the terms and conditions for holding the proposed conference at The Hague, we believe that negotiations between the parties at such a conference would be consistent with the basic purpose and objectives of the Council's resolution of January 28, which of course would remain in full force and effect. We believe it would be appropriate for the Security Council's Commission to consult with the representatives of the Netherlands, the Government of the Republic, and the leaders of the federal conference and assist them in reaching such agreement. If agreement is reached and the conference is held, our Commission could participate therein in accordance with its terms of reference.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR AUSTIN, PLENARY SESSION ON INDONESIA, DECEMBER 7, 1949

When the Round Table Conference was concluded at The Hague a few weeks ago, my Government expressed its gratification at the agreement which had been achieved there through the wisdom and conciliatory spirit exhibited by the representatives of the Netherlands, the Republic of Indonesia and the Federal Consultative Assembly. All of us know, also, that the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, through its participation in the Round Table Conference, contributed much to its success. The peoples of Indonesia and of the Netherlands-and, indeed, all freedom-loving people everywhere-can rejoice that there has been a peaceful settlement of the Indonesian question. That settlement, incidentally, will continue to be a monument to the high statesmanship of the representatives of the Netherlands and Indonesia. I am confident that the majority of the members of this Assembly are already in agreement that the basic principles for which our Organization stands have been advanced by the determined efforts of all those whose labors were recently concluded at The Hague. [The following paragraph was underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:]

The attack on the settlement of the Indonesian question by the representatives of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian S. S. R. and Poland is not, however, unexpected. They have consistently attacked constructive efforts of the United Nations to solve its problems. The continuation of disputes is essential for the promotion of the Cominform's expansionist ambitions. By the nature of the case, international communism mushrooms in dissension, strife and chaos.

Because the Indonesian leaders, concerned with sparing their people the hardship and debilitation of war, sought the road of peaceful negotiation in their fight for freedom, they are branded traitors. These attacks lay bare the fraudulent efforts of international communism to identify itself with legitimate nationalist independence movements. The legitimate leaders of those movements, however, have not far to look to see that, if they accept the support of international communism in their fight for independence, they merely trade one colonialism for another. No colonial peoples were ever more subjugated than those peoples now under the imperial yoke of the Soviet Union. That a representative of such a regime should say that The Hague agreements deny the Indonesian people self-determination and render them a puppet state is not very convincing. The whole Round Table Conference represents the free expresssion of the self-determination of the Indonesian people.

Although the representative of the Ukrainian S. S. R. argued in committee, and again here this morning, that the members were not competent to adopt the joint resolution because they had not before them the text of the round-table conference agreements, he nevertheless took occasion to pass judgment on those agreements himself. In doing so, he bent his efforts to distort the meaning of the several instruments which are a part of The Hague agreement. Again, this morning, he said that the members of the committee demonstrated complete ignorance of the settlement. But surely he realizes that we know that the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, when it comes into being at the end of this month, will be a sovereign and independent state and will join in a union of voluntary cooperation with the Netherlands. Does he hope, by patently distorting the meaning of The Hague agreements, to confuse the peoples of the Netherlands or of Indonesia? Perhaps so. Fortunately, whatever confusion he may have prompted here cannot be long-lived, for within a very few weeks the agreements themselves will be carried into action.

The draft resolution which the representative of the Ukrainian S. S. R. has reintroduced usurps the Security Council's prerogative and departs from the Indonesian situation of the present time. For the reason that article 12 of the

NOMINATION OF PHILIP C. JESSUP

Charter forbids the General Assembly to make recommendations on issues of which the Security Council is seized unless so requested by the Council, that resolution was not even voted on by the Committee. Since this time last year, hostilities have ceased and agreement has been reached on the timing of the withdrawal of troops. The resolution of the Ukrainian S. S. R. adds nothing to our consideration of the Indonesian question, and we can only conclude that it was submitted solely for propaganda purposes. It was apparently resurrected from drafts which were submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union to the Security Council a year ago and which were rejected by the Council at that time. Nothing in this draft resolution reflects the developments and progress of the past year.

