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Ambassador JESSUP. So far as Asia is concerned, it is true that the voice of Kremlin propaganda is the only voice which is saying: "All Asia is lost." It is not believed where people can know the truth through access to the facts. All over Asia the spirit of national independence is alive. Now, the Soviet Union tries to play on that feeling, and use it for its own imperialist purposes. Soviet theory as announced by Stalin himself provides for a two-stage operation in dealing with movements like these. The first stage involves getting control of the nationalist movement. The second stage results in making the new country subservient to the Kremlin. We have but one aim in our dealings with the people of Asia-and that is to give genuine help to the nationalist movement. When I traveled in Asia early this year I found that many of the people of Asia who have access to other information than Kremlin propaganda know this and know that the United States has no territorial ambitions and no desire for gain in Asia.

Mr. SEVAREID. In respect to Formosa-concerning that area, we have taken our own action without U. N. backing

Ambassador JESSUP. Mr. Sevareid, I think it is important to get the facts clear about the Formosan situation. It is true that the U. N. Security Council resolutions about Korea d'd not cover the situation in Formosa. However, the order of the President on June 27 directing the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa was directly connected with the aggression against the Republic of Korea.

The President pointed out, and I quote what he said, "The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations, and will now use armed invasion and war * * *. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of Pacific area and to United States forces performing their logical and necessary functions in that area."

The President instructed Senator Austin, our representative at the United Nations to report this action immediately to the Security Council and he did so on that same day. If the command to the Seventh Fleet had been an act of aggression we would hardly have reported it immediately to the Security Council.

On July 19 the President in his message to Congress again explained our action regarding Formosa and explicitly said that we had no territorial ambitions whatever concerning that island and we did not seek for ourselves any special pr v leges on Formosa. He said that the military neutralization of Formosa was "without prejudice to political questions affecting that island." He said further that we wanted to have all questions affecting Formosa settled by pacific means as envisaged in the Charter of the U. N.

Two days ago, the Chinese Communists sent a message to the Security Council accusing us of aggression on Formosa and demanded that the Security Council take action. Senator Austin immediately made an official statement saying that we would welcome U. N. consideration of the Formosan question. We said that we would approve full U. N. investigation either at Lake Success or on Formosa itself and that we would assist the U. N. in any consideration it decided to give to this problem.

In short, Mr. Sevareid, what we have done about Formosa has been done in the open and has been laid fully before the U. N.

Mr. SEVAREID. What about sacrifices which you and I-which Americans must make in this time of world emergency?

Ambassador JESSUP. It is important to understand that sacrifices which must be made by us are not solely a result of Korea. Korea brings the question dramatically to our attention, but what has happened is merely a symptom of the evil at large in the world. Even if Korea could be settled tomorrow, the people of the United States must still be ready for sacrifice.

Dictatorship today uses slave labor and a police state to build and maintain force with which to strike at peace-loving states. The great challenge put to us by this evil force is to show that democracies can be self-discipline build up and maintain strength and security without sacrificing the things we consider of greatest importance, one basic democratic principles.

Clearly we are going to have to make economic and military sacrifices-very considerable ones perhaps to make sure that we can go on living in a free and peaceful world. But those are not the only calls that will be made on us, As a people we're going to have to be firm, patient, and steady. We're going to have to forego the hope of easy answers, of quick, simple solutions.

Ambassador JESSUP. There is no push-button diplomacy any more than there is push-button war in Korea. And there are GI's in diplomacy just as there are in the Army. There's much footslogging to do. And it's not just a matter of decisions by the brass hats in the high command.

Mr. SEVAREID. How long will the emergency go on, Mr. Jessup? How long must we an impatient people-put up with the strain of a cold war?

Ambassador JESSUP. No one can say for how long we must be prepared for the difficult task of accepting our world as a troubled world. It would be a lot easier, I admit, if someone could promise: "In three months, or three years, or ten years our problems would be solved." But no one can surely say.

However long the period, it is worth the sacrifice. The sacrifices in Korea are very real ones, but they are as nothing compared with the sacrifices which would come with general war.

Mr. SEVAREID. Korea is where the fighting is now, but there are potential trouble spots in many areas of the world. What of them? Aren't there definite limits to what we can do if the fire should break out in other quarters?

