to it.

We are also informed by the supplemental report of the Commission that the president of the Republic, Mr. Soekarno, has indicated to the Netherlands that he is not at present in a position to accept the invitation. He has, however, indicated that he could agree in principle with the purpose of such a conference and that if certain conditions precedent were fulfilled his Government might be prepared to send a delegation. The principal conditional is the restoration of the Republican Government of Jogjakarta in accordance with the provisions of the Security Council resolution. There is an indication in the second appendix to the Commission's supplemental report that the non-Republican Indonesian leaders represented in the federal conference are in agreement with the President of the Republic on the necessity of the restoration of the Republican Government at Jogjakarta in accordance with our resolution. So far as our information is concerned, these other Indonesians have not yet accepted the Dutch proposal.

The second condition_precedent to the acceptance of the Republican Government to attend the conference at The Hague is that the position of the United Nations Commission, as provided in the resolution of January 28, should not be prejudiced thereby. It is our understanding that the Netherlands has invited the participation of the Commission in accordance with the terms of the Council's resolution and there would appear to be no difficulty on this point. [The following paragraph was underlined for emphasis, by Ambassador Austin:]

It would be unfortunate in our view if agreement could not be reached by the parties concerned on the preliminary step of restoration of the Government of the Republic of Jogjakarta in accordance with the provisions of the Security Council resolution in order to remove an obstacle to further free negotiations between the parties. If the parties come to such an agreement on