(The file referred to appears in the record, as follows:) 407 EXCERPT FROM PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO CONGRESS, 1948, ON UNITED STATES The Governments of France, the United States, and the United Kingdom on September 29, 1948, drew the attention of the Security Council to the situation which has arisen as the result of the unilateral imposition by the Soviet Government of restrictions on transport and communications between the Western zones of occupation in Germany and Berlin. This case is one of the most serious yet considered by the Security Council. At the end of the year, efforts of the Council were still continuing but had not brought about a solution. Detailed accounts of the imposition of the Soviet blockade of Berlin and of the fruitless efforts of the Western Powers, carried on over several months, to secure its removal through direct negotiations have been presented to the Security Council by the United States Representative and published separately by the Department of State. Accordingly, these events need not be summarized in this report. In their letter of September 29 to the Secretary-General, the three Governments stated that the Soviet restrictions on transport and communications were contrary to obligations of the U. S. S. R. under article 2 of the Charter and created a threat to the peace within the meaning of chapter VII of the Charter. They made clear that, as required by article 33 of the Charter, they had sought a solution of the problem by pacific means of their own choice, i. e. by their numerous requests for interviews with Soviet leaders and the fruitless negotiations in Moscow and Berlin. Inclusion in Council Agenda At the Council's first meeting on the matter on October 4, 1948, the Soviet Representative, Mr. Vyshinsky, opposed inclusion of the item in the agenda on the ground that the matter was placed beyond the Council's competence by article 107 of the Charter. This article reads: "Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action." He contended that a series of treaties and other international decisions had placed the responsibility for the occupation of Germany in the hands of the Four Powers and that, accordingly, it was not "legal or acceptable to transmit to the Security Council for its consideration any question relevant to the question of Germany, and that includes Berlin." This was accompanied by the usual charges that the Western Powers had violated international agreements. ly, he denied that any blockade existed. Final The United States Representative, Dr. Jessup, pointed out that in effect the U. S. S. R. was repudiating the use of the only international machinery in existence to remove a threat to the peace. As to the technical question of competence, he pointed out that article 107 was not designed to prevent any disputes among the victorious powers from coming to the Security Council but to prevent interference by the former enemy states in action taken by the victorious powers within the agreed realm of their responsibility: *** * * In other words, article 107 while precluding appeals to United Nations organs by defeated enemy states concerning action taken against them during the period of military occupation by the responsible allied powers, does not prevent one of the allied powers from bringing its differences with other allied powers to the attention of United Nations organs for consideration according to the provisions of Chapter IV, VI or VII of the Charter; much less would it preclude consideration by the Security Council of action by a Member of the United Nations constituting a threat to the peace." The other non-Soviet members expressed agreement with this position. After the discussion had ranged widely over the merits of the case, the Council finally on October 5 voted 9 to 2 to include the matter in the agenda. After the vote Mr. Vyshinsky declared that since in his Government's opinion the Consideration of the problem by the Council constituted a violation of article 107 of the Charter, he would not participate in the proceedings. The Representative of the Ukraine made a similar statement. 3 The Berlin Crisis: A Report on the Moscow Discussions, 1948. publication 3298. Department of State Council Consideration of Case [The following paragraph was underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin.] In two meetings on October 6 the United States, the United Kingdom, and France presented their case in detail. Dr. Jessup recalled the laborious and fruitless efforts of the three Governments to secure through negotiation the removal of the blockade and made clear their continued readiness to negotiate, provided the Soviet efforts at coercion through the blockade were dropped. He branded the blockade as a threat to the peace under article 39 of the Charter. "A threat to the peace," he said, "is created when a State uses force or the threat of force to secure compliance with its demands." He then explained in detail that * ** * "Firstly * * the United States is in Berlin as of right; secondly * * the right to be in Berlin includes the right of access and responsibility for the maintenance of the population there; thirdly the Soviet Goverrnment fully acknowledged these rights and responsibilities through speccific agreements and through practice over the course of nearly three years; fourthly * * * the Soviet Government on one flimsy pretext after another has sought in violation of its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to coerce the United States and France and the United Kingdom into abandoning Berlin and their rights and responsibilities in that city The salient feature of the case before the Security Council is that the Soviet blockade is still maintained and thus continues in existence the threat to the peace