Ambassador JESSUP. If we wanted an absolute guaranty against the march of aggressors anywhere, we would have to have vast armies around the world. I agree we cannot do that. Instead we must work constantly with other nations to build our collective strength and we must rely on our allies as well as on ourselves. As events in Korea have proved. we seem to be on the way to finding means for making international organization effective as a collective way to keep the peace.

Mr. SEVAREID. Can that be true even if the Kremlin doesn't share this view? Ambassador JESSUP. Yes it can. Peace and freedom have made great gains in some very important areas of the world despite the Soviet attitude. Perhaps the most important gain has been the united response of the free world to the act of aggression in Korea. We had hoped to build peace through international cooperation including the cooperation of the Soviet Union. Since, however, the Soviet Union has not seemed to want to cooperate in building a peaceful world, we are now seeking to achieve peace by strengthening the free world so that we can prevent aggression. In the meantime, we have no fear that we shall come to a place where every avenue of diplomacy has been exhausted. Diplomacy has given us great new instruments that we have only begun to test. We have new ways of concerting and multiplying our strength. New ways of informing the minds of men-new ways of attacking economic and social sources of international conflict.

For it is not just a military challenge that we face. The basic objective of our foreign policy is to help create the kind of a world in which people can live their lives in peace. The existence of poverty, illiteracy, disease, hunger-these things are the breeders of unrest on which promoters of dissatisfaction play. And so it is important that we support measures for international economic and political cooperation along with our great defense effort. These measures are not only required to meet the Soviet challenge but are basic to our long-run objectives. Mr. SEVAREID. It used to be said that we were so concerned with the problem of Europe that we were neglecting Asia. Is the situation now such that we are so concerned with Asia that we are neglecting Europe?

Ambassador JESSUP. I can't agree with the first part of your question which as I have heard it stated before suggests that the Marshall plan and the North Atlantic Treaty were not justified. Some people carry the idea further and say we should have had exactly the same programs for the Far East. Plans and programs which fit the needs and the opportunities of one area are not always suited to another. Of course, we have vital interest in Europe and that interest is as great today as it was before Korea. I do not say it is greater than it was, but I do think the general awareness of its importance has increased.

A few minutes ago I suggested that diplomacy or foreign policy is not all a matter of push-button decisions. It is also not all headline stuff. There are quiet, long-range steady activities which are going on constantly around the globe. Coming back directly to the European question, there is a new spirit abroad there. The growth of that spirit is directly related to what we have done to help. The signs of that spirit include these headline events.

The courageous Schuman plan to bring Germany and France together in the economic field; the steady increase in the importance and authority of international bodies such as the North Atlantic Treaty and the Council of Europe; the increase in economic prosperity and the decline of the Communist Parties; the new determination and decisions to move forward rapidly with the essential measures of defense.

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Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Jessup, a question which seems to be in the minds of many people these days is: Is war inevitable? And some go on to say that if war does seem inevitable, shouldn't we settle the whole thing right now by dropping atomic bombs on Moscow?

Ambassador JESSUP. Mr. Sevareid, war is never inevitable. Let us keep that fact constantly before us. The threat of war is a serious one. There is no doubt about that. But if we and our allies make ourselves strong, so that there will not be any temptation for aggression, and if we are steady and determined, we may be able to maintain the peace.

By thinking that war is inevitable, however, we will help to make it so. People who are defeatist about war are taking an easy way out, in their minds. And it's a disastrous way of thinking. Responsible and mature citizens realize, I am sure, that the destruction of war is so catastrophic, that no stone must be left unturned in the effort to maintain our security and our highest values by peaceful means. It is my faith, and the conviction of our Government, that this can be done, if the freemen of the world are determined to do it.

Mr. SEVAREID. That answers, then, the second part of the question, too— about the dropping of atomic bombs on the Soviet Union now.

are.

Ambassador JESSUP. I think it does, Mr. Sevareid, since war is not, in my belief, by any means inevitable. Dropping atomic bombs on the Soviet Union now is not the way we act; it is not the way America does things. But I do not see how anyone can believe that, even if our conscience permitted us to precipitate a war by dropping atomic bombs now, we would be any better off than we Such an action would not only not solve any problems, it would create many new and terribly difficult problems. Even if such an action were to be successful in knocking out the Soviet Union, it would leave occupation and reconstruction problems of such complexity as to make our present postwar problems look like child's play. And we would have sacrificed the respect and support of other nations. I do not believe this view can be seriously entertained by anyone who has given it thorough consideration.

