other political prisoners. These are the facts on the record which are known to the world and which reveal that the Soviet Government has no interest in supporting the Government of the Indonesian Republic or of restoring peace to Indonesia. On the contrary, it is following its familiar tactics which it has used in Korea, in Greece, and Berlin, and again now in Indonesia, and which have been described in the speeches of many delegates in the last session of the General Assembly; namely, seeking to overthrow a lawful democratic government and to undermine its authority. The Soviet Union does not want an independent Indonesia. It wants an Indonesia under the domination and control of a Communist minority taking its orders from Moscow. Anywhere in the world when a Communist government climbs in through the window, independence is kicked out of the door. "The Government of the United States on the contrary has viewed with admiration the efforts of the Indonesian people both in the Republic and elsewhere to gain their independence and has steadfastly sought to support them. It still takes that position and it is for this reason that it has taken the lead in endeavoring in the Security Council and in the Good Offices Committee to bring about a peaceful adjustment of the difficulties between the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands Government and to establish the United States of Indonesia as one of the fully sovereign and independent peoples of the world. IT'S 1776 IN INDONESIA "December 19, 1948, Holland invaded the Republic of Indonesia with a crushing, sneak attack like Japan's on Pearl Harbor, like Nazi Germany's on Holland itself. "The U. N. negotiated Renville agreement was trampled. Solemn international discussions were used as cover-up for weeks of Dutch preparation. "Holland, home of Kris Kringle and good cheer, timed its murder for Christmas. World leaders were conveniently dispersed. The U. N. General Assembly had adjourned. So had the United States Congress. "In Indonesia itself, the Dutch first cut off the U. N. delegation's telegraph lines, then notified it. Elaborate deceptions kept republicans off guard. "Then the Dutch struck without mercy or honor, but with American-manufactured planes, tanks, and guns. "The Netherlands lately and always has promised Indonesia independence in words, brutally suppressed it in fact. "The Renville agreement, January 17, 1948 "Promise: Free plebiscites within 6 months to a year in areas claimed by both sides; a constituent convention; an all-Indonesia legislature; voluntary DutchIndonesia union. On February 3, 1948, Queen Wilhelmina broadcast to the world: 'Colonialism is dead.' "Deed: All-out invasion on December 19, 1948; complete sea blockade of republican trade for 21⁄2 years, even on essential imports like medical supplies. "The Linggadjati agreement, March 1947 "Promise: A sovereign United States of Indionesia by January 1949; guaranty of Indonesian rights in interim period; voluntary Dutch-Indonesian union. "Deed: All-out invasion on July 20, 1947, stopped short of complete destruction of the Republic only by Security Council cease-fire order; refusal to implement agreement because of reinterpretation; sea blockade. "Postsurrender period, August 1945 "Promise: Constitutional reform; new era.. "Deed: Immediate mobilization of war-starved Dutch reservists for invasion service in Indonesia; dispatch of 120,000 troops over the next year or two. "Queen Wilhelmina's wartime pledge, December 6, 1942 "Promise: A postwar conference leading to 'a commonwealth in which the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam, and Curaçao will participate.' "Deed: Prewar refusal to train Indonesians militarily for their own defense; postwar use of armed force to restore Dutch power. "The direct Hitlerlike rupture of the Renville agreement is the most recent case in point. "Promise: The Renville agreement, January 17, 1948, reached through the U. N. Good Offices Committee, with especial United States encouragement, stipulated in particular: '(10) This agreement shall be considered binding unless one party notifies the Committee of Good Offices and the other party that it considers the truce regulations are not being observed by the other party and that this agreement should therefore be terminated.' "In general, it provided a military truce and a set of 18 political principles as a basis for final settlement. "Deed: The Dutch notified the Committee and the Republic of their December 19 invasion just as it began. Telegraph facilities of both were cut in advance, eliminating U. N. communications. "The Linggadjati agreement, March 1947, was likewise breached by a bloody, unheralded invasion during negotiations on its implementation. "Promise: After hysterical, false denunciation of the Republic as Japanesecreated, terror by Dutch forces and establishment of Dutch-controlled independent states outside the Republic had all failed to break it, the Dutch next tried negotiation. "The Lenggadjati agreement, which resulted, guaranteed Indonesian freedom, with something like dominion status. It also provided an interim period during which a mixed Dutch-Indonesian administration would prepare for the transfer of power. Furthermore, it gave formal Dutch recognition of the Republic as the de facto authority in Java, Sumatra, and Madura, the three main islands. "Deed: The agreement reached was 90 percent Dutch, but the Republic