which it created." Dr. Jessup pointed out that "the fact that this matter comes before the Council under Chapter VII of the Charter does not mean that the Council is precluded from using any of the machinery of pacific settlement suggested in any part of the Charter. * * ** The Security Council has the greatest flexibility of action." The three powers did not come to the Council, he said, with any cutand-dried formula for a solution. Although they had reserved to themselves full rights to take such measures as may be necessary to maintain in these circumstances their position in Berlin, they had not made a restricted or qualified submittal of the case to the council. The reservation expressed simply the determination to take such measures as might be necessary to insure the safety and subsistence of our forces in Berlin and of the population committed to their charge by Four Power agreement, pending Security Council action. He stated that one such measure is the Allied airlift and that any such measures would be in conformity with the Charter. The United States hoped that the Security Council could assist in removing the threat to the peace and would be ready the moment the blockade was lifted to participate in a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss with the U. S. S. R. any questions relating to Germany. [The two following paragraphs were underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:] After the Representatives of the United Kingdom and France had made similar presentations, the President adjourned the Council subject to further call by him. The members of the Council that were not directly involved in the dispute Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, and Syria-then began exploratory talks under the leadership of the President, Mr. Bramuglia, to gather information about the points of view of the parties and to clarify the issues. At a Security Council meeting on October 15 the six members reported on these talks and the President put two broad questions to the parties. suggesting that the answers might be given at a subsequent Council meeting. the first question, the parties were asked to explain in detail the circumstances of the imposition of restrictions upon transport, communications, and trade and the current status of these restrictions. The second question concerned the circumstances of the joint directive of August 30, 1948, addressed by the Four Powers to their military governors in Berlin and the detailed reasons for the failure of the military governors to reach agreement on the basis of it. In The Representatives of the three Western Powers indicated at once their readiness to give this information. Mr. Vyshinsky, the Soviet Representative, recalled his previous declaration that he would not participate, and said that— the very raising of these two questions here was dictated by nothing but a desire to drag the U. S. S. R. Delegation into a discussion of the Berlin question. * It is naive to believe that the U. S. S. R. Delegation will stick to this glue which has been spread over the piece of paper which is now called the Berlin question. The U. S. S. R. Delegation will not submit any material to the Security Council." [The four following paragraphs were underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:] At the following meeting the Representatives of the three Western Powers gave their responses to the questions. In view of the full presentation of the facts which they had previously made, they needed only to provide added details. The neutral group, after further discussions among themselves and with the parties, developed a draft resolution which was transmitted to the representatives of the parties. At the Council meeting on October 22 the six members presented the resolution. It called upon the Four Powers first to prevent any incident which would be of a nature to aggravate the situation in Berlin. Secondly, it called on them to put into effect simultaneously on the day of notification of the resolution to the four Governments (a) immediate removal by all parties of all restrictions on communications, transport, and commerce between Berlin and the Western zones and the restrictions on commerce to and from the Soviet zone and (b) an immediate meeting of the four military governors to arrange for the unification of currency in Berlin on the basis of the Soviet mark. The four military governors were to fix the conditions for the introduction, circulation, and continued use of the Soviet mark as sole currency for the whole of Berlin and to arrange for the withdrawal of Western mark "B". All these currency measures were to be in accordance with the terms and conditions defined in the joint directive of August 30, 1948, addressed by the Four Powers to their military governors in Berlin and to be carried out under the control of the Quadripartite Financial Commission. The currency change-over under the terms thus fixed, was to be completed by November 20, 1948. Finally, the draft resolution called upon the four Governments, within 10 days after the completion of all the above measures, or on such date as might be mutually agreed upon by them, to reopen negotiations in the Council of Foreign Ministers on all outstanding problems concerning Germany as a whole. After statements by the six representatives, the Council adjourned to give the parties an opportunity to study the draft resolution. On October 25, when the Council again took up the Berlin case, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States accepted the resolution as a fair compromise. Although it contained no express recognition that the Soviet blockade measures constituted a threat to the peace, it called for their immediate removal, concurrent with the beginning of negotiations looking toward