into account the August 30 directive as well as subsequent events, for agreement relating to the introduction, circulation, and continued use of a single currency for Berlin under adequate Four Power supervision, and regulations for the import and export trade of Berlin. The Secretary-General was invited to name an expert to work with the Committee. The Committee was authorized to consult with experts of the four occupying powers and was required to submit its report within 30 days. In promising cooperation with the neutral experts the Western Powers repeated their reservation to take such measures as may be necessary to maintain their position in Berlin, pointing out that they could not agree to be bound to submit to all Soviet measures which aggravate the Berlin situation, while Soviets remained uncommitted to any restraint.

EXCERPT FROM THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE YEAR 1949 ON UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN THE U. N.

ACTION TO REMOVE THREAT TO THE PEACE ARISING OVER BERLIN

Tangible improvement came about during the year in the situation in the city of Berlin which had been brought before the Security Council on September 29, 1948. At the beginning of 1949 the Soviet blockade was still in effect, and it was only through the air lift that the Western Powers were able to insure the safety and subsistence of their forces in Berlin and of the population of that city committed to their charge. In short, as the year began, the threat to the peace created by the Soviet blockade which the Western Powers had brought to the attention of the Security Council had not been diminished.

It will be recalled that, following the veto by the Soviet Union of the solution proposed by the six members of the Security Council not involved in the dispute, which the Western Powers had accepted, the president of the Council on November 30, 1948, established a Technical Committee on Berlin currency and trade. This Committee was composed of experts named by the six noninvolved members (Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Syria, and the Ukraine). It was directed to make recommendations on the most equitable conditions for agreement relating to the introduction, circulation, and continued use of a single currency for Berlin under adequate Four Power supervision and regulations for the import and export trade of Berlin.

This Committee rendered its report to the president of the Council on February 11, 1949. After analyzing the problem, the Committee stated that it had been unable to arrive at a solution acceptable to both sides. On the same day the United States Government issued a statement setting forth the obstacles which the Committee had encountered and pointing out the fact that they had been created solely by the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Western Powers as a whole expressed their continued readiness to explore any reasonable possibility of a fair and a workable agreement which might arise through a change in the Soviet position.

[The following information was underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:]

The Department of State noted that on January 30, 1949, Marshal Stalin made no mention of the currency question in Berlin in his reply to questions asked him by an American journalist concerning the Berlin problem. This was of particular interest since the currency question had hitherto been the announced reason for the Soviet blockade of Berlin. Accordingly, on February 15, in the course of a conversation in the lounge at Lake Success, Ambassador Jessup, then United States Deputy Representative on the Security Council, inquired of Mr. Malik, the Soviet Representative on the Security Council, whether Marshal Stalin's omission had any particular significance. One month later, on March 15, Mr. Malik informed Mr. Jessup that Marshal Stalin's omission of any reference to the currency problem "was not accidental," and that the Soviet Government regarded the currency question as important but felt that it could be discussed at a meeting of Foreign Ministers if a meeting of that body could be arranged to review the whole German problem. In response to further questions, Mr. Malik informed Ambassador Jessup on March 21 that, if a definite date could be set for the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the restrictions on trade and transportation in Berlin could be removed reciprocally and the blockade could be lifted before the meeting.

The Governments of France and the United Kingdom were kept informed of these informal conversations and on April 5 Ambassador Jessup read to Mr.

Malik a statement of the agreed position of the Three Powers. Further clarification of the position of the Soviet Union led to the conclusion of an agreement among the Four Powers on May 4, 1949, as follows:

1. All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948, by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on communications, transportation, and trade between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany and between the Eastern zone and the Western zones will be removed on May 12, 1949.

2. All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948, by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, or any one of them, on communications, transportation, and trade between Berlin and the Eastern zone and between the Western and Eastern zones of Germany will also be removed on May 12, 1949.

3. Eleven days subsequent to the removal of the restrictions referred to in paragraphs one and two, namely, on May 23, 1949, a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers will be convened in Paris to consider questions relating to Germany and problems arising out of the situation in Berlin including also the question of currency in Berlin.

The sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers then took place in Paris, from May 23 to June 20, 1949. The Foreign Ministers confirmed and clarified the New York agreement of May 4 and decided that the occupation authorities should consult together in Berlin on a quadripartite basis, with the purpose of mitigating the effects of the present administrative division of Berlin. This was to be accomplished through expansion of trade, development of financial and economic relations, facilitation of the exchange of information, and the movement of persons and goods between Berlin and the respective zones of occupation. Questions of common interest relating to the administration of the four sectors in Berlin were also to be considered with a view to normalizing as far as possible the life of the city.

The quadripartite consultations, however, did not achieve a satisfactory solution to those continuing problems, and they were adjourned on September 28, 1949. While it was impossible to make further progress in settling the Berlin problem during the rest of the year, the establishment of a modus vivendi and the effort at quadripartite consultation moderated, at least for the time being, a serious threat to the peace.

It was evident from the outset that the United Nations was exerting a persistent influence toward such improvement of the situation. The United Nations offered an effective forum in which public opinion could make articulate its opposition to Soviet action in Berlin, and it provided the opportunities for the conversions between representatives of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union that led to the lifting of the blockade. To the resulting easement during 1949 of, the critically difficult situation that existed regarding Berlin, the United Nations made a substantial contribution.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR PHILIP C. JESSUP, SECURITY COUNCIL, October 6, 1948

PART I

Mr. President, when the Security Council was discussing on October 4 the quesion of placing the Berlin question on the agenda, the Delegation of the United States called attention to some of the fundamental aspects of the serious matter which we are now called upon to consider in detail. The Government of the United States, in agreement with the Governments of the French Republic and the United Kingdom, has asked the Security Council to consider the action of the Soviet Government in imposing blockade measures in Berlin designed to split Germany by cutting off that city from the Western Zones of Occupation. Because we believe it is clear that this action constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Chapter VII of the Charter, we ask the Council to take up the question under that Chapter.

[The following paragraph was underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:]

In that same communication to the Secretary General the Government of the United States pointed out that it had complied with its obligations under Article 33 of the Charter to seek "first of all" a solution by direct discussions with the Soviet Government. In its note of September 26 to the Soviet Government, a copy of which has been supplied to the members of the Council, the Government of

the United States pointed out that it had become "fruitless to continue such discussions in the face of the unmistakable intention of the Soviet Government to undermine, and indeed to destroy, the rights of the three Governments as occupying powers in Berlin as a price for lifting the blockade, illegally imposed in the first instance and still unlawfully maintained." The United States, like France and the United Kingdom, has the right to be in Berlin and therefore the right and indeed the duty, to maintain its position there. I shall explain to the Security Council precisely what our rights in Berlin are. The Government of the United States will not surrender its rights under a threat of force applied in violation of the Charter.

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*

In the identic letters of September 29 addressed to the Secretary General, the three Governments quoted the statement they made in their identic notes of September 26/27 to the Soviet Government, that they reserved "to themselves full rights to take such measures as may be necessary to maintain in these circumstances their position in Berlin. Let there be no misunderstanding about the character of that statement. We have not made a restricted or qualified submission to the Security Council. That statement is, of course, without prejudice to whatever action the Security Council may take. It expresses simply the determination to take such measures as may be necessary to insure the safety and subsistence of our forces in Berlin and of the population committed to their charge by Four-Power agreement, pending action by the Council. One such measure which I should like to emphasize is the effort heretofore and now being made by the Western Occupying Powers through the air lift to discharge the responsibilities which are the correlatives of our rights in Berlin. Any measures which we take to discharge our responsibilties will be in conformity with our obligations under the Charter.

[The following paragraph was underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:]

The Government of the United States has sought by peaceful means to remove the threat to the peace which has been created by the Soviet Union and which, while it remains, is the insuperable obstacle to free negotiation. Our very resort to the Security Council is a further use of the same peaceful means and is directed to the same end. But as a member of the United Nations the Government of the United States will not allow the principle of pacific settlements to be destroyed by the use of force or the threat of force. The United States will be no party to encouraging or submitting to practices which would make a mockery of the Charter.