accepted it to facilitate a quick settlement. This was in June 1946. Republicans were assured Dutch ratification was a matter of a few days or weeks. Actually, it was March 1947 before Dutch signatures were affixed. The intervening months were occupied with Dutch obstruction and attempts to force new proposals on the Republic. "Both before and after signing, Holland repeatedly ignored the agreement, occupying major Republican cities, bringing in 120,000 troops, 30,000 more than previously agreed. Dutch interpretations of their commitments were so extensive that even after the signing, implementation was impossible. Negotiation continued. "At midnight July 20, 1947, while Republican leaders awaited reply to their latest formal communication, they were abruptly notified of suspension of the agreement. Simultaneously, full-scale war was launched. It ended only when the Security Council issued a cease-fire order some days later. "By that time, Holland had what it wanted most, the richest producing areas of the Republic. "Before, during, and just after the war, Holland volubly promised freedom, belied itself in action. "Promise: The famous Visman report of 1941 supposedly laid the technical base for it; Queen Wilhelmina's speech of December 1942, pledged it; Dutch utterances just after the surrender of Japan seemed to assume it. "Deed: The Visman report provided excuse for years of delay, while being made; Dutch administration and weakness left Indonesia defenseless before Japan. After the war, Holland left no effort undone to thwart, then destroy the universal vehicle of Indonesian independence-the Republic. "These infamies against 70,000,000 peaceful, long-suffering Indonesians--and against the United Nations-spring inevitably from the faithless Dutch repression of three centuries. "Dutch double talk notwithstanding, the cornerstone of all democracy, universal literacy, was effectively prevented. Funds were never assigned, teachers never developed for mass education. Pleading poverty in the world's richest colony, Dutchmen developed only specialized schools for Indonesian aristocrats' sons and daughters, who learned obedience along with their three R's and in higher education. “Mass organizations were unceasingly harassed. Nationalist leaders, including those who head the Republic today and many others who did not survive, were exiled for years at a time to remote swamps and jungles, often killed. "A nominal People's Council or Volksraad before the war was subject to the veto of both Governor General and the Dutch Parliament. Even then a high proportion of its members were appointed, not elected. And on top of that. those elected were chosen by a system of suffrage so indirect as to be meaningless. "Brutality like that of the Nazis at Lidice was meted out when the cup of slavery ran over and an uprising occurred. In 1926 whole districts of villages in Java were burned to the ground, the inhabitants murdered by fully equipped Dutch troops. In 1947 some 30,000 Indonesians were massacred in Macassar, Celebes. "Under its masquerade of paternalistic colonizer, Holland's program was extremely simple-self-enrichment. "Indonesia was a vast treasure house and workshop where 70,000,000 lived at subsistence level, their output streaming to the profit of a minority in Holland's 9,500,000 population: 15 percent of Holland's national income; $200,000,000 per year in straight profits (which made up annual Dutch foreign exchange deficit); $4,000,000,000 invested Dutch capital in Indonesia; the average income of a family of five Indonesians was 15 to 30 cents per day; 400,000 Dutch persons possessing a vested interest in Indonesia as a colony; complete Dutch monopoly of Indonesian trade, excluding the United States and others. QUESTIONS "1. Is our State Department engaged in international double talk? "2. Will the Dutch withdraw from the Atlantic Alliance? And what difference will it make if they do? And where will they go? "3. By our continuing to support the Dutch, are we not throwing all of Asia to Moscow? "4. If the Dutch have $4,000,000,000 in assets in Indonesia and are shutting out American business, why are we financing the Dutch at the rate of $500,000,000 a year? "5. Why has the President and the State Department attempted to kill the proposed Senate resolution? "6. Has the State Department been telling the Dutch to go ahead-privately, of course? "7. How long do we propose to pour American money into countries whose governments take actions that create the exact opposite of what our policy intends to accomplish? "S. Do we intend to support nineteenth century Dutch-British-French imperialism in Asia which will create a climate for the growth of communism? Or do we intend to support the moderate republican nationalists throughout Asia? "9. Does the United States intend to uphold the UN or not? "10. Does the Senate intend to take dictation from the executive department on all foreign-policy matters? Has the Senate relinquished its right to ask questions regarding our foreign spending policy?" TRANSCRIPT FROM INTERNAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE, SEPTEMBER 25, 1951 Senator EASTLAND. Now what about Indonesia? Were you satisfied with Professor Jessup's stand in the United Nations on the Dutch Government in Indonesia? Mr. COLEGROVE. I might say, in answer to that, that my whole attitude in this matter goes back some years and I was utterly surprised that Phil