the currency change-over. It thus would have removed the factor of coercion from these negotiations. However, Mr. Vyshinsky declared the intention of the Soviet Union to prevent adoption of the resolution by exercise of its veto right. He pointed out that the resolution did not provide "simultaneity" in the removal of the blockade and the currency change-over and argued that the resolution therefore "violated" the directive of August 30. The Soviet Union thus demanded that the Council treat the blockade as a legitimate measure, the withdrawal of which would be balanced against the currency concession to be made by the Western Powers, and thus assist the U. S. S. R. in achieving its objective through coercive methods. The United States Representative then pointed out that the responsibility for the failure of the Council's efforts rested "squarely and unavoidably" on the Government of the U. S. S. R.: * We must", he said, "now ask, 'What does the Soviet Union want?' "Does it want a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to discuss Berlin or questions of Germany as a whole? The Soviet Government can have such a meeting without the threat to peace. We have told them that before. We repeat that promise. We have indicated our acceptance of the principle in our approval of the draft resolution. * * * "Does the Soviet Union want the Soviet zone mark to be established as the sole currency of Berlin under Four Power control, as Premier Stalin himself suggested? They can have that without maintaining the blockade. We have told them so before and we tell them so again. "Does the Soviet Union want assurances that we do not want to use Four Power control of the currency in Berlin to damage or to control the general economy of the Soviet zone outside of Berlin? They can have such assurances without threat or violence. We have made that clear already. We make it clear again. "Does the Soviet Union want guaranties to prevent the use of transport facilties for black-market operations in currency in Berlin? They can have such guaranties without resorting to duress. Again, it is a matter which we have told them before we would do, and we are ready to say so again. 89965-51- -27 "The United States has never intended to use currency as a means of adversly affecting the economy of the Soviet zone. * Berlin * * * * * * peace. if on the other hand the Soviet Union wants to drive us out of that result they cannot get by maintaining their threat to If the Soviet Union wants us to work out technical details of the first four questions I put, under duress of maintenance of blockade measures, instead of through the process of free negotiation, again the answer to that question is 'No'. In short the Soviet Government can get all it says that it wants without maintaining the blockade. With the blockade it can get neither what it says it wants nor what its actions seem to suggest it actually does want. It is the blockade which is the barrier and it is the Soviet Union which can lift the blockade. 66 * * * * even now in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union has seen fit to indicate that it intends to block the efforts of the Security Council * the Berlin question can be settled on the basis of the program suggested in the draft resolution * * ** The three Western Governments have indicated their acceptance of the principles contained in that resoultion. If the Government of the Soviet Union would give reciprocal assurances * it can be done." * [The four following paragraphs were underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin.] The vote on the resolution was 9 to 2, only the Soviet Union and the Ukraine casting adverse votes. The U. S. S. R. vote prevented adoption of the resolution. Efforts Outside Council Three days after the veto, on October 28, 1948, the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States met and issued a communiqué stating that they stood by their expressed willingness to be guided by the pr ne pl`s of the draft resolution; that the matter was still on the agenda of the Security Council; that the Council was in a position to consider any development in the situation; and that as members of the Council they would continue to discharge their responsibilities. Two days later the Soviet point of view was sharply stated by Premier Stalin in a press interview. Attributing the efforts made by the non-Soviet members of the Security Council to "reactionary circles" and "warmongers" in the Western countries, chiefly the United States, he charged that two "agreements" to settle the case had been breached. One of these was the August 30 directive. Actually it is of course clear that the understandings leading to the August 30 directive were subject to agreement being reached by the military governors in Berlin. Because of Soviet repudiation of these understandings the military governors failed to reach agreement by the date set. Although the reference to the second "agreement" was never explained by the U. S. S. R., it seems to have been an unfounded allegation that the six neutral representatives and the Western representatives had suddenly reversed themselves and agreed outside the Council to the Soviet demand for "simultaneity." In addition to the continuing efforts of the neutral group in the Security Council, Secretary-General Lie and Mr. Evatt, President of the General Assembly, sought to further a settlement. Early in November the Secretary-General announced that the Secretariat was studying the Berlin currency problem. On November 3 the General Assembly adopted a resolution proposed by Mexico, appealing to the great powers to renew their efforts to compose their differences and establish a lasting peace. Ten days later, Mr. Evatt and Mr. Lie sent a joint communication to the heads of the