After giving consideration to the opprobrious remarks of Mr. Manuilsky this morning regarding the great leaders of both Dutch and Indonesians. I am more confident than before that the majority of the members of the United Nations will accord the settlement reached at The Hague their fullest support. It is a settlement to which the United Nations may look with a good deal of hope. After 27 months of effort, agreement has been reached on a Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty, on a Union Statute, and on certain interim arrangements. Although we are aware that much remains to be done and that these agreements are yet to be implemented, we can confidently look forward to the coming into being, before this month is out, of a fully free, sovereign, and independent Indonesia. When it does, the members of this Organization can rejoice that the peaceful methods enjoined upon us by the Charter have prevailed over force.

My Government believes that the joint resolution sponsored by 14 delegations and adopted by the Committee is a fitting expression of approbation of the accomplishments of the round-table conference. We earnestly hope that it will receive the support of an impressive majority of the General Assembly. By such majorities, confidence in the effect of such settlements would be inspired.

INDONESIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE U. N.

Senator SPARKMAN. May it be noted that Indonesia became the sixtieth member of the United Nations.

Ambassador AUSTIN. Thank you, sir. That is true.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, you want to proceed to the Italian colonies?

Ambassador AUSTIN. All right.

Senator SPARKMAN. As I understand, Ambassador Jessup handled that in the General Assembly; is that correct?

Ambassador AUSTIN. Yes: I think his arguments appeared in an ad hoc political committee. Was the Chairman a member of that committee?

Senator SPARKMAN. I handled some specific matters in that committee.

No; I was a member of the Committee No. 2. I think Senator Dulles represented us usually in the ad hoc political committee, but you will remember various members of the delegation handled specific subjects in that committee.

I believe the Senator from Maine would be interested in this. It was my privilege to handle the Spanish matter in the ad hoc political committee.

SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD INDONESIAN QUESTION

Senator BREWSTER. Before we leave Indonesia, do you recall what the attitude of the Soviet Government was on the issue as between the independence of Indonesia as against the continued colonial relationship with the Netherlands? Were there votes or other places where that was developed?

Ambassador AUSTIN. I can only say this, that I believe they followed a course which they had been following in all these cases where there was a chance to charge the United States with helping to maintain the old archaic policy of colonialism, and that they used this as a medium for argument; that it was the United States who was to blame for the whole business.

Senator BREWSTER. So that in general it very well may have been true that they would have supported the independence of Indonesia from the Netherlands, and that that might well have been a parallel line with the attitude of the Ambassador, Mr. Austin, and of Mr. Jessup, as well as of myself and many others, that we were all on parallel lines.

Ambassador AUSTIN. If so, it would have been. You see, that is one of the infirmities of our international relations that has its roots in years and years of relations.

Up to this time we have been unable in the United Nations to establish a feeling of confidence on the part of the Soviet Union that we are in good faith. They charge us with imperialism in Asia, Indonesia, and all of that great area in which they have their puppet troops all garrisoned against Japan and Hong Kong, Indochina, Malaya, and all around. All the time that they are shouting "peace" they are making these accusations. That is what they did.

There was a duplicity in it, do you not see, which resulted, I believe, in their abstention-not voting for it, but abstaining and allowing it to go, do you not see.

Frequently, this double play results in abstention.

Senator SPARKMAN. I believe it is fair to say, of course, that in connection with the statement you made there, that the very people whom the Soviets were attacking were the people we were supporting. Ambassador AUSTIN. Oh, yes. Oh, yes; and those brave Indonesians really won their own battle there through force, against the Communist attacks. It is a great credit to them.

FORMER ITALIAN COLONIES

Now, shall I go on with the Italian colonies point?

