Ambassador AUSTIN. That may be the difference. Seventeen and five. Yes. Senator BREWSTER. Is the Ambassador trying to make a train? Ambassador AUSTIN. I am trying to make a 2 o'clock train. I have plenty of time. Senator BREWSTER. I have one or two more questions. Senator SPARKMAN. Were you through, Senator Smith? CHINESE VOTED WITH UNITED STATES RE BERLIN BLOCKADE Senator BREWSTER. In connection with the Berlin airlift, does this document you submitted show the vote of the various nations? Ambassador AUSTIN. Yes, it does. Senator BREWSTER. What was the vote of the Chinese Nationalists? Ambassador AUSTIN. I will have to check it. I think they supported us. Now, you will remember that this resolution got vetoed, do you not? Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Ambassador AUSTIN. This is the shortest way for me to do it. I will read this. This is from page 69 of the report by the President, to the Congress. After the representatives of the United Kingdom and France had made similar presentations, the president adjourned the Council, subject to further call by him. The members of the Council that were not directly involved in the dispute, to wit, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, and Syria, then began exploratory talks under the leadership of the President, Mr. Bramuglia— I was president during that month but I withdrew on account of the interests of the United States. to gather information about the points of view of the parties and to clarify issues. At a Security Council meeting on October 15 the six members reported on these talks and the president put two broad questions to the parties, suggesting that the answers might be given at a subsequent Council meeting. In the first question, the parties were asked to explain in detail the circumstances of the imposition of restrictions upon transcript, communication, and trade and the current status of these restrictions. The second question concerned the circumstances of the joint directive of August 30, 1948, addressed by the Four Powers to their military governors in Berlin and the detailed reasons for the failure of the military governors to reach agreement on the basis of it. The representatives of the three Western Powers indicated at once their readiness to give this information. Mr. Vishinsky, the Soviet representative, recalled his previous declaration that he would not participate, and said that— * * * 66* * # the very raising of these two questions here was dictated by nothing but a desire to drag the U. S. S. R. delegation into a discussion of the Berlin question. It is naive to believe that the U. S. S. R. delegation will stick to this glue which has been spread over this piece of paper which is now called the Berlin question. * * The U. S. S. R. delegation will not submit any material to the Security Council." At the following meeting the representatives of the three Western Powers gave their responses to the questions. In view of the full presentation of the facts which they had previously made, they needed only to provide added details. Now it went to a vote. Vishinsky vetoed it, but later comes the work of Philip Jessup. Senator BREWSTER. I am asking how China voted; that is my question. Ambassador AUSTIN. Of course he proposed it. Ambassador AUSTIN. China. Senator BREWSTER. What was their action in the vote? That was my question. Ambassador AUSTIN. The vote was 9 to 2. He was one of the yea's. Here it is on page 72. The vote on the resolution was 9 to 2, only the Soviet Union and the Ukraine casting adverse votes. Senator BREWSTER. We voted in that ourselves? Senator BREWSTER. I thought we had refrained? Ambassador AUSTIN. Oh, no. We all voted. Nine of us voted for it. Mr. Jessup carried on from that and succeeded in obtaining, through very difficult and skillful negotiations, an agreement to lift the blockade. FACTOR OF GENERAL CONFIDENCE Senator BREWSTER. Mr. Ambassador, I share the appreciation of the others of your presentation of this matter and the deep confidence which we entertain in both your judgment and devotion to the principles of the United Nations, as well as the United States. I had the good fortune to sit behind you in the Senate for some years and I always considered it a very high privilege to breath the atmosphere of devotion to this ideal which you always assailed. I wanted to ask you this: You have spoken very highly of the character and capacity of Dr. Jessup and of your association with him. You speak of yourself as an attorney for the people of the United States, in essence. Is there not one other consideration taken into account in the selection of an attorney, ambassador or accountant, and that is that they must not only possess all these qualities you have pointed out, but that it is also very desirable that their clients should have confidence in them? In a democracy of 150 million people you, of course, cannot get the unanimity which you achieve in the United Nations in your representation of us there, but that is a factor in which our institutions must have a bearing. That is conspicuously present in the case of yourself. I think there is almost universal confidence enjoyed in both your character and your capacity, borne out of your long experience. These unfortunate questions have arisen here. I can understand how strongly you feel