Mr. SEVAREID. Mr. Jessup, there is time for a closing thought from you. Ambassador JESSUP. Let me say this. America is facing the most dangerous period in its history. It is of utmost importance that Americans see clearly who and what are responsible for the dangers we face. Above all, the force of world communism and its leaders-the men in the Kremlin-are responsible. They are the culprits.

When the interests of democratic nations clash with those of dictatorship, the dictator has what can be a strong advantage. He makes unilateral decisions. There is only one line, one authority, one national opinion in the Soviet Union. In preserving the very things we stand for, we in the United States must pursue a course which does not permit unity by decree. But when the American people face a fundamental challenge to their liberty, they pull together. Not at this point can we afford to be divided, to waste our energies in the recriminations among ourselves. If we are to win over the forces of slavery which are on the march today, we must be one Nation indivisible.

[State Department Press Release No. 139, February 21, 1951]

ADDRESS BY HON. PHILIP C. JESSUP, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE, AT UNION COLLEGE, SCHENECTADY, N. Y., ON FOUNDERS DAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1951

The current debates on American foreign policy are a good sign of the awakened popular interest in our international relations. It is no longer necessary, as it was 30 years ago, to try to persuade people that they should have an intense personal interest in such questions. In 1922, Elihu Root, who in addition to his many other distinctions was an honorary chancelor of Union College, wrote the inaugural article in Foreign Affairs. In that article he said:

"The control of foreign relations by modern democracies creates a new and pressing demand for popular education in international affairs * * * a selfrespecting democracy which undertakes to control the action of its government as a member of this community of nations, and wishes to respond fairly and fully, not only to the demands of its own interests, but to the moral obligations of a member of the community, is bound to try to understand this great and complicated subject so that it may act not upon prejudice and error but upon knowledge and understanding."

It would be fortunate if one could say that foreign policy is really very simple but that would not be true. Foreign policy has to cover the whole world which is full of complications. If we commonly used the expression "domestic policy" to describe everything the Government does in regard to agriculture, taxation, conservation, interstate commerce, defense, veterans' affairs, the mails, and the dozens of other governmental functions, we would find that domestic policy covered a less complicated bundle of problems than those which have to be met by our foreign policy. This is true because almost every subject which the Government deals with internally has its duplicate in the international field. As the President said in his state of the Union message on January 8, "the state of our Nation is in great part the state of our friends and allies throughout the world." Foreign policy actually also must cover relations with our enemies as well.

In the same article to which I have referred, Mr. Root, who had been Secretary of War, Secretary of State, and United States Senator, made some further wise comments which are pertinent today:

*

"There is one specially important result which should follow from such a popular understanding of foreign affairs. That is, a sense of public responsibility in speech and writing, or perhaps it would be better stated as a public sense of private responsibility for words used in discussing international affairs. It cannot, however, be expected that every individual in a great democracy will naturally practice restraint. Political demagogs will seek popularity by publie speeches full of insult to foreign countries, and yellow journals will seek to increase their circulation by appeals to prejudice against foreigners. Hitherto these have been passed over because the speakers and writers were regarded as irresponsible, but if the democracy of which the speakers and publishers are a part is to control international intercourse that irresponsibility ends, and it is the business of the democracy to see to it that practices by its members which lead directly toward war are discouraged and condemned.”

In the course of the current debates on foreign policy, there has appeared a line of argument which is no less dangerous because its authors have been unwilling to be perfectly frank. One development of this theme has received wide circulation through its publication in a weekly magazine. The comment is based on the following passage from the President's message on the state of the Union: "If we build our strength-and we are building it—the Soviet rulers may face the facts and lay aside their plans to take over the world. That is what we hope will happen, and that is what we are trying to bring about. That is the only realistic road to peace."

This statement by the President was part of a general exposition of the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union and of the contrasting policies of the United States. He outlined three points in our foreign policy.

The first covered the economic assistance program which we are carrying out in various countries. The President showed that this was one of the most effective ways to counter the typical Communist propaganda and their subversive techniques. He reminded us of the tremendous effect of the Marshall plan on the stabilization of the European countries. He pointed out the way in which our programs of economic development will help to meet the basic causes of human distress upon which Communist propaganda attempts to feed.