One of the most difficult tasks of negotiations in the history of the United Nations was the disposition of the former Italian colonies. Under the Treaty of Peace with Italy, this problem came before the General Assembly for settlement. It was Dr. Jessup's assignment to represent the United States on this question in 1949. Through weeks of tedious harangue and elaborate maneuver by the Soviet delegation, Dr. Jessup created and held together a coalition of antiCommunist United Nations members determined to reach a just and lasting settlement for the colonies. His exposure of the Soviet imperialism, or new colonialism was successful in frustrating the Soviet Union's intended sabotage.

Instead of a Libya controlled by Soviet Russia, there is now emerging an independent Libyan state which soon will take its place in the community of free nations.

Dr. Jessup again spoke for the United States at the 1949 Assembly session on the question of Soviet violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of

control even under the Renville truce agreement, cannot be regarded as being in conformity with the Council's resolutions of December 24 and 28. The clear intent of these resolutions was that the high officials of the Republican Government should be restored to a position in which they would be free to exercise their governmental authority. The minimum which would seem to be called for at this moment is that the President and other interned officers of the Republic should be allowed to return to their capitol and to exercise their appropriate functions there free from the constraint of any occupying army. They should be free to establish and maintain contact with other officials of their Government. They should also be free to provide their own forces for maintenance of law and order in Jogjakarta.

Further, my Government in considering the Netherlands-Indonesian dispute cannot but recall a history of noncooperation on the part of the Netherlands in the work of the Good Offices Committee in Indonesia.

The failure to achieve a political settlement and the protracted negotiations which followed the signing of the Renville agreement in January 1948 brought about in Indonesia an increased tension between the Netherlands and the Republic with a consequent increase in provocative incidents which sorely strained the truce. The bill of particulars for these actions has, over a period of months, been reported by the GOC to the Council. From these reports it appears that even prior to the resumption of military action against the Republic, the Netherlands pursued a policy which had the effect of weakening the Republic; working unnecessary hardship on the population; isolating the Republican Government economically and politically, and presenting it with a prefabricated interim administration for Indonesia with which it was to associate itself but which it had no part in forming. My Government considers these actions and the Netherlands failure to enter into bona fide negotiations since May of last year to be indicative of a reluctance to utilize the procedure for pacific settlement made available by the United Nations, and to be in conflict with both the spirit and letter of the Linggadjati and Renville agreements.

[The following paragraph was underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:] From a purely pragmatic point of view it should be pointed out that the quick military successes of the Netherlands forces will not effect a solution of the Indonesian problem. The United States Government cannot associate itself with any aspect of the Netherlands military action. The use of force in this situation makes the solution of the problem far more complex and difficult. The problem remains a matter of international concern with which the Security Council must continue to deal. It cannot be solved if we begin on the basis of acceptance of the fruits of the illegal use of force.

The Republic of Indonesia represents the largest single political factor in the projected federation and should therefore have a voice in the formation of the federation. The Republic has a twofold nature. Firstly, it is a political entity and, secondly, it is the heart of Indonesian nationalism. This latter attribute cannot be eliminated by any amount of military force. The Netherlands Government may find that far from assuring law and order in the Indies the action they have embarked upon may instead let loose forces of terror, chaos, and sabotage. It may well be that the only victory will be that of the forces of anarchy.

My Government is of the opinion that real peace in Indonesia can be expected only if there is a settlement of the political issues on the basis of the principles and procedures agreed to by the parties in the Linggadjati and Renville agreements and under the auspices of United Nations machinery.

The responsibility for the future rests in the first instance on the Netherlands authorities. The Security Council has a right to assume that the Netherlands Government will in accordance with its obligations bring to an end its defiance of the Security Council and give its full cooperation toward a fair and reasonable solution of the Indonesian question.