We stand on the record which will be laid before the Security Council. If the members desire further information, we are prepared to give it. I submit that the record is a record of patience and restraint under great provocation. I assert without equivocation that that restraint is born out of conviction in the justice of our cause and not out of weakness. In the words of Secretary Marshall in his address to the General Assembly on September 23: "It would be a tragic error if patience should be mistaken for weakness." We have exercised the restraint which is incumbent upoǹ members of the United Nations when threatened with force. We have done so because the tradition and the spirit of our people teaches that the pledged word is binding. But the threat to peace continues and we are asking the Security Council to assist in removing it so that we can turn again to free negotiation and other methods of pacific settlement.

The Soviet Government in its note of September 25 asserted that it was willing to negotiate. Is it "negotiation" when the Soviet Government uses its armed forces to set up and maintain a blockade designed to prevent the maintenance of my Government's troops and the German people committed to their charge, and says it will "negotiate" the question of taking away our rights in Berlin? Secretary Marshall also declared in his address to the General Assembly: "For its part, the United States is prepared to seek in every possible way, in any appropriate forum, a constructive and peaceful settlement of the political controversies which contribute to the present tension and uncertainty." I say expressly that this statement includes the continued readiness of the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Government in any appropriate forum regarding any issue outstanding between it and the Government of the United States. The term "any appropriate forum" includes the Council of Foreign Ministers. But what we are now discussing is this barrier to negotiations, the threat to the peace created by the Soviet blockade of Berlin. The appropriate forum for the discussion of a threat to the peace is this Security Council of the United Nations. We are here to discuss it.

[The following paragraph was underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:]

What constitutes a "threat to the peace" as that term is used in Article 39 of the Charter? A threat to the peace is created when a State uses force or the threat of force to secure compliance with its demands. The acts of the Soviet Government in illegally obstructing by threat of force the access of the three Western Powers to Berlin creates a threat to the peace. All the world knows that this is true. Who will believe the argument that when a threat of force is employed in an effort to compel submission to a unilateral assertion of rights, it is the intended victim which threatens the peace if he stands on his rights and refuses to submit meekly to aggression?

The Charter recognizes in Article 51 the right of self-defense, individual or collective. When there is an actual armed attack, the Charter recognizes the need and the right of self-defense. When the act is aggressive and threatens the use of force but falls short of an armed attack, it constitutes an' act of aggression or a threat to the peace. The Charter requires that in such a situation a member shall first of all seek to exhaust the peaceful procedures indicated in Article 33 and if these fail, to resort to the Security Council. That is why the United States in agreement with France and the United Kingdom has brought the Soviet blockade measures in Berlin to the attention of the Security Council. In their communication submitting this matter to the Security Council, the three governments called attention to the fact that in addition to the direct measures of blockade against the forces of the occupying powers, the Soviet blockade "has threatened the Berlin population with starvation, disease, and economic ruin." The Soviet Union may pretend that it cannot understand why it can be charged with the threat or use of force against the United States, France, and the United Kingdom when a primary consequence of its action falls directly and intentionally upon the civilian population of Berlin for whose well-being the three western occupying powers are responsible. That an effort should be be made to deprive two and one-half million men, women, and children of medicines and food and clothing and fuel, to subject them to cold and starvation and disease, may seem to some a small matter. But to us, the welfare of people committed to our charge is a matter of serious concern. We cannot be callous to the suffering of millions of people in any country, much less when we have responsibility for them as an occupying power.

[The following paragraph was underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:] We are well aware of course that on July 20 the Soviet authorities made an offer to feed all of Berlin. This offer was made nearly a month after the total blockade had been imposed. Having failed to achieve complete political control of the city by the weapon of starvation, they (the Soviet authorities) now attempted to try political control by a political offer of food. Actually, the offer was so hedged as to make it practically impossible for the inhabitants of the western sectors to accept it even if they had desired thus to subordinate themselves to Soviet control. The regulations contained in Soviet Order No. 80, for example, would have required most of the residents of the west sector of Berlin to travel about 40 kilometers each time they desired to purchase food. This Soviet propaganda plan failed as the blockade failed. The German population recognized it for the political bribery it was. In September, only 56,000 Berliners from the western sectors out of a population of nearly two and a half millions registered their food cards in the Soviet sector.