Secondly, he mentioned our military assistance to countries which want to defend themselves. Here he referred to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He referred to the courage and confidence inspired by the appointment of General Eisenhower. He pointed to the record of U. N. armed resistance to aggression in Korea and our general support for independent governments of Asia. In a later part of his speech he dwelt at length upon the essential need of our own great rearmament effort.

Thirdly, the President pointed out that our foreign policy-program includes our determination to continue to work for peaceful settlements of international disputes. He repeated our willingness to engage in negotiations with the Soviet Union as well as with anyone else. He repeated our fixed determination to avoid appeasement.

The attack upon this program is based upon a very different idea. This other idea is that the United States can save itself only by resorting to preventive war. This is the inescapable logic of the position even though the conclusion is hedged by saying that maybe war is inevitable and maybe it is not. This line of thinking is obviously based on the cowardly and defeatist attitude which thinks that the United States and the other countries of the free world have no strength whatever except the atomic bomb. It assumes that we are incapable of determina

organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the organization." It is perfectly clear that a state which is a member of the Security Council is obligated to be in a position at all times to take part in its work. This provision would have no meaning if in spite of having a representive at the seat of the organization the representative should have a right to refuse to attend the meetings. The Soviet Union has thus violated its obligations under the Charter by resorting to the tactics of "walking out."

Disregarding this question the Soviet Union argues that it nevertheless has the power to cripple the functioning of the Security Council because article 27 of the Charter says that decisions of the Security Council on substantive matters "shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members." Since the Soviet Union is a permanent member, it is argued that the absence of their concurring vote invalidates the action of the Council.

The history of the drafting of this article and of its application in practice leads to quite a different conclusion. The provision which I have just cited from article 27 about the concurring votes of the permanent members is, of course, the legal language describing the decision at the San Francisco Conference to give the permanent members a veto on substantive questions. The Charter is a constitutional document and like all constitutions, including that of the United States, the exact meaning of its words is developed by practice. One of the practices in the Security Council which has developed over the years is the practice of abstaining from voting on questions which are put to the vote. The Soviet Union, beginning in April 1948 abstained in four instances on Security Council resolutions dealing with Palestine. Beginning in January 1948, the Soviet Union abstained on four resolutions dealing with the Kashmir case. Beginning in December 1948, the Soviet Union abstained on two resolutions in the Indonesian case. In none of these 10 cases has the Soviet Union challenged the legality of the action taken by the Security Council. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has never questioned the legality of action taken by the Security Council in which it voted with the majority but on which other permanent members of the Council abstained. This has occurred in at least three instances. We thus already have over a dozen cases in which it has been established that the meaning of article 27 of the Charter is that, while the negative vote of a permanent member can defeat the substantive resolution, the failure of a permanent member to vote for a resolution does not defeat it. Clearly it can make no difference in terms of the application of the Charter on this point whether the representative of a permanent member sits at the table and abstains or whether he fails to come at all. The essential difference relates to the question of a member's sense of responsibility and willingness to discharge its obligations under the Charter. The Soviet Union had the legal power to attend the meeting of the Security Council and, by taking the responsibility before the world, to cast a veto to block Security Council action. It did not have the power to block action by staying away from the meeting in violation of its obligations under article 28.

The consideration of this part of the Soviet Union's argument would not be complete without mention of the excuse which the Soviet Government has given for its recent refusal to cooperate with the United Nations. The excuse is that a majority of the members have not accepted the Soviet view that the representative of the Chinese Communists should be seated as the representative of China. The position of the United States on this point has been frequently stated. Our position is that we are always ready to abide by the decision which is made by any one of the organs of the United Nations in accordance with the established procedures of that organ. We have never taken the position that we will disregard decisions merely because we do not agree with them. We have made it very clear that we do not believe that this question of deciding what representative is entitled to sit for his government is subject to the veto. We believe that under established rules this is a procedural question to which the veto does not apply. It is also necessary to recall that the Soviet tactics of resorting to a walkout in the United Nations has not been confined to the pretext of the issue of Chinese Communist representation. Mr. Gromyko resorted to the same tactics in the case of Iran in 1946; the effort was unsuccessful then as now. If the question is asked whether China was represented at the meetings of the Security Council on June 25 and 27, the answer is clearly “Yes.” The Security Council had considered the claim of the Soviet Union that the Chinese Government was not entitled to represent China, and it rejected this claim. Until this decision is changed by a

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