years has found out that the vitality of its service in the United Nations depends very largely upon the amount and force and activity of public opinion. UNITED STATES REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE RED CHINA Senator BREWSTER. I think that answers the question. Now, there is one other line that I would like to refer to. I assume that the questions dealing with the Far East, as with all other parts of the world, come very constantly to your attention. I think particularly of Korea and China also. Did there come to your attention in 1949 discussions which were apparently proceeding as to possible change of policy toward nationalist China with a view possibly to the recognition of Red China, with a view to cutting off supplies to Nationalist China? Was that a matter that at any time came to your attention? Ambassador AUSTIN. No, sir. Senator BREWSTER. Would that naturally not have been a matter that was of rather vital consequence to you in your procedures? Ambassador AUSTIN. Of course, but there has never been a time that I can recall when there has been any question about our refusal to recognize Red China. Senator BREWSTER. As far as you know, there was never any discussion within the competent authorities in our Government of a change of policy? Ambassador AUSTIN. That is what I say I know nothing about. Ambassador AUSTIN. I have nothing. Senator BREWSTER. I want to call attention to an article here from the New York Times, coincident with Dr. Jessup's representation in connection with the East. I will ask that this be put in the record at this point. It is from the New York Times of December 18, 1949. Senator SPARKMAN. Let it be included in the record. (The article referred to appears in the record, as follows:) [From the New York Times, December 18, 1949] RED THREAT TO ASIA GAINS-BURMA AND INDOCHINA REACT TO PEIPING VICTORIES— NEED FOR UNITED STATES POLICY SEEN (By Hanson W. Baldwin) The collapse of resistance to the Chinese Communists and the advance of the Communist armies to the borders of southeast Asia already have had politicomilitary effects in Asiatic countries, according to reports reaching Washington last week. In recent days Communist guerilla activity in Indonesia and Burma has been stepped up considerably, and Washington observers fear that this portends an intensified campaign supported from China—to extend communism throughout Asia. Chinese Communist troops, disguised as civilians, already are reported to have penetrated the state of Tongking in French Indochina, where they are said to have gone "underground" preparatory to later operations. Arms and men, it is reported, have filtered across the border, and are believed to be preparing to join the Communist-held revolt against the French. The French, with some 122,000 troops in Indochina, have been doing little more, to date, than holding their own; they control, though somewhat tenuously, the major cities and the principal communication routes, but the hinterland is really ruled by the rebels. The political and the military effects of the extension of communism to the board may, therefore, be major. In the new nation, the United States of Indonesia, the first president, Dr. Sukarno, will also face the effects of the Communist conquest of China. Communism is still a very important factor in Indonesian radical leadership and the first crisis of the new government may be touched off by the Communists. A HOTBED OF COMMUNISM Burma, torn by civil war and with no stable government that could really claim to represent the country since the end of British rule, is a hotbed for communism, and already it is feeling the effects of the Communist victories in China. It is against the background of such somber reports as these that the United States in stumbling toward some sort of an Asiatic policy. No final policy on the baffling problems of recognition or nonrecognition of Communist China, Formosa, southeast Asia, southern Korea, and Japan is likely to be formulated until the return of Dr. Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, from an extensive exploratory trip to the Orient for the State Department. However, even in advance of Dr. Jessup's findings, preponderant opinion in the State Department is believed to favor strongly the recognition of Communist China, although there is considerable dispute about the timing of such recognition. The treatment accorded Angus Ward, United States Consul General in Mukden, by the Manchurian Communists and the growing isolation of all Americans, even those with diplomatic status, in iron-curtain countries, has, however, given some pause to the adocates of recognition. DIFFERENCES OF OPINION The National Security Council also has formulated, in general outline, an Asiatic policy, that, however, does not meet the approval of some persons in the Pentagon, and it remains merely a paper until it receives the final approval of the President and implementation by the State Department. Considerable differences of opinion between various high-ranking officials in the Department of Defense and in the State Department about United States far eastern policies have handicapped somewhat the development of any active and vigorous program of action in Asia. Generally