Today the daily living requirements of these 2,500,000 people, two-thirds of the population of the City of Berlin, are being met by the combined efforts of the British and American air forces. Two hundred and fifty planes are supplying the Western Sectors of Berlin with food, coal and other essentials. The efforts of thousands of American and British and French men and women have been devoted to the organization and establishment of an air bridge, which, in one single day, has delivered almost 7,000 tons of supplies to the land-locked city. The Security Council as well as the population of Berlin may well regard the airlift as a symbol of peace and of the methods of pacific settlement.

But the fact that the courage and ingenuity of the men and women who are participating in this stupendous achievement saved the people in Berlin from much of the suffering which the Soviet Government sought to enforce upon them does not mean that the threat to the peace has been removed. Members of the Council will recall that Marshal Sokolovsky, in an obvious attempt to counteract the airlift, in complete disregard of the directive as interpreted by Generalissimo Stalin himself, insisted upon new restrictions upon air transportation between

Berlin and the Western zones of Germany. The Soviet Government, in this note of September 25 instead of repudiating Marshal Sokolovsky's action, added new demands that air communications should be subjected to the control of the Soviet Command.

[The following paragraph was underlined for emphasis by Ambassador Austin:]

Moreover, the Soviet Government sought and resorted to another method of duress and compulsion, a method with which others are unfortunately all too familiar. I refer to the fact that when, because of the airlift, the blockade failed to undermine the morale of the population of Berlin by the weapons of starvation and disease, organized and inspired mob violence took place against the Municipal Government of Berlin. This was the government elected in 1946 by democratic process and under four-power supervision. Because it was thus elected by a free expression of popular will it was not a Communist government. Because it was not a Communist government attempts were made to sabotage it, to destroy it by organized gangs and subversion. These attempts failed but the blockade measures, and therefore the threat to the peace which the blockade measures created, still remains.

The members of the Security Council are entitled to know the exact nature of this threat to the peace, how it began and how it is even now continuing. With your permission, Mr. President, I propose to state the essential facts in this case. I shall explain first our right to be in Berlin and our right to have access to Berlin. Second, I shall show how the Soviet Union, after recognizing those rights, has sought by its illegal and hostile blockade to force us out of Berlin. Third, I shall outline the steps by which the Government of the United States, in full accord with the Government of France and of the United Kingdom, has fulfilled its obligation under the Charter to try to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union by direct discussions.

(a) Origin of Rights

PART II

The United States is in Berlin as of right. The rights of the United States as a joint occupying power in Berlin derive from the total defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany. Article 1 of the Protocol on the Zones of Occupation in Germany agreed to by the Soviet Union in the European Advisory Commission on 14 November 1944 provides:

"1. Germany, within her frontiers as they were on the 31st December 1937, will, for the purposes of occupation, be divided into three zones, one of which will be allotted to each of the three Powers, and a special Berlin area, which will be under joint occupation by the three Powers."

This agreement (later amended to include France) established the area of Berlin as an international enclave to be jointly occupied and administered by the four occupying powers.

The representatives of the Commanders in Chief adopted, on 7 July 1945, a resolution establishing the Allied Kommandatura for the administration of Berlin. This Kommandatura was to be under the direction of a Chief Military Commandant which post was to be held in rotation by each of the Four Military Commanders. The Chief Military Commandant in consultation with the other Commanders was to exercise the administration of all Berlin sectors when questions of principle and problems common to all sectors arose. In order to exercise the supervision of Berlin local government one or two representatives from each Allied Command were to be attached to each section of the local German government.

Implicit in these agreements is the right of each of the four powers to free access to and egress from the Greater Berlin Area. Not only has this right been clearly recognized and confirmed by the Soviet Union by practice and usage for almost three years, but it has been the subject of written agreements between the respective governments as well as by their representatives in the Allied Control Council for Germany. The rights of free access were directly specified in a message from President Truman to Premier Stalin on 14 June 1945 which agreed to withdraw back to the prescribed zonal boundaries those United States forces which in the course of the war had overrun part of the territory which later became the Soviet Zone of Occupation, provided satisfactory arrangements for free access by rail, road and air to the United States forces in Berlin could be entered into between the military commanders. I shall quote one sentence from President Truman's message:

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* As to Germany, I am ready to have instructions issued to all American troops to begin withdrawal into their own zone on 21st June in accordance