Jessup would accept the chairmanship of the board of trustees of the IPR. He is a great international jurist; that is his field. He had not made a reputation, not at that time, in the Far East. He had written no articles I know of and no books. He had made no special study. So the appointment of Professor Jessup as chairman of the IPR seemed to me at the time to be very peculiar, something extraordinary. Senator EASTLAND. Yes; but then it was extraordinary and in his attacks on the Dutch Government and Dutch imperialism in Indonesia he followed the Communist line? Mr. COLEGROVE. Yes; the Communist line for many years has been the destruction of the Dutch rule in Indonesia. Senator EASTLAND. Is it your judgment that he went beyond his instructions from the State Department to follow the Communist line in this instance? Mr. COLEGROVE. Well, it seemed to me that the speeches that Ambassador Jessup made to the Security Council in December 1948 and again in January 1949 against the Dutch Government were very unfair and were not the speeches that a scholar should make. There was a rumor around the State Department that Ambassador Jessup had exceeded his instructions in pressing the Security Council to take drastic action against the Dutch. I recall a dinner I had with Ambassador Jessup in February of 1949 at which I said to him that rumors had been to the effect that he had exceeded his instructions in the Indonesia affair. Phil Jessup, however, denied that had been the case and told me that he had not exceeded his instructions. Nevertheless the rumors persisted. Senator EASTLAND. He was following the Communist line? [Excerpt from the Congressional Record, April 6, 1949] Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I call up my amendment A, which I submitted some time ago, and which is on the desk. I offer it at this time, and ask that it be read. It deals with the termination of the allocation of funds to a foreign government which fails to comply with the orders or requests of the Security Council of the United Nations. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. At the proper place in the bill it is proposed to insert the following: "No funds authorized for the purpose of this act shall be allocated to or expended for any foreign government which fails to comply with the orders or requests of the Security Council of the United Nations until such times as the Administrator is advised, in writing, by the President of the Security Council that such compliance has been effected." Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, I now offer a substitute for that amendment, and I wish to explain briefly the occasion for it. Perhaps it will be in order now to send the proposed substitute to the desk and have it read. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The substitute for the amendment will be stated. The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. At the end of the bill it is proposed to insert the following new section: "SEC. 113. The second sentence of section 118 of such act is amended by inserting before the period at the end thereof: 'or (3) the provision of such assistance would be inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventative or enforcement action.'" Mr. BREWSTER. Mr. President, this substitute is a result of very considerable discussion of this matter by all concerned. As I understand, the substitute is acceptable in this form to the members of the Foreign Relations Committeeof course, they will state their own position-and to many other Senators who have been concerned. I should not want the substitute to be regarded as one which would completely accomplish the ends originally proposed to be accomplished by the amendment which I submitted in cooperation with several other Members of the Senate and as a result of discussions with many Members on both sides of the aisle, inasmuch as the amendment originally offered would definitely have cut off the aid now being extended and aid now proposed to be extended to the Netherlands Government, so long as they fail to comply with the orders or directives of the Security Council of the United Nations. Under the proposed substitute, that matter would be subject to the action hereafter of the Security Council in taking so-called preventative or enforcement action, which is the technical language of the Charter of the United Nations; and the substitute is perhaps, from a purely technical standpoint, more desirable on that account. The substitute amendment would fit in to the original ECA Act, known as the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, at page 20, in section 118, where there are provisions regarding the termination of assistance. That act says, in section 118, to which this substitute would be an amendment: "TERMINATION OF ASSISTANCE "SEC. 118. The Administrator, in determining the form and measure of assistance provided under this title to any participating country, shall take into account the extent to which such country is complying with its undertakings embodied in its pledges to other participating countries and in its agreement concluded with the United States under section 115. The Administrator shall terminate the provision of assistance under this title to any participating country whenever he determines that (1) such country is not adhering to its agreement concluded under section 115, or is diverting from the purposes of this title