from your intimacy of association. I wanted simply to have it clear in your mind that as Members of the United States Senate passing upon this matter, we are obliged also to take into account this other factor among apparently large groups of people and many highly honorable men, where doubts at least have been created as to soundness of the judgment, and the understanding of Dr. Jessup. That does not bear upon Dr. Jessup except as his actions may have lent color to it, but I wonder if you would comment upon the extent to which that factor of general confidence is important. You can put yourself back in the Senate now. Ambassador AUSTIN. I can say to you that the United States Mission-I will not speak about myself-to the United Nations in these 5 years has found out that the vitality of its service in the United Nations depends very largely upon the amount and force and activity of public opinion. UNITED STATES REFUSED TO RECOGNIZE RED CHINA Senator BREWSTER. I think that answers the question. Now, there is one other line that I would like to refer to. I assume that the questions dealing with the Far East, as with all other parts of the world, come very constantly to your attention. I think particularly of Korea and China also. Did there come to your attention in 1949 discussions which were apparently proceeding as to possible change of policy toward nationalist China with a view possibly to the recognition of Red China, with a view to cutting off supplies to Nationalist China? Was that a matter that at any time came to your attention? Ambassador AUSTIN. No, sir. Senator BREWSTER. Would that naturally not have been a matter that was of rather vital consequence to you in your procedures? Ambassador AUSTIN. Of course, but there has never been a time that I can recall when there has been any question about our refusal to recognize Red China. Senator BREWSTER. As far as you know, there was never any discussion within the competent authorities in our Government of a change of policy? Ambassador AUSTIN. That is what I say I know nothing about. Ambassador AUSTIN. I have nothing. Senator BREWSTER. I want to call attention to an article here from the New York Times, coincident with Dr. Jessup's representation in connection with the East. I will ask that this be put in the record at this point. It is from the New York Times of December 18, 1949. Senator SPARKMAN. Let it be included in the record. (The article referred to appears in the record, as follows :) [From the New York Times, December 18, 1949] RED THREAT TO ASIA GAINS-BURMA AND INDOCHINA REACT TO PEIPING VICTORIES— NEED FOR UNITED STATES POLICY SEEN (By Hanson W. Baldwin) The collapse of resistance to the Chinese Communists and the advance of the Communist armies to the borders of southeast Asia already have had politicomilitary effects in Asiatic countries, according to reports reaching Washington last week. In recent days Communist guerilla activity in Indonesia and Burma has been stepped up considerably, and Washington observers fear that this portends an intensified campaign supported from China-to extend communism throughout Asia. Chinese Communist troops, disguised as civilians, already are reported to have penetrated the state of Tongking in French Indochina, where they are said to have gone "underground" preparatory to later operations. Arms and men, it is reported, have filtered across the border, and are believed to be preparing to join the Communist-held revolt against the French. The French, with some 122,000 troops in Indochina, have been doing little more, to date, than holding their own; they control, though somewhat tenuously, the major cities and the principal communication routes, but the hinterland is really ruled by the rebels. The political and the military effects of the extension of communism to the board may, therefore, be major. In the new nation, the United States of Indonesia, the first president, Dr. Sukarno, will also face the effects of the Communist conquest of China. Communism is still a very important factor in Indonesian radical leadership and the first crisis of the new government may be touched off by the Communists. A HOTBED OF COMMUNISM Burma, torn by civil war and with no stable government that could really claim to represent the country since the end of British rule, is a hotbed for communism, and already it is feeling the effects of the Communist victories in China. It is against the background of such somber reports as these that the United States in stumbling toward some sort of an Asiatic policy. No final policy on the baffling problems of recognition or nonrecognition of Communist China, Formosa, southeast Asia, southern Korea, and Japan is likely to be formulated until the return of Dr. Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, from an extensive exploratory trip to the Orient for the State Department. However, even in advance of Dr. Jessup's findings, preponderant opinion in the State Department is believed to favor strongly the recognition of Communist China, although there is considerable dispute about the timing of such recognition. The treatment accorded Angus Ward, United States Consul General in Mukden, by the Manchurian Communists and the growing isolation of all Americans, even those with diplomatic status, in iron-curtain countries, has, however, given some pause to the adocates of recognition. DIFFERENCES OF OPINION The National Security Council also has formulated, in general outline, an Asiatic policy, that, however, does not meet the approval of some persons in the Pentagon, and it remains merely a paper until it receives the final approval of the President and implementation by the State Department. Considerable differences of opinion between various high-ranking officials in the Department of Defense and in the State Department about United States far eastern policies have handicapped somewhat the development of any active and vigorous program of action in Asia. Generally speaking, American politicomilitary policies in the area remain policies of negativism. About one phase of one of the far eastern problems-Formosa-there is, however, pretty general agreement. The military, generally speaking, would like to do something about keeping Formosa out of the hands of the Communists; the State Department does not seem to favor any active action, but both agree that the United States could not undertake the physical job of defending the island. To insure the security of Formosa against both possible external assault and internal subversion would probably take more than the 10 divisions that the United States now maintains all over the world. FLEET TO BE STRENGTHENED Other measures to protect the island against external amphibious assault can be taken. The recent announcement that the United States Pacific Fleet was being strengthened slightly has some significance in this connection. It was learned last week from naval sources that the aircraft carrier Boxer would be sent to Asiatic waters shortly to join the two cruisers and eight destroyers now maintained in Japanese and Asiatic areas. At the same time, the key United States base at Okinawa, which has been in deplorable shape since the war, with morale, leadership, and housing probably worse anywhere else under the United States flag, is being put into shape as rapidly as possible. Thus, some slight improvement in the United States military position in the Orient is one of the immediate results of the Communist victories, but there has been no solution to the problem of internal subversion in Asia, and United States Asiatic policies, in general, are still largely negative in their implications. 89965-51- -29 DISCUSSING BALDWIN'S ARTICLE Senator BREWSTER. I speak of Mr. Baldwin as only a very competent capital critic. This is what he says in the course of this article: It is against the background of such somber reportsthat was in December 1949, when things were not in very good shapeas these that the United States is stumbling toward some sort of an Asiatic policy. No final policy on the baffling problems of recognition or nonrecognition of Communist China, Formosa, southeast Asia, southern Korea, and Japan is likely to be formulated until the return of Dr. Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, from an extensive exploratory trip to the Orient for the State Department. At that time he was not working under your jurisdiction, was he, December 8, 1949, or was he in the United Nations? Ambassador AUSTIN. No. Without checking, I would say "No." Senator BREWSTER. I think that is correct. If it is not, you may correct it. Senator SPARKMAN. May I just say this: He served in the General Assembly in the fall of 1949 but I am certain that it had adjourned before the date of this article. Senator BREWSTER. Then he went out, I gather, to the Far East, to make these observations? Ambassador AUSTIN. Yes. Senator BREWSTER. Now, there was the other citation from General Baldwin-I do not know whether he is a general or not. Senator SPARKMAN. He is a graduate of the Naval Academy. You better not call him that. Senator BREWSTER. He goes on to make this statement, which is in the New York Times: However, even in advance of Dr. Jessup's findings, preponderant opinion in the State Department is believed to favor strongly the recognition of Communist China, although there is considerable dispute about the timing of such recognition. Now, do you have any knowledge of any character regarding any discussions of that sort? Ambassador AUSTIN. None at all. Senator BREWSTER. I think that is all. Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much. Earlier in the discussion the question came up about the confirmations of Ambassador Jessup. The staff now has prepared a memorandum showing five different occasions on which he has received appointments requiring confirmation and favorable action each time. I believe it would be well to have this inserted in the record at the point where the discussion took place. (The record of previous confirmations of Ambassador Jessup referred to appears in a previous part of this record.) Senator SPARK MAN. Ambassador Austin, let me add to what the others have said, our vote of thanks for coming down here and giving us this presentation. We all commend you for the very fine work you are doing, and we hope that you will give our best wishes to Mrs. Austin, and that she may soon be recovered from her indisposition. Ambassador AUSTIN. Thank you very much. I must say it is really a delight to be with you. You do not know how much I miss you. Senator SPARKMAN. Come and see us more often. Senator SMITH of New Jersey. We miss you. |