speaking, American politicomilitary policies in the area remain policies of negativism. About one phase of one of the far eastern problems-Formosa-there is, however, pretty general agreement. The military, generally speaking, would like to do something about keeping Formosa out of the hands of the Communists; the State Department does not seem to favor any active action, but both agree that the United States could not undertake the physical job of defending the island. To insure the security of Formosa against both possible external assault and internal subversion would probably take more than the 10 divisions that the United States now maintains all over the world. FLEET TO BE STRENGTHENED Other measures to protect the island against external amphibious assault can be taken. The recent announcement that the United States Pacific Fleet was being strengthened slightly has some significance in this connection. It was learned last week from naval sources that the aircraft carrier Boxer would be sent to Asiatic waters shortly to join the two cruisers and eight destroyers now maintained in Japanese and Asiatic areas. At the same time, the key United States base at Okinawa, which has been in deplorable shape since the war, with morale, leadership, and housing probably worse anywhere else under the United States flag, is being put into shape as rapidly as possible. Thus, some slight improvement in the United States military position in the Orient is one of the immediate results of the Communist victories, but there has been no solution to the problem of internal subversion in Asia, and United States Asiatic policies, in general, are still largely negative in their implications. 89965-51-29 DISCUSSING BALDWIN'S ARTICLE Senator BREWSTER. I speak of Mr. Baldwin as only a very competent capital critic. This is what he says in the course of this article: It is against the background of such somber reportsthat was in December 1949, when things were not in very good shapeas these that the United States is stumbling toward some sort of an Asiatic policy. No final policy on the baffling problems of recognition or nonrecognition of Communist China, Formosa, southeast Asia, southern Korea, and Japan is likely to be formulated until the return of Dr. Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, from an extensive exploratory trip to the Orient for the State Department. At that time he was not working under your jurisdiction, was he, December 8, 1949, or was he in the United Nations? Ambassador AUSTIN. No. Without checking, I would say "No." Senator BREWSTER. I think that is correct. If it is not, you may correct it. Senator SPARKMAN. May I just say this: He served in the General Assembly in the fall of 1949 but I am certain that it had adjourned before the date of this article. Senator BREWSTER. Then he went out, I gather, to the Far East, to make these observations? Ambassador AUSTIN. Yes. Senator BREWSTER. Now, there was the other citation from General Baldwin-I do not know whether he is a general or not. Senator SPARKMAN. He is a graduate of the Naval Academy. You better not call him that. Senator BREWSTER. He goes on to make this statement, which is in the New York Times: However, even in advance of Dr. Jessup's findings, preponderant opinion in the State Department is believed to favor strongly the recognition of Communist China, although there is considerable dispute about the timing of such recognition. Now, do you have any knowledge of any character regarding any discussions of that sort? Ambassador AUSTIN. None at all. Senator BREWSTER. I think that is all. Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much. Earlier in the discussion the question came up about the confirmations of Ambassador Jessup. The staff now has prepared a memorandum showing five different occasions on which he has received appointments requiring confirmation and favorable action each time. I believe it would be well to have this inserted in the record at the point where the discussion took place. (The record of previous confirmations of Ambassador Jessup referred to appears in a previous part of this record.) Senator SPARKMAN. Ambassador Austin, let me add to what the others have said, our vote of thanks for coming down here and giving us this presentation. We all commend you for the very fine work you are doing, and we hope that you will give our best wishes to Mrs. Austin, and that she may soon be recovered from her indisposition. Ambassador AUSTIN. Thank you very much. I must say it is really a delight to be with you. You do not know how much I miss you. Senator SPARKMAN. Come and see us more often. Senator SMITH of New Jersey. We miss you. Senator SPARK MAN. The committee will stand in recess until 2:30. (Whereupon, at 1: 30 p. m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m. the same day.) AFTERNOON SESSION The session convened at 3 p. m., upon the expiration of the recess, Senator John J. Sparkman presiding. Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please. Senator Gillette will be here shortly. I think we might get started. It may be that we shall have some roll-call interruptions during the course of the afternoon anyway. Mr. Jessup, on yesterday when we quit I believe you had gone through page 25. STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP C. JESSUP, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE— Resumed Ambassador JESSUP. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. Senator SPARKMAN. Therefore we will start with the top of page 26, or anything else that you may want to present. Ambassador JESSUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have disposed now of five of the so-called affiliations which were intimated by Senator McCarthy, and I would like to pass on to the next one, which I think is the Institute of Pacific Relations. Mr. Chairman, in connection with the subject of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which has been under a good deal of discussion lately, I should like to remark that before another subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations last year I described the functions and purposes of this institute as well as my association with it. That testimony can be found beginning at page 228 of the published hearings of that subcommittee. Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Might I ask, Mr. Jessup, what they were investigating? What hearings were those? Ambassador JESSUP. Those were the hearings before the so-called Tydings committee. Before taking up these specific charges that involve my connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations, I may say that since these unfounded charges have been made time and again despite repeated publication of the facts, I would like to describe for the committee something of the history of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the part that I played in its activity over a period of years. ORIGIN OF THE IPR I think attention has already been drawn to the fact that the institute was established in Honolulu in 1925 by a group of businessmen, religious leaders, and scholars who wanted to increase knowledge and understanding of the peoples of the Pacific area, and the word "Pacific" is spelled with a capital "P." It did refer to the area of the Pacific. The group which was responsible for launching this organization was a committee of the Honolulu Young Men's Christian Association, of which the chairman was Mr. Frank C. Atherton, who was at one time vice president and general manager of Castle & Cook, and president of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, I may say, one of the big names in the history of Honolulu and the Hawaiian Islands. In its original statement of purpose, the organization recognized that it could accomplish the ends which it had in view only by promoting sound, scholarly research and by the frank exchange of views by persons of varying backgrounds whose experience and training would qualify them to discuss objectively the complex problems of the Pacific. AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE IPR The stated aims and purposes of the Institute of Pacific Relations were set out in a pamphlet entitled, "The Origin and Present Activity of the Institute of Pacific Relations," which was published in 1927, 2 years after the founding, and the purposes are summarized as follows, and I quote from this pamphlet: The IPR and it may be convenient to use that abbreviation for the Institute of Pacific Relations is an unofficial, international body established to promote the cooperative study of the relations of the people in the various countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean. As a means to this end the institute holds biennial conferences, promotes and coordinates research by other agencies, conducts research through its own secretariat, and endeavors to stimulate the mood of inquiry regarding Pacific problems on the part of the public generally. Now, in order to carry out these objectives, national constituent councils were set up in Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, and the United States. A national council was established in the U. S. S. R., the Soviet Union, in 1934, but did not participate at all in the activities of the Pacific Council after 1939. PACIFIC COUNCIL, THE GOVERNING BODY The governing body of this international organization was the Pacific Council, composed of representatives of the various councils as well as elected international officers. An international secretariat was established with headquarters in New York and an office for a time in Honolulu. A quarterly publication, Pacific Affairs, is published by the international office. Senator SPARKMAN. Dr. Jessup, before we get too far away, on the fourth line on page 26 you refer to your testimony before the Tydings subcommittee. You say it begins on 228. I have the hearings before me and I think for the accuracy of the record you should say page 226. Ambassador JESSUP. Thank you, sir. I think perhaps I refer to the part which more or less parallels the summary of the organization, but I think 226 is correct. Thank you very much, Senator. ORGANIZATIONAL SET-UP OF THE IPR I would like to emphasize, Mr. Chairman, the fact that when we are talking about the IPR we are dealing in reality with two organizations. Failure to distinguish between the two organizations has, I think, caused some confusion, and I shall endeavor in my testimony, |