My Government has over a substantial period of time devoted serious thought to the problem and to its proper solution. Our views are contained in the plan which our representative on the Good Offices Committee submitted to the two parties on September 10 of last year and which was accepted by both of them as a basis for the resumption of negotiations. If Indonesian leaders were restored to their rightful position as the responsible representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, free to conduct the affairs of their Government and to negotiate freely with the Netherlands Government concerning the future of Indonesia, and if these two Governments could proceed to negotiate on the basis of this proposal in accordance with their earlier undertakings this would be a notable contribution to the ultimate solution of the Indonesian problem.

A first and fundamental step in this direction should be the fixing of a definite date for the holding of elections throughout all Indonesia with a view to establishing the foundations of the United States of Indonesia. Secondly, and also of fundamental importance, is the fixing of a firm date of the transfer of sovereignty from the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia. The elections should be for the purpose of choosing an assembly to represent the people of Indonesia as a provisional legislature and at the same time as a constituent assembly for the purpose of drawing up a constitution. The elections should be held by secret ballot with all the safeguards necessary to insure a vote free from any coercion. Freedom of assembly, speech, and publication must be guaranteed as provided in the Renville agreement. This program contemplates a termination of the type of military occupation of the country which has been brought about by Dutch military action. The withdrawal of the Dutch armies should commence at the earliest possible date and as rapidly as the need for the preservation of law and order permit. The occupation must be completely terminated before an effective transfer of sovereignty could take place.

My Government believes that the length of time which should elapse between the present and the date when elections should take place, and also the date of transfer of sovereignty, should be calculated in terms of months and not in terms of years. As soon as elections have been held and a provisional regime set up, authority should be turned over progressively to the new regime by the Netherlands Government, and the transfer should have been completed by the time when sovereignty is assumed by the United States of Indonesia.

As I have stated earlier, the problem of Indonesia remains a matter of international concern with which the Security Council must continue to deal. The carrying out of the steps necessary for the ultimate transfer of the sovereignty of the United States of Indonesia should, we believe, be accomplished under the auspices of the United Nations and with the help of the machinery it affords. The Good Offices Committee in its report of January 7 has appropriately pointed out that it does not wish to be put in a position of seeming to approve by its participation or even its authentication any settlement based on force rather than on true negotiation. The Good Offices Committee was created at the outset as an instrument to further free negotiations between the parties. The Dutch action has temporarily suspended the committee's ability to carry out that function. But the Council's agencies in the field remain in existence ready to carry out any task assigned to them by the Security Council. No temporary suspension of the functioning of an agency of the Security Council can operate to remove an established interest of the United Nations in dealing with a situation to which the Security Council has already addressed itself. In this connection it is necessary to call attention to the report of the Good Offices Committee which indicates that the Netherlands authorities took upon themselves the authority to question whether the military observers were reporting to the Consular Commission or the Good Offices Committee. This is not a question which concerns the Netherlands authorities. The Security Council can utilize any agency which it considers appropriate, and it is the obligation of a member of the United Nations to cooperate with any and all agencies operating under Security Council instructions.

It cannot be denied that despite the efforts of some governments of states which are members of the Security Council, this body has not yet succeeded in overcoming the obstacles which have been placed in the path of achieving a peaceful settlement in Indonesia. The responsibility of the Netherlands Government for this lack of success has already been made clear. Another obstacle has been created by the action of a member of the United Nations which has in many parts of the world sought to obstruct the successful operation of the United Nation. I refer to the Soviet Union.

[The two following paragraphs were underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:]

When this question of Indonesia was being discussed in the Security Council in Paris, the Soviet Union speaking both through its own representative and through the Ukrainian representative followed its familiar procedure of endeavoring to cloak its own improper actions by seeking to place the blame on someone else. The representative of the Soviet Union and the representative of the Ukraine both insinuated that the Government of the United States was in same way responsible for the action of the Netherlands in resorting to hostilities against the Indonesian Republic. It thus becomes necessary to point out again certain salient facts. In the first place, it was the Government of the United States which took the initiative in convening an urgent meeting of the Security