delegations of France, the U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, and the United States referring to this appeal and urging that the four Governments should hold conversations and take any steps necessary to reach a solution of the Berlin problem. They asked that the four Governments lend active support to the mediation efforts of the President of the Council and, as far as they themselves were concerned, offered to lend any further assistance that might be most useful. The U. S. S. R. reply stated the earlier Soviet position, that the August 30 directive should be accepted as an agreement and that a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers should be held to consider the problems of Berlin and of Germany as a whole. The Western Powers replied on November 17, stating that they were still ready to take part in the efforts of the Security Council to solve the Berlin problem. On the same day, noting that all For Powers had replied and had indicate i a desire for settlement of the issue, Mr. Evatt and Mr. Lie renewed their appeal that the Four Powers lend their support to the efforts at mediation by the President of the Security Council. The group of six neutral members of the Security Council had, in the meantime, initiated studies of the currency problem. Through Mr. Bramuglia, the following questions were directed to the four parties concerning the implementation of the August 30 directive: 1. Which organ is to exercise quadripartite control of the financial arrangements on behalf of the four occupying powers? 2. What are to be the functions of the organ for quadripartite control? 3. Over what financial operations and in what areas should quadripartite control be exercised? 4. What should be the exact wording of the directive to be released for the implementation of quadripartite control? 5. How will control over trade between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany and third countries, including the issue of export-import licenses, be exercised? On November 26 Mr. Bramuglia made public the replies which he had received. The Soviet reply confined itself to generalities which did not go beyond or suggest means for carrying out the terms of the August 30 directive itself. That of the three Western Powers laid the greatest stress on the necessity of effective quadripartite control. They pointed out that they had stated their willingness to meet the Soviet insistence that the Soviet zone currency should be made the sole legal tender in all Berlin, but only on condition that the military governors could work out satisfactory arrangements to assure the provision of adequate currency and credit in all sectors of Berlin with effective quadripartite control over the practical implementation of such arrangements. They would not in any circumstances agree that the Soviet authorities should exercise sole and unrestricted control over the currency and finances of Berlin. Developments in Berlin In late November and early December 1948, developments in Berlin itself increased greatly the difficulties in the way of agreement on a uniform currency. Up to that time, the Soviet authorities in Berlin had, in various ways, increasingly isolated the Soviet sector from those occupied by the Western Powers. Their efforts, directed especially at splitting the city administration, were accelerated greatly in November and finally culminated in a complete split of the city government. This, coupled with similar measures in other fields, went far toward making impossible the development of any system of quadripartite currency control on which the Western Powers would be justified in relying. Under the temporary constitution for Berlin, approved by the Allied Coordinating Committee, the city officials who were elected in October 1946 were to hold office for two years. New elections were thus necessary in 1948, and duly elected German officials decided to hold these elections. The Soviet authorities, however, forbade the holding of elections in their sector, and the Communistfront parties throughout the city refused to participate. On November 30, 1948, a meeting of selected Communists and Communist-front organizations, held under the sponsorship of the Soviet authorities, purported to elect a new provisional government for all Berlin. This body, for which no legal basis exists, has been treated as the governmental authority of the Soviet sector and was undoubtedly brought into being as an excuse for the failure to permit participation of the Soviet sector in the elections of December 5 and as a rival government to that which would result from those elections. The elections, which were held on December 5 despite Soviet and Communistfront opposition of every sort, registered so heavy a non-Communist vote (86.2 percent) as to show a definite trend toward the non-Communist democratic parties. The Representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States brought these events to Mr. Bramuglia's attention on December 5, pointing out that the de facto political division of the city made the establishment of a unified currency extremely difficult and that the currency experts would need to take it into account. They made clear once more, however, their continued willingness to cooperate in seeking a solution of the currency problem. Technical Committee on Currency and Trade On November 30 Mr. Bramuglia made public a further step in his exploration of the currency problem. “In the exercise of his powers" as President of the Security Council he established a Technical Committee on Berlin Currency and Trade, consisting of experts named by the six noninvolved members of the Security Council. The Committee was directed to study and make recommendations to the President of the Council on the most equitable conditions, taking |