assistance provided hereunder, and that in the circumstances remedial action other than termination will not more effectively promote the purposes of this title; or (2) because of changed conditions, assistance is no longer consistent with the national interest of the United States." Mr. President, I may say that is of course a very broad limitation. The substitute however would add a third section, known as (3), which would provide that aid shall be terminated if "the provision of such assistance would be inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under the Charter of the United Nations to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventative or enforcement action." Of course, that would further tie in the European relief program with the Charter of the United Nations, which is altogether a desirable objective. However, the substitute would not altogether result in the immediate termination of aid, inasmuch as technically I believe the Security Council has not yet taken what may be termed enforcement action; and it is understood that the taking of enforcement action would be subject to the veto of the five major members of he United Nations Council, and that such veto might be interposed not only by the nation which frequently has interposed vetoes thus far-the Soviet Union, which is the nation which has most consistently used the veto—but also by one or another of the other major powers which, because they have colonial interests, have interests somewhat parallel with those of the Dutch in Indonesia. In fact, the French already have interposed one veto, and it might be that China, which has Asiatic interests peculiar to itself, might also be inclined to interpose a veto. I say this in justice to those who have been most desirous of immediately terminating aid in such cases, so that we may act with the full knowledge of the consequences. Nor am I impressed with the suggestion that the action we had proposed would be unilateral action, inasmuch as it seems to me that not only the action we here propose may come under that classification, since in certain instances it would result in the termination of aid by unilateral action by the United States in determining that the continuation of such aid was not in our interest, but we also have a precedent for this in the two clauses which I already have read, which are parts of the European Cooperation Act, and which provide for the termination of aid under certain circumstances. I am also impressed with the fact that we have taken unilateral action already in cuting off aid in the amount of $15,000,000 to Dutch Indonesia because of the conditions which prevail. Certainly we have taken unilateral action independently of the United Nations, in respect to our original action in Greece and Turkey. We were also more or less involved in unilateral action in Palestine. I think we must consider the entire Marshall plan as unilateral, in a sense, in that it is a plan proposed by us without regard to the necessary action of the United Nations. However, having said all that, I myself still have reached the conclusion-and I trust that it is shared by many others who are associated in advocating this solution that after taking all the factors into account, the cause which we have commonly in mind will best be advanced by accepting the compromise solution which has been proposed. It is for that reason that I am offering this amendment as a substitute. A part of the consideration which led me to that view was the fact that it seemed likely that the amendment in this form would have the almost complete support of the Senate; and I think that unanimous or almost unanimous action of that character would exercise a most beneficial influence not only on this situation but on others which might arise. Moreover, I think the fact that those with whom this matter was discussed, representing the point of view of those primarily responsible for the program, were ready to accept the proposition, the defeat of the amendment which had been originally proposed by the Senator from Maine would have very unfortunate consequences, in seeming to give a green light in many cases, with which, so far as I know, no Member of the Senate is in accord, with respect to the action of the Dutch in Indonesia. Finally, I was influenced also by the fact that many of those who share a very great concern as to the unfortunate consequences of the Dutch action in Indonesia, if it shall go unrebuked and uncorrected by the continuing inaction of the Security Council, would feel very strongly, to put it no more bluntly, that the Netherlands Government, if they still continue in violation, will present a major hurdle to the Senate and to the country in their subscribing to the so-called Atlantic Pact, when, as, and if that comes before the Senate for ratification. That consideration, hanging perhaps as a sword of Damocles over the situation, it seems to me should exercise a very persuasive influence. At least that was the feeling of many of those in the Senate who are earnestly interested in giving major support to the development of the prestige and influence of the United Nations and its Security Council. I pointed this out in my original discussion of the question when I read the language of the Atlantic Pact, which says very bluntly, in so many words-and I quote from article I of the pact : "The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat 89965-51-37 |